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Caracas, Venezuela, April 2011: Today I am meeting up with Miriam1 
again, the community worker from the state institution Fundacomunal. 
As I approach the curve connecting the neighborhoods of Casalta 2 and 
Casalta 3, I can see her sitting in a jeep from the Ministerio del Poder 
Popular para la Energía y Petróleo (Ministry of Popular Power for Energy 
and Petroleum). We greet each other with a kiss on the cheek, and she 
introduces me to the two men accompanying her: Juan Carlos from the 
state-owned company Electricidad de Caracas (Electricity of Caracas), and 
Nelson from the Ministry of Popular Power for Energy and Petroleum.
Together, they have an inspection scheduled in the barrio (shantytown 
neighborhood) El Nazareno. The President’s Office, which responds 
directly to President Hugo Chávez, has ordered the launch of Plan Zero 
Maraña (Plan Zero Spiderweb) in the entire Sucre parish, one of the larg-
est and poorest neighborhoods in Caracas. The plan is to inspect all the 
chaotic homemade electric and telephone pole connections—hence the 
name spider web—and come up with solutions to make sense of the chaos. 
The money to carry out the plan will come from the state oil company 
PDVSA,2 Nelson from the ministry confides with a smile. PDVSA has 
financed innumerable social projects since Chávez came to power in 1998.
Preface
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Photo 2 Inspection of electricity poles in el barrio of Nazareno. Photo by the 
author
 
Photo 1 Typical electricity pole in informal neighborhoods. Photo by the author
  ix PREFACE
A tiny middle-aged woman named Maria is waiting for us down by the 
entrance to the barrio El Nazareno. She is the spokesperson for the social 
controllership committee in her consejo communal (communal council), 
as the local community organization for popular participation is called. 
Maria has serious eyes and a wrinkled face marked by the sun. She greets 
us and points upward toward where we are heading: a dense mass of brick 
shantytown houses stacked one on top of the other as far as the eye can 
see. These are informal settlements dating decades back, built brick by 
brick by barrio inhabitants and connected by thousands of small alleys 
and stairways. Maria, who has already been involved in several local proj-
ects to improve housing and infrastructure, will be our guide through the 
neighborhood. She already knows Miriam well, as Miriam helped form the 
communal councils and develop projects within the community.
Photo 3 View from the barrio of el Nazareno toward Casalta 3 and Casalta 4. 
Photo by the author
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Already sweating in the morning sun, the five of us start to slowly climb 
up the steep stairs, joking about how the women in the barrios always have 
such nice buttocks due to their everyday involuntary exercise up these 
arduous hills. I have wanted to visit this barrio for a long time. I pass by it 
every day and it looks overwhelming and gigantic from the hill of Casalta 
3, where I currently live. It appears more like a mountain than a hill really, 
covered with tens of thousands of houses. I don’t even want to think 
about how early in the morning the inhabitants at the top have to get up 
in order to arrive at work on time.
Photo 4 The barrios of Casalta and la Silsa, seen from 23 de Enero. Photo by the 
author
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Nelson from the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum asks me if I know 
why these barrios developed. “Well, the development of an oil economy 
and the subsequent migration from the countryside,” I respond. He 
answers: “Well, yes that is one part of it, but the bottom line is capitalism, 
that is what happened. Capitalism is the bottom line of this.” We chat 
about the complex problems of the barrios and I ask him if he thinks they 
will be resolved. He answers: “Well, the problem is so profound that my 
generation will not see it resolved, but there is hope for the next genera-
tion.” We fall into silence and continue to climb slowly up the narrow 
concrete steps.
 Notes
 1. All names in this book are fictitious, unless they are cited in their capacity as 
public figures.
 2. PDVSA: Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.
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In the period between 1999 and 2013, the late president Hugo Chávez 
spearheaded a broad social and political transformation in Venezuela, fre-
quently referred to as the Bolivarian revolution. This concept took inspira-
tion from the nation’s great hero from the Wars of Independence, Simón 
Bolívar, whose ideas about national sovereignty and social justice also left 
him with a legacy as a great political thinker. At the heart of the Bolivarian 
revolution, or Bolivarian process as it is often referred to, was an upsurge 
of popular mobilization emerging from the country’s poor and previously 
marginalized majority. Through participatory social and political policies 
and legislation, and drawing on decades of grassroots mobilization, the 
urban shantytowns in particular were converted into a hotbed of social 
activism. This mobilization went in tandem with government-led attempts 
to reform the state institutions into being socially responsive and politi-
cally inclusive instruments for concretizing the Bolivarian revolution’s ide-
als of poder popular (popular power) and social inclusion.
When Chávez died from cancer in March 2013, the country’s poor 
poured into the streets crying. In the more prosperous neighborhoods 
however, the home of the country’s middle and upper class, celebra-
tory fireworks went up in the air and champagne bottles were popped. 
Venezuela under Chávez had in no way been a socially harmonious society. 
His entry into the presidential palace has caused a massive displacement 
of political, economic and cultural power. During the 40 years prior to 
Chávez’s 1998 electoral victory, the middle and upper classes had enjoyed 
a near hegemonic position in Venezuelan society, relegating the poor and 
2 
colored majority to a life of social marginalization and everyday hardships. 
With Chávez in the presidential palace, the poor took on a new role in 
Venezuelan society as the stewards of new social ideologies, cultural poli-
tics and political reforms. This turning of tables generated deep political 
polarization in Venezuelan society, mobilizing divisions along racial- and 
class-based social cleavages rooted in the country’s colonial history.
At An ImpAsse
Today, four years after Chávez’s death, Venezuela is far from fulfilling the 
ideals that the Bolivarian process harbored. The country is ravaged by 
economic hardships, and the political scene is characterized by a political 
stalemate between the Maduro government and the opposition who won 
a landslide victory in the elections to the National Assembly in December 
2015. This was their first electoral success since Chávez came to power 
17 years earlier. President Nicholas Maduro has record-low backing, and 
many social activists have become disillusioned and abandoned politics 
altogether. Others are struggling to gain new foothold for the Bolivarian 
process and to resist the oppositions’ bid to regain political, economic, cul-
tural and social power. That is, a new page has been turned in Venezuelan 
history, and the ambitious ideals of the Bolivarian revolution are seemingly 
left obsolete.
However, the fact that the Bolivarian revolution apparently has reached 
an impasse makes it even more compelling to try to understand what actu-
ally took place during its most intense period when Chávez was still alive. 
Indeed, for many years, Venezuela was the epicenter for the so-called left-
ist turn in Latin America, as well as a source of inspiration of so-called 
anti-imperialist and anti-globalization activists and movements across 
the world. The charismatic and always outspoken Chávez drew crowds 
of people to popular assemblies from Argentina to London, and he was 
the spider in the web for a growing number of Latin American govern-
ments who sought—to various degrees—to reverse the USA’s political 
and economic grip over the continent. Significantly, the Chávez govern-
ment regained control over the country’s semi-privatized oil-industry that 
for years had benefited foreign oil companies more than the majority of 
the Venezuelan population. This move, in combination with historically 
high oil prices, enabled the enactment of myriad of social policies that rap-
idly reduced the country’s poverty rates and inequality index. Venezuela’s 
poor and colored majority population embraced Chávez, who was the first 
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president in the country’s history with an impoverished background and 
black and indigenous heritage like themselves. In short, Venezuela was 
frequently referred to as evidence of the anti-globalization movement’s 
slogan “another world is possible,” challenging Francis Fukuyama’s well- 
known postulate about liberal democracy and capitalism as “the end of 
history” (Fukuyama 1992).
ComplICAtIng the pICture
However, this is evidently the short and simplified version of Venezuela 
during the Chávez years and not of much worth if we want to understand 
in depth the complexities and difficulties characterizing the unfolding of 
the Bolivarian revolution. Neither is it of much worth if we search for a 
more nuanced understanding of the Bolivarian revolution’s successes as 
well as difficulties—and how these came about. It is my belief that through 
exploring these questions we can achieve a fuller comprehension—also on 
a more theoretical level—of the difficulties inherent in processes aimed 
at fomenting deep social change and political transformations. This is a 
lesson that can be valuable for political struggles elsewhere and at other 
times.
Thus, this book tells a lot more complex tale, taking as a point of 
departure a broad analysis of social and political change in Venezuela seen 
from the point of view of the barrios (shantytowns) of Caracas where 
the majority of Chávez´s supporters were found.1 By exploring political 
history and social life in the barrios, local arenas for political activism as 
well as the relationship between barrio communities and the Venezuelan 
state under Chávez, I will argue that the popular sectors2 under Chávez’s 
passed through a significant transformation. In simple terms, they moved 
from a state of historical marginalization to feeling part of a project of 
social development and nation-building. However, the processes taking 
place in Venezuela also brought out in stark relief the challenges in alter-
ing social relationships, political dynamics and cultural imageries in accor-
dance with the ideology of radical social transformation that the Chávez 
government, and many of its supporters, articulated. Through in-depth 
explorations of people’s hopes, aspirations and actions, this book shows 
how the Bolivarian process was in essence a struggle over attempts to cre-
ate new moral economies, new cultural values and new forms for social 
and political life. Indeed, to social activists in the Venezuelan shantytowns, 
“the Bolivarian revolution” or “Socialism for the twenty-first century,”3 as 
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it later also was called, were not abstract slogans. Rather, they represented 
a day-to-day lived experience, filled with joy, frustrations, setbacks and 
victories, as people were trying to change themselves, their immediate life 
worlds as well as their society more broadly.
In the midst of this struggle was an attempt to transform the Venezuelan 
state from below, into a more just, socially responsive and democratic 
entity. However, the ethnographic explorations offered in this book illus-
trate the intrinsic difficulties in fomenting changes at the level of the state. 
It shows how the everyday politics, ingrained practices as well as ideas 
associated with the “old” Venezuelan state were challenged, negotiated 
and reproduced in the midst of a process of radical political reform, and 
how these dynamics brought up deep tensions and contradictions in the 
midst of the Bolivarian process. Seen together, these analyses will provide 
a vivid imagery of the interplay between what social scientists favor to 
call “structure” and “agency”; the historico-cultural legacies and socio- 
political structures conditioning the Bolivarian process’s possibilities and 
limitations, as well as the multiple and differently socially situated actors 
that shaped its everyday and long-term dynamics.
A revolutIonAry stAte
Much has been said and written about the relationship between Chávez 
and his supporters. Frequently depicted as a charismatic populist4 in 
the mainstream media, the underlying script indicated that people were 
seduced by his charisma and style. Another frequent subtext is that the 
poor were “bought” by generous government programs targeted toward 
underprivileged communities. In this book I aim to show that both of 
these postulates are superficial at best, failing to respect not only poor 
people’s political agency, but also the variety of personal motivations for 
supporting Chávez found among his supporters. If we fail to take into 
account the long history of popular protests and contestations emerg-
ing from the popular sectors as well as the political narratives and collec-
tive memories shaping a “Bolivarian” ideology and political agency from 
below, we do not achieve a proper understanding of the historical origins 
of, and dynamics within, the Bolivarian revolution.
Throughout this book I will place everyday political action in the bar-
rios in a broader social, political and historical context, and argue that the 
convergence between political agency and ideology from the grassroots 
and the political project of the Chávez government opened up a  political 
space which I have chosen to call a Bolivarian space. The Bolivarian space 
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is the complex conundrum of political discourses, practices, policies, his-
torical narratives and ideological templates that shaped the interaction 
between the state and the popular grassroots in Venezuela under the 
Chávez government. This was not a top-down process whereby Chávez 
univocally imposed a political idea from above. Rather, it was a flow of 
multi-directional processes that were shaped by popular efforts to appro-
priate the political space opened up by the Chávez government’s pro-poor 
political alignment. While the popular sector grassroots did have both an 
affective and political rapport with the Chávez government, they were 
well aware that their struggle went beyond having a sympathetic govern-
ment in power. The popular grassroots’ struggle was both a political and 
a socio-cultural one, challenging a legacy of centuries of accumulated 
inequalities and exclusion, as well as a historical state formation that posed 
severe obstacles not only for popular sector activism, but also for the gov-
ernment’s efforts to enact political reform from above. In that process, the 
popular sectors took a stance that might be termed “strategic ambiguity” 
in the words of Aymaran scholar Pablo Mamani (Fernandes 2010:28). 
“Strategic ambiguity” refers to the manner in which social movements are:
identifying themselves as a part of the state in order to highlight the new 
form of access and inclusion they have opened up, but maintaining a sense 
of their autonomy to be able to put pressure on the state when necessary. 
(Fernandes 2010:28)
As I will show, popular political mobilization drew on a long history 
of struggle, and was fused with new narratives and practices as people 
became identified with the Bolivarian revolution and entangled into the 
government’s project of social development and nation-building. This 
relationship constituted in many respects a new model of dignity (Gledhill 
2000:27), whereby poverty and marginalization was converted into 
a source of collective identity formation and political agency instead of 
being associated with shame and social stigma.
the lens of oIl
Over the past years, a handful of ethnographically oriented books have come 
out that focuses on popular politics emerging from Venezuela’s grassroots 
movements in the Chávez era (Fernandes 2010;  Ciccariello- Maher 2013; 
Valencia 2015). While this book complements and expands on the insights 
emerging from these books, my analytical scope does not stop there. 
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Throughout, I will frame my analysis of the dynamic relationship between 
barrio communities and the Venezuelan state through a very particular 
perspective: one that seeks to understand the everyday unfolding of the 
Bolivarian process through the lens of oil. The epigraph above, recount-
ing my barrio-inspection together with Miriam, Nelson, Juan Carlos and 
Maria, points to the salience of oil-fuelled capitalism as an entry point into 
the nation’s historical development, self-understanding, as well as state 
policies in the Chávez era. Venezuela, currently the world’s fifth largest 
oil exporter, has been characterized as a petro-state par excellence (Karl 
1997). The country found oil in 1914, long before formal democracy was 
installed, and by the end of the 1920s, it was the largest oil exporter in the 
world. Rivers of ink have been spent on explaining oil’s political and eco-
nomic effects and consequences (Mommer 1996, 2004; Karl 1997; Pérez 
Alfonzo 2011 [1976]), yet the nation’s history as a petro-state has yet not 
been explored in relation with an analysis of the social and political pro-
cesses taking place in Venezuela’s barrios and within its state institutions 
during the Chávez years. This is precisely what this book sets out to do.
the revolutIonAry petro-stAte
One might ask: what has grassroots mobilization and social policy reform 
to do with oil? The answer is: if one looks closely enough, a lot of things. 
The first book that I read about Venezuela before I embarked on my first 
research trip to Venezuela in 2005 was the late Fernando Coronil’s semi-
nal work The Magical State. Nature, Money and Modernity in Venezuela 
(1997). Here, the Venezuelan-American historian and anthropologist 
seeks to bring together not only how oil rents shaped Venezuelan state for-
mations, but also how the conceptualization of the relationship between 
the state, society and nature shaped social relationships and political 
dynamics. The title of the book, The Magical State, reflects the idea of the 
Venezuelan state as seen by its citizens, a state capable of doing great things 
and transforming the nation through appropriating and putting to use oil 
rents gushing up from beneath. In one of his key passages, Coronil writes:
I argue that the deification of the state took place as a part of the transformation 
of Venezuela into an oil nation. As an oil nation, Venezuela was seen as having 
two bodies, a political body made up from its citizens, and a natural body made 
up from its rich subsoil. By condensing within itself the multiple powers dis-
persed throughout the nation’s two bodies, the state appeared as a single agent 
endowed with the magical power to remake the nation. (Coronil 1997:4)
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In his account, Coronil weaves together an analysis of how Venezuelan 
citizens “saw” the Venezuelan state, personified by its magician-like poli-
ticians, with an analysis of how this imagery and the Venezuelan state’s 
projection of itself was crafted by Venezuela’s subjugated position within 
global hierarchies of power.5 Coronil invites the reader into a labyrinthine 
journey through Venezuela’s political economy, political affairs, public 
scandals and spectacles of power, ultimately showing how the imagery of 
the grandiose Venezuelan state, both in its material and symbolic form, 
slowly imploded throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
the AbsenCe of the subAlterns
“The Magical State” is a story told from “the highest centres of polit-
ical power” (Coronil 1997:15). It is a tale about the spectacles of the 
Venezuelan elites at different historical conjunctures, and not so much 
about how this idea of the state was absorbed and interpreted by “the 
masses.” Coronil himself was aware of this, acknowledging that writing 
from “the spheres of power” engenders the risk of excluding the subor-
dinated sectors from view, converting them into “shadowy figures in the 
background” (Coronil 1997:15). This in turn, he argues, “unwittingly 
tends to reinscribe the arrogant view from above and reproduce its self- 
proclaimed universality and fundamental disregard for the lives and forms 
of knowledge of subaltern subjects” (Coronil 1997:16). Although he 
wanted to weave subaltern perspectives into his account, they are never-
theless absent in his text. To the extent that they are present, it is in the 
form of a shared relation of subordination together with the rest of the 
Venezuelan nation as mirrored through hegemonic notions of modernity 
and development emanating from the Global North. However, the poor’s 
voices and lives aren’t heard or seen, and it remains opaque how subaltern 
lives were actually lived in the shadows of the oil-fuelled spectacles at the 
top.
petroleum And people
Coronil’s account ends in 1997, one year before Chávez gained power. 
Throughout my years of engagement with Venezuela, his work has lin-
gered in the back of my mind, haunting me with the question: how is the 
Venezuelan oil state imagined and encountered from the poor’s points of 
view? This book explores this question through examining people’s mem-
ories from and experiences living on the margins of the twentieth-century 
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Venezuelan oil state that Coronil analyzed. At the same time, it extends 
this line of thought through inquiring into how the imagery and socio- 
political architecture of the Venezuelan oil state shaped the Bolivarian pro-
cesses in the Chávez era. Thus, this book is inspired by Coronil’s deep 
insights into Venezuelan society, while at the same time I locate my analy-
sis in a different ethnographic space, context and temporality.
There is a growing body of literature on the cultural, epistemic and 
material dimensions of oil, seemingly inspired not only by an acute aware-
ness of how our lives are both materially and viscerally saturated and shaped 
by oil in the age of capitalist modernity, but also of the looming threat, 
or even mass-destruction, that oil’s omnipresence appears to harbor. The 
current renewed interest in oil is considered a “third” wave of oil- and 
energy scholarship within anthropology (Rogers 2015:366). Challenging 
the political-science-dominated concept of “the resource curse” (Sachs 
and Warner 1995, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2000, 2005; Rosser 
2006), anthropological approaches favor to explore and theorize how 
oil itself as well as the industries that extract it and put it into circula-
tion “enter social, cultural, political, and economic relationships” (Rogers 
2015:370–371).
This book aligns itself with this line of thinking, through adapting a 
perspective that sees oil wealth as a formative agent of multiple and inter-
linked aspects of Venezuelan society (Coronil 1997; Tinker Salas 2009). 
However, my analytical scope is conditioned by the ethnographic field 
that I am concerned with. Thus, I am not striving for an analysis of the oil 
economy per se. Rather, I am focusing on how Venezuelan social, cultural 
and political formations—such as its political system, state apparatus, class 
relations, urbanization processes and national identities—were shaped by 
the country’s history as a petro-state, and how these formations were chal-
lenged, transformed and fought over during the Chávez era. Moreover, 
I do not seek to establish a stringent analysis of how exactly oil wealth 
entered and circulated in the political and social system during the Chávez 
era, but to better understand the multi-faceted ways in which oil wealth 
gained salience as a material resource, a social property and a cultural 
imagery.
My analytical purpose for coining the concept “lens of oil” is there-
fore to tease out oil wealth’s multiple properties as it enters social rela-
tions, while also underlining how its social dimensions are intertwined 
with its structural embeddedness in local and global political economies. 
Logan and McNeish (2012) argue that we need to do a “qualitative 
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analysis of the interface between the political dynamics of global capital-
ism, on the one hand, and local processes of value formation, person-
hood, histories and relationships to resources, on the other” (Logan and 
McNeish 2012:30). Taking cue from these insights, this book is guided 
by a curiosity to explore the effects of oil in a place that was first margin-
alized from, and then brought into the center of the Venezuelan petro- 
state, that is, the barrios. Concurrently, I locate this ethnography within a 
broader analysis of how Venezuela was shaped as an oil state and oil society 
through the confluences of local and global processes. In doing so, I am 
also thinking through the continuities as well as transformations charac-
terizing Venezuela’s history with oil in both its structural and imaginative 
dimension.
KnowIng oIl
To that end, this book will take you through a critical reading of 
Venezuela’s historical formation as a petro-state, followed by an analysis 
of how the lives and identities of the poor were shaped in the shadows of 
the oil-fuelled Venezuelan state in the latter part of the twentieth century. 
I will show how this particular dimension of Venezuela’s socio-political 
history was constitutive of how class identities and political imaginaries 
were formed, and ultimately a catalyst for enabling Chávez’s rise to power 
and shaping the Bolivarian process’ imaginary horizon. Concurrently, I 
will turn my attention to how the Venezuelan poor came “to know oil” 
(Rogers 2015:374) through social policies and participatory politics, mak-
ing poor people feel that they were finally granted “their drop of oil.”
At a material level, poverty alleviation and increased welfare during 
the Chávez era was boosted by the government’s decision to spend large 
chunks of the country’s oil wealth on pro-poor policies. In that sense, the 
ethnographic analysis provides for an exploration of participative models 
for redistribution and collective consumption in the context of  particular 
political-economic conjuncture in an oil-rich state. But this mode of gov-
ernment spending also gained a deeper meaning. On the backdrop of peo-
ple’s historical memories of being negated a share in the nation’s riches, 
social spending also became a symbolic vector for the reformulation and 
enactment of ideas of popular power, community, nationhood, citizen-
ship, social justice and political subjectivities.
However, I will also show how oil resources, transformed into money, 
became a key social signifier for the inherent difficulties in concretizing 
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the ideals embodied in the Bolivarian revolution. Through focusing on 
imageries of consumption, individualism, corruption and greed, and the 
ways in which these were mediated through everyday political practices, 
I aim to tease out an underlying script of the ills and immoralities associ-
ated with Venezuela’s history of extractive capitalism. Seen as a whole, this 
analysis illustrates how both the materiality and the imagery of oil have 
historically been ingrained into Venezuela’s social, cultural and political 
body, and how this legacy informed, in very concrete ways, the everyday 
unfolding of grassroots politics and social policy in the Venezuelan barrios.
Ultimately, I argue, it is paramount to understanding this legacy, in its 
various dimensions, if we want to get a proper grasp of the challenges of 
concretizing the Bolivarian process’ goal of deep political transformation 
through bottom-up participatory politics. Indeed, the key intervention in 
this book is that the confluence between Bolivarian ideals and politics on 
the one hand, and the social practices, cultural ideas and political dynamics 
inherited from the pre-Bolivarian era on the other hand, created deep ten-
sions and hindrances for the unfolding of the goals of the Bolivarian pro-
cess. Such a historicized bottom-up perspective on the “thick” processes 
shaping day-to-day dynamics within and outside formal political arenas 
are indispensable correctives to simplistic interpretations and characteriza-
tions of the Bolivarian process frequently circulating both in the global 
press and in the academic community.
everydAy stAte-mAKIng
Scholars have increasingly turned their attention to how political struggles 
are grounded in everyday actions—lo cotidiano—in people’s face-to-face 
interactions in their local spaces: markets, workplaces, neighborhoods 
and local social movements, and in their everyday encounters with state 
bureaucracy and political representatives (Nuijten 2003; Lazar 2008; 
Fernandes 2010). One of the anthropological novelties in studies of the 
state has exactly been to treat everyday practices as state-making in prac-
tice. Through numerous and seemingly mundane encounters, the state 
both manifests itself and naturalizes its presence and power, while the 
population simultaneously comes to learn, feel, comprehend and imag-
ine what the state is. Because it is given for granted and removed from 
the political realm, everyday bureaucratic proceedings that every citizen 
must engage in—in one way or the other—are powerful windows into the 
naturalized and almost inescapable presence and effect of the state—and 
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thus its power—in people’s lives (see Foucault 1991; Gupta 1995; Blom 
Hansen and Stepputat 2001).
However, in this book, I will argue that community activists in Caracas 
to a large degree conceived of everyday encounters with the state as “state 
making in practice.” Community politics constituted a series of negotiated 
encounters between popular sectors and state actors where people pushed 
and tested the resilience of a historically adversary state power, trying to 
shape a new state form responding to the ethos of poder popular (popular 
power) as articulated within the Bolivarian discourse. Often state bureau-
cracy was unresponsive and occasionally hostile, effectively opposing the 
creation of a state at the service of its citizens and subordinate to popular 
sovereignty. As I will show, las instituciones (the institutions) and la buro-
cracia (the bureaucracy) constituted multi-layered templates embodying 
not only a historicized notion of the “degeneration of the state” during 
the political era prior to Chávez—often referred to as Puntofijismo or the 
Fourth Republic6—but also a complex understanding of the internal inco-
herence and personalized rules of power permeating state bureaucracy. 
This emic perception of the state apparatus reflects the historical socio- 
political formation of the Venezuelan state and its various language of 
stateness (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2001), providing both an obstacle 
and an opportunity for the popular sectors to carve out a space for them-
selves. In order to tease out these dimensions of both state transformation 
and state stasis, I will focus on the everyday encounters between popular 
sector activists and public officials, as well as the mundane activities in the 
barrios and the ways in which these were constituted as ways of assuming 
popular power. Drawing on Scott (1999), I will explore how the knowl-
edges of the state and the knowledges of the grassroots were negotiated 
in everyday encounters, constituting a focal site for carving out a space 
for popular power within the languages of the state (Blom Hansen and 
Stepputat 2001)—and in extension of transforming the state itself.
However, I will suggest that just as much as local struggles were con-
cretely grounded in claims to material vindication and political recogni-
tion, they can also be interpreted as attempts to find a new sense of moral 
community—a locally grounded form of ethical life (Lambek 2011). In 
his analysis of the Chávez government, Escobar suggests that:
Besides the policy level, it would be important to investigate the extent to 
which the processes under way have changed those imaginaries, represen-
tations, and desires of the population that became more deeply ingrained 
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than ever during the neo-liberal decades—e.g. ideologies of individualism, 
consumerism, the “marketization” of citizenship and so forth. (Escobar 
2010:9)
As I will demonstrate, the contradictory tensions that Escobar refers to 
played out on the arenas for social and political mobilization as an ethos 
toward re-founding the “collective” through community activism and 
participatory politics; an ethos that often clashed with social inclinations 
privileging individual gains and ambitions.
These locally enacted struggles formed part of a broader calling for cre-
ating a new Bolivarian society, drawing on a repertoire of contested imag-
eries of the Venezuelan state at different historical conjunctures. People 
conceptualized both individual and collective action within the realm of 
the Bolivarian space as part of a deeper process of social transformation. 
Thus, people “lived” state-making through their everyday actions, which 
is, I will argue, part of the explanation of why the Bolivarian revolution 
attained such enormous affective and political appeal among the poor.
CApturIng reAlItIes
The scholarly community is deeply divided over how to characterize 
Chávez’s time in government. While some argue that he presided over 
an authoritarian and undemocratic regime, others argue that he democ-
ratized Venezuelan society through expanding democratic participation 
and incorporating new social groups into the political domain. Roughly 
speaking, these divisions reflect disagreements between those who deploy 
a formal procedural model for liberal democracy as their yardstick (e.g., 
see McCoy and Myers 2004; Corrales and Penfold 2011), and those who 
argue that Chávez inspired a form of radical democracy that has to be 
assessed sui generis (see Ellner 2010; Smilde and Hellinger 2011; Azzelini 
2013; Ciccariello-Maher 2016). Though this book is not concerned with 
judging how the Chávez government fared with regards to either of these 
models per se, my analytical approach concurs with the latter position. 
Overall, it will be clear that I do not find it analytically meaningful for the 
purpose of my ethnographic focus to apply pre-defined and frequently 
Euro-centric and elitist models and concepts onto complex realities defy-
ing simplistic assessments. Rather, I offer an historicized and contextual-
ized analysis of the Bolivarian process through unpacking how political 
dynamics, state–society relations and social life in the Chávez era was 
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shaped in the intersection between the country’s historical legacy and 
emerging and evolving social, political and cultural formations.
Moreover, my long-term ethnographic experience in the field allows 
me to ground my analysis in a view on Venezuelan society “from below.” 
As Lindisfarne notes: “Because anthropology pays attention to the lives of 
ordinary people, they see society from below. From there, power and priv-
ilege stand out in sharp relief” (Lindisfarne 2008:23, cited in Armbruster 
and Lærke 2008). In alignment with this assertion, this book is concerned 
with tracing the various ways in which different forms of power—be it 
epistemological, political, crude or structural—have shaped life in the 
Venezuelan barrios both in the past and in the present, and the creative 
and multi-faceted ways of resistance and contestation this has engendered. 
Concurrently, I seek to carve out a broad and complex understanding 
of processes of change and political struggle under the Chávez govern-
ment, as experienced and conceptualized by the urban popular sectors in 
Caracas.
lIfe In the bArrIo
By now, the reader should have a fair idea about the analytical scope and 
ambition of this book. Hence, it is time to properly introduce the ethno-
graphic field in which these analytical explorations are located in. Allow 
me to present a snapshot of a random but representative barrio in western 
Caracas:
* * *
You get off the crowded camioneta (small bus), decorated with plastic 
saints, plastic flowers and painted stencils, filled with school children, 
mothers holding their babies, housewives carrying grocery bags, white- 
collar workers dressed in neatly ironed shirts, youngsters listening to music 
from their telephone, the rest of us forced to listen to whatever salsa, 
 reggaeton or hip-hop tune the driver prefers. The camioneta has taken us 
from the main street, where we lined up waiting for the buses to fill and 
take off, up through the winding, potholed main road passing through 
various barrio neighborhoods, interspersed with some lower middle-class 
residential buildings.
Here in the Venezuelan barrios you find all the people who keep the 
wheels in Venezuelan society going; the brick-layers, the hairdressers, the 
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waiters, the electricians, the cooks, the cleaners, the gardeners, the bus 
drivers, the taxi drivers, the construction workers, the shop attendants, 
the secretaries, the nannies, the informal vendors; indeed, the entire pro-
letariat as well as precariat. You also find many lower-level government 
employees, bank clerks, teachers, nurses, police, soldiers, and not in the 
least, housewives who shoulder much of society’s high costs for social and 
household reproduction.
On both sides of the road there are sprawling barrio houses built on 
top of each other, packed so closely together that it is almost impossible to 
distinguish one construction from the other. Some of them are half-built 
or abandoned—perhaps those who built them ran out of money or found 
luck somewhere else.7 Some of them have home-painted signs hanging on 
the wall announcing se vende (for sale). Others have a poster of Chávez 
hanging in the window facing the road. Here and there, some provision-
ally built stairways or passages lead into the barrio, continuing up the hill. 
It is impossible to see how far up the community goes, as the buildings 
along the road, often reaching three or four stories, block the view. All you 
see is an impressive organic mass defying gravity. Most of the houses have 
grids in front of their open window frames, where laundry is left to dry.
Along the road, on the ground floor, various bodegas (small shops) are 
selling everyday basics—candy, sodas and juice, mobile telephone refill 
cards, canned tuna, single rolls of toilet paper. The bodegas mostly have 
a grid between the customer and the vendor, and most shops have a sign 
outside saying something like no se fia (no credit). Often, friends and 
neighbors hang out outside gossiping with the shop owner.
The roadside is dotted by outdoor garages, where greasy men with bare 
chests are repairing crumbling cars that have been repaired hundred times 
before. These men are more likely than others to whistle at girls passing 
by or to make indecent comments. On weekends, they often have a beer 
while working, and younger boys hang around getting introduced to the 
men’s world. The sidewalks along the streets are often falling apart, suf-
fering from a lack of maintenance and frequent remakings because pipe 
systems need to be repaired or extended, or new families try to tap into 
them. Plastic tables frequently line the sidewalks, offering mobile phones 
for rent, charging by the minute. These stalls also sell chewing gum, candy 
and single cigarettes, and sometimes home-baked cakes wrapped in plas-
tic. Or, alternatively, pirated DVDs or lottery tickets.
It is often young girls working at these stalls, text-messaging friends, 
boyfriends and potential boyfriends, picking at their neatly painted acrylic 
nails, chatting and gossiping with friends and neighbors. Their hair, 
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clothes and makeup are immaculate. Venezuela is renowned for its women, 
though the women who win Miss Universe and Miss World are upper-class 
women of European descent who have spent years in beauty schools and 
a fortune on plastic surgery. The girls in the barrios are shorter, darker 
and with more curves, radiating a street-smart air and awareness of their 
body—a result of having grown up in a society where little girls are social-
ized into becoming sexual objects before they have even started primary 
school.8 Many of the barrio girls become pregnant while still in their ado-
lescence. They carry their “adorned” babies on the bus, on the metro, and 
through barrio streets looking like what they are: a child carrying a child. 
The father may be the skinny local teenage boy who hangs out at the cor-
ner, mobile phone in hand, expensive sporting clothes, watching the girls 
from a distance, a true “street corner society” with complex social rules 
and crushing demands for upholding masculine pride. In the evenings, 
weekends or holidays, the boys might be drinking beer, or collectively 
repairing an old car or a motorbike.
The neighborhood’s skinny alcoholics, crack addicts and near-crazy 
people hang out on the corner as well, or perhaps sit on the ground next 
to an electricity pole. They greet passersby and are as much a part of street 
life as anyone else, feeding their habits and otherwise surviving by taking 
small jobs in the neighborhood, like carrying bags of sand for cement, gas 
tanks, or bricks, or basically any small job that can be found.
Housewives and the elderly also walk along the narrow sidewalk, quickly 
picking up something from the bodega and stopping for a chat, sometimes 
dressed in nightgowns or comfortable clothes. There may be children 
accompanying them or they might have a child in their arms. In general, 
there are children everywhere, quickly passing by in their black- and- blue 
school uniform, or hanging out in the street with a parent who has a busi-
ness close by, or on their own, socialized to the adults’ world all too early. 
The way they talk, how they move, how they carry their body, their eyes—
it all reveals that their innocence is long gone, if it ever was there.
Street dogs, also part of the urban landscape, roam through the gar-
bage, sad-looking mixed breeds, often with a limp, a cut, or half an ear 
torn off after surviving a dog-eats-dog fight. Pieces of garbage and litter 
are everywhere—paper, plastic cans, empty soda bottles, empty bags of 
fries and candy, half-eaten food. Once in a while a community brigade 
cleans the open sewers, the pavements, the sidewalks, the hillside, which 
invariably become littered again soon. The smell of garbage mixes with the 
smell of sewage, urine, gasoline, dust and food, creating a greasy air that 
covers your skin with a thin, black film.
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Along the road is a basketball field, set up by the communal coun-
cil, where the local boys shout, listen to music and play basketball while 
looking at girls walking by or gossiping with some of them. Girls often 
hang around the basketball field in groups, alternating between posing 
for and quarreling with the boys in teenager’s way. These girls will often 
be talked about by their neighbors. Their reputation can easily be tar-
nished even before they appear with a growing belly. There is probably a 
Barrio Adentro module along the main street—the characteristic octago-
nal Cuban medical station, with an office on the first floor and the doctor’s 
apartment on the second. A hand-written note announces its opening 
hours. A lot of hand-written notes are also pegged to the walls of private 
homes, selling cakes, yogurt, vegetables, cigarettes, gelatin, or offering 
nail, hair or makeup services, repair of domestic items or whatever other 
entrepreneurial activities its residents have come up with to make some 
extra money.
By eight or nine o’clock at the latest, most barrio streets start becoming 
more and more deserted. Violence and insecurity have caused most “ordi-
nary people” to stay inside their homes late in the evening and at night, 
unless they have to come home late from work. This has led to less “ordi-
nary people” mingling in the street, and turning public and common spaces 
into areas considered even more unsafe. Imagined or not, the streets are 
considered the unruly and hazardous realm of el hampa (the street delin-
quents) at night. Fenced off by locks and metal grids, people gather in their 
small ranchos (barrio homes) and apartments, eating a late evening dinner 
or snack, talking, and watching TV. Except for the occasional barking dog, 
gunshot, noisy muffler or muffled music, the barrios are surprisingly silent 
at night during weekdays. Its inhabitants have a long and exhausting day of 
work, studies and household chores waiting for them the next day.
* * *
unbounded bArrIos
This snapshot serves as an introduction to the barrios of Caracas, my site 
of ethnographic research during the past 12 years. Since 2005, I have 
gone back and forth to Venezuela eight times, spending altogether almost 
two years in the country. For the most part I have been living in either the 
parish of 23 de Enero or in the hilltop barrio of Casalta 3 above the com-
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mercial- and residential hub known as Propatria. In many ways Venezuela 
has become my second homeland: in the course of these years, I married 
a Venezuelan, got an extended family-in-law spread across Caracas and 
indeed Venezuela, and gave birth to a daughter that is half-Venezuelan.
During the field visits when I lived in 23 de Enero, I rented a small 
room in an apartment close to the metro station known as Agua Salud. 
Here, I shared a flat with Ernesto, a journalist and revolutionary native 
of 23 de Enero in his early 60s, his blind poodle Beethoven, and his cat 
Amarilla (and later her four, non-toilet-trained kittens). Later, I moved to 
Casalta 3, where I lived with my extended family-in-law in a large, typical 
barrio dwelling that had been constructed and gradually expanded over 
the last 40 years as the family grew.
These different living arrangements provided me with a broad plat-
form for getting to know Venezuela’s barrios from the inside. Living 
with Ernesto was an invaluable inroad into getting to know people in 
23 de Enero, and I learned a lot from his stories about the community’s 
Photo 1.1 The parish of 23 de Enero. Photo by the author
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history—and his engagement with it—for the past 60 years. Moving to 
Casalta 3, however, gave me a contrasting experience to that from 23 
de Enero, which is a very emblematic barrio with a set of very particu-
lar characteristics. The area surrounding Propatria had a different social 
and demographic profile and a different social and political history, and 
gave me new insights into the heterogeneity—yet also similarities—that 
exists between different barrios. Second, living with an extended family 
also provided a space for me to get to know Venezuela much more from 
“the inside,” providing me with detailed knowledge of social life, family 
dynamics, and the nitty-gritty details of everyday practicalities.
However, throughout all my field visits, I have been regularly visiting 
and traveling to other barrios in western Caracas. The purpose of this 
methodology was that I didn’t want to confine myself to one barrio com-
Photo 1.2 Some of the famous superbloques (apartment buildings) of 23 de 
Enero with the barrio la Pastora and the mountain ridge Ávila in the background. 
Photo by the author
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munity. As you settle in a barrio community, you become acquainted with 
people who want to bring you to their area and to attend events or meet-
ings in other parts of the city. Community activism fomented new and 
very fluid social networks and meeting arenas both within and among 
barrios. Thus, drawing an analytical circle around “my community” would 
have been both limiting and reifying. As Fernandes also notes in her study 
of social movements in western Caracas: “As I moved among the barrios 
of Caracas, I realized that these worlds within the shantytowns were an 
interconnected whole, and selecting one research site would be an artifi-
cial enterprise” (Fernandes 2010:30).
Moreover, my quest for understanding the Bolivarian process as a 
dynamic interaction between shantytown communities and the state in 
a broader perspective also required that I explored political change and 
social transformations beyond the socio-territorial confines of the barrios. 
To that end, I went to all sorts of public and political events and venues. 
I participated in mass gatherings with Chávez and military parades, sat in 
on committee meetings of the National Assembly, visited PDVSA head-
quarters, was in doubt about who is interviewing whom in the intelligence 
unit of the vice-presidency, lingered in the waiting area of the mayor’s 
office and in lunch box queues waiting for ministers and other high-level 
officials. I chatted with state bureaucrats, studied public documents, was 
accidentally locked up in the national assembly office building after clos-
ing hours (a guard eventually came to my rescue) and visited public shel-
ters for the homeless after the 2011 torrential rains. I have also twice 
roadtripped across Venezuela, visiting 20 of the country’s 23 states and 
meeting up with community activists in other parts of the country. And 
finally, on the back of a moped I traveled from Caracas to the remote rural 
village known as Llora Llora (“Cry Cry”) in the state of Guarico (alleg-
edly constituting the center point of the country), making me intimately 
acquainted with the country’s many potholed roads in a manner that my 
buttocks will never forget.
But most of all I delved into the barrios of western Caracas, spending 
liters of sweat climbing the arduous barrio hills, and fared up and down its 
main roads in camionetas. I participated in numerous community assem-
blies and community groups meetings, “hung around” talking to people, 
and inspected a variety of community projects accompanied by both local 
activists and public officials.
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everydAy bArrIo lIfe
Living in a barrio was an indispensable tool for understanding local life 
worlds and the deeper meaning of political struggle from below. Though 
naturally shielded by having more money at my disposal than local resi-
dents, I physically felt the inherent challenges of living in a barrio. That 
was not only related to the unstable and interrupted supplies of water, the 
strenuous task of buying food and household items and the problems with 
garbage collection and public transport, but I also witnessed the social 
problems generated by decades of accumulated poverty up close. The 
threat of crime and violence was a factor that structured my everyday life, 
and the (often related) hidden and visible consequences of alcohol and 
drug (ab)use evidenced the deeply rooted social problems that the pro-
cesses of social struggle were seeking to reverse. Twice, I ducked because 
shooting broke out nearby, and on several occasions people were killed in 
the street in places where I used to spend my time or pass by.
Photo 1.3 Public meeting about the communal councils in the National Assembly. 
Photo by the author
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At the same time, living in a barrio was also a powerful antidote to 
the tendency of scholars, media commentators and middle- and upper-
class Venezuelans to portray the barrios as “no-go” areas; as a social 
anomaly in a constant state of emergency. Life in the barrio has many 
characteristics that I deeply appreciate. It is filled with energy, informality, 
friendliness, humor and generosity, and everyday life goes on as it does 
anywhere else. As I explore in Chap. 3, the barrios are composed by social 
micro- landscapes, where people’s engagement with their surroundings is 
structured by social relationships, local histories and spatially embodied 
Photo 1.4 Mural of Che Guevara, 23 de Enero. Photo by the author
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knowledge. As my research field also became my temporary home, I too 
found “my” place in the social landscape. Joining the local boxing club, 
drinking beer in the local backyard bar, attending popular religious cele-
brations, chatting with my working-from-home manicurist, eating at local 
food joints and participating in women’s gossiping around the kitchen 
table over a bottle of sweet liquor constituted a central part of my ethno-
graphic engagement with Caracas.
struCture of the booK
This remaining part of this book is divided into nine chapters, followed 
by a conclusion. In Chap. 2, I offer a reading of Venezuelan history that 
frames the analysis and arguments pursued in the rest of the book. In 
this chapter, I will pay particular attention to Venezuela’s development 
trajectory as an oil state, and how this shaped key political dynamics in the 
Photo 1.5 Barrio houses, 23 de Enero. Photo by the author
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Puntofijo era. Chapter 3 seeks to shed light on the history of grassroots 
organization and popular sector struggle that preceded and paved the 
way for Chávez’s electoral success, followed by an exploration of people’s 
experiences and memories from the Puntofijo era in the form of poverty, 
marginalization and state violence. Chapter 4 draws linkages between dif-
ferent forms of spatial, economic and social segregation that have shaped 
Venezuelan society, and shows how these divisions played out in the con-
text of political polarization in the Chávez era. Toward the end of the 
chapter, I focus on people’s own explanations for their support for Chávez 
and the Bolivarian process. Chapter 5 begins the exploration of commu-
nity politics through focusing on how popular sector communities estab-
lished themselves as political actors vis-à-vis the state through the idiom 
of poder popular. At the same time, it sheds light on the heterogeneity 
of popular sector communities, and how this is played out in local power 
struggles. These dynamics are teased out through a close examination of 
a case study depicting the mobilization around the building of a new hos-
pital in 23 de Enero. Chapter 6 brings us on the inside of the Venezuelan 
state, as I critically discuss how the internal dynamics, institutionalized 
structures and heterogeneous actors within the Venezuelan state appara-
tus shaped the unfolding of the Bolivarian process. This discussion pre-
pares the ground for Chap. 7, where I examine the interface between 
the Venezuelan state and popular sector communities through focusing 
on the so-called promotores integrales—lower-level public employees who 
assist community organizations that receive funds from the state. In this 
chapter, I also discuss how different forms of knowledges—that of the 
state and that of the popular communities—are negotiated in the context 
of community politics, and how social and political hierarchies between 
state officials and popular sector activists are challenged and mediated in 
Bolivarian discourse. In Chap. 8, I will explore how the social dimen-
sions of Venezuela’s historical legacy as an extractive state is articulated 
through discourses and practices within the Bolivarian space. In particular, 
we will tease out how templates revolving around oil wealth, money and 
consumption emerge as social critique of capitalism’s and neoliberalism’s 
harmful effect upon society. I will also show how these templates gain 
salience as potent social signifiers in the ideological and political polariza-
tion between supporters and opponents of the Bolivarian process, and 
how these can be linked to global templates associated with modernity and 
development. In Chap. 9, I turn to the issue of collective consumption in 
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the form of social spending during the Chávez era. I will examine how 
the historical political culture of state paternalism and strategic clientelism 
was both contested and reproduced, and how social spending produced 
at times ambivalent notions of “deserving” and “undeserving” recipient 
of oil wealth. In Chap. 10, I will turn to the issue of corruption. I will 
seek to illuminate corruption’s historical meaning and origin in the light 
of Venezuela’s historical trajectories as a post-colonial extractive state, and 
its role as a dense social signifier and as a social practice in the context of 
community politics. In the final chapter, I offer a synthesized analysis of 
the different foci and lines of investigation pursued throughout the book, 
before I reflect upon what the Venezuelan case can tell us about the prom-
ises and perils of oil wealth, as well as political, ecological and social chal-
lenges characterizing the contemporary state of the world more broadly.
 notes
 1. Note that voting patterns in favor of the Chávez government were not con-
sistently class-based as he also drew significant support from the middle class 
(see Lupu 2010). However, this book is solely focusing on the relationship 
between popular sector citizens and the Chávez government.
 2. By the term “popular sectors,” I am, in the context of this book, referring 
to the part of the urban population living in lower-income housing areas, or 
informal shantytown settlements. It is important to note that this term does 
not only refer to a socio-economic stratum but also refer to an imagined 
community (Anderson 1983), “the poor,” depending on context. Similarly, 
el pueblo constitutes a multi-faceted and multi-layered term in Spanish, 
meaning village/rural town or people/popular classes, or a combination of 
both, depending on the context (Nugent 1993:34). In political Bolivarian 
discourse it commonly refers to “the poor” or the popular sectors, having an 
implicit historical reference to oppression and marginalization.
 3. In 2005, at the fifth annual gathering of the World Social Forum in Porto 
Alegre, Brazil, in front of a crowd of 15,000 people, Chávez declared him-
self a socialist. He also made it clear that in his view the way forward was not 
the dogmatic socialism of the past, but a gradual search for what he called 
“Socialism for the twenty-first century.”
 4. “Populist” is one of the milder characteristics. The US media in particular used 
a strong language to describe him. Adjectives used include “would-be dictator,” 
“authoritarian ruler,” “autocrat,” “petro-dictator,” “indomitable strongman,” 
“brutal neo-authoritarian,” “warmonger,” and “caudillo” (see Bhatt 2014).
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 5. Theoretically, he weaves together “theories of underdevelopment, neo- 
classical views of natural resources, the Marxist theory of value and an analy-
sis of the evolution of oil prices in this century” (Coronil 1997:6) as well as 
modernization and subalternity theories, seeking to “unsettle the illusion 
that [Venezuela’s] history can be contained within fixed theoretical, tempo-
ral, or cultural boundaries” (Coronil 1997:xi).
 6. The term “Puntofijo” refers to a political pact (the pact of Punto Fijo, from 
the place where it was signed) between the two dominant parties, Acción 
Democrática (Social Democrats) and COPEI (Christian Democrats). It was 
signed in 1959, and lasted until 1998 when Chávez came to power. The 
Puntofijo era or puntofijismo is interchangeably referred to as the Fourth 
Republic and its powerholders are referred to as cuartarepublicanos (fourth 
republicans).
 7. Over time, most barrio dwellers manage to gradually build up a house made 
of brick and zinc, but a total of 13,610 homes in Caracas and Greater 
Caracas were classified as ranchos in the 2011 national census, defined as a 
construction built with waste materials, such as wooden boards, cartons and 
so on (Universidad de los Andes n.d.).
 8. A five-year-old girl I know dressed in a mini-skirt looks at her behind in the 
mirror and says: “I have to continue with my swimming lessons; it gives me 
nice thighs and lifts my buttocks.”
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CHAPTER 2
A History Written with Oil
In the words of the Venezuelan intellectual and politician Domingo 
Alberto Rangel, “no event in Venezuela can be separated from oil … 
It is the fundamental force that shapes national life. All aspects of the 
Venezuelan economy are the legitimate or bastard children of that sub-
stance that irrevocably stained our history” (cited in Tinker Salas 2009:2). 
In July 1914, Zumaque 1, Venezuela’s first oil well, was put in production 
in Mene Grande in the state of Zulia. By 1928, Venezuela was the largest 
oil exporter in the world (Grisanti n.d.). These first decades of the twen-
tieth century constituted an important period of transition in Venezuelan 
history. In Hillman’s words, Venezuela went from a state of “caudillistic 
anarchy to a status of peripheral dependency” (Hillman 1994:34). Oil was 
a key component in this process. It attracted foreign oil companies to the 
country and shaped the formation of a nominally “modern” state and its 
economic base. It shaped Venezuela’s relation to foreign, primarily North 
American business interests, and the country’s relation to the global econ-
omy. It shaped the formation of different social groups and political alli-
ances within Venezuela, as well as, with time, patterns of migration and 
the abandonment of the countryside, of rapid and uncontrolled urbaniza-
tion, and of underdeveloped labor markets. It also shaped patterns of class 
formation, and the country’s exposure to North American cultural models 
and values (Tinker Salas 2009). Indeed, oil was a transformative agent in 
Venezuelan society. In a relatively short time it metamorphosed the coun-
try from being a coffee-exporting and geopolitically quite insignificant 
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country, still caught up in its post-colonial internal power struggles and 
correspondingly weak state structures, into becoming a putative petro-
state (Karl 1997) and a hub for international extractive industries and 
global commodity flows.
These patterns and processes are of deep contextual significance for 
our subsequent analysis of twenty-first-century Venezuela. In particular, 
I want to highlight three important aspects. One is the ways in which the 
transition from dictatorship to electoral democracy was premised upon 
the consolidation of a political system that centralized access to political 
power and the benefits of the country’s oil revenues in the middle- and 
upper classes, creating a deeply socially segregated society. As we follow 
the unfolding of this story in the period 1960–1998, some events and 
trajectories that would later become of potent political, social and cultural 
significance in the Chávez era are highlighted.
The other aspect that I will bring attention to is the United States’ 
strong presence in the country through the oil industry, and how this 
influenced the ways in which consumer culture and class identities were 
shaped among the Venezuelan middle- and upper classes. As we will 
discuss more in depth later on, this dimension of Venezuelan society is 
important for understanding how political ideologies, social identities and 
national(ist) sentiments were shaped in the Chávez era.
The third aspect that I want to bring attention to is of a subtle nature, 
namely how Venezuela’s formation as a state and a society is intertwined 
with the country’s uneven amalgamation into global geopolitics and 
global capitalist markets. Amalgamation, because as an oil-exporting 
country it was central to the flow of black gold so vital to global capital-
ist development. And uneven, because as a post-colonial, semi-peripheral, 
oil- exporting country, its political and economic processes have been 
intrinsically connected to political and economic forces beyond its control. 
These processes have brought cycles and patterns of social and political 
conflict and full-blown crisis.
As the country now is passing through a phase of great difficulties, 
I believe there is a lesson to be learned here, as well as a question to be 
asked: why has it been so difficult for Venezuela to find a solid economic, 
political and social platform for its societal development? What are the 
underlying causes for the country’s continuous conflictive and contradic-
tive search for a political future? The rest of the book will seek to provide 
some answers to those questions, but first we need a solid understanding 
of where the Venezuela of today is coming from.
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Gomez’s Rule
Venezuela gained independence from Spain in 1811 under the leadership of 
the national hero and icon Simón Bolívar. The ensuing decades were charac-
terized by violent clashes between the Republicans and the Royalists, which 
escalated into the bloody three-years Federal Wars in 1858. After the war 
ended, the country continued to be characterized by caudillo rivalries and 
caudillo rule, a weak economy, abysmal living conditions for the common 
man and woman (Ewell 1984:19), and nascent attempts of nation building.
The first drop of oil was extracted from Venezuelan soil during the 
reign of Juan Vicente Gómez, who ruled the country in various periods 
between 1908 and 1935. Under Gomez’s rule, Venezuela stepped into 
the era of industrialization and increased political centralization. Gomez 
personally negotiated concessions and terms with foreign oil companies 
(Ewell 1984:57). By 1922, he had built a national administration that was 
stronger and more unified than anything that had existed in Venezuela 
since the colonial period (Ewell 1984:59). Thus, to put it simply, the 
Venezuelan state took form through the establishment of the oil industry, 
and as Tinker Salas notes, “during the Gómez era the foreign oil industry 
and the Venezuelan state became inextricable” (Tinker Salas 2009:2).
Gomez’s rule created significant opposition, conflicts and discontent 
in Venezuelan society outside of the limited circles that benefited from 
his regime—the army, the landed oligarchy, emerging economic elites, 
the church, foreign oil companies, and his loyal family and friends (Ewell 
1984:59). Power struggles between old and emerging power factors 
carved out new political and economic faultlines. New political, ideologi-
cal and artistic ideas inspired by European intellectual currents started to 
gain foothold, at the same time as Gomez’s regime drove many intellec-
tuals and artists into exile (Ewell 1984:48–50). Significant social unrest, 
including a series of anti-government protests at the Universidad Central 
de Venezuela (UCV) in 1928, was violently clamped down on and spurred 
the formation of a new generation of political leaders. Among them were 
Rómulo Betancourt, Raúl Leoni and Jóvito Villalba (Hillman 1994:35); 
two of them would later become presidents.
el TRienio: 1945–1948
Several factions and transitory parties were formed in the years that fol-
lowed, but it was eventually Acción Democrática that stood out as the 
victorious party. Not only did it boast important national intellectuals 
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and politicians on its side, such as Rómulo Gallegos and Andrés Eloy 
Blanco, but it also successfully managed to tap into the campesino popula-
tion and gain the upper hand with the worker movements, weakening the 
Communists (Ewell 1984:91–92). Many middle-class professionals also 
gathered behind the party, carefully distancing themselves from commu-
nism as well as fiercely opposing the gomecistas (Ewell 1984:91–92). The 
seeds for a multi-class, but not a class-based party, were sown.
Gómez died in 1935 and was succeeded by General Eleazar López 
(1936–1941) and General Isaías Medina Angarita (1941–1945). Growing 
discontent and rigged elections in 1940 led to a coup against Medina in 
1945, organized by Acción Democrática and young army officers.
Rómulo Betancourt, from Acción Democrática, headed the new gov-
erning junta. During the three years that they stayed in power—called 
el trienio—the junta wrote a new constitution, implemented a new 
petroleum law (Hillman 1994:36) and extended suffrage to all citizens 
above 18 years of age, including women and illiterates (Ewell 1984:97). 
Moreover, collective bargaining was introduced for the first time. Adeco 
cadres (members of Acción Democrática) tirelessly visited neighborhoods 
and municipalities, facilitating party organization and reaching half a mil-
lion party members in 1948 (Ewell 1984:99).
However, the junta failed to be considered as legitimate mitigators 
between diverse claims and interests emerging from the church, the mili-
tary, militant political party activities as well as the Christian-conservative 
COPEI, the other dominant party (Hillman 1994:36). In 1947, Rómulo 
Gallegos was elected president for Acción Democrática. Shortly thereafter, 
the military carried out a coup.
The Rule of maRcos PéRez Jiménez
The rule of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez lasted until 1958. Pérez 
Jiménez was accused of widespread corruption and of favoring himself 
and his allies. He banned opposition parties, closed the UCV and jailed 
and tortured opponents. But he also presided over a significant leap in 
industrialization, infrastructural developments and the promotion of 
sports and culture (Ewell 1984:108; see Derham 2010 for a re-reading of 
Pérez Jiménez’s rule). As a consequence of the increased economic activ-
ity in the country, the non-petroleum share of GDP increased significantly, 
as did commerce and services (Ewell 1984:111). In 1955–1956, Pérez 
Jiménez’s government negotiated a new set of petroleum concessions, 
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seeking a way to ensure fresh revenues for its ambitious projects (Ewell 
1984:110).
During his regime, urbanization processes accelerated, the immigra-
tion rate expanded, birth rates went up and life expectancy increased, and 
a media market of film, TV, press and radio took shape. These years also 
transformed the social life and values of the Venezuelan population. Many 
of the movies, TV-shows and magazines consumed in Venezuela were 
North American productions (Ewell 1984:113–114). A growing and 
prosperous middle class looked to Europe and North America in search 
of new identities. Christian Dior and Yves Saint-Laurent opened shops in 
Venezuela in the 1950s. The number of cars in the streets skyrocketed, so 
did the consumption of Scotch whiskey and champagne (Ewell 1984:117). 
Bars and nightclubs, not to mention brothels, rocked the Caracas night 
life (Ewell 1984:115–117). In short, Venezuela, at least urban Venezuela, 
was a booming country with political censorship.
Public conflict levels were low during large parts of the Pérez Jiménez 
regime. The clandestine parties kept a low profile, and the relative pros-
perity maintained popular discontent under control, even among the 
peasants and the working class (Ewell 1984:118). However, from 1957, 
tensions started to intensify. Commerce and business sectors, the working 
class and even the military started to feel excluded by different aspects 
of Pérez Jiménez’s style of governance (Ewell 1984:119). An announced 
plebiscite over Pérez Jiménez’s rule, designed to make him win, provoked 
the anger of the public. A failed military conspiracy against him on January 
1, 1958, alerted civilian leaders of the high levels of dissatisfaction in mili-
tary circles. Civilian political leaders had been clandestinely organizing and 
mobilizing for a long time, and now the time for action had come. Under 
the banner Junta Patriótica, they called for a general strike on January 21, 
and a popular uprising followed. On January 23, 1958, Pérez Jiménez fled 
the country.
1958–1998: a PacTed democRacy
When Rómulo Betancourt once again assumed the presidency in 1959, 
this time through democratic elections, the political game had largely 
already been determined. Prior to the elections in 1958, all presidential 
candidates has signed the interparty agreements Pacto de Punto Fijo (Pact 
of Punto Fijo) and the Declaración de Principios y Programa Mínimo de 
Gobierno (Declaration of Principles and Basic Program for Government) 
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(Karl 1997:82). In these documents, all the signatories committed them-
selves to pursue the same political and economic policies, regardless of 
the electoral outcome. Moreover, the Pact of Punto Fijo ensured that 
in future elections, each party would be guaranteed a piece of the pie, 
regardless of the electoral outcome, in the form of state jobs and contracts, 
control over ministries, as well as political positions granted through a 
complicated spoils system (Karl 1997:83).
The Programa Mínimo established that development would be pur-
sued through the accumulation of foreign and private capital, and the 
private sector would receive subsidies and protection in order for it to 
prosper. Expropriation and socialization of property were ruled out, and 
land reforms were to be accompanied by compensation. Nationalization 
of the oil sector was also ruled out and the continued presence of multi-
national companies was guaranteed (Karl 1997:84). This implied a radical 
shift from Acción Democrática’s previous nationalistic and anti-imperialist 
stance (Herrera Campins 1978, cited in Karl 1997:84).
lockinG The PoliTical Game
In the new constitution approved in 1961, presidential powers were 
greatly expanded. This granted Betancourt the authority over all signifi-
cant public bodies, along with the power to name cabinet ministers, state 
governors and state enterprise officials (Karl 1997:83). A non-reelection 
clause was included, that in time would contribute to the lack of account-
ability of those installed in office (Karl 1997:84). The powers of congress 
were reduced by containing political competition, creating a system that 
left little room for challenging the executive (Karl 1997:84).
Karl defines the design of these arrangements as “the right to rule 
for the right to make money” (Karl 1997:85). In essence, Acción 
Democrática carved out a political model design to lock the political 
game to their benefit and secure control over the state apparatus, in 
exchange for guarantees to the business sector. The model also guaran-
teed that the interests of foreign business sectors, the church, the mili-
tary and the ascending middle class were secured. Those who didn’t have 
access to the party machine via client organizations, such as unorga-
nized peasants or unskilled urban workers, were effectively shut out from 
the clientelist system. Labor and peasant groups were incorporated in 
the party-dominated Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos (CTV-
Confederation of Venezuelan Workers) as well as in the Federación 
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Campesina Venezolana  (Venezuelan Peasant Confederation). Labor 
negotiations, especially tied to the oil industry, were carefully controlled 
through state-mediated collective bargaining, so as not to stir ten-
sions with foreign oil companies. Acción Democrática’s manipulation 
of workers’ unions and the formation of parallel unionism undermined 
the influence of leftist currents and weakened organized labors’ bargain-
ing power (Derham 2010:185). The growth of the oil economy under-
mined agricultural production, and the continuation of migration from 
the countryside to the cities, which had intensified under Pérez Jiménez 
(Derham 2010:176), quickly weakened the peasant class. Land reforms 
were enacted on a very limited scale, mainly applied to public land, or 
the land of perezjimenistas (Ewell 1984:139).
In order to contain forces within the party that wanted to push the 
limits of the pre-signed agreements of the Punto Fijo pact, Betancourt 
purged the party of radical elements from peasant and labor organiza-
tions, and stopped trying to mobilize new groups (Karl 1997:85). Both 
the Communists and the radical wing of Acción Democrática, whose 
members had risked their lives in the struggle against Pérez Jiménez, grew 
increasingly frustrated. In 1960, the youth branch of Acción Democrática 
left the party in protest. Later, they would re-emerge in the form of a gue-
rilla movement allied with the Communists (Karl 1997:85).
BeTancouRT’s line
The initial phase of Puntofijismo coincided with a shift in the North 
American approach to Latin America. While Washington had previ-
ously supported Pérez Jiménez as a bulwark against communism and 
because of his openness to foreign capital (Ellner 2008:51), they soon 
embraced the new democratic dawn in Venezuela. Betancourt appeased 
the neighbor in the north by signing favorable oil contracts with for-
eign companies, pursuing a staunch anti-communist line domestically 
and aiding Washington in politically isolating Cuba (Ellner 2008:62). 
Indeed, Rómulo Betancourt would become a close friend of both Nelson 
Rockefeller and John F. Kennedy. Internal struggles with the far left were 
dealt with through a divide-and-conquer political maneuvering, as well as 
through raw power, as expressed by the maxim attributed to the interior 
minister Carlos Andrés Pérez, who would later become president: “Shoot 
first and ask questions afterwards” (Ellner 2008:60).
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caRlos andRés PéRez: fiRsT TeRm
Betancourt was followed by Acción Democrática’s Raul Leoni, who largely 
continued along the political line of the Betancourt years. In 1969, the 
presidential elections were won by COPEI for the first time, and Rafael 
Caldera, who founded the party in 1946, took the presidential seat. In 
1974, Carlos Andrés Pérez, or CAP as he was also called, was elected pres-
ident of Acción Democrática at a moment in which Venezuela overflowed 
with oil revenues—a result of the 1973 OPEC oil bonanza caused by the 
Arab oil embargo. These were years of lavish spending, and Venezuela was 
nicknamed “Venezuela Saudita.” The country was awash in petro-dollars, 
social programs were launched in order to mitigate social conflict, and 
even the labor movement stopped calling for redistributive policies (Ellner 
1989:118). According to Karl, the charismatic Carlos Andrés Pérez, or 
CAP as he was also called, had an immense ego and desire to leave his 
mark on Venezuelan history (Hellinger 2000:107). In an address to con-
gress in 1974, he announced far-reaching social and political reforms, as 
well as a development plan called the Fifth National Plan, designed to put 
the country on track toward becoming a developed nation. Ambitious 
industrialization programs were drawn up to change the country’s eco-
nomic structures overnight, and massive infrastructure projects were put in 
motion (Hellinger 2000:107). Modernity and development were thought 
to be just around the corner, symbolized by the potent skyscrapers that 
dominate Caracas’s cityscape to this day. As Judith Ewell (1984) put it:
The new wealth and the perceptions of it affected all aspects of national 
life … Money abounded to subsidize more publishing and artistic ven-
tures and a reorganization of the state cultural bureaucracy. Middle-class 
Venezuelans luxuriated in consumption and display of status symbols from 
imported food and clothing to the acquisition of condominiums in Miami, 
Florida. Neglected regions received more national investment to create 
poles of development in the interior. It is doubtful that much of the new 
wealth reached the poorest and least skilled of the population, but massive 
development projects encouraged the eternal expectation that soon the 
wealth would indeed trickle down to the poor. (Ewell 1984:193)
During these years, middle-class Venezuelans went to Miami on weekends 
for shopping trips, generating the famous expression “está barato, dame 
dos” [it is cheap, give me two]. Corruption reached unprecedented lev-
els during Pérez’s rule (see Karl 1997). The sheer amount of money in 
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circulation, a re-organization of the state administration, the massive 
development projects, and the close linkages between Pérez’s office and 
his close circles of technocrats, business and political allies, gave ample 
space to corrupt practices.1
The BeGinninG of The end
However, the boom didn’t last long. Elected in 1979, Luis Herrera Campins, 
from COPEI, “inherited” a massive foreign debt that had been accumu-
lated during the Pérez years (Ellner 2008:79). In 1983, the combination of 
reduced oil prices and declining confidence in the economy triggered specu-
lative pressure on the Venezuelan bolívar, leading to the adoption of price 
controls.2 Having borrowed on the basis of anticipated future oil prices, 
the country now found itself in an economic quagmire as oil prices fell. 
However, in spite of criticizing Pérez for his borrowing practice, Herrera 
Campins went ahead and doubled the foreign debt. This placed Venezuela 
in a state of dependency vis-à-vis foreign creditors that would later lead to a 
deal with the Bretton Wood institutions. Debt payments absorbed between 
one-fifth and one-third of the country’s annual foreign exchange earn-
ings over the following years. And as Pérez’s grandiose development plans 
were abandoned, highly indebted state companies were left with a bloated 
bureaucracy and an underutilized work force (Ellner 2008:80).
The cRisis conTinues
The disasters of the previous years had already spurred off voices arguing 
for privatization and neoliberal reforms. The economic and political dete-
rioration that continued under the presidency of Jaime Lusinchi (Acción 
Democrática) strengthened these positions. By 1985, foreign-exchange 
reserves were at a mere USD 1.8 billion, state companies were heavily 
indebted and corruption was endemic. Many claimed that in the subse-
quent years, state companies were deliberately bankrupted in order to 
prepare the ground for privatization (Ellner 2008:81). Lusinchi cashed 
out on the foreign debt, including parts of it that were allegedly illegal, 
having been borrowed in contravention of Venezuelan law. The exchange 
mechanisms applied to foreign debt payment were opaque at best, and 
even Lusinchi’s own planning minister claimed that the currency conver-
sion process implemented in 1983 represented the “greatest state transfer 
to speculators in world history” (Ellner 2008:82).
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PéRez’s lasT Round
In 1989, Carlos Andrés Pérez was elected president for the second time. 
Fashioning himself as a nationalist and a defender of el pueblo, he capital-
ized on popular sentiments resisting privatization, neoliberal policies and 
economic tutelage under the Bretton Woods institutions. However, in the 
backroom he had brokered a deal with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which ensured that significant structural adjustment programs 
would be implemented once he took office. On February 28, 1989, the 
government of Carlos Andrés Pérez and the IMF signed a letter of intent 
that would align Venezuelan petroleum products—which had been heav-
ily subsidized—with prices closer to the international market. On average 
the prices were to rise 94 percent, and it was scheduled for prices to rise 
an additional 70 percent in January 1990 (Mommer 1996:147). The IMF 
deal also included a severe readjustment of interest rates and the deregula-
tion of certain basic commodities in addition to a sharp price increase of 
others (Ellner 1989:105).
Pérez had called the neoliberal package el Gran Viaje (the great turn-
about), portraying it as a necessary measure to safeguard the nation’s 
future. But he underestimated the extent to which the poor part of the 
population, which throughout the past years had seen living conditions 
radically worsen, had been brought to their brink. The first phase of 
Pérez’s structural adjustment reform led to the “the largest and most vio-
lently repressed revolt against austerity measures in Latin American his-
tory” (Coronil 1997:376). The uprising, called el Caracazo or el Sacudón, 
is described in the next chapter and will not be examined in detail here. 
Suffice to say that the government’s violent response to the massive pro-
test left somewhere between 300 and perhaps as much as 3000 dead. 
These numbers are still disputed.
Social unrest continued and increased in the aftermath of el Caracazo, 
leading to violent confrontations between protesters and state forces fre-
quently resulting in injuries and deaths (López et al. 1999). The legitimacy 
of not only the political parties, but also of the whole political system was 
free falling. There was also unrest within military ranks. The lower ranks 
were primarily staffed by young men from poor backgrounds. Dismayed by 
having been sent out to “kill their own” during el Caracazo, many of them 
started to question the legitimacy of the Pérez government. One of them 
was Hugo Chávez, who was already a central figure in clandestine left-wing 
milieus. He led a secret dissident group within the army, called Revolutionary 
2 A HISTORY WRITTEN WITH OIL
 39
Bolivarian Movement-200 (MBR). In 1992, the group, which had attracted 
more supporters after el Caracazo (Ellner 2008:96; Trinkunas 2002), led 
out a failed civil-military uprising against the Pérez government. The justi-
fication for the uprising was that the government had lost its constitutional 
legitimacy after massacring its own people during el Caracazo. The upris-
ing failed and Chávez was jailed, but the cause, and Hugo Chávez himself, 
gained enormous popular support (see Strønen 2016).
imPeachmenT
At this point there was a sense of chaos in Venezuelan society (see López 
et  al. 1999; Trinkunas 2002). The following year, Carlos Andrés Pérez 
was impeached on corruption charges, partly becoming a scapegoat for 
the de-legitimization of the political system at large. Before leaving office, 
Carlos Andrés Pérez left his mark in the Venezuelan economy. In spite 
of el Caracazo, the IMF-prescribed shock treatment was implemented. A 
1992 privatization law facilitated widespread privatization of strategic sec-
tors. Organized labor was weakened and the informal economy expanded. 
Except for a few basic commodities, price controls were lifted, tariffs were 
sharply reduced, and restrictions to foreign investments were removed. 
This resulted in a massive multinational penetration of sectors such as 
finance, gasoline retail and fast-food outlets (Ellner 2008:92). Cost of liv-
ing increased and new sectors of the population descended into poverty. 
Decentralization laws reduced the powers and responsibilities of the state 
in a number of strategic areas, while new municipalities were established in 
affluent areas, diminishing the tax base that befell the poor neighborhoods 
(Ellner 2008:93).
PavinG The Way foR chávez
Caldera won the presidency in 1994 through embracing an anti- neoliberal 
discourse and showing sympathies for the cause of Hugo Chávez and his 
fellow rebels, attributing the coup attempt to the unacceptable social 
conditions among large parts of the citizenry. In the first phase of his 
presidency, Caldera took some steps to curb the effects of Pérez’s reforms 
(Ellner 2008:100). However, soon after, the consequences of Pérez’s 
deregulation of the financial sectors started to set in. In the wake of 
deregulation policies, the banks had gained control over companies in 
sectors such as telecommunications, agriculture, tourism and broadcasting 
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(Ellner 2008:100). However, this expansion soon turned into collapse as a 
number of banks went bankrupt. Caldera’s response to the banking crisis 
was to take over and administer 18 of the country’s 41 banks, represent-
ing 70 percent of all deposits (Ellner 2008:100). Moreover, the govern-
ment permitted foreign takeover in the banking sector, greatly weakening 
domestic capital. The former bankers fled the country, heading for the 
United States and elsewhere. With them they brought both the money 
they had embezzled from the banks as well as the funds the government 
had injected into the system in order to keep the banks floating. A total 
of 322 bankers were issued arrest warrants—none were brought to justice 
(Ellner 2008:100). It was an economic fraud of epic proportions. In the 
meantime, real wages continued to fall, and inflation reached 71 percent 
in 1994 and 57 percent in 1995 (Ellner 2008:100).
“The oPeninG”
In 1996, Caldera entered into a new deal with the IMF, which he called 
“Agenda Venezuela.” The IMF granted Venezuela a 1.4 billion loan, 
while also giving its stamp of approval to government policies in order to 
reassure foreign investors of the country’s solidity. In 1997, the national 
steel company SIDOR was privatized, and the government sold out its last 
shares in the communication company CANTV. (Both of these companies 
were later re-nationalized by Chávez.) Health and retirement branches 
in the social security system were privatized, and severance payment 
systems reformed in a manner that reduced payouts to workers (Ellner 
2008:100–105). Caldera also continued the process of privatization of 
the oil industry that had begun under Pérez, a maneuver euphemistically 
termed la apertura (the opening).
As we will explore further in the subsequent chapter, social protests 
and political unrest was abundant during these years. People in the bar-
rios still spoke of Chávez, and many sympathizers and leftist activists vis-
ited him in prison. In 1994, Chávez was granted pardon from Caldera 
and released from prison. Caldera was an old political hawk, and sensed 
the popular sentiments that were simmering in favor of Chávez. In 
1997, Chávez formed a political party, Movimiento Quinta República or 
MVR (the Fifth Republic Movement). Chávez toured the country with 
an anti- establishment message promising to restore justice and dignity 
to the country, to call for a constituent assembly, and to break with the 
old Puntofijismo system. In the 1998 elections, Chávez’s main electoral 
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contender was Irene Sáenz, a former Miss Universe and the mayor of the 
wealthy municipality of Baruta, in Caracas. Sáenz was faring well on the 
polls, until she was endorsed by COPEI just before the elections: a move 
that proved fatal. Chávez won the presidential elections with 56 percent of 
votes, ending 40 years of Acción Democrática/COPEI hegemony backed 
by the Punto Fijo pact of 1958.
The excePTionalism myTh
It should be noted that the reading of Venezuelan history has in many ways 
been greatly re-interpreted during the past few decades. Contemporary 
writers from the Punto Fijo period tended to overlook the underlying 
internal conflicts and the power struggles simmering below the surface of 
an apparently functioning democracy. For long, Venezuela was hailed as 
an exceptional case in Latin America, a designation also referred to as “the 
Venezuelan exceptionalism.” Surrounded by countries marred by military 
coups and authoritarian dictatorships, Venezuela showcased an uninter-
rupted line of democratically elected governments since 1958. The Punto 
Fijo pact sustaining this model has led researchers to term the Venezuelan 
model “partidocracia” (Rey 1989:266, cited in Hillman 1994:17), “pacted 
democracy” (Hellinger 1991:94) and “pactocracy” (Cockcroft 1989:340, 
cited in Hillman 1994:17). Elsewhere, Hellinger defined it as “elections 
without participation” (Hellinger 1996:4). Few analysts foresaw the break-
down of the Venezuelan political system that started to gain pace since 
the early 1980s. One exception is Hellinger, who in 1984 wrote: “The 
Venezuelan state is likely to find itself increasingly caught up in reviving 
class struggle as the decade proceeds” (Hellinger 1984:56).
Especially in the aftermath of the social and political disintegration start-
ing in the 1980s, as well as after Chávez’s electoral victory in 1998, critical 
research shed light on the cracks in Venezuela’s “exceptional” political 
model. Indeed, Derham has argued that “the myth of a popular, fully rep-
resentative Venezuelan democracy has been created by an alliance between 
self-interested democratic politicians and foreign (mainly US) scholars and 
‘mentors’” (Derham 2010:271). In a similar vein, Ellner indicates that
For many years, political analysts, along with those close to the circles 
of power in Washington, presented the exceptionalism view by labeling 
Venezuela as a model democracy due to its stability, marginalization of the 
left, and avoidance of militant independent trade unionism. (Ellner 2008:2)3
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Moreover, Buxton has argued that the “failure of the state to competently 
administer elections debased any claim that the country was a ‘democ-
racy’” (Buxton 2001:103). She argues that not only was the right to vote 
or have your vote counted often flaunted in practice, but that “the elec-
toral system was rife with gerrymandering and characterized by a lack of 
regulatory clarity and an absence of institutionalized norms” (see Buxton 
2001:82–103 for details).
oil, PunTofiJismo and foReiGn oil
The abundance of oil revenues is a central factor for explaining the long 
durée of the Punto Fijo system. As Hawkins notes:
The oil revenues allowed the hegemonic parties to develop an extensive 
network of clientelist networks, creating mechanisms whereby new political 
actors were either co-opted or excluded. (Hawkins 2010:89)
A central element of this consolidation of power was to make sure that 
potentially radical elements were kept at bay (either with carrot or stick), 
while at the same time ensuring that powerful interest groups and the 
dominant ascending political base—the middle classes—were satisfied. 
Acción Democrática, presumably the most radical party as opposed to 
the conservative COPEI, had radically changed its social and political 
orientation from the first ruling experience in 1945–1948 to the con-
solidation of power in 1959. While el trienio was relatively socially radi-
cal,  anti- imperialist and nationalist, post-1958 Acción Democrática was 
staunchly anti-Communist, pro-North America and politically shrewd.
However, intimately interlinked with AD and COPEI’s co-optation 
over access to oil revenues and positioning in the political game, another 
process was taking place, shaping Venezuela’s economic and political 
architecture, as well as the country’s relation to the global economy. 
Foreign petroleum companies carved out an extensive space for political 
and economic maneuvering and revenue extraction, while domestic elites, 
who were intimately connected to and identified with the global world 
of extractive business and cosmopolitan ideals, controlled the national oil 
industry. At the same time, middle-class identities and material interests 
gradually became, in part through social engineering by the foreign oil 
companies themselves (Tinker Salas 2009:4), intimately tied to the con-
tinuous presence of foreign oil companies. In order to understand how 
this happened, we need another quick detour back in Venezuelan history.
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shaPinG The PeTRo-sTaTe
The appearance of foreign oil companies under Juan Vicente Gómez’s 
rule took place at a time with surprisingly weak state structure, or in 
Karl’s words: “A legacy of extreme administrative weakness that is 
remarkable even in the context of Latin America” (Karl 1997:74). Part 
of the reason was that Venezuela was marginal to the Spanish empire 
because it had few resources that were attractive to the European emerg-
ing markets. The country had been ruled by shifting caudillos, and few 
administrative structures were developed. The limited scope of the state 
and the lack of a strong state identity gave the foreign oil companies, 
backed by the United States, an easy pass once they entered the country. 
As Karl writes:
Together, they were able to effectively limit Venezuela’s sovereignty by fash-
ioning the international oil market and the conditions for domestic business 
in their favor, redesigning the country’s property laws, keeping social forces 
weak, decisively influencing leaders, and, when necessary, helping to change 
actual rulers. (Karl 1997:89)
The development of the country in the aftermath of the emergence of 
the oil industry was conditioned by the encounter between the weak 
domestic political economy and the most powerful forces of the inter-
national economy (Karl 1997:73). The establishment of a petroleum 
regime  subsequently led to what Karl terms “petrolization,” or the for-
mation and empowerment of oil-related interest groups to the expense of 
non-oil- related interest. Oil-related sectors became pegged to the state, 
discouraging political diversification. The gravitating power of the oil 
economy also prevented the development of other economic sectors, and 
undermined the agricultural economy that had been the backbone of the 
country prior to the oil industry’s emergence. Venezuela had become a 
net importer of food already during Gómez era (Tinker Salas 2009:207), 
a condition that strongly contributes to its fundamental problems today. 
Already in 1958, 71 percent of the state’s revenues came from oil (Tinker 
Salas 2009:211).
The oil economy also created a class pattern different from other Latin 
American countries. Since growth was fueled by oil rents more than by 
real productive activities, the middle class grew proportionally larger than 
the working class—an inverted class pyramid propped up on petro-dollars 
(Karl 1997:82–83).
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The foRmaTion of PeTRóleos de venezuela s.a 
(Pdvsa)
Venezuelan oil production was in its first decades almost entirely domi-
nated by foreign companies. In 1928, there were 107 companies working 
on Venezuelan soil, but the big three—Dutch Shell, Gulf, and Standard 
Oil controlled 98 percent of the market (Ewell 1984:63). Most of the 
exports consisted of heavy crude, and most of it was refined in the Dutch 
Antilles before it was shipped to the eastern coast of the United States 
(Ewell 1984:63). Less than 3 percent was consumed domestically (Ewell 
1984:63). The “big three” cultivated close relationships with shifting gov-
ernments, while the US state department carefully monitored the rela-
tionship between the foreign companies and the Venezuelan government 
(Tinker Salas 2009:205).
The first state oil company, Corporación Venezolana de Petróleo, was 
not created until 1960 (Mommer 1996). On September 10, that same 
year, delegates from Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Iraq gath-
ered in a meeting in Baghdad. Few days later, OPEC was formed (Grisanti 
n.d.). The Venezuelan delegate, Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso, played a cru-
cial role in this process.
After having gradually built a national knowledge- and capacity base, and 
reflecting nationalist currents in and beyond the country, the Venezuelan 
oil industry was nationalized in 1976 under the first government of Carlos 
Andrés Pérez. The foreign companies put up resistance, but they had also 
carefully monitored nationalist sentiments in the country and positioned 
themselves for a shift in policies. And in effect, international oil companies 
continued profiting from the Venezuelan oil industry through lucrative 
service contracts, indemnification, expensive loans, foreign investment 
diverted to other economic sectors and other mechanisms (Bye 1979:73; 
see also Hellinger 1984, 2016; Tinker Salas 2009:228–229).
However, the nationalization of PDVSA served another purpose. The 
popular and working-class agitation platforms of class struggle and nation-
alist advocacy were neutralized, and replaced by a national consensus ide-
ology (Bye 1979:63). As Tinker Salas notes, political parties and leftist 
intellectuals for the most part lost interest in oil after the nationalization, 
while the managers of the oil industry increasingly viewed both politi-
cians and the populace as “a potentially disruptive force” (Tinker Salas 
2009:229). Indeed, in spite of the nationalization, PDVSA’s Venezuelan 
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oil executives continued to share the perspective of the international 
oil companies that had trained them (Mommer 2004:131). Over time, 
PDVSA developed into a “state within the state” (Mommer 2004:131), 
viewing itself as a player on the global scene steeped in corporate neolib-
eral logic rather than a national state company that had to respond to its 
owners, that is, the Venezuelan state and the Venezuelan populace. The 
country’s subsequent political leaders failed to put in place efficient fis-
cal and regulatory systems (Mommer 2004) and the oil giant effectively 
escaped political oversight.
oil and laBoR
The oil industry was a generous employer to the lucky few who were able 
to secure work there. In 1958, the 40–50 thousand workers employed by 
the oil and iron industries, comprising less than 3 percent of the country’s 
total workforce, earned more than half of the country’s wages. In addi-
tion, their housing, education and health services were provided by their 
employers (Lieuwen 1961:14). In contrast, the common city wage earner 
employed in industry and commerce on the other hand, spent 48 percent 
of his income on food. Less than one-third of dwellings were reported to 
have running water in the 1957 national census (Lieuwen 1961:13–14). 
Thus, even if Venezuela reportedly had the continent’s highest per capita 
income at the time—USD 743 in 1962—this wealth was concentrated in 
the hands of those who benefited (Lieuwen 1961:14) from the oil indus-
try. The labor movement tied to the oil industry emerged as the most 
powerful part of the Venezuelan labor movement (Tinker Salas 2009:11), 
prompting some to call them a labor aristocracy (ibid.). As we will discuss 
more in detail below, the oil industry also became the center of gravity 
for the ascending managerial and professional classes, allowing them to 
enjoy an elevated standard of life that resembled that of their middle-class 
peers in the United States—far beyond reach for the common Venezuelan 
worker.
The development of the oil industry also intensified the migration from 
rural to urban areas, as peasants flocked to the oil fields and to the cities 
in order to find work (Ewell 1984:64). The oil production itself wasn’t 
labor-intensive, but the infrastructures and services (including prostitu-
tion) spread and provided job opportunities around the oil areas (Ewell 
1984:64).
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Re-oRdeRinG venezuelan socieTy
The development of the oil industry spurred the construction of large oil 
camps surrounding the oil fields. As Tinker Salas (2009) has analyzed in 
detail, the oil camps became an epicenter for the social, spatial and cultural 
re-ordering of Venezuelan society. Of key importance in these processes 
were the construction of new divisions between public and private space, 
the fostering of new ideas of work ethics and personal development, the 
consumption of new commodities and foods, the promotion of new mod-
els for family life, gender relations, citizenship and racial hierarchies, and 
the promulgation of new forms for social interaction and social rituals 
(Tinker Salas 2009). Over time, the norms, values and standards of living 
in the oil camps evolved “into a set of social assumptions and class expec-
tations that defined those employed in the industry and against which 
other elements of society could measure their own status” (Tinker Salas 
2009:171).
The Venezuelans who managed to get a foot inside or in the ambits 
of the oil industry eagerly absorbed these new political, social and cul-
tural models. Ever since the 1940s, the companies also pursued a strat-
egy termed “venezolanization,” seeking to employ Venezuelans in all 
but the top-level managerial positions. The explicitly stated aim was to 
ensure that the Venezuelans had a personal stake in the company’s pres-
ence and that their employees would circulate between oil and the state 
in a revolving- door manner, safeguarding that the companies’ long-term 
interests would be upheld (Tinker Salas 2009:186). And rightly so, many 
of them became important actors on other political, commercial and social 
arenas in Venezuelan society (Tinker Salas 2009:5). Consequently, their 
views, reflecting “a series of self-sustaining myths about the oil industry 
and its importance to the nation and society” (Tinker Salas 2009:5) were 
diffused throughout society.
oil, naTionalism and modeRniTy
At the core of these beliefs was the idea that the foreign oil industry was 
of paramount importance if the country were to enter into the era of 
modernity (Tinker Salas 2009:5). The trope of modernity and its associa-
tion with foreign oil was multi-faceted and forged over time. For one, the 
foreign oil companies conjured an imagery of themselves as the anti-thesis 
and solution to the backwardness and thirdworldism of the country prior 
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to their establishment in the country. This aligned the companies with 
the potentiality for progress and modernity, interlocking their presence 
with middle-class ambitions and the post-1958 developmentalist political 
leadership. They even embraced and propagated the famous slogan “sow-
ing the oil,” first coined by Arturo Uslar Pietri in 1936. Referring to the 
need to diversify the economy through investing (“sow”) oil into other 
economic arenas, in particular agriculture, the slogan was appropriated by 
the oil companies who portrayed themselves as key agents in the modern-
ization of the Venezuelan economy (Tinker Salas 2009:190).
The oil companies also carefully monitored communist and national-
ist currents in society, working in close relationship with the government 
and security services (Tinker Salas 2009:213–216). At the same time, they 
maneuvered diligently to associate themselves with cultural nationalist 
sentiments in a manner that hedged against the surge of political national-
ism that could threaten their interests. The companies engaged extensively 
in philanthropy as well as making content for media outlets, ranging from 
radio programs to sponsoring and publishing magazines featuring famous 
national writers and articles promoting popular and traditional cultural 
heritage (Tinker Salas 2009:193–199).
The TRiad
Seen as a whole, what took place in Venezuela during these decades was 
the construction of a political and social triad among the dominant politi-
cal classes, the oil industry and the main beneficiaries from the oil econ-
omy: the labor aristocracy, the middle classes and the elites. Their views 
became hegemonic in the Venezuelan public, and together, like in an echo 
chamber, they crafted the idea of the oil industry as the exclusive enclave 
through which modern Venezuela was emerging. As the notion of meri-
tocracy had been cultivated throughout the industry’s development (in 
spite of the central importance of nepotism and networks in hiring prac-
tices), people nursed by the oil industry were comfortably reassured of 
them being deserving of their status and priveleges. This evolved into a 
sense of privilege as a birthright: they were the pillars upon which modern 
Venezuela was standing. Concurrently, the middle classes had an intrinsic 
interest in maintaining status quo, making them essentially conservative 
and reactionary vis-a-vis political radicalism and the country’s underprivi-
leged citizens.
 THE TRIAD 
48 
oil and sTRuGGle in The chávez eRa
A picture now slowly emerges of a nation whose social identities and polit-
ical interests were segregated between those who benefited from the circu-
lation of oil wealth, and those who were cut off from the benefits from not 
only the oil industry per se, but also the whole array of social, cultural and 
political arrangements conjured up in its orbit. As Tinker Salas notes: “the 
portrayal of a prosperous oil economy transforming the nation obscured 
the fact that a significant portion of the Venezuelan population existed 
on the margins of the oil economy” (Tinker Salas 2009:6). This picture, 
when extended into also encompassing an understanding of the extensive 
corporate and political interests tied to the control over the oil indus-
try, enables us to better understand the enormous shake-up that Chávez’ 
arrival to power, and his gradual attempt take control over the oil industry, 
represented. Tinker Salas summarizes it succinctly:
At one level, the dispute between Chávez’s government, the oil company 
hierarchy, and the oil workers’ unions regarding the future of the oil industry 
was a struggle for the economic purse string of the nation, a battle between 
the new PDVSA, aligned with the social priorities of the government, and 
the old mode. At another level, the dispute was a symbolic contest over the  
nation’s identity, its model of citizenship, and a definition of modernity 
and progress previously defined by élite and upper-middle-class concerns. 
(Tinker Salas 2009:207)
The first thing Chávez did in terms of oil policy was to (successfully) reach 
out to other OPEC countries in order to strengthen cooperation and 
reach an agreement for limiting production and rising prices (Hellinger 
2016:64).
Politically, the Chávez government would not get control over 
PDVSA until after the oil strike/sabotage in 2003. By then, a struggle 
had for long been unfolding between the national executive and the 
PDVSA management. Traditionally, PDVSA executives had controlled 
the ministry of petroleum by appointing “their people” to ministerial 
posts, and the ideological position of the PDVSA leadership was essen-
tially neoliberal and pro-privatization. They had for long advocated for 
the final privatization of the company, putting them in direct confronta-
tion with Chávez’s government, who were well aware that they would 
be politically and economically castrated if they didn’t gain control over 
PDVSA. Tellingly, middle-class employees in the oil industry also formed 
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a group called Gente de Petroleo (Oil People) who were actively opposing 
Chávez.
In November 2001, having been granted special powers by the con-
gress, Chávez passed 49 laws by decree—one of them securing the 
state full control over the oil sector (Tinker Salas 2015:150). The follow-
ing months, tensions escalated across Venezuela and rumors of a coup-in- 
the making were simmering. In early April 2002, Chávez fired several of 
PDVSA’s top executives on live TV. On April 11, 2002, a large opposition 
march, symbolically convoked to gather outside the PDVSA headquarters 
in Chacaito, marched toward the presidential palace Miraflores. I will not 
go into the details of the coup here.4 Suffice to say that the coup was 
well planned and included the use of massive media manipulation, snip-
ers to make it look as if the government had fired on protesters and pre- 
organized dissent among a group of military generals. Chávez, threatened 
with having the presidential palace bombed, was eventually taken into cus-
tody by the military coup plotters. He was later flown to a military base on 
the island La Orchila off the Venezuelan coast. Eventually, the coup fell 
apart as a result of internal disagreements among the coup plotters, mas-
sive popular mobilization in favor of Chávez, and a series of maneuverings 
by Chávez’s supporters within the military. On April 14, he was brought 
back to Miraflores.
The coup had been orchestrated by the labor union CTV (histori-
cally tied to Acción Democrática), the national business confederation 
FEDECAMERAS, opposition parties, the private media and dissident mil-
itary generals. By now, there is also considerable evidence that the United 
States was involved in the coup at some level (Golinger 2005; Al Jazeera 
2009; Villegas 2009; Beeton et al. 2015). When the coup was defeated, 
Chávez took a reconciliatory tone, setting up the Presidential Commission 
for National Dialogue. He also re-hired some of the people on PDVSA’s 
top executive board, who had been fired on live TV. However, in December 
2002, the PDVSA management, as well as CTV, FEDECAMERAS and 
the opposition parties called for an indefinite general strike. The purpose 
was to force Chávez out of power by creating a situation of in ungovern-
ability and popular discontent.
PDVSA was subsequently shut down by upper-management against 
the will of the petroleum worker union FEDEPETROL and other 
smaller unions (Ellner 2008:119). Other opposition-led businesses also 
orchestrated lockouts, while the majority of businesses in non-affluent 
areas remained open (Ellner 2008:119). As gasoline reserves dried up, 
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the country came to a halt. Citizens were forced to queue for up to 
two days to fill a tank of gasoline, and people died as ambulances ran 
out of gasoline and could not attend to emergency calls. Supermarkets 
ran out of basic goods as the supply system broke down. In the barrio 
households, which cannot afford to store large quantities of food, people 
scraped together whatever they could find to eat, sharing among family, 
friends and neighbors. Many had to burn their furniture for cooking and 
sterilizing baby bottles.5 The strike lasted eight weeks, although it was 
never formally called off. The government managed to take over the oil 
establishments that had been closed, with the help of the military, retired 
personnel and loyal workers, and production slowly regained pace (see 
Tinker Salas 2015:163–168 for a detailed account of these events). The 
sabotage affected the popular sector the most, but the popular uprising 
that the sabotage-plotters had hoped for never materialized. Rather, peo-
ple rather stoically endured the hardships in a spirit of collective struggle, 
turning their anger toward the conservative sectors that was strangling 
the country for political purposes.
The PeoPle’s oil
The effects of the strike were devastating; GNP declined 24 percent that 
year (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007) and poverty rates spiked drastically. 
Nevertheless, the government came out as the winner after the strike. It 
removed 16,000 (mostly white-collar) PDVSA workers who had partici-
pated in the strike, and took political control over the company. As Tinker 
Salas notes, “many Venezuelans applauded Chávez’s efforts to rein in the 
oil conglomerate” (Tinker Salas 2009:233).
Following this takeover, PDVSA was ideologically re-fashioned as a 
guarantor of social development and national sovereignty. Not only was 
a large portion of oil revenues channeled into the government’s so-called 
social missions that were rolled out during the following years (see Chap. 
4), but the company also had an active role in many of them. Contracts 
with foreign companies were reviewed and re-negotiated giving PDVSA 
a majority stake in all joint ventures, and taxes and royalties were raised. 
In 2005, Petro-Caribe was established, through which several economi-
cally vulnerable Latin American nations were provided with Venezuelan 
oil through long-term credit arrangements (Tinker Salas 2015:151; see 
Hellinger 2016 for a review of Chávez’s oil policy). Through an oil-for- 
doctors exchange with Cuba, the government’s flagship social program, 
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Photo 2.1 Poster of Che Guevara made by the Ministry for Energy and 
Petroleum. It reads: “with energy we sow oil and we sow consciousness in order 
to form the new man and construct a new society.” Photo by the author
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Barrio Adentro (Into the barrio), was established, setting up health clinics 
across Venezuela staffed with Cuban doctors.
Ideologically, these moves were fashioned as a break with corporate, 
neoliberal logic, and PDVSA became a potent symbol for national sov-
ereignty, social justice, international solidarity and integration between 
developing countries. To Chávez’s supporters, the symbolic remaking of 
PDVSA as well as the government’s policies of steering oil revenues into 
social welfare became a very tangible evidence of the government’s com-
mitment to comply with radical demands from below.
* * *
This chapter has chronicled a broad—and far from exhaustive—trajectory 
of Venezuela’s political and social history in the twentieth century. The 
narrative shows that oil is an indispensable key for understanding the most 
significant features of Venezuela: its economic strengths, weaknesses and 
inherent vulnerability, the solidity and durability of the Punto Fijo sys-
tem, the Punto Fijo system’s eventual demise, the country’s development 
efforts and failures, the formation of different classes with diverging social 
ideologies and world views, and eventually, the rise of Hugo Chávez and 
the dense significance of oil in his rule.
As a social anthropologist, I am interested in the ways in which a passive 
agent (oil) becomes formative for molding social and political dynamics 
and structures (see Mitchell 2011). As previously stated, this is the argu-
ment that I am trying to puzzle together in this book; we need to under-
stand oil as property that works through political structures, economic 
processes, and social relations in a multiplicity of ways. The rest of this 
book is an attempt to trace the “secondary effects of oil,” that is, how the 
political and structural legacy of oil, its cultural representations and social 
expectations gained salience in the Bolivarian process as lived in the bar-
rios of Caracas. To start that journey, we will now turn our attention to the 
relationship between Chávez and his supporters.
 noTes
 1. Ellner (2008:72) identifies Pérez with a leftist, pro-Third World current in 
opposition to the more moderate and conservative currents within Acción 
Democrática. That being said, Pérez was originally associated with the 
Betancuristas, having been Betancourt’s personal secretary in the 1940s and 
minister of the interior in the 1960s when he was accused of orchestrating 
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massive human rights abuses (Ellner 2008:71). However, during his presi-
dency, Pérez re-established relationships with Cuba, supported the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua and advocated for a strong interventionist role of 
the state as a means to achieve greater independence vis-à-vis the developed 
countries (Ellner 2008:72). In 1976, the oil industry was formally national-
ized, though, as we will discuss more in depth below, the nationalization did 
not lead to a real process of independence from foreign oil companies oper-
ating in Venezuela. However, in spite of conflicts with the more conservative 
Betancourtista currents in the party, Pérez never engaged in a real confron-
tation with established interests, and he didn’t mobilize broad popular sup-
port. His outreach to the labor movement was rather lukewarm (Ellner 
2008:73).
 2. The new exchange regime established a three-tier system, which according 
to Ellner could have worked hadn’t it been for the excessive irregularities 
and corruption associated with it (Ellner 2008:79).
 3. It can be argued that there were some aspects about Venezuelan politics that 
were exceptional. Venezuela had less visible manifestation of class conflict 
than other countries, the working class was less violently and systematically 
repressed than in countries like Bolivia and Argentina, and the vast oil 
resources channeled through clientelist mechanisms discouraged collective 
struggle (Ellner 2008:2). Moreover, the internal mechanisms developed 
within the dominant multi-class parties allowed for the negotiation of class 
disputes, and social mobility, especially within the military, contributed at 
times to easing social tensions (Ellner 2008:2–3).
 4. Detailed accounts of the coup can be found in Bartley and Ó Briain (movie) 
2003, Golinger 2005, Palacios (movie) 2004, Villegas 2009, Gott 2005. 
For an analysis angled from the oppositions’ point of view, see Nelson 2009.
 5. Most people in the barrios cook on gas stoves.
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CHAPTER 3
Understanding the Bolivarian Revolution 
from Below
“We were sitting at home watching Chávez on TV when he gave the 
famous por ahora speech,” Rosa, a staunch Chávez’s supporter from Catia, 
recalled. “Afterwards, I said: ‘there is our future president.’” As we learned 
in the previous chapter, Chávez had led an unsuccessful military uprising 
against the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez (Acción Democrática) 
in February 1992. After the arrest, he was allowed to speak on national 
TV.  Wearing his red signature beret, he was cast into the spotlight of 
Venezuelan public life, becoming a popular hero for large parts of the 
population. The words por ahora (for now) signaled that the fight against 
the then loathed political status quo was not over, and that Chávez could 
be the man leading that fight. Moreover, having for long been accustomed 
to politicians that lied and deceived,1 the population finally saw a man who 
was willing to take responsibility for his actions. A poem, handed to him in 
jail by an anonymous supporter, illustrates the sentiments that he incited 
in people at the time:
Our Chávez who is in jail
holy be thy coup
come (to revenge) to us, your people
make your will come through
that of Venezuela
that of your army
give us today the confidence already lost
and don’t forgive the traitors
as we will neither forgive
58 
those who apprehended you.
Save us from all the corruption,
and liberate us from Carlos Andrés Pérez.
Amen.
(Elizalde and Baez 2004:9, author’s translation from Spanish)
Six years later after his imprisonment, Chávez would move into the presi-
dential palace Miraflores, sustained by a wave of popular support.
Shifting the LenS
Many scholarly analysis and media accounts focus on the “gravitational 
power” that Chávez’s figure exercised, some of them with an explicit 
undertone that portrays his supporters as passive and ignorant recipients 
of a seductive political message (e.g., see Corrales 2001; Canache 2002). 
However, in this and the following chapter, I will explore Chávez’s appeal 
by turning my attention away from his public persona for a while. That 
does not imply that I want to remove Chávez from my analysis; rather I 
posit that we have to slightly shift our perspective. If we focus too much 
on Chávez as a charismatic figure and ideologue, we miss the opportunity 
to appreciate the “thick background,” to paraphrase Geertz (1973), which 
preceded and prepared the ground for people’s support of the successive 
Chávez governments. In my analysis I will therefore focus on the shared 
historical experiences of marginalization and collective struggle that peo-
ple from the popular sectors perceived as the background for embracing 
Chávez’s political project. We will then be better equipped, I believe, to 
turn our attention back to Chávez’s persona and understand how he was 
able to incite such popular support.
However, before we proceed, it is necessary to dwell a bit on the recur-
ring classification of Chávez as a populist. Populism as a concept has been 
closely associated with Latin American politics though it has, in recent 
years, also been used to explain new political movements in Europe, the 
former Soviet Union and even contemporary US politics. Populism as 
a political style is generally understood to have surged in Latin America 
from the 1930s to the 1950s, supporting import-substitution industri-
alization (Weyland 1999:379) and gaining support from the working 
class. Examples of politicians embracing this approach are Juan Perón in 
Argentina, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico and Jorge Eliécer Gaitán (who was 
murdered) in Colombia. In more recent times, political leaders  combining 
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popular mass appeal with neoliberal policies have frequently been described 
as neopopulists (Ellner 2003). Examples are Alberto Fujimori in Peru, 
Fernando Collor in Brazil and Carlos Menem in Argentina.
However, the term “populism” itself remains highly contentious 
among researchers. As Jansen (2011) states, even academic discussions 
about the concept rely on folk theories (Jansen 2011:76). Indeed, “every 
usage of the term is overly general, applying to any person, movement, or 
regime that makes claims by appealing to ordinary (i.e., non-elite) peo-
ple” (Jansen 2011:76). Several scholars have questioned the usefulness of 
the concept, though there have been a number of attempts to define and 
operationalize it for comparative analysis (Knight 1998; Weyland 2001; 
Roberts 2006; Jansen 2011).
the faceLeSS MaSSeS
The purpose here is not to assess whether Chávez was a populist or not. 
In the descriptive and reductionist sense, or what we can summarize as 
“the political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders 
who challenge established elites” (Roberts 2006:127), he certainly was, 
and it is beyond the scope of this book to engage in a discussion about 
populism as a concept.2 However, I do want to dwell a bit on what the 
labeling of Hugo Chávez as a populist entails in qualitative terms. There 
frequently is an inherent normativity in the use of the term “populist” 
which tends to lean toward describing a pathological trait of political cul-
ture, “to imply that the accused is corrupt, undemocratic, or cynically 
opportunistic” (Jansen 2011:77). This implicitly converts populism, as a 
concept, into a powerful weapon for discrediting political movements that 
appeal to the disadvantaged classes rather than to middle- and upper-class 
sectors.3 Populism becomes a catch-all phrase for a political form of advo-
cacy for the rights and identity politics of certain sectors of the population. 
Obscuring the class politics in it, such an approach conveniently isolate 
and limit a political movement to a form or a relationship, without tak-
ing into account the historical context, or broader relations of power and 
domination circumscribing the political and social domain at large.
This use of the term is exacerbated by the fact that the concept belongs 
more to the realm of comparative politics and political sciences than to 
that of anthropology and ethnographically oriented sociology. This disci-
plinary dominance tends to produce an analysis that portrays “the masses” 
as a “faceless mass,” responding in an instrumental way to the strategic 
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maneuvers of a charismatic leader. Thus, the political agency of the elec-
torate responding to this “populist call” and the relational and interpre-
tative space between leaders and their supporters tend to be left as an 
explanatory open void.
It is precisely this void that I want to explore in this chapter, by focus-
ing on people’s own agency for engaging with the Bolivarian process, and 
their own historical experiences that sustain the world view and political 
alternatives that Chávez sketched out. Arditi (2007) has argued that popu-
lism is liberal democracy’s “awkward guest”: one which we seek to ignore, 
but which is nevertheless intrinsic to liberal democracies’ entrenched 
shortcomings (Arditi 2007:78). “[Populism] is a symptom of democratic 
politics; it grants visibility to the founding negativity of the political by 
summoning the disruptive ‘noise’ of the people” (2007:78). In this view, 
populism is therefore a mirror to liberal democracy; it makes visible the 
claims and voices of those who are disenfranchised or muted within liberal 
democracy’s architecture of power and privilege. This also explains why 
populism is so uncomfortable for the mainstream polity; it reminds us of 
how liberal democracy’s idea of equal rights co-exists with the de facto 
unequal consummation of those rights.
If we adhere to the view that Chávez was a populist in the conventional, 
descriptive usage of the term, we may also read the evolvement of the 
Bolivarian popular process as a historical, context-specific reaction to how 
the particular architecture of liberal democracy in Venezuela marginalized 
large parts of the populace, both materially and identity-wise. This view 
frames the Bolivarian process as a political populist alternative where the 
“disruptive noise” of the people was finally forcefully heard and given 
a political space. It is impossible to properly understand the Bolivarian 
process without understanding its supporters’ previous experiences with 
Venezuela’s elite-controlled liberal democracy, and how they juxtaposed 
this epoch with Chávez’s political message and project. The disruptive 
noise of the people had been present for a long time in Venezuelan society, 
only to be met with violence and censorship.
a hiStory of PoPuLar organization
“Are you a Chavista as well?” I asked the feisty retired school teacher 
from 23 de Enero. She looked at me over the glasses in a typical teacher 
manner. “I have always been a revolutionary, and now I am a Chavista. 
And we will defend him to wherever, sick or not.” This was said when 
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Chávez had undergone his third cancer surgery in Havana in December 
2012. “We will stand by him through whatever, unless he turns against el 
pueblo. Then…” she said, indicating that people’s loyalty was dependent 
on Chávez’s loyalty to the people who brought him to power. “But he 
would never do that,” she said, convinced.
Social struggle in Venezuela didn’t begin with the figure of Chávez. 
The popular sectors in Venezuela come from a long process of political 
and social resistance that multiplied, expanded and took on a new form 
when Chávez emerged on the national political scene. The variety of 
movements and networks supporting the Bolivarian project were highly 
heterogeneous in form as well as in focus. They were composed of a vari-
ety of activists, old and new, and a wide range of organizations, networks 
and groups with different genesis and organizational characteristics.
Contemporary urban movements trace their genealogy through four 
decades starting in the 1950s (Fernandes 2010:40). The 1950s were char-
acterized by clandestine resistance to the authoritarian regimes, culminat-
ing with the overthrow of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1958. The following 
decade was dominated by guerrilla struggles brought about by the politi-
cal exclusion of the left following the Pact of Punto Fijo. The 1970s were 
characterized by a surge of cultural activism, merging political activism 
with a wealth of cultural expressions among the popular sectors. The esca-
lating socio-economic crisis of the 1980s generated a new wave of popu-
larized resistance and public protest which, as we will see below, became 
increasingly violently repressed.
1960s: The Guerrilla Strategy
Radicals from the Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV) as well as 
from Acción Democrática played a crucial role in bringing the dictator 
Marcos Pérez Jiménez down in 1958. From the 1940s onward, both par-
ties built their support base on the popular sectors (Fernandes 2010:44). 
However, both PCV and the new radical party Movimiento de Izquierda 
Revolucionaria (MIR)4 became excluded from formal political participa-
tion under the government of Rómulo Betancourt (1959–1964). Inspired 
by the Cuban revolution and deprived of other democratic channels, this 
political exclusion gave birth to a guerrilla movement that organized itself 
in small rural guerrilla units known as focos (Ciccariello-Maher 2013:32). 
The rural guerrilla units were also linked to networks in the popular urban 
neighborhoods, where they found food, shelter and storage for their 
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weapons. This also made the popular neighborhoods and members of the 
excluded political parties a target of state repression.
The guerrilla movement was violently repressed by the state. Clashes 
happened all over the country, and most of the first guerrilla members 
were killed at an early stage (Ciccariello-Maher 2013:32). The political 
protest of students, peasants and workers was also met with state vio-
lence during the early Betancourt years. Ciccariello-Maher quotes a senior 
citizen who moved to Caracas in 1956: “The Betancourt years were the 
worst! It was lead, lead and more lead! His policy was to shoot first and 
ask questions later” (Ciccariello-Maher 2013:27).
The guerrilla conflicts waned down toward the end of the 1960s due 
to the progressive liquidation of combatants by state forces, tactical errors 
and internal rivalries (Ciccariello-Maher 2013). The decline of the guer-
rilla movement was also partly related to the so-called pacification strategy 
put in motion by Rafael Caldera (COPEI) when he gained the presidency 
in 1969 (Fernandes 2010:49).
Moreover, the guerrilla members increasingly found themselves with-
out popular mass support (Ciccariello-Maher 2013). In the following 
decade, radical political parties growing out of the guerrilla struggle such 
as PRV (Party of the Venezuelan Revolution) and MAS (Movement for 
Socialism) would become important arenas for developing a “Venezuelan 
political radicalism,” uniting “reformed guerrilla members” and new 
nascent political radicals. Urban struggle developed on various fronts 
(Ciccariello-Maher 2013:47), creating a radical current of leftist intellec-
tuals, workers, students, cultural activist and other popular sector leftist 
networks and organizations. What remained of the guerrilla groups oper-
ated on both an open electoral and a clandestine front (Ciccariello-Maher 
2013:65). Facing a “zealously repressive state apparatus” (Ciccariello- 
Maher 2013:64), the legal fronts focused on organizing students and 
workers in mass protests, while also publishing radical newspapers. 
However, these “backroom” guerrilla groups lost legitimacy and failed to 
garner mass support, in particular after the high-profile kidnapping of an 
American businessman, referred to as the Niehous case (Ciccariello-Maher 
2013:59–64). This kidnapping case also led to the arrest of some 400 
revolutionary leaders. Many of the militants were also killed, further erod-
ing the support base of what was left of the post-guerrilla organizations 
(Ciccariello-Maher 2013:61).
State-sponsored political mobilization was channeled through the cli-
entelist apparatus of Acción Democrática at the time, which tapped into 
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the popular sectors through a vast network of local neighborhood com-
mittees, including comités de barrio (barrio committees) and comités de base 
(base committees) (Fernandes 2010:46). Edgardo Lander describes this 
system as having a “populist-paternalist-clientelist character” (Fernandes 
2010:46), creating a strong dependency on the state and weakening hori-
zontal bonds in the community (Fernandes 2010:46). Constituting a 
threat to this mode of social control, the police would raid the popular 
neighborhood, looking for those considered insurgent and subversive.
Even though the guerrilla strategy never obtained mass support, these 
early forms of popular urban resistance played a central role in fomenting 
counter-hegemonic currents of resistance. Many of the activists I spoke 
to recall that their parents or relatives were politically active at the time. 
Thus, in spite of the evident guerrilla failure in terms of accomplishing 
revolutionary goals, this political epoch had a formative effect in shaping 
social and political consciousness in the barrios, providing a narrative of 
struggle that strongly informed political agency and ideology from below 
in the Chávez era.
1970s: The Cultural Turn
While some continued to organize political parties and fronts, others 
turned to cultural politics during the 1970s (Fernandes 2010:49). This 
shift partly reflected a de-politization of the left, while cultural politics 
were incorporated into wider social and political struggle against the 
marginalization of popular sector neighborhoods (Fernandes 2010:49). 
Simultaneously, worker priests, formed by liberation theology, played an 
important role in mobilizing local communities against deficiencies in the 
health, education and infrastructure systems. The most important figure 
was the Belgian priest, Francisco Wuytack, based in the community of La 
Vega in western Caracas. He was deported by President Rafael Caldera 
in the 1970s, accused of interfering with internal politics and fomenting 
illegal street demonstrations (Fernandes 2010:51). However, Wuytack left 
an important legacy of mobilization and political consciousness that to 
this day makes La Vega one of the most politically vocal neighborhoods in 
Caracas (see Strønen 2006; Fernandes 2010).
In 23 de Enero, a new form of community activism also took shape, 
focusing on sports, cultural and social work. That is however not to say 
that that these activities were void of political content, or that the for-
mer political networks of the 1960s had disappeared. Rather, the new 
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 community organizations represented a new strategy for popularizing 
political ideas. This intertwining of culture and politics was highlighted by 
Ernesto, my host while I lived in 23 de Enero. He is now in his 60s but has 
lived in 23 de Enero and participated in popular struggles since his youth:
[During other events] or the Holy Week we carried out activities that were 
related to religion, but also connected to another element, that of protest, 
the struggle. And of course all these things, as we now perfectly know, were 
monitored by the Venezuelan state and by its security organs. In the case 
of cultural and sports activities, these were a possibility we can say, a valve, 
that one could use for capturing people, in this case youths … and be able 
to communicate a message as well, try to bring forward what one thought 
was best.
Moreover, protests and confrontation with state forces continued, and the 
focal point for struggle was the deficiency in basic infrastructures and ser-
vices in the community. The 1970s were also marked by the ascendance of 
several significant popular folk singers who combined their artistic expres-
sions with political activism, such as Grupo Madera and Ali Primera. 
Several of the members of Grupo Madera died in a boat accident in 1980, 
in what many believed was a “deliberate act of negligence on the part of 
the government” (Fernandes 2010:56). Ali Primera died in 1985, in what 
many people still today think was a rigged car accident.
1980s: The Battle Is in the Streets
The 1980s saw the intensification of a direct and open conflict between 
the popular sectors and the state. The social control exercised by Acción 
Democrática through its paternalistic-clientelistic maneuvers waned as a 
result of multiple causes: a general economic decline and rise in poverty 
and unemployment rates, as well as the de-legitimization of the political 
parties and entities attached to it, such as the worker’s union and neigh-
borhood committees. Acción Democrática’s growing inability to contain 
social activism through the continuation of clientelism and patronage 
meant that a new and broader field of social protest was opened up. Several 
and interrelated fronts of activism emerged.
Of central importance are the neighborhood or community move-
ments, which have a long history in Venezuela (Rivero Santos 1995). 
Roughly speaking, neighborhood movements can be divided into two 
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 different organizational categories (López et  al. 2002:63). As we just 
learned, popular sector demands were channeled through the clientelis-
tic apparatus of Acción Democrática in exchange for electoral support. 
In the upscale neighborhoods on the other hand, community organiza-
tions exercised pressure on municipal authorities in order to tackle existing 
challenges in their urbanizations5 (Lopez et  al. 2002:63). However, as 
the political ties between the popular sectors and the traditional political 
parties became weaker, neighborhood associations in the popular sectors 
increasingly started to stage street protests targeted at local authorities. 
This shift was also related to de-centralization reforms carried out in the 
1980s, which transferred decision-making power and resources to local 
governments, while also reinforcing the segregation of neighborhoods 
with a strong or weak tax base (Fernandes 2010:58–59). The combination 
of impetus from the cultural politics of the previous decade and focus on 
local challenges consolidated a new form of activist identity and political 
thinking rooted in local communities (Fernandes 2010:59–60).
Street protests, where students played a central role, became a frequent 
form of protest from the 1980s onward, starting with the government of 
Jaime Lusinchi (1984–1989) (Lopez et al. 2002:13). The student move-
ment has a long and vibrant history dating back to the nineteenth century 
(Lopez et al. 2002:148). Student protests frequently took the form of so-
called encapuchados- masked protestors carrying out violent actions such 
as burning tires, barricading streets and throwing stones and Molotov 
cocktails. The students not only protested against the increasing deteriora-
tion of the quality of education, educational facilities, and student support, 
but they also became of central importance in organizing protests against 
the deterioration of living conditions in the popular sectors. During the 
1980s, the student movement became the main target of state repression 
and many students were killed (Amnesty International 1980).
The 1980s also gave birth to the so-called colectivos, mainly located in 
23 de Enero (see Chap. 5). These radical, often armed, groups emerged 
not only as a response to the increasing incursion of drug trafficking and 
crime in popular sector communities, but also as a response to the violent 
practices of state forces. Indeed, many people viewed drug trafficking and 
police abuse as two sides of the same coin, as the police was allegedly cen-
tral in masterminding drug trafficking in popular sector neighborhoods, 
seeking to undermine social cohesion and popular organization.
“Street politics” is the term that López et al. (2002) use to describe the 
increasing practice of street demonstrations taking place in Caracas  during 
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the 1980s and 1990s. These represented a “peculiar form of relation 
and negotiation between diverse social sectors and power” (López et al. 
2002:9). Protests not only became more commonplace, but their nature 
was also more confrontational and aggressive. Moreover, new members 
of the society that hitherto had not participated in social protests, such 
as retirees, also went to the streets. These new modalities of social pro-
test evidenced a shift in the relations between society and the agents of 
power (Lopez et al. 2002:10). The apparent social pact between Acción 
Democrática and sectors of the working class was shattered. In the absence 
of any other arena for articulating political demands, people increasingly 
took to the streets to voice their demands. The state responded with vio-
lent repression of a social sector that was increasingly vilified among the 
dominant sectors of society.
Finally, it is important to remark that the emergence of these forms of 
street protest and tentative organization around rights-based demands in 
Venezuela from the late 1980s coincided with similar trends across Latin 
America, coupled with a global tendency to frame citizenship around the 
notion of “rights.” The increasing deprivation of conditions for social 
reproduction constituted a key mobilizational platform for these demands, 
as did the struggles for broadening “sociopolitical citizenship” (Escobar 
and Alvarez 1992:4), making identity struggles and claims for alternative 
spaces for political deliberation key foci for activism. Thus, in tracing the 
genealogy of popular mobilization in Venezuela, we can find a pattern of 
similar trends across the continent. In broad term, the foci of struggle 
shifted from the targeted criminalization and persecution of the left under 
the banner of the war against communism during the Cold War, to the 
increasingly broadening struggle between the state and a variety of social 
forces demanding basic rights and recognition (see Escobar and Alvarez 
1992; Alvarez et al. 1998).
the hoStiLe State: MeMorieS froM the fourth 
rePubLic
In his song “Alberto Lovera hermano,” the popular folk singer Ali Primera 
commemorates Alberto Lovera, a teacher, leftist activist and secretary 
general of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) who was kidnapped, 
 tortured and killed by Venezuelan security forces in Caracas on October 17, 
1965.
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      You came out of the water in chains
      Accusing, those who killed you
      Your clamour is always heard
      Revolutionary clamor
      Your clamour is always heard
      Alberto Lovera brother
      They wanted, they wanted to hide your body
      They tried, they tried to drown your clamour
      Your clamour is always heard
      Accusing, accusing
      Your clamour is always heard
      Alberto Lovera brother
      And it is the clamour of your people
      The clamour of your beloved fatherland
      Alberto Lovera brother
      Your death will be revenged
      Alberto Lovera brother
      Your death will be revenged
      (…)6
Lovera’s body, wrapped in metal chains, got caught in a fisherman’s net 
in the coastal state of Anzoátegui ten days later. Lovera’s face, fingers and 
teeth had been crushed to complicate the identification process.
Albero Lovera was far from being the only prominent political activ-
ist who died by the hands of the police and security forces during the 
Punto Fijo period. Other high-profile victims include Fabricio Ojeda, the 
leader of the Patriotic Junta that overthrew the dictator Marcos Pérez 
Jiménez, and Jorge Rodriguez, the founder and secretary general of the 
political movement and party, Liga Socialista. Other particularly notorious 
episodes from the Puntofijo period include the Massacre of El Amparo in 
the state of Apure in 1988, where 14 fishermen were shot from behind 
and later presented as Colombian rebels killed in combat by Venezuelan 
security forces. Six years earlier, 23 members of a guerrilla cell from the 
radical underground movement of Bandera Roja (a political party as of 
1994) had been ambushed and assassinated in what is called the Massacre 
of Cantaura, in the state of Anzoátegui. In May 1986, in what is called 
the Massacre of Yumare in the state of Yaracuy, nine political activists were 
captured and killed, and many of them tortured. The initial official ver-
sion in all cases was that these individuals were guerrilla members killed in 
combat by security forces.
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Venezuela received relatively little international attention for its human 
rights situation at the time. As reports of the gross human rights violations 
taking place elsewhere at the continent slowly became known, the world’s 
attention was focused on the brutal dictatorships in Chile, Argentina, 
Brazil and Uruguay in the southern cone, and Nicaragua, Guatemala and 
El Salvador further north. Approximately 30,000 people were killed dur-
ing Argentina’s “dirty war.” In Chile, approximately 3000 were killed 
and 40,000 tortured under General Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship. In 
Guatemala, it is estimated that 200,000 people were killed, the majority 
from the indigenous population.
And indeed, the persecutions taking place in Venezuela were not as 
systematic, or on the same scale of the aforementioned countries. Besides, 
Venezuela was a formally elected democracy. Nevertheless, political per-
secution and human rights violations took place in an extensive manner, 
targeting mainly leftist leaders and activists, those associated with the com-
munist party, the guerrilla, the student movement and community activ-
ism. Amnesty International’s report from 1980 opens with the following 
statement:
During the year Amnesty International has been mainly concerned about 
allegations of arbitrary imprisonment and short-term detention, “disap-
pearances”, killings and torture by security forces. (Amnesty International 
1980:170)
The state’s persecution of political dissenters implied that leftist political 
activists had to operate clandestinely. Yet, they ran the risk of being identi-
fied and targeted. This is how Alfredo, an activist in 23 de Enero, recalls 
an event of his childhood, some 40 years back:
ALFREDO: I remember once when we were kids … we had a commu-
nist flag hidden beyond the refrigerator … this was after 
they banned the communist party, we had to hide such 
things … outside our house, we were living over at Monte 
Piedad then, a group of adecos and copeyanos were gath-
ered together with some police … my little brother found 
the communist flag behind the refrigerator and ran out 
and past them waving the flag, split naked!! My mother 
yelled that I had to go after him, I ran after him and got 
him back home in the house … but the police came to 
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our house and beat up my father …. But then they let him 
go to the toilet … he climbed out of the a small window 
and ran away as fast as he could and hid over there in the 
barrio … the day after we were at school, down there in la 
Cañanda, and someone told us that the police was on its 
way … you know they had been looking in the registers in 
the Ministry for Education, ta, ta, ta our names, the sons 
of [name removed], my father … when we heard that we 
took off and ran as fast as we could up to el Mirador, we 
ran the whole hill…
ISELIN: Did they really come for you, you were just kids?
ALFREDO: They were looking for my father! It was a dictatorship; 
they came after communist and the radicals. They didn’t 
want any leftist movement to surge.
The persecution of Alfredo’s father was nothing unusual at the time 
(except that one must admire his little brother’s boldness). We were sitting 
in his living room in his worn-down apartment in 23 de Enero when he 
told me this story. As he talked, he was scrambling through all his books 
and magazines trying to find a poster of the most well-know “martyrs” 
of that time—leftist radicals that had been killed by the police and army. 
Many of them came from 23 de Enero. It was Alfredo that showed me 
the Spanish version of the Amnesty International report that is referred to 
above: its cover brown and its pages yellow, worn by time. “I don’t know 
how I managed not to get killed,” he said. We had talked the whole after-
noon about how the police and army treated people in the barrios, and 
leftist activist in particular, during the Fourth Republic. Kill first and ask 
afterwards. Torture. House raids. Violent repressions of manifestations. 
Illegal detention. As a member of MAS and inhabitant of the political 
hotbed 23 de Enero, Alfredo knew many of those who had felt the mano 
duro (hard hand) of the state. A cousin of his was beaten and hung by the 
arms in a shower at the police station for 24 hours. Alfredo himself was 
only gravely beaten once, with a metal stick when the police rounded up 
some people by the bloques in Monte Piedad. “The guys hit me three 
times over my behind,” he said, pointing to his bottom.
But as I always carried my wallet and a notebook in my back pockets, it 
didn’t hurt. Then they commanded us to run. I didn´t want to run a coño, 
so they guy started to hit me on my back. People were watching and booing 
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and throwing bottles from the bloques. The guy hit and hit until another 
officer yelled that he had to stop, that he would kill me. He stopped and 
I walked away and ran home. Some neighbors came running and yelled to 
my mum “Señora Alvarez, Señora Alvarez, they are killing your son over by 
the bloques.” “No, no, he is here,” my mum responded. I must have been 
16, 17 years old.
Many times, the victims were not even involved in politics; they were only 
in the wrong place at the wrong time. One young kid in the neighbor-
hood was shot and killed because he ran down the stairs with a stapler in 
his hands, and a police officer who saw him thought that it was a gun and 
shot him dead. Another time, the police yelled to a man passing by that he 
should stop. But he was deaf-mute and didn’t hear them so he continued 
walking. They killed him on the spot. I asked what the families could do 
in such cases. Alfredo shrugged as if saying “nothing.”
One boy over there in the bloques had a goodbye party with his family and 
friends before he was going to enroll in the military cuartel—you know that 
they hung up lists sending the boys to there and there. They ran out of caña 
(liquor) and he ran down to the shop to buy some more. There he met some 
police officers who tried to rob him of the caña. They started to fight and 
the police dragged him down here to the local police station.
Alfredo pointed to the building down by the metro station that used to be 
a feared police station, but which now operated as the headquarter for the 
colectivo Coordinadora Simón Bolívar.
There he was beaten up. His relatives started to alert people and many came 
running to the police station gathering outside yelling that the boy should 
be set free. This often happened when someone was arrested. The police 
called for back-up forces. Somehow the boy managed to escape and they ran 
after him. The caught up with him in the stairs leading up to his house. He 
was shot in the back. They put a hood on him and carried him down to the 
jefatura. The next day, the newspaper reported that a hooded man had been 
shot dead while participating in an attack on the police station.
It was common that the police or security forces planted arms or drugs 
or dressed victims up as guerrillas or encapuchados (with hoods) in order 
to justify their killings. This way, it was difficult for the families to push 
their case, and the officers got to add a notch to their belt. “Like the false 
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positives now recently in Colombia,” Alfredo said. He was referring to the 
revelations about members of Colombian security forces who murdered 
campesinos and dressed them up as guerrilla members in order to cash the 
reward that the army had promised for “dead terrorists.” “People hated 
the police here,” Alfredo said. “It was above the Policía Metropolitana 
who did these things, they were like a mafia.”
everyday rePreSSion
Everyday repression of the popular sectors was also commonplace. Here is 
a story as recounted by Juan Alberto, now a political activist and Chávez’s 
supporter in his early 30s from Catia Parish:
This must have been in the early nineties because I remember that I was 
wearing the school uniform from the liceo (secondary school). I was on my 
way home when the bus was stopped by the police on the way up the hill. 
The police entered the bus and ordered all males to line up and show their 
ID card. I had forgotten my ID card at home, and the police said that I was 
arrested. I protested and said that they must see that I was wearing a school 
uniform, that I was just a school boy, but they just pushed me in the back of 
the van with the others, I think they rounded up 10 or 12 men there. First 
we were sent to the police station down in Catia, where they left us in the 
backyard. I remember that I had to take a piss so desperately that I couldn’t 
think of anything else, I asked the police officer if I could take a piss, but he 
told me to shut up, otherwise I would be sent to a cell.
After a while came a van from the National Police, they were driving 
from station to station picking up detainees, and we were taken to the main 
police station in 23 de Enero. There we were put in a cell. We were ordered 
to line up and take off all belts and shoelaces and stuff like that, so we 
wouldn’t hang ourselves. Then they gave all of us three beatings on the back 
with a flat baton. I had to take a piss so desperately that I didn’t even feel the 
beatings. Then a police officer came in, he was drunk, and said that someone 
had said that we had a gift for him, and if he liked the gift, he would let us 
go. People scrambled to collect the money that they had, I had nothing of 
course, and handed it over to him. But he just tossed it to the floor, scream-
ing that it was not enough. We were all poor so it wasn’t much. I remember 
how the other men threw themselves over the money on the floor, fighting 
over how much each of them had put in.
We stayed in the cell that night; we must have been around 20 men in 
one cell. I had to sleep on the floor next to the toilet, I remember that I put 
 EVERYDAY REPRESSION 
72 
on the hood in my sweater and tied it as tight as I could around my head, 
there were cockroaches everywhere running over me.
The next morning everyone in the cell put together some money and 
one of the good cops went out to buy us some bread and mortadela (cheap 
sandwich ham). The other men gave me some food as well, even though I 
had no money. Later that day they allowed us to take a phone call. I called 
my aunt Christina because she was the only one in the family that had a 
phone then. But she wasn’t at home, I think I spoke with my little cousin 
Julio and told him to find my mum and tell him where I was. So I just waited 
and waited, thinking coño de su madre (shit), since there was no phone at 
home they would have to find a car and go up the hill to find my mum. It 
would take forever. Finally, late in the evening, I heard that my mum and 
my brother came. The police officer said that they would have to give him 
a bottle of whiskey if they wanted to have me freed. My brother got furi-
ous saying that he wasn’t going to give him shit, I heard my mother yelling 
that I was underage and that it was illegal to have me there. Then another 
police officer came and intervened, he said that the other police officer who 
wanted whiskey was drunk and had been up drinking since last night. So 
eventually they let me go and we went home.
Arbitrary arrest of men was a quite common occurrence. Often the pur-
pose was merely, as in the story above, to get bribes from detainees in 
exchange for their release. Sometimes, police officers rounded up all the 
young men that they could find. Those who couldn’t prove that they were 
studying or working were sent off to the army, backed by a law against 
vagrancy. At other times, the police entered the barrios with the purpose 
of finding and eliminating personal foes or criminal elements. As Juan 
Alberto recalls it, police incursions in the poor neighborhood constituted 
a constant potential threat of violence:
When I was a kid it wasn’t the fear of the malandros (street gangs/criminals) 
that stopped us from hanging out in the street, it was the risk that the police 
would come. Sometimes they came and just rounded up all the men who 
were there, or sometimes they came to look for someone specific and then it 
was shooting and shooting and no one was safe. I remember once they were 
looking for my neighbor Johnny who was living in front of me, we were 
friends when we were younger, but then he became a malandro …. I was 
standing on the roof of our house watching it … the police came banging 
on his door, yelling “where is he, where is he,” his girlfriend was standing 
on the floor in the patio (backyard) screaming and screaming … the police 
stormed in and searched all the rooms, they found him in his bed, and they 
shot him dead right there in his bed.
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Both of these stories, as recalled by Juan Alberto, took place in the early 
1990s. Stories like that of Juan Alberto and Alfredo are often recounted 
by popular sector inhabitants and activists as a manner of illustrating 
how everyday state violence during the Fourth Republic was carried 
out, creating a sense of being under permanent siege by a hostile state 
apparatus.
Simultaneously, the escalating political protests were increasingly 
met with violence during the 1990s. According to López and Parker, 
“one out of three nonviolent protests was repressed, with an elevated 
cost in human lives” during the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez 
(López et al. 2005:97). Repression of protests diminished during the 
subsequent Caldera presidency (1994–1999), when approximately one 
out of six protests was violently repressed. However, the state’s antago-
nism toward the poor had already left a deep and collective open wound 
due to an event that took place a few years earlier, namely the Caracazo 
in 1989.
eL caracazo
People came down from the cerros (shantytown hills) and started to loot the 
shopping mall Propatria.7 The police came in masses and started to shoot. 
They gathered on the roof of the mall and shot indiscriminately up towards 
the cerro (shantytown hill). Many people were looting a department store 
some stories up in the mall. The police gathered in front of the door and 
shot people as they came running out. They shot them down like rabbits. I 
saw a lot of people lying around here dead. Afterwards they took the bodies 
and dumped them over at el Cementerio del Sur in the mass grave. That is 
why we still don’t know how many people died.
Juan Alberto, 33 years old from Propatria. A young school boy at the time, 
he escaped his mom’s house during el Caracazo in order to loot notebooks.
No event in Venezuela, perhaps with the exception of the 2002 coup 
against Chávez, is etched in people’s minds as deeply as the Caracazo 
uprising.8 The riot started on February 27, 1989, and lasted several days. 
Probably the first IMF riot in the world, tens of thousands of people 
reacted spontaneously to the consequences of a new round of structural 
adjustment reforms (see Chap. 2). However, the reforms were just the 
last straw, as social misery and unrest had been growing for years. The 
distance between the governing elites and the impoverished masses had 
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become so wide that the authorities never saw it coming. In the narratives 
of el Caracazo there is a strong sense of betrayal—not only because Carlos 
Andrés Pérez lied during his electoral campaign and imposed new IMF 
reforms once in office, but also because the use of indiscriminate violence 
against the poor population was so massive. El Caracazo made it clear that 
the illusion of a social contract between the poor and the rest of society 
was irrevocably compromised. From that moment on, the popular sectors 
become increasingly radicalized, which explains the massive support for 
the attempted coup led by Chávez in 1992. This, in turn, paved the way 
for the election of Chávez in 1998.
The slogan “el pueblo tiene hambre” [the people are hungry] was 
frequently scribbled on walls during el Caracazo (Coronil and Skurski 
2006:110). Preceding the riots, the poor part of the population had seen 
their living conditions worsened over a period of several years. This was 
not only related to a general condition of unemployment and a deteriora-
tion of working conditions, education, health and other public services, 
but also to a situation of widespread hunger and malnutrition, where peo-
ple were struggling to feed themselves and their children. Rosa illustrated 
the desperate situation that many people were facing like this:
Look, there was a time when people ate dog food here, a dog food called 
Perraina. They gave dog food to their children because it was cheap. And 
when the producers of the dog food realized that people bought it as food, 
they increased the prices! Imagine that! If you tell this to people, many will 
say that it was a lie. But I remember. Not everyone, but many people ate 
dog food.
In 1989, only 30 percent of Venezuelan households were economically 
capable of meeting their basic needs, that is, to purchase the stipulated 
basic food basket and additional necessities (Pedrazzini and Sanchez 
1992:16). Research carried out at the time concluded that the calorie 
consumption in the barrios in Caracas dropped from 2327 kcal per day 
in 1983, to 1869 kcal per day in 1989—far below an adult’s estimated 
daily minimum intake.9 The consumption of proteins dropped in particu-
lar (Cavendes 1990:41, cited in Pedrazzini and Sanchez 1992:17). This 
is also consistent with what people have told me about their diet at the 
time. They basically survived on rice, some beans and arepa (cornflour 
bread). Meat was an uncommon luxury. This is how Juan Alberto recalls 
his childhood diet:
3 UNDERSTANDING THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION FROM BELOW
 75
ISELIN: So what did you eat?
JUAN ALBERTO: Well, in the morning we normally just had a coffee. 
And for school we sometimes had a cold arepa or 
nothing. I remember how it felt like sitting on the 
school desk being so hungry that I couldn’t think.
 I remember once that one of my class mates who 
had more money than us looked at my arepa and 
asked if I wanted to switch, he had one of those 
Yoko juices and a sweet bun filled with vanilla 
cream. I just threw him the arepa and grabbed 
his lunch pack and ran before he could change his 
mind.
 When we got home from school, it was rice and 
beans for lunch. My grandma made food for all of 
us, all the siblings and my cousins who she was also 
taking care of at day time. She covered the floor 
with newspapers and put all of us there, we were 
sometimes as much as 12 kids, and then she gave 
all of us a plate of rice and some beans. I think she 
must have cooked like a kilo of rice each day.
 I didn’t really eat meat until I was a teenager. 
If we sometimes had a piece of meat, it was the 
cheap ham, the mortadela.10 Or we killed one of 
our hens that we kept in the backyard and shared 
it among all of us. Or sometimes a can of sardines 
or tuna fish. But we usually ate rice and arepa, rice 
and arepa, and beans. I used to move the few black 
beans around at the plate as I ate, so that it would 
seem like there was more of them. In the evening 
it was arepa with margarine. I used to fill the arepa 
with rice if there was some left from the lunch, so it 
was more filling. Or sometimes there was nothing 
to eat in the evening.
ISELIN: And what did you do then?
JUAN ALBERTO: Then I went to bed hungry.
The Pérez government enacted some social policies in the form of direct 
monetary subsidies or assistance programs targeted toward the poorest 
in an attempt to mitigate the social crisis that was unfolding. However, 
 EL CARACAZO 
76 
according to my informants, these programs were poorly developed at 
best. One girl recalled that the relief provided through one of the govern-
ment’s food relief programs took the form of her school teacher sitting at 
his desk with a piece of ham, distributing small pieces of the meat among 
the students.
Moreover, the government’s social policies only partially compen-
sated for the abrupt deterioration of living conditions, as the traditional 
programs (health, education, and housing) also deteriorated (Lander 
and Fierro 1996:65). The government’s social expenditure per capita 
in the 1989–1991 period was the lowest since 1968 (Lander and Fierro 
1996:66). Diseases, thought to have been eliminated, reappeared, infant 
malnutrition increased, as did mortality and infant mortality (Lander and 
Fierro 1996:66). These worsening living conditions, coupled with an 
increasing rage against the political system and widespread state violence, 
help us understand the repressed rage that was unleashed with el Caracazo. 
The uprising was a perfect storm that had been brewing for a long time, 
and a rejection of the system that for a long time had increasingly proved 
itself to be corrupt, violent and hostile toward the poor majority which 
was paying the price for political decisions taken away from its spheres of 
participation. Rosa, after having described the years and months leading 
up to the Caracazo, said:
it was something … something horrible, horrible, horrible all this that was 
taking place … it is almost indescribable, I cannot say to you “look, this 
happened, this is what it felt like,” it was like a torment of many things, of 
many emotions, of many things that had been repressed and people took to 
the streets to protest.
According to the late Fernando Coronil, el Caracazo was “the largest 
and most violently repressed revolt against austerity measures in Latin 
American history” (1997:376). The popular sector neighborhoods were 
swarmed with police and armed forces that shot and killed indiscrimi-
nately, riddled residential complexes with holes of machine gun fire, rolled 
into the communities with military tanks, and dragged activists out of 
their homes for execution (Ciccariello-Maher 2013:96). A report by 
the Relatives of Victims Committee (Comité de Familiares de Victimas) 
estimates that 97 percent of the victims were killed in their own homes 
(Ciccariello-Maher 2013:97). The number of people that were killed is 
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still disputed—at the time, official estimates placed it at 300, while pop-
ular estimates put the number as high as 3000 casualties. The newspa-
per quickly stopped reporting on the number of causalities (Coronil and 
Skurski 2006:118) and the Pérez government sought to obstruct inves-
tigations in the aftermath of the massacre (Ciccariello-Maher 2013:96). 
People searched frantically for their loved ones in overfilled jails, hospi-
tals and morgues. Decomposing bodies were piling up in the morgues, 
and the city ran out of coffins (Coronil and Skurski 2006:118). Soon 
thereafter, morgue workers told desperate family members that unidenti-
fied bodies had been driven away by trucks—in garbage bags. In 1990, a 
mass grave was opened in El Cementerio de Sur in Caracas, and 68 bod-
ies wrapped in plastic bags were unearthed (Ciccariello-Maher 2013:97). 
This secluded spot in the cemetery is still vivid in people’s mind and is 
known as El Nuevo Peste (the new plague).
While the riots in the rest of the country were quelled after three days, 
Caracas was in an upheaval for five days (Ciccariello-Maher 2013:97). 
Famed for its radical stance, 23 de Enero was particularly targeted by state 
forces. The bloques are, up to this day, riddled with bullet holes. The lack 
of concern in distinguishing between looters and non-looters, as well as 
women, children and the elderly, illustrates to what extent “the poor” had 
become a single adversary—one group identified as an enemy of the state. 
Ernesto, a long-time revolutionary who has lived in 23 de Enero all his 
life, recalls it like this:
ISELIN: I remember that you told me once about the mili-
tary tanks coming up to the square outside your 
house [in 23 de Enero].
ERNESTO: Yes, exactly, at the square.
ISELIN: When was this?
ERNESTO: This was like the 27, 28 [of February 1989], or 
I think March 1, because it was difficult for them 
at first to get into 23 de Enero. And of course, 
they were busy elsewhere, with other disturbances 
… but as they quelled those disturbances, 23 de 
Enero was what was left … so they paraded towards 
23 de Enero in their tanks, the National Guard in 
particular, and of course some units from the army 
… they came to bloque 26, bloque 24 and 25, to 
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the central zone of 23 de Enero, like bloque 1 … to 
the area of Monte Piedad, bloque 5, bloque 7, blo-
que 6, they were … floor 12 and upwards were vir-
tually bullet-holed indiscriminately, including the 
roof and everything … people were terrified, the 
children, the elderly … and of course afterwards no 
one apologized or anything…
 I’d say that the psychological damage that they did 
to those people, well … no one can imagine what 
could have happened … some people died from a 
heart attack … of course, imagine a situation like 
that?
 And of course, afterwards reports were made, 
human rights and all that, but at the time these 
things didn’t work very well here, and it wasn’t even 
possible to put forward a serious denouncement, 
because if you were detected, you were converted 
into a target for any of these [state] bodies and 
any of these functionaries could carry out reprisals 
against you or anyone in your family or your friends 
… so it was necessary to be very careful.
Even after el Caracazo, the government didn’t make any concessions to 
the demands of the poor sectors (Lopez et al. 2002:17). Public popular 
protests continued and increased. According to the Venezuelan NGO 
Provea, a total of 7092 public protests took place between 1989 and 
1999, constituting an average of two protests per day (Lopez et  al. 
2002:9). The number of protests peaked between 1992 and 1994, which 
correspond to the years of Chávez’s failed coup (1992) and of Carlos 
Andrés Pérez’s conviction for corruption (1993) (Lopez et al. 2002:9, 
Table 1).
oiL in the fourth rePubLic
What took place during the 1980s and 1990s was not only the breakdown 
of a political and economic model; it was also the breakdown of an idea 
about a nation. As Derham (2010) terms it, the Venezuelan state increas-
ingly revealed itself to be an “antagonistic state” for large sectors of the 
population. A central part of this antagonism consisted of state violence 
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combined with a sense of being forced to shoulder the price for the elite’s 
mismanagement and usurpation of national wealth.
During my field interviews, I often asked middle-aged or elderly people 
what they thought about oil during the Puntofijo era. To my surprise at 
first, almost everyone responded that they didn’t think about it, or that 
they didn’t know much about it. However, it soon dawned on me that this 
professed lack of consciousness about oil to a large extent was a reflection 
of the schism between “the two Venezuelas”: that of the middle and upper 
classes imagining themselves in the core of and benefiting from the oil 
state, and that of the popular sectors who had no means to partake in the 
symbolic and material manifestations of its riches. As one elderly woman 
said: “oil didn’t concern us, oil was for the oil people.”
If we remember Coronil’s words about the little that we know about 
how subaltern lives were lived in the shadows of the Magical State, it is 
my belief, through numerous conversations, that people were above all 
concerned with mitigating life’s innumerable challenges in their immedi-
ate life worlds. However, that does not mean that the grandiose imagery 
of the Magical State that he describes was not present though the ever- 
present promises and political spectacles that the poor were also exposed 
to. Indeed, as Ewell indicates (Ewell 1984:193) and as we will address 
more in depth later on, Carlos Andrés Pérez’s golden period in the 1970s 
in particular conjured an imagery of prosperity being just around the cor-
ner, also for the poor. However, in spite of these expectations and the 
Venezuelan state’s dazzling spectacles, people’s tangible experiences with 
the state were above all characterized by marginalization and oppression. 
While some experienced a growing frustration leading to an enormous 
anger with the whole system (as evidenced by the frequent protests during 
the 1980s and 1990s), others again described themselves as apathic during 
these years. They had no interest in or concern for politics. It belonged to 
the realm of “the others.”
However, historical memory is a malleable imaginative horizon. As 
Schwartz notes, “the way ordinary people conceive the past, reflects the 
concerns of the present” (Schwartz 1997:470, cited in Auyero 2001:183). 
And I believe that we can safely assume that knowledge about oil was pres-
ent at some level for most people, even if they felt that it didn’t concern 
them. However, if we do contend that our focus in the present shapes 
our memories of the past, it follows that Chávez’s promise to redistribute 
oil gave new meaning to their memories of the Fourth Republic. It was 
through Chávez’s political message that many people internalized that 
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they actually, as citizens of the oil-rich nation-state Venezuela, were co- 
proprietors in the nation’s wealth. Through this new sense of collective 
entitlement, collective memory-making of the “absence of oil” gained 
a strong imaginative and emotional power. Following Tilly’s notion of 
collective memories having structuring capabilities (Tilly 1994a:244, 
cited in Auyero 2001:184), Chávez’s call for popular involvement in the 
state’s effort to pay its historical debt to the poor through redistribut-
ing the nation’s oil wealth provided them with a deep sense of historical 
revindication.
This sense of continuity between their collective deprivation in the past 
and their collective struggle in the present was a strong impetus for explor-
ing and shaping new venues for grassroots activism. We will return to this 
theme in Chap. 5.
* * *
In this chapter, I have addressed how popular sector support for the 
Chávez government built on historical trajectories of popular mobiliza-
tion dating decades back, and how people recall their experiences of being 
marginalized and oppressed during the Puntofijo-era. In the following 
chapter, I will explore the structural and spatial dimension of Venezuela’s 
class division, and how Chávez’s rise to power, and the political empower-
ment of previously marginalized groups, produced a deep confrontation 
in Venezuelan society. I want to start by inviting the reader on a jour-
ney where the oil money that never reached the barrios did flow; to the 
wealthy districts of Eastern Caracas.
 noteS
 1. Unwillingness on the part of Venezuelan politicians to assume responsibil-
ity for their actions has translated into the colloquial expression “yonofui” 
[yo-no-fui, it wasn’t me].
 2. Elsewhere, the differences between the neopopulism of Hugo Chávez and 
Alberto Fujimore, often referred to as prime examples of the resurgence of 
Latin American populism, have been analyzed in depth (Ellner 2003; 
Roberts 2006).
 3. Here I must be quick to note that I am mainly thinking of left-wing popu-
lism in Latin America, as right-wing populism as we are seeing in contem-
porary Europe and the US should be treated separately and as a contextually 
different phenomenon.
3 UNDERSTANDING THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION FROM BELOW
 81
 4. MIR was founded in April 1960 (Fernandes 2010:48) by members of 
Acción Democrática who left the party in protest against its lack of 
radicalism.
 5. Urbanizaciones is the Venezuelan term for middle- and upper-class neigh-
borhoods dominated by gated condominiums.
 6. Ali Primera’s music was declared national patrimony by the Venezuelan 
government in 2005. This is the author’s translation from Spanish of the 
original lyrics which can be found on http://www.musica.com/letras.
asp?letra=1389248.
 7. A huge shopping mall in Catia called Centro Comercial Propatria, which is 
still operating.
 8. El Caracazo is also sometimes called El Sacudón (from saqueo which trans-
lates into looting).
 9. The daily estimated consumption need in Norway is about 2150 kcal/day 
for an adult inactive woman and about 2600 kcal/day for an adult inactive 
man (Smith Sørhøy and Heir n.d.). It is reasonable to assume that the 
great majority of adults in the popular sectors in Caracas at the time were 
carrying out hard physical labor or otherwise had a significant level of 
physical activity, such as manual household labor, carrying water or walk-
ing long distances in the absence of adequate and affordable public 
transport.
 10. Mortadela is a cheap ham sandwich, similar to a bologna sandwich.
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CHAPTER 4
The Politics of Space, Race and Class
April 2011: Finally I had a Saturday off and I decided to go to the wealthy 
eastern part of Caracas together with a friend. I had planned on doing 
this for a long time, but I never found the time. During all my stays in 
Venezuela I probably spent 95 percent of my time in the western part, 
the poor part, in Municipio Libertador. My axis of movement, my com-
fort zone, went from the middle of Sabana Grande crossing over to Plaza 
Venezuela and moving on toward Parque Central, to Plaza Bolívar and 
continuing to the presidential palace of Miraflores on the outskirts of the 
city center, and from there on to the barrios stretching out to the west. 
The west is a place of both great pains and great pleasures, of overcrowded 
streets and overcrowded houses, of yelling street vendors and death- 
defying motorizados (motorcycle drivers), of aggressive traffic jams and 
honking camionetas (small buses), of shouting and music and car horns 
during the day and the occasional gun shot at night, of cheap restaurants 
and street stalls surrounded by the odor of frying oil, of the sweet smell 
of garbage rotting in the street, of murales (stencils and artistic graffiti) 
and political slogans on the walls, of pro-government politics and people 
dressed in red T-shirts, of the pains of poverty and the resilience that 
accompanies it. This was what I knew. On this motorcycle trip I was finally 
about to see another side of Caracas.
The city of Caracas is squeezed into a narrow valley and can be 
crossed from one end to the other quite quickly (at least hypothetically, 
if one ignores the congested traffic). We rapidly crossed the city on 
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our motorbike via the highway going through Municipio Chacao and 
Municipio Baruta. As we raced between the cars, the city became nota-
bly more spacious, cleaner and more orderly. In the east, we reached the 
entrance to El Hatillo. This municipality of about 70,000 inhabitants is 
conformed both by high-class residential areas and by low-class neigh-
borhoods in the valleys to the north. A large Welcome to El Hatillo sign 
greeted us in both English and Spanish. The road climbing up to the 
sector called Los Naranjos was steep and windy with upscale residential 
apartment buildings hovering over the sides of the hills. The motorbike 
was working hard to get us up the hill. On the way up I only saw one 
graffiti on a wall. It read: “Hugo, me cago en tus leyes” [Hugo, I shit 
on your laws].
As we finally made it to the top, we stopped for a drink at a roadside 
kiosk. Outside the kiosk was a giant stack of opposition newspapers, 
El Nacional and El Universal, while two copies of the pro-government 
newspaper Diario Vea were half-hidden on the news stand. There was 
almost no one to be seen, just a few nice-looking cars driving by. The 
apartment buildings were surrounded by gates and protected by a uni-
formed guard at the entrance. On the other side of the valley we could 
see some giant mansions, scattered around the lush landscape. The 
abundance of green bushes and vegetation around us gave the area an 
airy, fresh feeling—a stark contrast to the east, where almost no green 
space can be seen.
We got back on the motorbike and continued upward, until we 
reached the Centro Commercial Los Naranjos, a mid-size exclusive-
looking shopping mall hovering over the valley. As we continued up the 
road, we reached the entrance to a gated community on the right-hand 
side. Behind the gates we got a glimpse of a white mansion built as a 
copy of the White House in Washington. I wanted to go closer to get a 
picture, but we were well aware that two people on a motorbike taking 
photos would probably raise fear here, and I was worried that if we got 
any closer the guard at the entrance would call the police before our 
roadtrip had even begun. So we continued upward and east, toward La 
Lagunita, one of the really posh neighborhoods. Along the road con-
tinued the nice-looking, well- maintained apartment buildings and the 
gated mansions. Still, curiously, almost no people could be seen. We 
finally reached La Lagunita Country Club, one of the private leisure 
clubs for the really rich, complete with a golf course that could be barely 
seen behind the gates. Reaching the end of the golf course we passed 
through a small roundabout and continued into another really upscale 
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neighborhood. Huge mansions were scattered along the road, many with 
garages that could fit five to six cars, and most of them surrounded by 
high gates and barbed wire. Many had security cameras, making us feel 
like intruders even though we had nothing bad in mind. The mansions 
had broad frontyard patios in marble and ceramic, well-kept gardens and 
lush vegetation. Swimming pools were hidden in the backyards. The cars 
that were parked in the front of these houses were all shiny and polished, 
most of them 4 × 4—a necessary status symbol for anyone who can 
afford it. And there it was again; another replica of the White House. I 
just had to take a photo. So we passed the house on our motorbike one 
more time while I tried to take the picture as fast as I could, still worried 
that someone would see us and call the police.
For the next hour we cruised around the area. Up and down the hill, the 
gated mansions continued, one more luxurious than the next. At the end 
of the valley we encountered another huge private gated club, complete 
with several tennis courts and large green areas stretching up the hill—
again there was no one in sight. And there was another shopping mall, 
Photo 4.1 Private homes in Eastern Caracas. Photo by the author
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with another “White House” on the other side of the road, and another 
exclusive-looking gated community that we didn’t dare to approach. The 
cars that passed us were all shiny, new and expensive. Only a few times did 
we pass a camioneta, and those we saw had a sign announcing that they 
went all the way to Casalta 3—at the far end of the other side of town, 
where I lived. But the camioneta was not for the people who lived in El 
Hatillo, it was for their domestic servants, mostly women, but also a few 
men who were probably guards and gardeners. They were looking tiredly 
out of the window, all of them notably darker than the few locals we saw. 
My friend commented that a friend of his who worked as a delivery boy 
once had the door opened in this neighborhood by a woman that was 
dressed in a black-and-white domestic servant uniform as in the television 
soap operas, complete with the hair cap and everything. I didn’t even want 
to think of how early you had to get up in the morning if you were to cross 
Caracas from a western barrio up to El Hatillo by bus.
In the afternoon, we went back to the shopping mall Los Naranjos. 
On the way up to the food court we passed two TV personalities. We sat 
down at an Asian restaurant, starving after the long trip. Next to us were 
two women and a teenage girl eating sushi. One of the women, prob-
ably in her thirties, was talking in a loud voice about her recent return 
trip from Miami and how the plane had been delayed from a stop-over 
in Panama and how her father had called the airline company to demand 
to know where she was. Three teenage boys were sitting at another table 
with a “fuck the world” expression on their faces, all dressed in trendy, 
expensive sporting clothes, fiddling with their Blackberries (another status 
symbol) and eating sushi. On the other side of the room a group of peo-
ple had occupied two tables. They were all fair-skinned, well-dressed and 
self- confidently gesticulating—with the exception of one person around 
the table, the darker-skinned nanny that they had brought with them to 
occasionally hold one of the toddlers. So as to make it clear that she was 
not one of them, she was dressed in the kind of shirt that the women who 
work in kindergartens use—a blue overall with prints of dancing bears on. 
Her hair was up in a bun. The hair of the other women looked shiny and 
perfect as if it had just been done by the hairdresser. In the west of Caracas, 
the nanny could have been my next-door neighbor, or any woman in the 
street; here she stood out, the only one in the group with mixed-race fea-
tures marked by a hard life, sitting quietly and with a bent back.
It was getting late. We got back on the motorbike again and slowly 
descended the long and winding road down to the middle-class area of 
El Cafetal. If I turned my head to the right, I could see Petare, perhaps 
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some two kilometers away in air distance. Petare is said to be the largest 
shantytown in Latin America, located in Municipio Sucre, on the border 
between Distrito Capital and Estado Miranda. As a displaced pincushion 
it lay there, thousands of red brick ranchos and spiderweb-like telephone 
and electricity cables sprawling up the mountain right next to the other-
wise wealthy sectors in the east. From Petare comes a steady stream of 
news reports of murders and robberies and houses that are falling apart 
when it rains, but it is also conveniently close to its richer neighborhoods 
and a source of labor for bars and restaurants, shops and services, domestic 
servants and private guards.
As we reach the highway and the border of the El Hatillo Municipality, 
there is a sign welcoming us back, in both Spanish and English. There 
is also a blue sign—apparently set up by the municipality—asking: “Is 
your vehicle insured?” It was probably a reminder for the good people 
of El Hatillo that they were now leaving the safe haven of their gates and 
guards, and entering the dangerous jungle that is the rest of Caracas.
* * *
The contrast between wealth and poverty in Caracas is glaring for any visi-
tor. The physical features of Caracas, cramped into a narrow valley, make 
it even more evident. Paradoxically, when traveling on the highway from 
the international airport of Maiquetia, along the coast and then into the 
city of Caracas, one inevitably has to pass the enormous, sprawling shanty-
town hills of, among others, Gramoven, Carretera Vieja, El Limón and 23 
de Enero. A friend of mine once said that rich people, rushing by in their 
SUVs on their way home to eastern Caracas, probably just close their eyes 
when they pass these communities, pretending they are not there. Maybe 
that is true. Or perhaps they do see them, but what they see is “the space 
of the others”: something that doesn’t concern them or is part of their 
life world.
But the two extremes of Venezuelan society, the opulent mansions in 
the east and the ramshackle ranchos (shacks) in the west, are like two sides 
of the same coin. People’s lives on either side of town are bound together 
by a common past, shaped by the twists and turns of politics, history and 
life. As discussed in previous chapters, Venezuela was shaped by oil flowing 
into a society structured by its colonial past. If we can grasp the conse-
quences this had on creating different social groups inhabiting completely 
different life worlds, we are one step closer to understanding the underly-
ing conflict shaping political processes in the Chávez era.
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Manifestations of social inequality
Viewing the physical habitat as a surface expression of much deeper social 
histories and historical-political developments, the city-valley of Caracas is, 
more than anything else, a testament to the unequal distribution of riches 
and radical differences in life quality that characterize not only Venezuela, 
but also the entire continent. Deep poverty and overwhelming luxury 
are found side by side, as in most Latin American cities. This is nothing 
new, but rather a basic feature of the continent since colonial times. Latin 
America and the Caribbean is the region of the world with the highest 
levels of inequality, characterized by three main features: “[inequality] is 
high, it is persistent, and it reproduces itself within a context of low socio- 
economic mobility” (UNDP 2010:19).
The continental shift to neoliberal policies in the 1980s dramatically 
exacerbated social inequalities. Contracted economies, a downscaling 
of the productive sectors of the economy with the subsequent contrac-
tion of job markets, de-regulation and privatization of basic services and 
the reduction of social spending all led to increasing poverty rates and 
more social inequalities. As part of this process of social disruptions and 
economic changes, a redrawing of spatial and social maps has been tak-
ing place in urban centers in recent decades. The essence of these recent 
urbanization processes are new forms of spatial segregation and social 
discrimination, whereby those who can afford it, that is, the middle 
and upper classes, increasingly withdraw from public spaces in favor of 
 building “exclusive, fortified enclaves for their residence, work, leisure, 
and consumption” (Caldeira 2000:1).
Caracas is no different in this respect. Those who can afford it live in 
mansions, gated communities and closed-off condominiums, pass their 
leisure time in expensive private clubs, use private transportation, send 
their children to expensive private schools and use private medical facili-
ties. Vacations are spent in the USA, preferably Miami, and in Europe, 
Aruba, the Dominican Republic, or other high-class destinations. These 
are possibilities and places that are inaccessible for the poor. As a con-
sequence, there are few or no spaces left for public interaction between 
those at the bottom and those at the top of the class hierarchy. The pre-
dominant types of cross-class encounters are those between employer 
and employee, and service buyer and service provider. “The rich” know 
“the poor” only as their employees, security guards, maids, bartenders, 
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waitresses and shop keepers. There are few or no arenas in which different 
social classes mingle and few or no spaces that are non-hierarchical or have 
the potential to transgress class boundaries. The only spaces where dif-
ferent social classes can potentially mingle are the shopping malls. Thus, 
paradoxically, the consumer capitalism following the de-industrialization 
that drove social classes even more apart is also the force uniting them—
on the surface at least.
stratified Media spaces
The increasing monopolization and privatization of media and communi-
cation further reduced spaces available for public debate and deliberation 
(Fernandes 2010:2), strengthening the domination of the worldview and 
the interests of the powerful. This is also the case in Venezuela, where the 
media, contrary to what the opposition and national and international 
media commonly claim, was overwhelmingly dominated by private actors 
also under Chávez’s rule (Weissbrot and Ruttenberg 2010; BBC 2012; 
Sapiezynska 2017:207).
Mixing media ownership and political and economic interests in a 
manner that would in no way be acceptable in Europe, media moguls 
in Latin America, including Venezuela, hold an enormous power—not 
only in furthering their own interests, but also in defining perceptions 
of citizenship and society. It was only after Chávez came to power that 
dark-skinned, poor people became legitimate protagonists in Venezuelan 
media, through governmental and grassroots media (Schiller 2011). The 
private channels are still displaying predominantly white people, and if 
colored and poor people are portrayed, it is more often than not as fools, 
villains or victims in news reports or soap operas.
cleavages revealed
“Chávez destroyed the harmonious society that we once had,” was one of 
the truisms repeatedly stated by Chávez’s opponents. This statement can 
be taken as a testament to the affluent minority’s lack of knowledge about 
the lives of the poor. As one female Chávez’s supporter worded it:
They [the opposition/middle- and upper class] never knew anything about 
the living conditions in the rest of the society. They didn’t have to use public 
transport because they had their own cars. They didn’t need to use public 
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hospitals because they were insured at private clinics. They didn’t have to 
care about pensions or social security because they had money. They didn’t 
have to worry about crime because they had their private security firms. 
They knew nothing about all this and they don’t understand what is hap-
pening here because they don’t understand the background for it. It is like 
Chávez once said: even if we placed the opposition on a pedestal covered 
with diamonds, they would still hate us.
Chávez’s coming to power laid bare the existing cleavages in Venezuelan 
society, at the same time as these cleavages were exacerbated by the ensu-
ing political struggle between different social groups and classes. As the 
Chávez government provided the poor and colored with a renewed sta-
tus, self-confidence and visibility in Venezuelan society, deep-seated and 
racialized stereotypes and prejudices against “the poor” became highly 
accentuated among the whiter and wealthier. At the same time, govern-
ment supporters framed their antagonism against the elites in politically 
charged terms, criticizing the middle classes for being “bourgeois” para-
sites as well as traitors of national interests. Underlying these conflicts 
were deep racialized tensions harking back to the country’s colonial 
formation.
the salience of race
The issue of race is an under-communicated, yet omnipresent feature of 
Venezuelan society. “Here in Venezuela there is no racism,” people some-
times told me. “Here we all mingle.” Nothing could be further from 
the truth. From the blonde European-looking women in skimpy biki-
nis figuring on the ever-present propaganda posters for the beer brand 
Polar, to people’s vernacular conception of beauty; from the overwhelm-
ing whiteness of private media celebrities, to the differences in skin color 
between people in pro-opposition marches and people in pro-govern-
ment marches: skin color is a vehicle through which racial hierarchy and 
prejudices speak.
The hierarchicalization of people based on color and race in Latin 
America has deep historical roots dating back to the Spanish invasion of 
indigenous land, the import of African slaves and the political conquest 
and domination of the continent constituting the Europeans as the supe-
rior victors. The white Spaniards constituted themselves as a race supe-
rior to those of black and indigenous people: a belief that found support 
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in religion, politics and scientific beliefs at the time (see Harrison 1995; 
Hoffman and Centeno 2003; Mullings 2005).
In the post-emancipation period, Venezuelan elites regarded blacks 
as inferiors because they were associated with their status as slaves, per-
ceived of as a separate cast designed to work for the whites (Wright 
1990:5). Hence, the elites did not consider themselves racist, but 
rather attributed their contempt for blacks to the fact that they were 
poor—a just socio- economic classification in the elites’ eyes, rather than 
a racial categorization (Wright 1990:5). However, black and colored 
people held important positions among regional and national elites 
after Venezuela’s independence in 1830. The lack of a strong central 
state allowed black and colored individuals to establish themselves as 
regional caudillos through using military might, and pardos (the term 
used to describe the racial amalgam of Europeans, blacks and Indians) 
were found in the federal agencies and military organizations (Wright 
1990:10).
the Myth of racial deMocracy
In the 1890s, leading Venezuelan intellectuals talked about the need to 
“whiten the race” by encouraging the immigration of white Europeans, 
while blocking the immigration of non-whites (Wright 1990:2; Tinker 
2009:133; Derham 2010:69). Attributing racial dispositions to genetic 
deficiencies (Derham 2010:69) they didn’t perceive blacks and pardos as 
compatible with democratic self-rule, and advocated for a strong cen-
tralist government that they eventually found in Juan Vicente Gómez’s 
regime (Wright 1990:10). Following Gómez’s death in 1935, the sub-
sequent heads of state took a more “open-minded” stance on the cor-
relations between race and democratic inclinations, allowing Acción 
Democrática to form its party with a leadership drawing from mixed-race 
and middle- class groups. Moreover, Acción Democrática soon found 
alliances with pardos and blacks (Wright 1990:10), turning the notion 
of racial democracy into their official party ideology (Wright 1990:11). 
These changes were seen as threatening by the white elites, not necessar-
ily because of the threat of color, but rather because of the threat of the 
mobilization and rise of the lower classes (Wright 1990:11). Immigration 
processes driven by the bourgeoning oil industry also raised a lot of con-
troversy. Leading intellectuals were overtly concerned with the dangers 
 THE MYTH OF RACIAL DEMOCRACY 
94 
of colored immigration, as the oil industry attracted workers both of 
North American, European, Asian and Afro-West Indian origins (Wright 
1990:132–133).
disposable savages
However, as Acción Democrática and COPEI consolidated their gov-
ernance following 1959, racial democracy gradually became the domi-
nant official ideology, sustained by a populist-nationalist hegemony. This 
provided the Venezuelan lower and predominantly colored classes with 
a legitimate position in the lower end of the social hierarchy during the 
Fourth Republic until the social breakdown in the 1980s. They were por-
trayed as el pueblo; “as virtuous, albeit ignorant, and therefore in need 
of guidance” (Coronil and Skurski 2006:199). This perception changed 
notably as social conflict increased in the 1980s and 1990s. The esca-
lating tensions between the elites and the poor transformed el pueblo 
from a noble mass to an unruly mass that threatened the civilizatory 
harmony of the nation (Coronil and Skurski 2006). This shift brought 
out in the open the underlying colonial racial templates associating color 
with primitivism and inherent inferiority. As Coronil and Skurski dem-
onstrate through a minute analysis of the public reactions to the Amparo 
massacre in 1988 and el Caracazo in 1989, both instances “made salient 
suppressed conceptions of the poor as disposable savages” (Coronil and 
Skurski 2006:123).
the poor in velvet seats
When Chávez emerged on the political scene during the attempted coup 
in 1992, Venezuela’s self-imagery as a racial democracy with a pacted 
class-compromise had been thoroughly shattered. When he a few years 
later ran as a presidential candidate, the poor saw in him the possibility to 
finally be represented by someone who didn’t only understand them, but 
who also looked like them. With his mixed-race physical features and poor 
background, Chávez turned himself into the first statesman to not only 
speak for the poor, but also with them. As his presidency evolved, the poor 
and colored became increasingly visible in those public spaces that had 
been previously controlled and defined by the middle- and upper classes. 
Suddenly, they had access to media, to politicians, and to other arenas that 
were previously forbidden territory. Many times, people told me of how 
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the pompous concert hall, Teresa Careño, in downtown Caracas, with its 
soft, red velvet seats, had suddenly become accessible to the poor classes. 
Not only was it being used for political meetings, but discount tickets were 
also sold for cultural events such as concerts, plays and operas. Previously, 
this concert hall was the exclusive space of the elites.
And never before had the poor classes been able to enter the offices of 
government ministries or of the National Assembly to directly talk to the 
decision-makers. Suddenly, the poor were at the center of the political 
agenda, and they could meet with politicians and even solicit their pres-
ence in meetings organized by the popular sector. No longer did they have 
to bow to power and privilege. The stigma of poverty had been removed 
and converted into a symbol of pride, strength and virtuousness. Gerardo, 
a young man in his late 20s once told me of when he used to work as a 
delivery boy. Equipped with a motorbike, he ran errands for a company 
around town—a common occupation where mail services are highly defi-
cient. He always felt so ashamed and intimidated when he walked into the 
nice office buildings. The employees would disapprovingly look at him 
and his grimy face covered with traffic dust. “Things had changed,” he 
said. Poor people no longer felt ashamed.
For the middle and upper classes, who were used to having monop-
oly over defining social and political hegemony, this immense social and 
political change came as a shock. Not only was the country suddenly ruled 
by colored people that, in their eyes, were not capable or entitled to rule 
a country (Fernandes 2010:118), but all of a sudden poor people were 
imposing themselves across social and political spaces and claiming power 
and privileges. The wealthy homeowners in eastern Caracas complained 
that their maids and gardeners had become too demanding and assertive. 
As political tensions rose, the class and race cards were increasingly played 
by the wealthy to demonstrate their disgust with the government and its 
followers.
Monkeys, Marginals and Mobs
The racial dimension of their political disdain was evidenced in the fre-
quent portrayal of Hugo Chávez, and other colored political leaders, 
as a monkey in cartoons. Moreover, government opponents frequently 
referred to Hugo Chávez as mico mandante. The expression is derived 
from mi comandante (my commander)—an expression Chávez’s follow-
ers often used when referring to him, while mico is a small monkey. The 
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expression thus translates to “monkey in charge.” Some years back, the 
US embassy in Caracas hosted a party where the guests were entertained 
with a puppet show portraying Chávez as a gorilla. Colin Powell, the US 
foreign minister at the time, was not amused—perhaps for obvious rea-
sons—and publicly reprimanded the embassy (Ali 2013). Monos (mon-
keys), hordas (hordes), chusma (lowlife, scum), turba (mob), marginales 
(marginals), ordinarios (simple) and lumpen (poor, vulgar, brute) were 
other expressions frequently used by government opponents when refer-
ring to supporters of the Chávez government. Another expression was 
that the government’s supporters have a bozal de arepa (muzzle of arepa). 
The muzzle full of arepas is in this case used to suggest that the poor 
were silenced and fooled by government handouts. Another deroga-
tory expression used to refer to poor people in general is tierruos, which 
comes from tierra (soil). The expression harks back to when the streets 
in the barrios weren’t asphalted and a barrio inhabitant could be rec-
ognized because of his or her soil-covered feet upon entering the city 
center. Another term is pata en el suelo, simply meaning “hoofs on the 
ground,” referring to a person who cannot afford to buy shoes and thus 
walks barefoot.
civil society and Mobs
Scholars have drawn attention to how both oppositional groups and affili-
ated private media consistently portray themselves as “civil society groups,” 
whereas government supporters are described as hordes, mobs and scum 
(Fernandes 2010:118; Duno-Gottberg 2011). As Duno-Gottberg writes 
about how the private Venezuelan media portrayed the popular mobi-
lization during the 2002 coup: “As a mob, they were undifferentiated, 
faceless” (Duno-Gottberg 2009:160). They were cast as barbaric, irra-
tional and violent, and deprived of political rationale (Duno-Gottberg 
2009:160). The “civil society” of the middle and upper classes in con-
trast, represented order, reason, modernity and prudence, exercising their 
 political agency in manners consistent with legitimate middle-class citizen-
ship in modern capitalist societies.
The imagery of the poor as a mob can also be found in a more recent 
story. This was experienced first-hand by a middle-class friend of mine. 
During the 2014 demonstrations and guarimbas (violent riots) carried 
out by oppositional middle-class youth and students, there were fears 
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among middle-class citizens that government supporters would come to 
their neighborhoods to retaliate. At a meeting in one of the gated con-
dominiums close to the city center, they were discussing how to defend 
themselves if their gates were attacked by furious barrio dwellers. The 
suggestion that many of the residents found the most attractive was that 
they would gather at the roof of the building and throw boiling cooking 
oil down at the invaders. The hordes never came.
the ideology of the resentful
Another recurrent middle-class template of Chávez’s supporters is that 
they were resentidos (resentful) toward the rich, wanting what was not 
rightfully theirs at the expense of “hardworking” people. It is a com-
mon perception among the middle and upper classes that the poor are 
poor because they are lazy and incapable of “superarse y salir adelante” 
[improve themselves and move forward]. In contrast, the rich have what 
they have because of their hard work, and not because of inherited privi-
leges, their birthed social position, or structural inequalities. Chavismo 
appealed to the poor, according to this perception, because it gave them 
handouts and fed upon the hatred toward the rich. For example, an op-ed 
in the Venezuelan daily newspaper El Universal, titled “La ideología del 
resentido” [the ideology of the resentful], read: “As a central strategy, the 
Señor President [Chávez] appeals to the abandonment of the marginal, 
making him feel valued and to a great extent feeding their hatred towards 
the richest” (Guerra 2009, author’s translation from Spanish). Guerra’s 
initial opinion of Chavista activists was that they were:
individuals without any style whatsoever … lacking of any apparent educa-
tion, and with a threatening and ragged expressions. In their slogans they 
emulate curses against opponents, defending a revolution they don’t know, 
with hatred as a banner, vengeance as a motor and as principles and val-
ues …. They use weapons of all kinds against any march or convocation of 
the existing “oligarchy” and destruction is left in their wake, without any 
remorse whatsoever, nor basically any belief at all. (Guerra 2009, author’s 
translation from Spanish)
The author then modified her view of Chávez’s supporters, recognizing 
that among them are both educated and even intelligent people—though 
lacking “emotional intelligence.” Now she has come to believe that being 
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a Chavista is not a matter of education or money, but rather a matter of 
people who cuddle for some kind of traumatic experience of poverty or 
abandonment in life.
The views expressed in this op-ed eloquently sums up the different 
perceptions circulating among the middle and upper class about Chávez’s 
supporters and poor people in general. Structural explanations of pov-
erty have little resonance in this scheme. In line with conventional neo-
liberal individualistic ideology—not least social ideologies prevalent in the 
USA—it is believed that people have to accomplish themselves by their 
own efforts, and that poverty comes from inherent traits—laziness, pas-
sivity, sloth, resentment and envy. In this perspective, the Chávez govern-
ment’s redistribute efforts simply amounted to a strategy to win votes 
through cuddling up to a culture of poverty (Lewis 1966).
institutionalized prejudices
Nancy, a young and ambitious woman in her early 30s working as a 
teacher in a private school in the middle-class neighborhood of Altamira, 
frequently told me of how her mainly white middle-class colleagues and 
the children’s mothers talked about government supporters and poor 
people in general. Nancy’s school catered mainly to wealthier children, 
and Nancy had to be careful to disguise her political sympathy toward 
the government. In the stories of her work environment, everyday racism 
and class prejudices were abundant, evidencing that in spite of the politi-
cal removal of the stigma attached to being poor and colored within the 
socio-political sphere of the government and its supporters, social spaces 
dominated by the middle and upper classes remained unchanged. One of 
the episodes that she recalled was a conversation she had with the former 
principal at her school, who nodding toward a colored pupil, said with 
barely hidden contempt: “Before, we didn’t use to have negros here … it’s 
not like I am a racist, but you know….”
The Chávez government obliged private schools to admit pupils from 
the disadvantaged sectors of society. However, according to Nancy, 
schools did what they could to avoid it, or at least her school did. Nancy 
recounted that the school psychologists responsible for admissions had 
told her that they singled out those applicants whose parents didn’t have 
a professional degree because “surely they cannot pay.” They also singled 
out those children whose parents were likely to be Chavista (education, 
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color and address being what gave them away) “because they would 
only create trouble.” Nancy herself had never revealed that she was a 
Chavista. “They would kick me out, without a doubt. They would find 
any excuse to sack me,” she said. “I think there are other teachers there 
who are Chavistas as well, but we never talk about it. We just find a way 
not to say anything if the other teachers (supporting the opposition) 
say something,” she added. Nancy herself grew up in dire poverty in a 
shantytown in western Caracas, but through her mother’s and her own 
enormous efforts and sacrifices, she managed to graduate as a geography 
and history teacher. She has a fairly light complexion and takes great care 
of, and spends a large portion of her income on, her appearance (hair, 
skin and clothing) so as to not evoke the scorn of her pupils. That was 
why she managed to get the job in the first place and also managed to 
keep it. She recalled that a substitute teacher with darker skin, curly hair 
revealing her African ancestry and clothing that revealed her less afflu-
ent background had been bullied so much by her pupils that she had 
resigned after a week.
class resentMents reversed
Derogatory labeling of the middle and upper classes also seeped into 
the political vocabulary of the government and of the popular classes. 
The commonly used term esqualido as a substantive for opposition sup-
porters emerged in the midst of the political polarization after Chávez’s 
election. Esqualido derives from the word squalid, or to be without 
morals, values and social conscience. Sifrino is a common term for mid-
dle-class opponents, referring to a person that is materialistic, snob-
bish, superficial and preposterous, and has questionable values and a 
lack of social conscience. It is worth noting that sifrino is not only used 
as a class attribute, but can also be used of a person that has a snobby 
appearance and certain consumption preferences. People from a humble 
background can also be called sifrinos if they try to be snobbish in their 
behavior or consumption (see Chap. 8). Oligarchia (oligarchy) and bur-
gués (bourgeois) are commonly used class ascriptions within the leftist-
Marxist vocabulary.
Burgués is similar to sifrino while oligarchia is used to describe eco-
nomic interest groups that are using covert and/or violent strategies to 
maintain their power and privileges. Similarly, golpistas (coup-mongers) 
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and facistas (fascists) refer to the opposition’s attempts to undermine the 
Chávez government with any means necessary, in particularly referring to 
the 2002 coup. Vendepatria (sellers of the fatherland) refers to the per-
ceived attachment that the opposition/oligarchy has to external interests 
and their lack of loyalty to the interests of their homeland, both economi-
cally and spiritually. It is often said that the Venezuelan upper classes have 
their spiritual home in Miami. Not only was Miami the favored destination 
(and to a large extent still is) for middle- and upper-class shopping sprees 
during the Venezuela Saudita period of the 1970s, but it is also home to a 
large expat community that resembles the Cuban one in its virulent hostil-
ity toward Chávez and his supporters.
The degree of hostility between opposition and government support-
ers has changed with shifting political junctures. In the years following 
the coup in 2002, levels of hostility ran particularly high, and families and 
friends reportedly became bitter enemies over political differences. The 
conflict levels have also hardened in the aftermath of Chávez’s death and 
the election of Nicholas Maduro in 2013.
chávez, El PrEsidEntE and El Pana1
Chávez’s weekly Sunday shows, Aló Presidente, were undoubtedly crucial 
in shaping Chávez’s relationship with his supporters. The live transmis-
sions were filmed from across the country, as Chávez was touring the 
nation, visiting communities and inspecting government projects. There, 
he combined political analysis with historical lectures, anecdotes, jokes, 
songs, popular education and on-the-spot interaction with the audience. 
His ability to talk without a script was only comparable to that of Fidel 
Castro, and his pedagogical skills allowed him to present relatively dry 
policy topics in a way that captured even the most politically illiterate audi-
ence. Through these programs and other public appearances, people felt 
that they got to know Chávez the person. He became a man in the flesh, 
who was open about his feelings, apologized for his mistakes and shared 
generously from his personal life.
While it is tempting to characterize this form of communication as 
a merely populist strategy, Chávez’s mass appeal cannot be reduced 
to a question of charisma, manipulation and demagoguery (Hellinger 
2001:5). According to Alejandro Moreno, a Salesian priest and social 
psychologist who has lived in one of the barrios of Caracas for a long 
time: “What is important is not what he speaks but what speaks inside 
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him. In him speaks the convivial relations of popular Venezuela, of con-
vivial man … an elderly woman expressed it very well: ‘for me, it’s like 
my own son is president’” (Hellinger 2001:5). The intimacy that this 
elderly woman felt toward Chávez is telling of the general sentiments 
that he incited among his followers. Chávez appeared as a friend, a son 
or a neighbor. He was what Venezuelans colloquially call a jodedor, a per-
son that doesn’t take himself too seriously, who loves a good banter and 
knows how to tell a good story—the ideal person to have a beer with on 
your door step on a Friday afternoon. He was the anti-thesis to the kind 
of slick politicians that staged photo-shoots with the poor, kissing babies 
and squeezing the hands of old ladies trying to appear sympathetic to the 
plight of the disenfranchised. Chávez had been poor himself, and he was, 
as he once said describing his relationship with el pueblo, like a “fish in 
the water” (Ellner 2003:146).
sons and daughters of bolívar
Yet, while Chávez was recognized as the “maximum leader” in that 
historical moment, his followers were not merely passive recipients of 
his political directives. When Chávez announced a new political vision 
or a significant new strategy, it would be subjected to analysis among 
activists. By highlighting people’s power and emphasizing el pueblo as 
the sovereign, the poor felt enabled to appreciate and claim their own 
past, giving strength to a process of social organization from below. 
Like a housewife and activist from Catia in her 40s said to me as I was 
interviewing her in La Casa de Poder Popular (the house of people’s 
power) in Propatria:
We, the Venezuelans, since this revolutionary process that El Comandante 
Hugo Chávez Frias is leading, is submerged in a profound knowledge and 
recognition of our history. For years, the social movements were treated 
as hordes, as unruly negros, as ignorant … as uneducated, as uneducated 
without a fatherland … when el pueblo has gathered and poured out in the 
streets, to do revolution, to break the chains … it has taken place because 
that has been moments when el pueblo have been conscious of why they are 
taking to the streets…
This statement is representative of how “common people” articulated 
their newfound political subjectivities. “Bolivarian discourse,” shared 
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by housewives new to politics, long-term activists, and politicians alike, 
underscored that Chávez’s greatest achievement was to enable the poor to 
appropriate a cultural, social and political space that was rightfully theirs 
for the first time in Venezuelan history.
What was seen as rightfully theirs in this context was also a quest for 
restoring “true” Venezuelanness and national dignity. As Rosa, an ardent 
Chávez’s supporter in her 60s, worded it:
I have always rebelled against everything that goes against my country, not 
only now, but all my life, and like I say to people … many people say to me 
in a condescending way, ah, you are a Chavista. And I say to them, hold on a 
minute, I am not a Chavista, I am venezolana, Bolívariana and revoluciona-
ria (Venezuelan, Bolivarian and revolutionary), that is my way of thinking. 
And do I love Chávez? Yes, I do, because that man has done for this country 
what no one else has done.
To understand the meaning of Rosa’s words, it is important to capture the 
national mythology surrounding Simón Bolívar, and the way that he has 
become both mythologized and reinterpreted into a Bolivarian narrative. 
In simple terms, Simón Bolívar embodies the historical quest for national 
sovereignty and social justice. The struggle that he was fighting against 
the Spanish colonizers equals the contemporary struggle against foreign 
domination and exploitation. One of Bolívar’s most famous quotes is: “The 
United States seems destined by providence to plague Latin America in 
the name of liberty.”2 Accordingly, his master thought was the creation of 
a confederation of neighbouring countries called  Gran Colombia which 
could constitute a counter-hegemonic force against North American domi-
nance. Within the Bolivarian narrative, the Bolivarian process, leaded by 
Hugo Chávez, was the continuation of Bolívar’s quest for independence. 
Bolívar was born into oligarchy, but turned against his own as he joined 
forces with freed slaves and peasants against the Spanish conquistadores. Per 
the Bolivarian narrative, his fight for the liberty of el pueblo was paralleled 
to the fight against the contemporary oligarchy in the name of the liberty 
and dignity of the popular sectors. Within this interpretative scheme, both 
the oligarchs of Bolívar’s time and today’s oligarchs are betraying Venezuela 
because they have since long been allied with, and benefited from the alli-
ance with foreign exploiters at the nation’s expense.
Often, prose is better equipped than academic analysis to communicate 
deep-seated national sentiments. I will therefore quote the lyrics of the 
folk singer, Alí Primera, that express the emotions associated with Bolívar. 
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This is one of Primera’s most famous songs, titled Sangueo para el Regreso 
(drumbeat for the return)3:
El pueblo is wise and patient
the elders are saying
that when the guacharaca is singing4
they know how to calculate time
They say that the time is coming
be alert, for when we will be happy
Bolívar left yesterday
but he is about to return
Let’s go there
let’s go meet him
They say that Bolívar is coming
filled with rage and courage inside
Photo 4.2 The statue of Simón Bolívar at Plaza Bolívar, downtown Caracas. 
Photo by the author
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over seeing what they have taken from us
from what he left to be ours
They say that he comes angry
with our behaviour
for letting down his sword
and also his ideas
Let’s go there
let’s go meet him
Like Jesus Christ chased
the merchants from the temple
Bolívar also came back
to liberate his people
Let’s go there
let’s go to meet him
They say that he comes on a horse
but that in his horse’s saddle he is bringing
an arsenal of love
to plant in the homeland
Let’s go there
let’s go meet him
The homeland is a woman
and he came back to love her
against those who stay awake
Just to take pleasure from her
and instead of caressing her
what they do is just grope her
Let’s go there,
let’s go to meet him
In this poem, Venezuela is referred to as a woman that has been exploited 
and pillaged by greedy “merchants,” and el pueblo is portrayed as having 
betrayed the struggle and the legacy that Bolívar left them with. However, 
the poem also indicates that he will return to embrace them and con-
tinue the struggle. As an associated digression, it is worth recalling Pablo 
Neruda’s poem “A Song for Bolívar,” in which Bolívar says: “I wake up 
every hundred years when the people awake.” The imagery of Bolívar 
looms large in Latin American leftist political consciousness, because per 
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their political-ideological historical timeframe, the struggle for indepen-
dence and liberty that Bolívar started has never been completed. When we 
now revisit Rosa’s pledge to be venezolana, Bolívariana and revoluciona-
ria we can better appreciate the multi-layered meaning of that statement, 
whereby she aligns her support for Chávez with an ongoing struggle for 
reconquering the nation’s sovereignty and integrity.
Often, Latin American political symbolism is misunderstood by for-
eign observers. Drawing on more pathos and more mystique than what 
is usually allowed in Western political discourse, it is often interpreted as 
anti-modern and detrimental to political rationality. Chávez’s evoking of 
Bolívar in his political discourse has occasionally been chided as a cult- 
like manipulation of national symbols. However, while these symbols and 
associations are central to the Bolivarian ideology, they can also be read as 
interpretative vehicles for articulating historical trajectories, political ide-
ologies and social identities rather than as archaic narratives steeped in 
magical realism (but see Michelutti 2017).
caudillisMo and chávez’s charisMa
While, throughout this and in Chap. 3, I have sought to describe popu-
lar mobilization through the political and historical experiences of the 
popular sectors, it is also important to recognize the legacy of caudi-
llo leadership in Latin America’s political culture and the ways in which 
Chávez has been associated with this historical interpretation of leader-
ship and rule.
The imagery of the caudillo originated from Latin America’s tumultu-
ous political history after colonialism, which revolved around regional-
ist and centralist struggles whereby military strongmen were “rising from 
power and falling from it, to be replaced by new seekers after power who 
rose and fell in turn” (Wolf and Hansen 1972:205). The caudillo is often 
envisioned as a brave, fearless, strong and armed man “on horseback,” 
gaining power through his personal ability to muster followers through 
coercion, charisma or political visions, or a combination of the three. As 
Wolf and Hansen show, caudillismo has to be understood as a product 
of colonialism and post-colonial rule, forming certain configurations of 
political institutions, economic relations, territorial divisions, social strati-
fications and military power (Wolf and Hansen 1972:216–223). The his-
torical role of the caudillo in political life rests on a particular form of Latin 
American personhood molded through machismo: independent, brave and 
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with a dose of cruelty, dominant (both toward women and other men), 
shrewd and savvy (Wolf and Hansen 1972:224).
The imagery of caudillismo as a “one-man/strong-man rule” is often 
invoked in Latin American politics as proof of the fallback to “primitive” 
politics of the past. A Google search for Chávez + caudillo generates around 
426,000 hits, evidencing the extent to which Chávez became associated 
with this political style. Certainly, Chávez’s personal style resonated with 
the historical strong-man image—not least because of his military back-
ground. Both in charismatic terms and political terms, his government was 
very much centralized in the imagery of Chávez as the one man that had 
the strength to command the political change that the Bolivarian process 
entailed. Moreover, by invoking the figure of Bolívar, a larger-than-life 
icon of the “benevolent” caudillo in Venezuelan national mythology, the 
imagery of national salvation by the hands of one single man became even 
more bolstered.
However, as the discussions above have shown, people’s relationship 
(real and imagined) with Chávez was both complex and nuanced. His 
public persona and relationship with “the masses” certainly had certain 
messianic and “caudillistic” qualities, but if we give that too much explan-
atory weigh, we lose out of sight people’s own life histories, social identi-
ties and political agencies both prior to and after the arrival of Chávez. Just 
like the concept of “populism,” “caudillismo” provides for a thin explana-
tion when confronted with the complex reality of how people themselves 
related to Chávez and the Bolivarian process.
* * *
In this and the foregoing chapter, I have sought for a thick description 
(Geertz 1973) of people’s relationship to Chávez and the Bolivarian 
process, while at the same time addressing the deeper origins of the 
political polarization that flared up in Venezuela after Chávez’s arrival to 
power. In the chapters that follow, I will turn my attention toward the 
way in which people’s emerging political identities and agencies were 
enacted in the context of everyday popular politics. Commentators fre-
quently grouped all of Chávez’s supporters into one and labeled them 
Chavistas. From an emic point of view, this is a mistake. While some 
people self-identified as Chavistas—meaning that their political loyalty 
and beliefs were founded in the figure of Chávez (also in the after-
math of his death)—others were careful to emphasize that they were 
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not Chavistas. Rather they underscored that their support for Chávez’s 
political project rested on the basis of a shared conviction of the neces-
sity of social change and political struggle. The majority of Chávez’s 
supporters looked at state politics with a critical eye, and their support 
for the government was not unconditional. Most activists were care-
ful to underscore that it was not “Chávez’s revolution,” but rather a 
popular revolution whose success was dependent on people’s capacity 
to appropriate the political space that had been opened up through the 
Chávez government. At the heart of this struggle was the articulation 
of popular power through grassroots activism and community organiza-
tion. Chapter 5 starts with a reflection on how we may best understand 
community politics in the context of the Bolivarian process, followed by 
a minute examination of a case of long-term community mobilization in 
the Parish of 23 de Enero.
 notes
 1. Pana is an informal Venezuelan word for “buddy” or “pal.”
 2. In Spanish: Los Estados Unidos parecen destinados por la Providencia 
a plagar la América de miserias en nombre de la libertad.
 3. Author’s translation from Spanish. Sangueo is a verb referring to the sound 
of tambores, African drums, and it is therefore not easily translated. 
Original lyrics can be found at http://www.musica.com/letras.asp?letra= 
1093256.
 4. The guacharaca is a small parrot that only sings at certain hours of the day.
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Every night throughout the week, community meetings are taking place 
across Venezuela: at plazas, in the street, in a basketball court, at the 
neighborhood corner, at the local school or in whatever space available. 
Mostly they meet at 7 or 7:30, between dinner time and bed time, but 
due to people’s notorious habit of showing up too late the meeting sel-
dom starts on time. Often they are sitting on plastic chairs, or they are 
standing in a disorderly circle. More often than not, the majority of the 
participants at the meeting are women. Sometimes they have a child or a 
toddler with them. The spokesperson for the executive unit of the com-
munal council will, if present, most often lead the meeting. If not, it will 
be led by one of the other spokespersons, or the person with the most 
informal authority.
What the meeting is about varies widely. Sometimes it is a citizen 
assembly, where the whole community is urged to show up because 
some important information has to be discussed, elections have to be 
invoked or binding decisions have to be made. The meeting is normally 
announced with hand-written posters around the neighborhood a few 
days ahead. The poster usually lists the time, place and agenda for the 
meeting, and ends with the word asiste! (attend!) followed by various 
exclamation points.
Sometimes it is just a meeting for the spokespersons in the communal 
council. The topics of the meetings depend on what stage of the work they 
are on. It can be that they are recently elected and have to register with the 
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state institution Fundacomunal in order to be legally constituted. Perhaps 
they are having trouble opening a new bank account. Perhaps they have 
just received the message from a state institution that their project for 
 fixing the pavement or for repairing houses has been approved. Or perhaps 
they are having problems with the state institution in getting their project 
approved.
Sometimes the voceros will have some kind of conflict with other mem-
bers of the community, and fights will erupt. Sometimes practically no 
one shows up and the voceros that are present will be frustrated with the 
apathy that their fellow neighbors demonstrate. Sometimes there will be 
political discussions, but more often than not, the practical challenges are 
the most important. Often one or more of the voceros have spoken with 
someone in a state institution or assisted a seminar, forum or workshop, 
passing on whatever information they got. Sometimes there will be a rep-
resentative from the state institution present to give them some infor-
mation and answer questions. Sometimes the atmosphere will be tense 
and quarrels will erupt, or there will be optimism and hope. During the 
meeting, people will play with their mobile phones, smoke a cigarette and 
smaller discussions will frequently start within a smaller group until some-
one yells “one discussion, one discussion!” Sometimes it seems as if the 
meeting will never end and that the discussions will just go on and on. 
And then, suddenly the meeting is over, time and place for next meeting 
is agreed upon and most people rush home, while some stay behind and 
talk in small groups.
* * *
Seen from a bird’s-eye view, “social change” or “political struggle” or 
“social policy reform” often remain abstract concepts, because we are 
unable to fathom the actual real-life dynamics that shape the unfolding 
of events. In the case of Venezuela, radical social policy reform took place 
in parallel with the formation of new modes of grassroots organization 
and grassroots involvement in state politics. These multiple processes of 
change threw up a host of unexpected social and political dynamics that 
can only properly be understood through a keen ethnographic attention 
to detail. To that end, I will focus on one particular case in this chapter, 
which concerns grassroots mobilization for the building of a state hos-
pital in the parish of 23 de Enero. Through this case, I hope to reveal 
two important dimensions of popular politics and state-grassroots inter-
action during the Bolivarian process. Firstly, I will show the complexities 
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and nuances that circumscribe ideas and practices constitutive of “com-
munity,” or “grassroots mobilization.” Indeed, it will become clear that 
barrio communities are heterogeneous social landscapes composed by a 
diversity of differently positioned social actors, different social identities, 
networks and organizational formations. If we get a proper grasp on these 
complexities, we are better equipped to understand not only the richness 
of grassroots mobilization that evolved during the Bolivarian process, but 
also the inherent challenges of rolling out social policy reforms through 
bottom-up participation. Moreover, as a second point, the case illustrates 
the opaque dynamics characterizing the Venezuelan state and bureaucracy, 
and the multiple strategies deployed by people in popular sector com-
munities to make it more responsive. Seen together, this case provides a 
solid platform for our continuous explorations in subsequent chapters into 
how the Venezuelan state was sought transformed both from the inside 
and from below, and the numerous challenges and contradictions that this 
process implied.
Understanding “CommUnity”
Within the Bolivarian political discourse, la communidad (the commu-
nity) became a key idiom through which popular sector neighborhoods 
and social movements constituted themselves as collective political sub-
jects, as well as the idiom through which local conflicts and differences 
were negotiated. Vested with particular rights and responsibilities as well 
as certain social attributes, the concept of la communidad became a potent 
signifier in both political and everyday discourse reflecting the legitimi-
zation of “the local” as a sovereign space and of el pueblo as a politi-
cal community. Simultaneously, “the community” was constituted as the 
legitimate recipient for the redistribution of oil wealth through collective 
consumption. Rather than individual “drops of oil,” social welfare, and 
hence social justice, had to come about through “collective solutions to 
collective problems,” as one activist worded it.
“The community,”1 in its various forms of organization, was also ideo-
logically defined as the legitimate representation of popular interests and 
agencies in the eyes of the state. This view was constantly reinforced in 
political discourse, and supported by a range of legislations, resource 
allocations, policies and reforms aimed at increasing popular sector wel-
fare through state-community co-operation. The role of the state was to 
support community initiatives based on the notions of soberania popular 
(popular sovereignty) and el poder constituyente (constitutive power) as 
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provided for in the constitution (see Valencia 2015:56–63 for a thorough 
analysis of the institutionalization of popular power).
The struggle for a new political model of inclusive citizenship is, in 
Bolivarian discourse, coined as una democracia participativa and pro­
tagónica. While the first part of the expression is easily translated to “par-
ticipatory democracy,” the word protagónica (henceforth, protagonic) 
needs some clarification. It refers to a citizen’s right not only to participate 
in pre-established frameworks designed from above, but also to be a real 
actor taking the initiative and lead in public affairs. This signalizes a quali-
tative difference from “only” participatory politics.
A participatory and protagonic democracy was often contraposed to 
a representative democracy, which was cast as a limited form of democ-
racy reducing participation to the act of voting. For example, in a 1999 
speech, addressing a constitutional referendum, Chávez said: “[la 
democracia participativa and protagonica] is the restoration of democ-
racy, but a real democracy, the participatory democracy, the democracy 
which consults” (Aponte Moreno 2008:19, author’s translation from 
Spanish).
Participatory and protagonic are terms which were embraced by people, 
being a source of pride and evidence of the process of democratic deep-
ening that Venezuela was undertaking. However, participation was not 
only conceptualized as inclusion in the spheres of formal politics. Rather, 
it was conceived of as a new mode of citizenship that implied taking an 
active and conscious role in all ambits of society. This is for example how 
Vanessa, a housewife and member of a communal council in Propatria, 
explained it:
Our constitution, approved by referendum, I think it is one of the first ones 
in the world which is made by the people and for the people, it indicates 
that this is a protagonic process … participatory and protagonic. So we the 
Venezuelans have understood that participation and being a protagonist is 
part of each of us, I protagonize when I study and can bring this knowledge 
with me to my community, when I can change my way of being and be a 
different person. I am a protagonist when I change my family, because I am 
raising new men and women for society…
Protagonism within the Bolivarian space is thus conceptualized as a way 
of enacting citizenship through “a bundle of practices” (Lazar 2008:259) 
that cross-cut both the personal and the political as well as the individual 
and the collective.
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the missions
Popular participation in the context of the Bolivarian process has gone 
through various stages. As we learned in Chap. 3, Venezuela has a rich his-
tory of autonomous grassroots movements that also played a crucial role 
in the Chávez era. But the Chávez government also fomented new forms 
of organizations that were situated, to various degrees, in the interface 
between the state and the grassroots through focusing on social welfare 
and political empowerment. The coup against Chávez in 2002 and the oil 
sabotage in 2002/2003 proved to be watershed moment in this respect. 
After the sabotage was defeated in early 2003, the economy was in ruins, 
poverty rates had risen drastically as a result of the strike and Chávez was 
dropping in the polls. Shortly thereafter, the so-called misiones sociales 
(social missions) were launched—a series of poverty alleviation and social 
welfare programs that would be financed by PDVSA and government 
funds (see D’Elia and Cabezas 2008; Hawkins et al. 2011). In many ways 
this marked a new era in Chávez’s government. Both the government and 
its grassroots supporters had become radicalized following the coup and 
now viewed the way forward as moving toward two objectives: advancing 
the Bolivarian project, and forging a union against the sectors that had 
sought to remove the government.
In order to bypass the notoriously corrupt and inefficient bureaucratic 
state structures, the social missions were implemented with the direct col-
laboration of popular sector groups, PDVSA, local governments, military 
personnel, special administrators linked to the presidency, and a host of 
Cuban advisors and technicians. In 2003, Chávez and Fidel Castro struck 
a deal guaranteeing Cuba cheap oil in exchange for the support of Cuban 
doctors and advisors in setting up the missions in Venezuela (see Brouwer 
2011 for a detailed account of this program). Thousands of Cuban doc-
tors traveled to slums and remote countryside areas in Venezuela as part of 
what was called Misión Barrio Adentro: without doubt the most popular 
government social program. During phase 1 of the program, the Cuban 
doctors lived in private homes where they attended to patients and col-
laborated with local health groups in making home visits and in setting 
up outreach programs to bring preventive medicine and vaccines to local 
communities.
Later, the characteristic two-story octagonal health stations were built, 
with doctors living on the second floor, and patients’ visits taking place in 
the first floor. Under phases 2 and 3 of Mission Barrio Adentro,  clinics, 
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rehabilitation centers and advanced medical hospitals were built. The 
health outreach also included dental services (Misión Sonrisa) as well as 
Misión Milagro, which treated people with eye diseases such as cataract. 
This was a widespread condition among the poor and elderly who could 
not afford even routine operations.
The government also set up, with the support of Cuban educators, what 
are known as the educational missions: Robinson 1 and 2, Ribas and 
Sucre. Robinson 1 was aimed at teaching illiterates basic reading, writing 
and math skills, while Robinson 2, Ribas and Sucre were aimed at primary 
and secondary education, and university-level education. Additionally, 
community programs for culture and sports were also implemented, as 
well as Misión Vuelvan Caras—a practical skills training program promot-
ing the formation of co-operatives. Community programs for sports and 
culture were also organized, notably Misión Cultura. In 2005, Venezuela 
declared itself to have become a territory free of illiteracy. UNICEF 
described Misión Barrio Adentro as a “model of comprehensive primary 
Photo 5.1 A typical module of Barrio Adentro in 23 de Enero. Photo by 
the author 
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health care with active community involvement” (Nichols and Morse 
2010:211).
Another highly cherished mission was Misión Mercal, which put in 
place a government system for the distribution and sale of subsidized 
food. The political impetus for setting up such a system stemmed from 
the 2002 to 2003 strike, which showed how food supplies could be used 
as a political weapon. Small shops and bodegas were set up in rural areas 
and shantytowns, where basic goods were sold with discounts up to 40 
percent. The program also included “soup kitchens” called Casas de 
Alimentación, staffed by local volunteers who served a full, healthy meal 
each day to the community’s most vulnerable individuals—children, the 
elderly, the homeless, poor, pregnant women and others who were singled 
out as particularly vulnerable by the health census carried out by the local 
Barrio Adentro health committee (see Strønen 2006).
In February 2002, Chávez issued Presidential Decree 1666, which 
provided the initial legal framework for land titling in barrio settle-
ments.2 Through local committees called Comites de Tierra Urbana 
(Urban Land Committees-CTU), consisting of 100 to 200 families, bar-
rio residents who could prove that they had built their homes themselves 
could obtain titles for the land they occupied. In some cases, this was 
state land, and ownership was directly transferred. In other cases, it was 
private land and the state had to buy it first. This work was co-ordi-
nated by the Oficina Técnica Nacional de la Regulación de Tenencia de 
Tierra Urbana (National Technical Office for the Regulation of Urban 
Land Tenure- OTN), an institution that was part of the vice-presidency 
(García-Guadilla 2007:48). According to government reports, by 2006, 
there were 6000 CTUs organized across the country, covering about 
one million families (García-Guadilla 2007:48). Given that about 90 
percent of the Venezuelan population was living in urban areas, and 
around half of it in informal settlements, this was a crucial issue. At the 
same time, local communities organized themselves in Mesas Tecnicas 
(technical roundtables), mapping deficiencies and improving local infra-
structure related to water, electricity and gas distribution, in co-ordi-
nation with relevant state bodies such as Hidrocapital (water utility) 
and Electricidad de Caracas (electricity). Other forms of organization 
were the Centros de Participación para la Transformación del Habitat or 
CPTH (Participation Centers for the Transformation of the Habitat)—
comprising several CTUs and addressing issues under more than one 
CTU’s responsibility.
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steep Learning CUrve
These numerous experiences constituted a steep learning curve within 
popular sector communities. New local leadership figures emerged, and 
social interaction and cohesion in the barrios increased (see Strønen 
2006, 2012). Moreover, it also increasingly socialized the popular sec-
tors into the laws, language and procedures of the state, and created net-
works between the popular sectors and political figures. Local grassroots 
networks and electoral committees, organized around election time in 
support of the government, also added to the proximity between the 
government and popular sector activists. This became an important ref-
erence for the next phase of state-supported popular organization: the 
communal councils.
The communal councils were institutionalized in 2006 through the 
Organic Law for the Communal Councils.3 The law was revised, also 
through an extensive popular consultation, and reapproved by the 
National Assembly in November of 2009. Communal councils are local 
neighborhood groups, organized around 200 to 400 families in urban 
areas (significantly less in rural and indigenous areas). They are granted 
the legal right to plan and implement local social and socio-economic 
projects as well as projects related to community housing and infrastruc-
ture. These projects are funded by the government through various 
agencies.
A communal council is composed by three administrative commit-
tees4 and various thematic work committees. The citizen assembly is the 
maxima instancia de autoridad (highest authority) in the communal 
councils and composed by all members of the community. All members 
of the community above the age of 15 have the right to vote, and the 
elected members of the other committees have to abide by the citizen 
assembly’s decisions. Thus, the community as a whole does not cede 
power to the elected members of the community councils. In order to 
highlight this aspect, elected members are not called representatives, 
but voceros and voceras (spokespeople). The members of the communal 
council are elected for an electoral cycle of two years. There is also a 
permanent electoral committee responsible for elections and revocation 
of mandates.
It is up to the community to decide exactly which working commit-
tees they want to form; those suggested by the law are health, education, 
5 CONTESTED COMMUNITY POLITICS
 119
housing and habitat, communal economy, security and integrated defense, 
communitarian alternative media, recreation and sports, alimentation and 
defense of the consumer, water, energy and gas, social protection of chil-
dren and adolescents, physical disabilities, education, culture and citizen 
formation, and finally family and gender equality. The law spells out in 
detail the electoral procedures, organizational steps and legal require-
ments that a community has to go through in order to formally constitute 
itself as a communal council.
Photo 5.2 Elections in a communal council in 23 de Enero. Photo by the 
author 
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CommUnaL power
The communal councils were considered as part of the “Fifth Motor of 
the Revolution”—communal power—defined as one of the five paths 
toward the construction of Socialism for the twenty-first century. The 
contours of the five motors of the revolution were outlined in the Simón 
Bolívar National Project 2007–2013 (República Bolivariana de Venezuela 
2007).5 The overarching idea for the five motors was to create political 
mechanisms superseding and supplanting existing political, legal and ter-
ritorial structures:
We have to march towards the conformation of a communal state, and the 
old bourgeois state that is still alive, that is alive and kicking, we have to 
progressively dismantle it while we go on constructing the communal state, 
the socialist state, the Bolivarian state. (Hugo Chávez 2007, cited in Aguiar 
2007, author’s translation from Spanish)
The gradual process of creating the framework for the communal councils 
in the 2006 law can be read as a radicalization on the government’s part 
of the expansion of popular power as well as a pragmatic assimilation of 
past experiences. In 2002, the government had passed the Law for Local 
Councils for Public Planning (Consejos Locales de Planificación Publica 
or CLPP). The law promoted popular participation in the planning, allo-
cation and execution of public local budgets at the municipality and parish 
level. In 2005, the government passed the Organic Law for Municipal 
Public Power (Ley Orgánica del Poder Público Municipal). None of these 
reforms proved successful in promoting popular participation and mobili-
zation at the grassroots level (Wilpert 2011). People recall that participa-
tory attempts were co-opted or stalled by political figures and brokers at 
the municipal- and parish level, at the same time as people were getting 
more experienced in organizing and identifying needs in their immedi-
ate communities. This required a new political and legal mechanism that 
channeled resources directly into what people themselves considered a 
socio-spatial organizational forum.
the CommUnaL CoUnCiLs
Thus, the 2006 Law of the Communal Councils grew out of a gradual 
process toward searching for organizational and legal frameworks for 
public participation at the community level. The 1999 constitution has a 
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range of references to popular participation, though it does not explicitly 
mention poder communal (communal power) in its pages (García-Guadilla 
2008:8).6 However, the constitution explicitly states that citizens have 
the right to participate in a “direct, semi-direct and indirect manner,” 
including in the “formation, execution and control of public management 
(gestión pública)” (López Maya 2011:224–225).
The bulk of the resources destined to the communal councils 
comes from the Intergovernmental Fund for Decentralization (Fondo 
Intergubernmental para la Decentralización or FIDES) and the Law for 
Special Economic Allocations derived from Mines and Hydrocarbons 
(Ley de Asignaciones Económicas Especiales derivadas de Minas e 
Hidrocarburos or LAEE). Additionally, the communal councils can 
seek funding from a range of other public bodies, such as parishes, 
municipalities, ministries and state banks. They can also receive gifts, 
donations or generate their own income. In 2010, the communal 
councils received 2.3 billion bolivares for executing community proj-
ects. As a term of comparison, municipalities received 2.1 billion for 
performing their functions (Jaua 2010, cited in Álvarez and García-
Guadilla 2011).
Communal councils initially registered with and gained legal sta-
tus through the Local Presidential Commission for Popular Power 
(Comisión Local Presidencial del Poder Popular), which was directly 
appointed by the president. This arrangement received much criticism 
(López Maya 2011) because it linked the communal councils and the 
state directly to the executive. Later, this role was passed on to the 
Ministry of Popular Power for the Commune and Social Protection 
(Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comuna y Protección Social).7 
Fundacomunal, a state institution with sub-offices across the country, 
is responsible for supervising the organization of the elections, support-
ing electoral processes and developing projects, as well as distributing 
resources to the communal councils.
In 2009, the government also introduced the communes—
“confederations” of several communal councils covering a larger geo-
graphical area and with broader legal, financial and administrative rights 
and responsibilities. In December 2010, the Ley Orgánica de las Comunas 
(Organic Law for the Communes) was passed by the National Assembly. 
The communes were presented as the cornerstone of the project to 
gradually institutionalize popular participation as a new socio-political- 
economic model. Gradually, they multiplied in numbers and became more 
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organizationally consolidated and integrated across the national territory 
(Ciccariello-Maher 2016), though, just as the communal councils, they 
are also highly heterogeneous in scope, form and function (see ibid. for 
details).
spatiaL and soCiaL LandsCapes
Ever since I first arrived to Venezuela in 2005 and started to get to know 
the barrios, it always fascinated me how people seemed to carve out an 
intimate relationship with their immediate surroundings. Also, I gradually 
realized how the unfolding of community activism was essentially shaped 
by spatial and social formations constitutive of popular sector communi-
ties. Seen from a distance, the sprawling barrio hillsides look like an impen-
etrable and homogenous mass. However, from the inside they appear as “a 
finely differentiated congeries of ‘micro-locales’” (Auyero 2001:93). The 
barrio contains numerous, sometimes clearly delineated and sometimes 
partially overlapping, social micro-worlds. Territorialities—both spatially 
and socially—are inscribed through local histories, limitations in topog-
raphy and geography, the design of streets, stairways, passages, squares 
and recreational areas. Each area or zone is imbued with a social identity, 
forged by the mutual identification between the people living there and 
their relation to that space. As one man said at a public meeting, describ-
ing communal councils: “Territory is not only geographical; it is the ter-
ritory that we feel.”
Barrio sociality and everyday life is radically different from middle- and 
upper-class lives. Barrios are crowded and over-populated, but also social 
and informal. Often large chunks of the day are spent in the street, and 
private space is a luxury, both inside and outside the house. Other people’s 
lives are thrown at you, whether you want it or not. Music, babies scream-
ing and family fights blast out through open windows and doors. Barrio 
social interaction and street codes are characterized by informality: the 
ability to crack jokes, to tell stories, to know the fine line between insult 
and banter, to manage the local slang and to have a generally playful way 
of speaking, often with a sarcastic undertone. The social code of the bar-
rio is very much characterized by knowing how to manage one’s “front 
stage personality” (Goffman 1956). Stories and information, be it gossip 
or news, are shared in an almost competitive manner: it is important to 
show that one “knows,” that one is well informed and well connected.
People often have a strong sense of belonging to their barrio and 
sector. Each barrio and each sector has its own characteristics reflecting 
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the h istory of the barrio and the people who inhabit it. The feeling of 
belonging is also connected to the sense of personal security and insecu-
rity. Without the option of hiding behind high gates, security guards and 
cars with tinted windows, personal security is governed through knowing 
where, when and how to move in the street, and having personal con-
nections to people. Social territorialism is inscribed in the landscape in 
a number of ways: through “knowing” one’s space and place, through a 
barrio’s or a sector’s history, through neighborhood associations, through 
local control exercised by criminal gangs or others popular groups and 
networks, through sharing certain forms of infrastructure, through natural 
demarcations such as streets, buildings, hills and so on.
To varying degrees, barrio communities are characterized by tight social 
networks—for better or worse. The Spanish saying “pueblo chico, infi-
erno grande” [small village, big hell], captures the barrio reality with the 
constant gossip, conflicts and quarrels. But day-to-day living also allows 
for developing relationships of reciprocal help and solidarity. Throughout 
the years, community infrastructures have been developed through collec-
tive work. Often—on weekends and holidays in particular—people bring 
their chairs out in the street or talk with their neighbors in the street cor-
ner. Sometimes neighbors look after each other’s children, or borrow gas 
tanks, food or other items. During the 2002–2003 oil strike, when many 
popular sector neighborhoods experienced food scarcity, many communi-
ties started cooking collectively, everyone bringing what they had at home.
patterns and proCesses
Thus, communities are dense social landscapes shaped over time, and its 
inhabitants may have friends or foes that go a long way back. On a deeper 
level, the precariousness of social trust (Ystanes 2011) may often make it 
difficult for people to forge alliances with the people they do not know, or 
those that are perceived as different from “my” social micro-world (from 
the other side of the street, from the buildings “over there,” from the bar-
rio “up there”). The difficulties of forging social bonds that can facilitate 
community cohesion are also important factors for fueling disputes and 
multiple claims over what the community is and who can rightfully rep-
resent it.
At the same time, new strategic alliances and friendships were continu-
ously formed or dissolved within a community. Political and ideological 
differences, intensified in the polarized political climate, shaped alli-
ances, but did not determine them. People often had radically different 
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 motivations for taking part in community activism. Whereas some were 
primarily motivated by hopes of material gains, or by individual aspira-
tions, others viewed activism as a larger political and ideological struggle 
that should be guided by altruism and work for the common good. As 
Gledhill notes:
Social action is structured by the pursuit of “interests” by human agents, 
although the content of those interests is always determined culturally, 
and may not be “material” or “economic” in the narrow sense. (Gledhill 
1994:134)
These diverging perceptions of what community politics were and should 
be, and the different motivations for participation, were important factors 
in sharpening the conflictive edges of community politics.
At the same time, local contentious issues were also a part of a larger 
picture of social and political processes of change. People had differen-
tiated access to wider networks outside the community, to politicians, 
bureaucrats and public officials, shaping the unfolding of events of internal 
struggles. Laws, political priorities and institutional processes had direct 
impact on the life in the communities. Political conjunctures and events 
could cause community mobilization to stop, to change its focus or to 
come to a momentary halt.
Thus, community politics are shaped by the intimate and the social, 
by the intersection of macro-politics coming from above and micro-pol-
itics coming from below reshaping local, social and political relations. It 
is the fluidity of these processes, and the underlying social patterns that 
sustain and shape them that we need to understand if we want to get a 
grasp of the real-life dynamics of the unfolding of popular politics dur-
ing the Chávez era. As Nuijten cites Fredrik Barth on stating: “I am in 
no way arguing that formal organisation is irrelevant to what is happen-
ing—only that formal organization is not what is happening” (Nuijten 
2003:157).
the partiCULarities of 23 de enero
The community where the case study that we now will turn to is tak-
ing place, 23 de Enero, is quite distinctive from other communities in 
Caracas (Ciccariello-Maher 2013 for detailed accounts of its history; see 
also Velasco 2015). As we have previously learned, this parish is histori-
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cally famous for being a hotbed for leftist radicalism. In particular, it is 
famed for the so-called colectivos (literally, “a collective”) whose presence 
gives the parish a set of particular social, political and spatial dynamics. It 
is important to note that grassroots organizations calling themselves col-
ectivos are found in a range of popular sector neighborhoods, dedicated 
to various social, political and cultural activities. However, the particular-
ity of the colectivos in 23 de Enero rests not only in their fame, visibility 
and organizational strength, but also in their spatial control. Within 23 de 
Enero, different colectivos are claiming different territories, and the police 
has not had a formal headquarter in the community for decades. (During 
Puntifijismo, as we learned in Chap. 4, the local police headquarters was 
notorious for being a center of police violence.)
The colectivos’ presence is highly visible in the community. Their names 
and slogans appear on murales, wall paintings, often of impressive artis-
tic quality, decorate walls and fences all over 23 de Enero. The murales 
also feature political slogans, images of deceased revolutionary martyrs or 
international leftist icons, and political symbols. The most famous colecti-
vos are arguably La Coordinadora Alexis Vive, La Coordinadora Cultural 
Simón Bolívar, Los Tupamaros and La Piedrita, but there are numerous 
others with less power and public visibility.
As a rule of thumb, the more powerful and well-established a colec-
tivo’s claim over an area is, the safer it is, as “competing claims” for ter-
ritorial control emerging from criminal gangs and drug vendors are not 
allowed to escalate. More generally, the 23 de Enero parish is considered 
one of the safest barrios—if not the safest—in Caracas. Personally, it was 
within the confines of the territorial areas of the strongest colectivos that 
I felt the most at ease in Caracas. That being said, their territorial control 
also comes with a price, and there have at times been a lot of blood spilled 
in disputes with “enemies” such as drug vendors and delinquents, as well 
as in rivalries with other colectivos in the area. It is no secret that they are 
armed, and some of them also cultivate a public image in which arms are 
very present. This is also part of the reason why the colectivos have a very 
ambivalent status in the community.
The colectivos are also extensively engaged in social and cultural activi-
ties, both on their own accounts and collaborating with the communal 
councils and other social groups. However, as we will see in the following 
case study, many residents are wary of their claims to local power, in par-
ticular as the communal councils surged as an additional source of formal 
local authority.
 THE PARTICULARITIES OF 23 DE ENERO 
126 
Under siege
Radical political organization in 23 de Enero dates back to the Pérez 
Jiménez era and his fall in 1959. The colectivos’ later evolution into rela-
tively organized and armed groups came as a response to excessive state 
violence in the Puntofijo era (see Ciccariello-Maher 2013). In the begin-
ning of the 1980s, 23 de Enero started overflowing with drugs. Several 
of my interlocutors alleged that this was planned by the government as 
a means to de-stabilize popular organization in the community. Similar 
statements have been documented elsewhere (Martinez et al. 2010:274; 
Ciccariello-Maher 2013:77). To what extent it was a government strategy, 
is difficult to prove, but what is certain is that lower-level police officers 
were heavily involved in drug trafficking, cutting deals with, and supply-
ing, local criminals and drug dealers. In any case, the community found 
itself under siege by both the police and criminal networks. It was the 
need to respond to these threats that led to the creation of colectivos as 
distinct, territorially rooted, social organizations. Armed and masked, they 
would give local delinquents an ultimatum: “Disappear or we will eradi-
cate you.” Simultaneously, the police (the Policia Metropolitana in par-
ticular who played a crucial part in the 2002 coup and was later dissolved 
by the Chávez government), famous for its corrupt and violent practices, 
was a declared enemy.
ambivaLent reLationship
Among the opposition, as well as in national and international media 
accounts critical of the Chávez government, the colectivos have frequently 
been portrayed as armed, violent and dangerous vigilante groups, some 
also referring to them as the government’s paramilitary branch. It is beyond 
the scope of this book to discuss the “true” nature and correct label of 
these groups, but many of these accounts have often drawn on hearsay 
and the invocation of politically charged imageries of the  savage mobs and 
hordes (Duno-Gottberg 2009) discussed in Chap. 3, rather than docu-
mented analysis of their actual form and function. However, the colectivos 
have on various occasions resorted to violent tactics, something which 
also brought them on collision course with the Chávez government. For 
example, in February of 2009, a group from the colectivo La Piedrita 
attacked the headquarters of the opposition TV station Globovision at 
night with teargas and pamphlets. Their motivation was the perception 
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that Globovision had been attempting to incite a coup. The attack pro-
voked a strong response from Chávez who publicly stated that this behav-
ior was no better than the behavior of the far right and that the leader of 
the group, Valentino Santana, should be arrested.
As Ciccariello-Maher (2013) has shown, the relationship between the 
government, the colectivos and the Bolivarian process cannot be under-
stood without taking into account their popular genealogy and ideological 
orientation. For the colectivos, and many popular sector activists more 
generally, the Bolivarian process in Venezuela is perceived of as the fruit of 
a long popular struggle. From this perspective, Chávez was by the colecti-
vos perceived of as a catalyst for a broader political struggle, as well as their 
“maximum leader” (Ciccariello-Maher 2013:5, 84–85). However, they 
were above all profoundly identified with la lucha popular (the popular 
struggle)—a struggle that goes far beyond the figure of Chávez.
There is also another important dimension to add, namely that 23 de 
Enero in general and the colectivos in particular have always been a thorn 
in the side for the Venezuelan right. Both the colectivos and the so-called 
Bolivarian Circles were singled out for persecution during the 2002 coup. 
Allegedly, a list over political activists and community leaders that would 
be hunted down had been elaborated by the coup mongers, and politi-
cal persecution of Chavista leadership figures was already well under way 
when the coup was aborted. As was said at a community meeting in 23 
de Enero that I attended: “If Chávez falls, the first place they are going to 
crush is 23 de Enero.” For that reason, the colectivos do see themselves 
as the armed vanguard for the Bolivarian process should the Venezuelan 
right try to take over power again with illegitimate means. But so do many 
other people, whatever name they give themselves or their networks. The 
colectivos can therefore not be seen in isolation, but as part of the broad 
heterogenous landscape of popular sector organization and in the context 
of a long history of struggle from below—including the coup in 2002.
from the generaL to the speCifiC
James Scott has stated that “Any carefully detailed empirical case is always 
far richer than the generalizations that can be extracted from it” (Nuijten 
2003:21). Taking cue from his insight, the rest of the chapter will explore 
in detail a long process of community mobilization in 23 de Enero that 
involved colectivos, communal councils and other local community mem-
bers and activists. The mobilization’s aim was to force the government to 
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complete the construction of a local hospital, a Centro de Diagnostico 
Integral (CDI), which is part of the Barrio Adentro mission. The hospital 
had been abandoned two years prior, just before it was finished, and had 
been since taken over by rats and drug addicts. In 2009, some people 
in the community decided to mobilize in order to pressure the govern-
ment to complete it. Both adjacent colectivos and communal councils got 
involved, generating a long-term field of interaction (Nuijten 2003) in the 
form of work groups, activities and meetings between the community and 
a host of state representatives.
These forms of negotiation revealed how claims of legitimacy, popular 
sovereignty and power played out vis-à-vis the state. At the same time, 
an intense mobilization over the politics of local socio-political space 
was generated: Who would “control” the mobilization? Which interests 
were at stake? Who had connections to people in high-ranking positions? 
Who could successfully claim to represent the community? How would 
“the community” be used as a strategic concept for negotiating inter-
nal differences? In short, the case study constitutes the ideal “condensed 
case” allowing me to capture both the specificities of 23 de Enero and 
the broader processes characterizing community-led mobilization and the 
interaction between community and state.
the story aboUt the Centro de  
diagnostiCo integraL (Cdi)
The first time I heard about the CDI was at a community meeting in 
the Christo Rey zone in the spring of 2009. I was invited to attend the 
meeting by Oscar, a man in his early 50s who was a member of an “old 
boys” colectivo in 23 de Enero. They were primarily organizing cultural, 
social and political activities and differed in that sense from the more pub-
licly visible colectivos which were also concerned with cultivating their 
image and had a more militant style. However, both Oscar and the other 
 members of the colectivo had lived in 23 de Enero pretty much all their 
lives and knew a lot of people in the parish.
At the time, I had just arrived in 23 de Enero and had been introduced 
to Oscar by a friend of a friend. He was a good-tempered man with an 
internationalist outlook, and was happy to bring me into the parish. The 
meeting that he brought me to that evening, held in the local primary 
school, was about the communal councils, and representatives from sev-
eral state institutions were present. Toward the end of the meeting Oscar 
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asked if he could address the crowd with a pressing issue. He spoke pas-
sionately about the abandoned CDI, and stressed that the completion of 
the project would benefit the whole community. The first opportunity to 
get involved would present itself on the same night of the meeting, he 
said, in a community assembly by the abandoned building. Oscar and I left 
by foot for the assembly shortly thereafter. When we arrived a group of 40 
to 50 people were gathered outside the locked gate leading into the con-
struction site. No one had the key to the gates, or was able to locate some-
one who could have provided them. As it was getting late, the meeting 
was dismissed, and a new one was scheduled for the following weekend.
a taLe of a stranded projeCt
The initials “CDI” stand for Centro de Diagnostic Integral (Center for 
Integrated Diagnosis). CDIs are part of the Barrio Adentro health sys-
tem, which was created in 2003 by the Chávez government. The system 
covered both Barrio Adentro 1, with its octagonal primary health care 
station, and Barrio Adentro 2, which houses both hospitals (complete 
with emergency and surgical units) and rehabilitation centers. As previ-
ously stated, the Barrio Adentro health system relied on human capital 
and material supplies from Cuba, based on the oil-for-doctors exchange 
between Venezuela and Cuba, which was initiated in 2003.
When I started my fieldwork in 23 de Enero in the early spring of 2009, 
there was only one CDI, located in the F-zone. In addition, there was a 
rehabilitation center (CDR) in front of the Christo Rey barrio. Behind 
the rehabilitation center, located between a football and a basketball field, 
stood what was left of the abandoned CDI building. The only other hos-
pital in the immediate vicinity was Clinica Popular de Catia, located two 
blocks from Plaza Catia. However, it was a private hospital, which meant 
that patients either needed health insurance or had to pay for their treat-
ment directly.
Out of all the missiones (social programs) that the Chávez government 
had launched, the Barrio Adentro system was probably what people appre-
ciated the most. The public healthcare system before Chávez was highly 
inadequate. Privatization and reduced public spending had relegated the 
poor sectors of the population to an overcrowded and decaying public 
health system. Many people died from the lack of access to health care. As 
there weren’t any health stations in the barrios, people had to go to the 
city center to get treated: an expensive and difficult journey for someone 
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living high up on a barrio hillside and perhaps couldn’t even afford a bus 
ticket. If someone needed emergency treatment, they had no guarantee 
of reaching a hospital or being attended to in time. People told me of 
family members who had died or nearly died in the waiting room because 
of inadequate and irreverent treatment. Hospital supplies were often non- 
existent or not accessible; one had to have his or her own supplies or buy 
them from hospital personnel who had stolen them in the first place.
In Venezuela, private health insurances are paid by employers, which 
mean that the majority of citizens, making a living through the infor-
mal or semi-formal sector, were effectively left out of the private health 
system known as clinicas privadas (private clinics). After Chávez’s arrival 
to power, a larger share of the lower-sector population got health insur-
ance because the possibility to access public sector jobs increased—or 
because people had a relative that was insured. (It is sometimes possible 
to extend coverage to the family members of an insured individual.) Yet, 
many people still depended on the public health system. Having a private 
health insurance is not necessarily a guarantee of receiving sufficient or 
adequate treatment. Health insurance plans have coverage limits, and if 
the insured exhausts that limit, for example, in the case of chronic or long-
term illnesses, they are left with no option but to pay out of pocket or to 
resort to the public system. An important and highly cherished part of the 
Barrio Adentro health system was thus the Cuba–Venezuelan agreement, 
whereby people were sent to Cuba for free treatment of complicated, long-
term or chronic illnesses.8 In terms of primary care, the Barrio Adentro 1 
installations have been vital in attending patients in the community that 
would not have been otherwise able to reach, or afford to go to, a private 
primary care doctor. The Barrio Adentro 1 system was fundamental in its 
implementation of vaccinations programs, maternal health outreach, old 
age and disability outreach, as well as in dispensing medicines that would 
otherwise be very expensive in private pharmacies. In short, in spite of its 
 shortcomings, the Barrio Adentro system was widely considered the most 
cherished logro de la revolución (achievement of the revolution).
the bUiLding of the Cdi
CDIs respond to the Ministry of Popular Power for Health (Ministerio 
del Poder Popular para la Salud), supported by Cuban health professionals 
working under the vice-ministry (located opposite the presidential palace 
Miraflores).
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The construction of the CDI in 23 de Enero had started in 2005, 
through the co-operation of various health committees with the different 
Barrio Adentro 1 health stations. At the time, the Chávez government was 
in the process of starting up the Barrio Adentro II phase. The CDIs were 
the cornerstones of expansion. When this was announced, the local health 
committees seized the opportunity and made contacts with the Ministry 
of Popular Power for Health in order to locate a CDI in their area. After 
long discussions among the co-ordinators of the various health commit-
tees in the parish, and in spite of disagreement within the community, it 
was decided that the only suitable location for the construction of a hos-
pital would be the field where it stands today. It was also decided that the 
hospital would take over part of the adjacent football and basketball fields.
The building was to be financed by the Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda 
or INAVI (the National Institute for Housing). The ente ejecutor (building 
contractor) was Fundación Caracas, or Fundacaracas, which is the prop-
erty development branch of the Libertador Municipality. Construction 
work was contracted out to a private company.
The construction process got off to a quick start. However, as Felipe, 
one of the key community activists involved in the process, later told me, 
various neighborhood groups soon noticed that things weren’t going 
smoothly.
When the problems started the neighbors over there in the Sierra Maestra 
sector alerted us, the social groups in the area, that there were problems 
with the construction of the CDI … and well, we go over there, we present 
ourselves, we identify ourselves as the contraloría social (social comptroller-
ship), we talked to the company, we talked to the on-site responsible for the 
work, and we alerted him to some of the observations that we were making, 
because there were cracks in the walls, in the roof, the waterproof cover on 
the floors was deteriorated.
We could see that the job was not done the way it should be, and we 
started to fight with the head of the company … we also started to fight 
with the inspector chief of the work, who we made responsible for the level 
of deterioration that was taking place. Why? Because he had the obligation 
to make his observations and report to Fundacaracas so that the work was 
paralyzed or they sent another company to finish it. So that they could end 
the contract and we could start up again with another company that was 
doing the work well … we had a lot of problems because parts of the popu-
lation that were living nearby, who had some interests in the CDI, started 
to attack us.
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Among other serious problems with the construction, I was told at a later 
meeting when we entered into the building, was the joint compound 
between the ceramic tiles on the walls, which had a rough, untreated sur-
face. This was illegal for a medical facility, as germs and bacteria could stick 
to the porous joint compound mass and make it impossible to adequately 
sterilize an operating room. Felipe told me that, when they later got the 
project up and running again, they discovered there never was a proper 
project plan in place. However, at the time, they were simply trying to 
identify who was responsible and attempting to fully understand what was 
happening.
We made a number of denouncements, we have copies of a quantity of com-
munication that was sent to people, to Fundacaracas, to INAVI, to many 
organisms where we are alerting them that the health center is constructed 
in an erroneous manner … additionally, it was only two workers for a two- 
story building, that was insufficient, it would be impossible to inaugurate it 
in 2007. So we were asking ourselves how is it possible that a center that was 
supposed to be opened in 2007 had only two people working there.
And well, in the end, within all this pugnacity, there were a lot of prob-
lems with those that we think had particular and peculiar interests in this 
centre. In this case it was the consejal (parish council woman), who was 
always benefiting from (montada) the health committees, and there was 
another woman, you met her, who is the señora Yurelia, every time we went 
there she was confronting us.
On one occasion, we asked her to identify herself, to clarify if o era 
empresa o era communidad (she was company or community) because she 
couldn’t be both things at the same time … every time we went to ask the 
company to show us the accounts, she was confronting us, saying that they 
were doing a good job, that they were constructing it well, that they had 
been there that day and just left. We never understood what the interests 
of that lady were, we really don’t understand it still … to us the important 
thing is the benefit of the community….
In the end, Fundacaracas and the company made a number of prom-
ises, that they were going to finish at the stipulated time. The building was 
almost 90 percent completed, what was missing were some details and that 
people from the Cuban mission came and installed the equipment in order 
to make the center operational. So we retired and thought that we had com-
pleted the mission, this was in the beginning of 2008. Our surprise now is 
that the center is abandoned, we didn’t know…
The official explanation, now that the community had taken over the 
project, was that the project had been abandoned because the construc-
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tion company had run out of money and had to rescind the contract. 
From Felipe’s account, it was clear that there were a lot of “particular 
interests” surrounding the project, within the community, within the 
local political office, within Fundacomunal and the construction com-
pany. It is quite common in Venezuela for construction projects to stop 
because of budget limitations, which in reality means that all different 
interested parties have taken their cut of funds. In this case, the con-
struction company just packed up and left once the community activists 
were convinced the project would be completed. When the company left 
the building site, construction was approximately 90 percent completed. 
But once they left, both the site and the building turned into a dump: 
stripped of everything of value, its windows smashed, teenagers looking 
for a place to drink alcohol and do drugs. No one had approached that 
building until now.
finding Common groUnd with the state
When I showed up at the following meeting, which took place on a 
Saturday afternoon, a dozen people were outside the building. Some 
people from the community had already tidied the area, but rubbish 
and construction material were still scattered around the site. The CDI 
was a large, rectangular two-story building of a yellow–orange color, 
clearly in a state of abandonment. Just behind the building, behind its 
fence, was a large barrio community. There was a baseball field next 
to the building, and on the other side a large football field in dire 
need of maintenance. The octagonal Barrio Adentro health building 
and the Sala de Rehabilitación Integral or SRI (Center for Integrated 
Rehabilitation) were located in front of it, next to the street. On the 
other side of the road, and north of the football field, were two addi-
tional large barrio communities.
As I had just started my fieldwork in 23 de Enero, I didn’t have a clear 
idea of “who is who” in the community. However, it was evident that sev-
eral of those present at the site that day were from the famous colectivos 
in 23 de Enero. Their militant-like posture and green T-shirts made those 
belonging to the colectivo La Piedrita particularly easily discernible. As I 
would soon learn, the presence of the colectivos generated a lot of uneasi-
ness among many community members.
Oscar and Felipe were running around slightly stressed, trying to set 
up the sound system and microphone that they had brought with them. 
More and more people were coming, standing in small groups talking, 
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and eventually Oscar grabbed the microphone and welcomed everyone. 
He explained that it had come to their attention, a couple of weeks ear-
lier, that the center was abandoned and dysfunctional, and said that they 
had contacted other compañeros in order to get the construction process 
started again. The colectivos had tomado los espacios (taken over the site) 
two weeks earlier. They had convoked the meeting with the purpose of 
rescuing this site and converting the abandoned building into a function-
ing hospital attending the whole of Caracas, he explained. “This is a part 
of paying the social debt to the poor.” Knowing very well that not every-
one in the community was happy about the presence of the colectivos, he 
nipped the criticism in the bud by saying that: “Many have asked them-
selves what the compañeros from the colectivos are doing there.” Some 
people were nodding. “But,” he added rhetorically, “we are all compañe-
ros, and we have all known these sites since we were children, though then 
we were running across these fields with the police behind us.”
Photo 5.3 A deteriorated football field, a Barrio Adentro module and informal 
housing constructions in 23 de Enero. Photo by the author 
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Oscar had a fascinating personality, never afraid to speak his mind, but 
always doing it in such a refined manner that he seldom came off as con-
frontational (even though he clearly was). Like most Venezuelans, he 
was a gifted speaker. He rhetorically went on to ask who had given the 
permits to privatize the fields that “some people” were exploiting for 
their own benefit. By “some people” he meant Señora Yurelia, the 
woman who had control over the baseball field, and who had come run-
ning to the site every time they came to talk to the construction com-
pany. I soon learned that she was a key person in the matter of the 
CDI. She seemed to be a local community “patron,” with considerable 
power for controlling the baseball field. She made money charging base-
ball teams for using the site for practices and events, as well as selling 
beer. Additionally, she allegedly had two grown-up sons who could be 
quite intimidating.
The next speaker was Felipe, who summed up the community’s 
demands: that the project be completed, that the hospital start func-
tioning, that an investigation be launched and that those responsible be 
prosecuted for corruption “the same way Manuel Rosales should be.”9 
With a friendly gesture Felipe waved one of the “officially” invited repre-
sentatives over—a man from the technical division of Fundacaracas. He 
was a slender man in his forties, speaking with a soft voice. He made no 
definite promises, but indicated that Fundacaracas might be able to begin 
the rehabilitation of the site, while they waited for the new fideicomiso 
(project commission) to be constituted, led by the Ministry of Popular 
Power for Health.
The problem was not only the CDI itself, but also the adjacent base-
ball and football fields. The football field had been used as a parking lot 
during construction. The weight of the parked trucks had damaged the 
drainage system beneath the field, and the area was overgrown with weed 
and grass. Repair and maintenance of the football and baseball fields were 
part of another project that had also been abandoned. The original budget 
for repairing the two fields had been modified twice, and the company in 
charge of the repairs had left before the work was completed. The repairs 
of the baseball field were about 90 percent complete, while the football 
field was in worse conditions and only about 70 percent of it had been 
repaired. The repair company was being fined daily for not completing 
the work, the public official from Fundacaracas informed. His proposal 
was that they sit down together (Fundacaracas, the repair company and 
the community) and form a mesa technica (technical working group) to 
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figure out what could be achieved with the remaining project budget. It 
later transpired that the company had left the project because it had not 
been paid in time. A change in administrative procedures, involving the 
merging of two public offices, had caused payments to stop not only for 
this project but also for other similar projects in Caracas.
The floor was then taken by a representative from the vice-presidency, 
a chubby man in his late 30s. His tense body language and uneasy way of 
speaking suggested that he was not used to being in a barrio or in a commu-
nity meeting of this kind. After the customary greetings, and after congratu-
lating the community for gathering, he said that the vice-presidency had first 
been notified about the unfortunate situation with the CDI on Tuesday that 
week. Once alerted, they had immediately contacted the necessary institu-
tions,10 summoning people from the Ministry of Popular Power for Health, 
Fundacaracas and people from Barrio Adentro. He didn’t understand why 
representatives from the health ministry were not present that day, but hoped
…that the outcome from today is that you elaborate your proposals, every-
thing that you deem necessary, all the necessary complaints, and that a 
report is elaborated and handed to the minister in charge of the president’s 
office and I will see if it is possible that the report can reach the president … 
I cannot promise anything, this is not in my hands, but this is what will be 
done with today’s events.
He concluded his speech by saying that he hoped Fundacaracas would 
resolve the matter as soon as possible because he was well aware of the 
importance of the CDI for the community.
The community applauded. Oscar then took the floor again, announc-
ing that it was time for comments and questions from the community. 
He kindly asked that each speaker limit any comments to two minutes to 
keep the meeting from going on too long. For the next hour, a number 
of people took the microphone, some from the colectivos and others from 
the communal councils.
A man from a nearby communal council expressed his concerns about 
the safety of the site, and proposed that they arrange a 24-hour surveil-
lance of the area. He was worried about the project being sabotaged, add-
ing that “there are people who do not agree with this, they have personal 
interests, they have friends that have interests, economic interests, and 
their families have interests, so this is a problem that affects all of us.” 
He also urged that the community needed to participate in the supervi-
sion and contraloría social of the project once it was up and running again. 
5 CONTESTED COMMUNITY POLITICS
 137
The lack of supervision was what ended the project in the first place, he 
stated, and it was their responsibility to safeguard it since they knew better 
than anyone what the problems in the community were.
An elderly woman from another communal council was also asked to 
speak. She was fumbling at first, but once she got started, she delivered 
a quite passionate speech, demanding to know the name of the company 
involved in the project and where it was: “Aha, the CDI was started, what 
was done, where is the money, it is necessary to look for them, to inves-
tigate, who are these people who were given money to do this work and 
then left it?” she said, visibly upset.
I hadn’t noticed, I was sure that this CDI was working, I swore that this 
CDI was working, how is it possible that the CDI is in such conditions? So 
much money that the president hands over in order to get things done … 
one thing is that it is really necessary, it is for health, it is for us, the com-
munity and those who are not from the community as well, because they 
can come from other parts of Caracas, from Antimano, from Carapita, from 
Los Frailes, from wherever they come they will be attended to … we are the 
ones benefiting from this and how is it possible?
We have to find them, we have to make sure that this is constructed 
immediately, because that is why the president … I hear the president talking 
all the time, I am a true revolutionary, in my heart, if I get nothing from the 
president I don’t care, if they give something to me, fine, and if I don’t get 
anything, fine … I am 60 years old but I have a lot of grandchildren who are 
attending school and I have children who are studying, so I want this benefit 
for them and for those who will come … so … we have to fight, as commu-
nal councils we have to work on this, it is excellent what is being done here 
today, and the enterprise has to show up, those who started up all this has to 
show up, to show their face, to come and say, “look, it was because of this, 
there wasn’t sufficient money, we could not do it, for this reason.”
The woman ended her outburst by saying: “I wish that things were done 
as the president says, but that’s difficult, we don’t … I don’t know what 
happens with el pueblo who doesn’t want to learn, we have to learn.” 
These words were met with applause from the community and Oscar 
thanked her for being so passionate about the cause.
One woman, from the communal council located directly behind the 
building, was upset over the damage suffered by her community since the 
project had started. Her community had voted against the project when 
it was first initiated, three years prior, she said. “Well, the project started,” 
she continued, and all of a sudden their houses were invaded by rats “of 
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all sizes” and mosquitoes. “Our children are getting sick,” she added, and 
demanded that the authorities fumigate the area.
I want you representatives to tell me a date or that you come and do it 
immediately … because we are those who are directly affected, and there are 
children living there, elderly people, sick people, and we really don’t deserve 
this, because we were those who said that we didn’t want this and they did it 
anyway, so now you have to step up to your responsibilities … so now I ask 
the community; in the same way that you supported this, now support us as 
well … we are the people who live close to this, you talk about the planned 
surgical unit, but can you tell me what they will do with all the “things” that 
they take out from there?
By things, she referred to human waste and used medical material accumu-
lating in a hospital. No other hospital in Caracas was located that close to a 
residential area, exactly for that reason, she exclaimed. Oscar spoke again, 
saying that he wanted to respond to the compañera. In a slightly polemic 
tone, he pointed out that the CDI was a project created to address the 
lack of access to healthcare that the whole community experienced. As the 
woman flagged that Oscar was ignoring the infestation problem she had 
raised, he said, “Well, let’s fumigate; this is one of the problems that one 
has to find solutions to.” He then tried to end the session, but a man, who 
lived nearby, intervened and said that he had lived in front of that field for 
34 years and that he remembered that there had been a mosquito problem 
in the past as well because of a pit in the area. He hoped that the possibility 
of fumigation would be considered.
A man from one of the colectivos said that he had already heard that 
“people” were going to hablar paja (talk shit) about the initiative. “There 
are a lot of interests involved,” he warned. “And that is why the project 
was stopped in the first place. People will talk shit about it to damage 
the revolutionary process, to damage the health committees, maybe for 
the purpose of obtaining political privileges,” he stated and encouraged 
everyone present to become spokespeople for their communities, to talk 
to their neighbors, their friends, their boyfriends, their girlfriends, their 
children, about the importance of the project.
Contesting the CoLeCtivos
Another man presented himself as being from the communal council in 
front of the football stadium, which is the sector that had suffered the leak-
ages caused by the construction work. He said that, two years prior, when 
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work on the CDI was about to start and Fundacaracas got involved, he was 
the only one to oppose the project, along with another man from his sector
because we knew what would happen here, el compañero Jaime and myself, 
because when Fundacaracas got involved, we knew that the project wouldn’t 
finish, that it was demagogy … because we were present when they prom-
ised that they would not take land from the markings of the football field, 
and then they took more than two meters. In this football field it isn’t pos-
sible to make legal tournaments anymore, and there the problem started, 
because Fundacaracas … aha, there are the skeletons (of the building), for 
more than two years it’s been like that, and the kids living here cannot play 
football anymore, they have to go over to the fields in bloque 6 or bloque 
37, and besides, this is a historical site in 23 de Enero.
And the other thing I want to say is that if we are supposed to form work 
groups, it is necessary to have representatives from the Contraloría General 
de la República (General Comptroller’s office) and from the municipal 
comptroller because the problem here is the embezzlement of the money 
from these constructions and in the field … the problem isn’t that these 
projects have to be finished, we know that they have to, and we will support 
that, but those who embezzled the money and those responsible within the 
institutions, like the municipal administration, have to go to jail, and the 
president of Fundacaracas, the directors, those who gave the orders. They 
have to go to jail because they misappropriated the money destined to the 
construction of these projects.
This intervention didn’t get the response that one might think that it 
would, although some nodded. It was quite obvious that everyone knew 
that the money disappeared was water under the bridge, and that it would 
be impossible to find out who had taken it. The most pressing issue was 
now to move the process forward.
It soon became clear that the presence of the colectivos was problem-
atic. A representative from one of the colectivos in the F-zone proposed 
that they take over the surveillance of the construction site as of the fol-
lowing Monday. The representative mentioned that they had a CDI in 
their area and that his colectivo had been in charge of security in the area 
since the CDI was constructed. Another man from a different colectivo 
intervened. He had a few things to say about the role of the colectivos in 
safeguarding CDIs. He said:
Look, the satanization of the colectivos has gone so far that many people 
think that they aren’t necessary … but if the colectivo (name removed) 
hadn’t guarded the other CDI [in zona F], that one might also have been 
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in these very conditions … that is why this is so important and that is why 
I hope that you appreciate the proposal that the compañero just made, 
because not everyone offers to be present day and night to guard over a 
place like this, and we want to say to the community, be on their side, 
[bring them] a cup of coffee, a glass of water, whatever, so that this work 
is carried out…
A young girl from the barrio below the hospital then encouraged all com-
munal councils to form an asamblea de seguridad (security assembly) so 
that the colectivos would not be the only ones in charge of the security 
issue. Another man, a representative from one of the better-known colec-
tivos in the area, introduced himself and remarked:
Well, good evening to the whole community that is present, to the commu-
nal councils, to the colectivos. Well, I am a member of the colectivo (name 
removed), we have known about the problem here for a long time because 
we came here to do some meetings with the compañeros living here, but 
I think selfishness prevails here, we call for unity among all the communal 
councils, all people who live in this area.
The communal councils and the colectivos are about to start forming the 
Communes but yet we see that this CDI is in ruins and that the people living 
nearby have not displayed sufficient will to assume responsibility for address-
ing the problem. But this situation cannot be allowed to deprive the whole 
community of 23 de Enero and the whole of Venezuela, because as the 
compañero was saying previously, this belongs to el pueblo and we are all 
pueblo. Thus, I, as a representative for my organization, want to underscore 
for all the compañeros that are present here today that the revolutionary 
state, together with the colectivos, the communal councils and the whole 
pueblo of 23 de Enero, should be united in rescuing this CDI. It can’t be 
possible that a collective service is abandoned because of the particular inter-
ests of two or three people, we all need our health.
Another thing is that the communal councils and the colectivos, through 
the commune, should take control over the spaces outside of here, the prob-
lems of drug trafficking and alcohol, which are creating the situation we 
are presented with here. Thus, we, as integrated revolutionaries (revolu-
cionarios integrales), because we have to be integrated, have to assume this 
responsibility together with the revolutionary state which needs to make 
itself present here with all the colectivos and the whole of the parish of 23 
de Enero. That was all for now. Good night.
The meeting continued for a while longer, with various people chiming in 
to defend the presence of the colectivos. There were also some discussions 
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over whether the football field was actually being used or not. Eventually it 
was decided that a new meeting would be held the following Monday, and 
that mesas de trabajo (work groups) would be created to develop a plan 
with Fundacaracas. The representative from Fundacaracas promised to be 
present and to co-operate with the community as the process evolved, and 
assured the involvement of every one present in the institution in the proj-
ect. The meeting ended with applause and Oscar’s parting words:
Well, compañeros, this is the way to walk, hand in hand like Christ says, the 
revolutionaries are Christians and if we don’t share like brothers this will 
fall apart. We have to move forward, move forward with the diversity and 
with the unity, if we don’t unite we will continue to be poor, if we manage 
to unite we will achieve satisfaction for all of us. Good night on behalf of all 
the colectivos, all the communal councils and el pueblo in general that have 
been present here tonight.
forging CommUnity
When I arrived on foot the following Monday, 70 to 80 people were gath-
ered outside the locked gates leading to the hospital site. It turned out that 
those who had the keys, who seemed to be connected to Señora Yurelia, 
“the lady with the interests” in the nearby community, had not brought 
them along. People were upset and Oscar was saying that “we must con-
demn this; this site belongs to the community.” The representative from 
Fundacomunal was present, and informed everyone that he believed work 
could start within the following two to three weeks. The groups engaged 
in a lengthy discussion about when the next meeting would be held, and 
when they could sit down in work groups. Eventually, they decided that 
the meeting would take place the following Sunday at 10 am. A man then 
asked if he could read a written statement signed by the spokespeople of 
various communal councils out loud.
The statement read:
We, the signatories of this letter, spokespersons of the Communal Councils, 
will let it be known that we do not accept the proposal made on Friday, 
March 20, 2009, by the colectivos to take over the spaces of the CDI, and 
the spaces for culture and sports. The reasons for this refusal are that 1) the 
actions taken to enter the premises weren’t acceptable, as the adjacent com-
munities should have been involved and informed of the steps they were 
planning on taking; 2) their proposal to guard over the CDI is not agreeable 
for us as we are against the use of violence and guns.
 FORGING COMMUNITY 
142 
The community seems to ignore that 1) señora Yurelia is in charge of the 
baseball stadium area and it was the community that endorsed her role with 
their signatures; 2) we will also bring to your attention that in this stadium 
a junior school for baseball has been set up. Apart from what has already 
been said, the señora Yurelia was elected spokesperson for the sports and 
recreation committee in (barrio name removed) and it is she who carried 
out the necessary procedures with the state institutions in order to make 
these installations work; 3) in the football stadium there was a functioning 
football school, which was coordinated by the señores (name removed) and 
(name removed) and where children from the communities of (listing up 
the name of seven different adjacent barrios) were participating; 4) in the 
Theatre of (name removed), in spite of its deterioration, there are schools of 
theater, dancing, aerobic and an evangelical church.
Because of what has been said above, we will let it be known that we 
will accept the collaboration of the governmental institutions, municipality, 
Ministry of Health, (the presidential office) Miraflores, so that the necessary 
procedures are put in place to repair the CDI of (name removed) and get 
it up and running with the help of the community. We rectify that we do 
not want any colectivo to appropriate the structures that are for the use of 
the members of the community, in full accordance with the provisions in 
the article 3 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In 
the city of Caracas, on the twenty-third day of the month of March 2009, 
representatives of the communities, the following signatures…
Applause followed, and then a lengthy discussion erupted. Various repre-
sentatives from the colectivos spoke passionately about their disinterested 
and altruistic engagement in the CDI project, which in their opinion had 
been abandoned because none of the communities around it had showed 
any interest. A polemic developed between the colectivos and those who 
had written the statement referred to above. Tensions continued to rise 
until a young woman asked to speak. She said she was from the colectivo 
that was running a radio station from the theater that was mentioned in 
the letter.
We have been there for around a year, and we can assure and affirm and 
substantiate to everyone present that before we got there the insecurity in 
this zone was total, there it was only vandalism reigning, the crime, the 
delinquency … and for the community living behind the theater they have 
to walk between there and Mercal, in fact, people were attacked in Mercal I 
don’t know how many times, and we can affirm and substantiate that since 
we started to be there no one has been attacked in Mercal again, and we 
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have taken care of the security in this space and around it, because many 
people in the community, when they have problems with the delinquency, 
who do they go to? To us, and we make sure that they don’t consume drugs 
in the stairways, that they don’t rob the school children, their cell phones 
and backpacks, that they don’t attack an old lady who is passing by there, 
that they don’t park stolen cars there or burn cars…
Another man then interjected: “And that people don’t amanecen muertos 
(wake up dead).” The young woman continued:
That they don’t … exactly. Nothing of this has happened since we started 
to be there and yes, we are a colectivo … of course we need to maintain 
security and we defend ourselves like one has to defend oneself against 
the delinquency, do you understand what I mean? Because you cannot 
just throw flowers to the delinquents, and we are doing it assuming the 
risks…
A small conversation erupted in a corner and Oscar asked everyone to 
keep quiet. The girl then continued:
We are doing it knowing that it may cost us, that we might lose cameradas 
in the intent but we are doing it anyway and we are not asking the com-
munity to confront this, but rather we are doing it ourselves … and we are 
not asking for your gratitude, but you should recognize it, I mean, you 
cannot all the time say that they colectivos are delinquents, that they have 
arms … what are we going to do if the communities aren’t assuming the 
responsibility, if they don’t have neither the balls nor the ovary to confront 
the delinquents…
An enthusiastic applause erupted. A man shouted, “That is the way to 
speak, amiga, that is the way to speak!” The young woman signaled that 
she hadn’t finished:
Another thing: just to clarify that before these meetings here, in January 
and February 2008, we were in meetings here behind the CDI, with the 
people from the community here, including the señora Yurelia, and there 
we prepared some tasks for ourselves, and the community here said that 
they would be responsible for finding out which company did this and left 
it like this, that they will make social comptrollership and come back to us 
and inform us. We let the things pass and, look, it has been a year and we 
still don’t know what the community actually did.
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A man said: “Nothing!” and the woman continued:
So here we are, waiting. So if the community wasn’t able to take any 
responsibility, I am community too, I want to take responsibility for the 
problems, and well, I am colectivo but I am also community, and as com-
munity I am going to assume the responsibility of doing social comptrol-
lership and involve myself in this … well, finished, that was all I wanted 
to say…
After this intervention the mood changed notably. One man, from 
the community that the young woman had criticized, explained what 
they had actually done, that they had sought answers from the institu-
tions, constantly pestered Fundacaracas to send over their inspectors, 
but that, at the end of the day, they didn’t get proper answers. The 
crowd acknowledged that they had indeed done something. No more 
arguments broke out about whether the colectivos were to be involved 
or not. The meeting ended with an agreement to meet up again for 
roundtable work on the following Sunday, and Fundacaracas promised 
to bring tables and chairs.
roUndtabLes
The following Sunday a crowd of around 150 people showed up. 
Fundacaracas had brought chairs, tables and a large tent, like they prom-
ised. Mesas de trabajo (work tables) have become widely used in com-
munity work in Venezuela, as well as in public-political meetings where 
people discuss a new law or other political proposals. This is often called 
parlamentarismo de la calle (parliamentalism of the street), a term harking 
back to the pre-Chávez era when people gathered to discuss urgent com-
munity issues. On that Sunday, the crowd quickly split into four groups, 
based on their area of interest: sports, security, social comptrollership and 
health. Each group elected one person to write down the main points on 
a large white sheet and one to present the results to the crowd. I joined 
the group working on social comptrollership. After an hour of group work 
(Oscar was working hard to stick to the time schedule), the chairs were 
reorganized so that everyone would be facing the side of the CDI where 
the presenters would hang the large white paper sheet up and share the 
conclusions reached by each group. The main findings for each group 
were the following (Table 5.1):
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When all the roundtables had presented their findings, the community 
voted for the suggestions of each group—all of them were approved. This 
was then duly noted in the acta (minutes) of the event. All participants 
signed, thereby giving the decisions made in the assembly an appearance 
Table 5.1 Results from roundtable discussion in the Parish of 23 de Enero, 
March 2009
The health roundtable
  • Develop an overview of the status of the CDI structures
  • Evaluate how much time is needed in order to complete the work
  •  The members of the roundtable are obliged to take measures if they do not get 
satisfactory answers from the institutions. The measures may be: levantar una acta 
(make formal written complaints), go to the relevant institutions, organize a street 
protest, or take any other adequate measure
  •  Form a working group composed by everyone involved in social health work in 23 
de Enero through the health committees, as well as the communal councils
  •  The leadership of the health group should rotate among members
The security roundtable
  • Maintain security over the area
  • Co-ordinate the security issue with the colectivos and the social groups in the area
  • Make sure that the keys are handed over to the security group
  • Improve the illumination in the area around the CDI
  • Make a daily diary over occurrences around the CDI structure
  • Prohibit the sale of liquor in the surrounding area
  • Promote the sale of fast food instead of liquor
  • Prohibit cars stationing in front of the area leading into the CDI
  • Exercise territorial control together with the communal councils
  • Make an inventory of everything that is inside and around the CDI building
  • Make a telephone directory of everyone who will be involved in the security issue
  • Improve the fence around the CDI building
The sports roundtable
  •  Make sure that both the football and the baseball fields are restored according to a 
detailed list of repairs
The social comptrollership roundtable
  •  Constitute a social comptrollership named Network of Social Comptrollerships 
Simón Bolívar (Red the Contraloría Social Simón Bolívar) composed by the four 
communal councils that directly border the area, by other nearby communities, by 
the metropolitan council representative for the parish and the local contact person 
(enlace parroquial) in 23 de Enero for the Libertador Municipality
  • Divide the work between different work brigades
  •  Make an archive of all documents and document everything that has to do with 
institutional logistics as well as logistics in the neighborhood
  • Demand immediate results from the institutions involved
  • Work with everyone in a unified manner (forma mancomunada)
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of public legitimacy. Overall, the meeting proceeded in a rather harmoni-
ous manner, and the problematic involvement of the colectivos seemed to 
have been forgotten. It was Felipe who ended the meeting this time. He 
gave a lengthy speech during which he promised to contact Electricidad 
de Caracas and invite them to join the initiative and put up more light 
posts in the area. Moreover, he wanted everyone to notice how much 
could be achieved if the community and the institutions moved in the 
same direction:
In August 2009 we will have been struggling for this CDI for three years, 
for it to be finished. First we observed that the construction was done 
wrongly, then we denounced that those who were carrying out the work 
weren’t qualified for the job, we denounced the work inspector because he 
never appeared and when he did appear he just met with a little group and 
didn’t give any answers to the community.
So we were denouncing all this, and today we see the result. What is it 
that we want to say with this? That through the interaction between the 
institutions and the communities we can recuperate our spaces; I don’t have 
to go to Globovisión nor to Radio Caracas Televisión and complain in order 
to make things happen, because el camerada Oscar, el camerada Walter, my 
own person because I am a public functionary elected by popular vote,11 
we have the obligation to support the communities, and there is another 
example, Gerardo that got involved today, and the other compañera as well, 
this is our mission and our function, we are here in order to give the com-
munities all the necessary tools to solve their problems. And why? Because 
we have a leader, a leader who is giving us lineas (directions) every day, a 
leader that every day tells us what we need to do, and I believe….
Which is our obligation? Comply with this mandate. Why mandates? 
Because it is the welfare of our communities that we are fighting for. And 
who will bring you welfare? People from other sectors? No, it has to be us, 
what has happened here with this CDI really should not happen here again 
in 23 de Enero, it is really shameful that it happened here … but it happened 
and it has given us the opportunities to have here with us the compañeros 
from (the Ministry) of Health, Fundacaracas, Parlamento Latino and all 
the other entities that have come here and that have been preoccupied with 
these problems … but we will certainly move forward shortly, in accordance 
with the procedures that will be outlined by INAVI, I will make a promise 
on behalf of camerada Walter, that he will accompany me in this, Walter is a 
deputy in the Parlamento Latinoamericano, a neighbor from Catia, friends 
for all our lives, and I will publicly make this promise on behalf of him that 
he will accompany me doing all these procedures so that this has a happy 
ending.
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The meeting ended in general enthusiasm, after all had agreed that, those 
who could, would assist in doing the inventory of what was left of the CDI 
the next day.
Over the next few weeks, several meetings took place. A jornada 
de trabajo communitario (community work day) was arranged for a 
Sunday morning in order to clean up sand and dirt from the inside of 
the CDI. The colectivo La Piedrita had mobilized their youth group, a 
group of boys around 15 or 16 years old, whose members were giggling 
and whispering at the sight of the gringa ethnographer that was mov-
ing sand and dirty water out of the building. A group of people from 
the nearby communal councils also participated and, as frequently hap-
pens, they were mostly women. A Cuban team of doctors was expected 
later that week to inspect the site, but they had to travel to the city of 
Maracay, two hours from Caracas, because of a hospital building that had 
suffered damage during an earthquake. (Several minor earthquakes were 
recorded in the coastal region that spring.) The meeting was postponed 
to a few days later when Felipe, Oscar, a few other people from the com-
munity and I gathered. There were also two representatives from the 
Cuban commission in Miraflores, one engineer and the female doctor at 
the head of all the Cuban doctors stationed in Caracas, a representative 
from the company that had been contracted to repair the CDI, and a 
representative from the municipality. They had brought detailed draw-
ings of the building with them, and were discussing the next steps with 
Oscar and Felipe, who were both extremely happy with the involvement 
of high-level figures. The CDI module had apparently been put on a 
high-priority development list by Fundacaracas. Oscar and Felipe were 
both duly filming the whole meeting and made everyone present sign the 
minutes of the meeting.
After the meeting, I spoke with Oscar and Felipe for a while. They told me 
that the real issue now lay with the health committee. The health commit-
tee would have considerable influence over who would be employed at the 
hospital (nurses, assistants, janitors and so on), once it was up and running. 
According to the philosophy of community development, the community 
was supposed to have control over these matters. In the case of construc-
tion projects, this was also a way to stop labor unions from exercising their 
mafia-like influence over employment decisions, or from paralyzing work, 
if they so wished. Thus, the employment issue stirred the community and 
generated quite a bit of maneuvering by those who wanted control over 
any hiring process. The person running the show, I soon understood, was 
 ROUNDTABLES 
148 
once again Señora Yurelia, the lady with the baseball field and “interests,” 
who had quite a lot of influence on the committee connected to the Barrio 
Adentro I health module, in front of the CDI.
toward the end
Suddenly, activities waned down. Easter was coming, and Venezuelans 
cherish that holiday for traveling. Many people “add on” an extra few days 
to the vacation, which means that everything stops both in the communi-
ties and in public institutions during the holidays, and it takes a long time 
before things go back to normal. Felipe and Oscar were busy organizing 
the traditional Easter event in their community—a march simulating the 
suffering of Christ on the Via Dolorosa and his death on the cross. An 
actor draped in white, portraying Jesus, carried a cross through the com-
munity, and people followed him in his long march. When we reached 
one of the chapels in 23 de Enero, a group of “soldiers” was bashing and 
beating him before the march resumed, up to the football stadium and 
outside the bloque where Felipe and Oscar lived. There he was “hung” on 
a large wooden cross.
Because of sudden health issues, Oscar had very little time on his hands 
after the Easter holiday. Thus, despite being the motor of the project, he 
pulled out. When I asked him, he said that the initiative had to be taken 
over by the community living near the CDI. He was tired of trying to 
move the project along. Now people in the community had to take over. 
Not too long after that, I returned to Norway.
the end of the story
When I returned, half a year later, work around the CDI was once again 
paralyzed. I asked Sergio, a friend from the community next to the football 
field, why, and he answered that they had just reconvened to get the work 
started once more. I tried to inquire into why the project had stopped, 
but he said that he didn’t know. “When these things happen, it is often 
sabotage,” he said. Perhaps the money had dried up because of the fall in 
oil prices that autumn, he speculated. Or perhaps it had been postponed 
because there had been a change in the municipal government. “The real 
reason for why it stopped is not known; a lot of things are being said” (se 
dice muchas cosas).
When I went back the following year, the CDI was finished and up 
and running. Sergio told me that it had been completed with money 
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coming from the presidency. Someone else told me that it had been 
finished with money from the Ministry of Popular Power for Health. 
Then I asked Oscar, who had practically retired from community politics 
for the time being because of his personal health problems. He puffed a 
bit and said that the woman who controlled the baseball field had basi-
cally taken over and had been running the show. “She is a malandra 
(thug/bully),” he said. Besides, she had two sons who were bullying and 
intimidating people who dared to challenge her influence on the com-
munity. Thus, at the end of the day, she had placed her people to work 
in the hospital. The doctors were a mix of Cubans and Venezuelans who 
were “more or less attending people,” according to Oscar. He had just 
pulled out of the process altogether: “We didn’t want to exhaust our-
selves there, people didn’t participate. And it is difficult when you don’t 
live exactly there in the area. It is not enough to be there every 15–20 
days; you have to be there all the time to accompany people.” He also 
said that the colectivos had stopped being involved after the first phase 
when they were safeguarding the security situation in the building area. 
“She is there with her people,” Oscar repeated. “She has a lot of influ-
ence in that community.”
It was difficult for me to tell whether Oscar was critical of how the 
hospital was working because he was still hurt for losing control over the 
process or there were real issues at the CDI. A woman, who had been 
involved in the project from the very start, told me that everything was 
going fine over there, that the colectivos had “pulled out” after the con-
struction phase and that the health committees were working closely with 
the hospital. “Everything was going fine,” she said, and people were being 
attended.
In October 2013, while back in Norway, I read in the online version 
of the daily Caracas newspaper, Correo del Orinoco, that the football field 
had just been finished by Fundacaracas. The field, which was now at the 
disposal of local children and youths, featured artificial grass and met the 
standards for regulation fields. It had wardrobes, toilets, and illumina-
tion for late-night use. The mayor of the Libertador Municipality, Jorge 
Rodriguez; the head of the capital district (Distrito Capital), Jacqueline 
Farías; and parish authorities were invited to inspect the football field 
together with the local communities. In his speech, Jorge Rodriguez said 
that “this is not about finally finishing the building of the field, this is 
just the beginning, the beginning for the football players for the future 
that will be formed here, the golden generation that Chávez granted us” 
(Correo del Orinoco 2013).
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CommUnity aCtion and the poLitiCs of spaCe
This chapter has illustrated the inherent challenges that popular neighbor-
hood groups face when trying to constitute themselves as collective politi-
cal subjects (Lazar 2008:58) in the context of community politics. The 
experiences of popular mobilization since Chávez was first elected served 
to create different, and sometimes competing, bases of power in the com-
munity, which in many cases clashed with one another. This was particularly 
the case in the parish of 23 de Enero, where the previous territorial domi-
nance of the colectivos was partly displaced by the establishment of the 
communal councils. This feature was however not unique to 23 de Enero. 
The process of “forging a community” was an issue present in all arenas of 
struggle. In order to make their claims toward the state, communities were 
trying to present themselves as a unified political body (either as one single 
communal council, or as an association of several community groups, as in 
the case described), while, at the same time, facing internal conflicts.
As we saw in the CDI case study, the ideal of a unified, collective body 
of citizens, constituting itself as a community vis-á-vis the state, was clearly 
shaken by the de facto heterogeneity between different interests and pri-
orities as well as positions of power and influence. Both the people with 
rat problems and the people with drainage problems, referenced “their 
community” when speaking of their damages they had all suffered, and of 
the right they all had to see their problems resolved. Colectivos of various 
kinds were constantly trying to portray themselves as “community”—in 
this context as safeguarders of the common interests of the whole com-
munity, and under-communicating their special and controversial status 
in the parish. At the same time, they tried to portray themselves as special 
groups selflessly attending the interests of the community in matters of 
public security. Oscar and Felipe on the other hand (who had little per-
sonal interests in the project besides local prestige and a desire to improve 
local health facilities12) were constantly trying to frame everything in a 
wider context of collective social struggle and poder popular.
Señora Yurelia, “the lady with the interests” appeared to be the winner in 
the end. She was tied to the Barrio Adentro health module and led the sports 
committee in her communal council, controlling the local baseball field: 
positions that gave her significant leverage in her community. Moreover, she 
had the advantage of spatial proximity to the site and appeared to be con-
nected to other power bases in the community, like the local council woman.
Oscar and Felipe on the other hand, who were the ones who had ini-
tiated the process and managed to engage public and political entities, 
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might have seemed like the individuals who could have gained the most 
recognition and influence over the process. However, the fact that they 
lived elsewhere (approximately 1 km away) provided them with a weaker 
claim to represent local interests and less chances of ganarse los espacios 
(gain the spaces) through close interaction with local residents. This illus-
trates the symbolic importance given to space, as well as how community 
politics and the politics of local recognition are closely tied to a personal 
relationship with the space—confirmed by the need to be present, visible 
and ganarse los espacios.
What this case showed is thus the multi-faceted notion of community as 
it is used in Bolivarian political discourse. Community is a context-specific 
self-explanatory concept as well as an ambivalent concept that can be used 
strategically in order to substantiate claims to legitimacy both within the 
community and toward the state. In spite of the local conflicts simmer-
ing below the surface, people were capable of calling upon the notion of 
community in order to make their claims toward the state representatives. 
Their claim to represent the health interests of 23 de Enero (and other 
parishes as well, indeed the whole pueblo, as Felipe said) alluded to the 
government policies of paying up a social debt to poor communities. They 
could therefore draw on a broader conundrum of political discourses and 
symbolism when they staked out a position for themselves as the legiti-
mate protagonists of bringing this process forward. All along, in the con-
versation with public representatives, they underscored their prerogative 
not only to participate in the planning process, but also to have a final say 
in how it would proceed. Similarly, the state representatives explicitly rec-
ognized the crowd and its inherent collective political qualities, attributing 
them not only with the right to make claims toward the state in the name 
of “the community” as a whole, but also with the right to participate in 
the process itself.
However, as this example and subsequent discussions will show, “the 
community” had few chances of actually enforcing its legally sanctioned 
right to influence and shape public policy. The CDI project was prob-
ably delayed for reasons far beyond the community’s reach. There was a 
change in municipal administration at the time, which implies that the 
majority of institutional personnel are changed (see Chap. 10) as well 
as an overhaul of municipal budget. This illustrates the fragility of com-
munity-initiated politics, an issue that will be further discussed in the 
following chapter where we will explore the insides of the Venezuelan 
state.
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 notes
 1. “The community” is a contentious concept in scholarly writing (e.g., see 
Cohen 1985), and some scholars have suggested that the concept should 
be abandoned altogether (Young 1986 in Creed 2004:57). However, in 
spite of its ambiguity, “community” will inevitably be used in this discus-
sion. Not only is it a concept that is frequently used in local discourse, but 
it is also the concept that best encompasses the social setting that we are 
trying to get a grasp on. However, I am not presupposing that it is possible 
to understand a “community” a priori, or that the emic usage of the word 
presupposes a coherent or stable idea of what a “community” is.
 2. This was passed as a law in 2006, with the title Ley Especial de Regularización 
Integral de la Tenencia de la Tierra en los Asentamientos Urbanos 
Populares (Special Law for Integral Regulation and Land Tenure in Urban 
Popular Settlements).
 3. According to Article 2 of the Law for the Communal Councils: “The 
Communal Councils, within the constitutional framework of a participa-
tive and protagonistic democracy, are instances of participation, articula-
tion and integration between the citizens and the various community 
organizations, social and popular movements, which allow the organized 
people to exercise [as a] communitarian government and [the direct exer-
cise of] public policy and projects oriented towards responding to the com-
munities’ necessities, potentials and aspirations in the  construction of the 
new model of a socialist society of equality, equity and social justice.” 
Author’s translation from Spanish. The full law text can be found at 
http://www.minci.gob.ve/2012/09/ley-organica-de-los-consejos- 
comunales/.
 4. These are the executive committee (unidad ejecutiva), the communitarian 
financial and administrative unit (unidad administrativa y financiera 
comunitaria), and the unit for social comptrollership (unidad de contra­
loría social).
 5. The five motors are la Ley Habilitante (the enabling law), to grant the 
president the power to enact radical reforms; la Reforma Constitucional 
Socialista (the Socialist constitutional reform), which Chávez lost narrowly 
in 2007; la Educación Popular (popular education), an educational pro-
gram that teaches Socialist, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist values; la 
Nueva Geometría del Poder (the new geometry of power), which radically 
changes territorial and administrative structures in order to facilitate social 
and political development in an endogenous manner; and el Poder 
Comunal (the communal power), making popular power a backbone of 
the affairs of the state, through communal councils, communes and so on.
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 6. However, the constitutional base is legitimized in paragraph 70 (García- 
Guadilla 2008:8), which states that “Participation and involvement of 
people in the exercise of their sovereignty in political affairs can be mani-
fested by: voting to fill public offices, referendum, consultation of public 
opinion, mandate revocation, legislative, constitutional and constituent 
initiative, open forums and meetings of citizens whose decisions shall be 
binding among others; and in social and economic affairs: citizen service 
organs, selfmanagement, co-management, cooperatives in all forms, 
including those of a financial nature, savings funds, community enterprises, 
and other forms of association guided by the values of mutual cooperation 
and solidarity. The law shall establish conditions for the effective, function-
ing of the means of participation provided for under the present article.” 
See Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (1999).
 7. Now called Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comuna y los Movimientos 
Sociales.
 8. All costs associated with the stay at Cuba are paid by the agreement, includ-
ing for a relative to accompany the patient.
 9. Manuel Rosales was the former governor of Zulia who lost the presidential 
elections in 2007, and who fled to Peru seeking political asylum after he 
was charged for extensive corruption during his time as a governor.
 10. Here clarification is needed. Chávez set up a special unit linked directly to 
the president’s office where people could come and complain about prob-
lems they may have with the public institutions. The president’s office then 
called up the relevant institutions and commanded them to resolve the 
problem. The office was located in the White House, an impressive palace 
building guarded by the presidential army vis-à-vis the presidential palace 
Miraflores. Anyone could line up in the queue and have their complaint 
registered, and people came from all over the country to do so.
 11. Felipe held an elected position in the local circuit of PSUV.
 12. I can say this because I came to know both of them very well over time.
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It was Saturday afternoon. I was sitting outside one of the cafés in Zona 
F in 23 de Enero with Miche and Adrian, having a beer. Both were expe-
rienced revolucionarios, having been trained as cuadros (cadres) in the 
revolutionary youth organization Frente Francisco de Miranda. For sev-
eral years, they had worked in different government institutions echandole 
bolas (lit: throwing in balls, fig: working hard). For them, working with 
the state was a political and ideological task. Both believed in the necessity 
of profound changes and in the paramount importance of changing the 
state from the inside in order to create a new Bolivarian state and society.
Both Miche and Adrian had grown up in a barrio and were high-school 
dropouts, living with their single mothers and extended family, forced to 
start working at an early age. Even if they had always had an ideological 
affinity with anti-imperialist and popular sector struggles, they had not 
become really politicized until Chávez arrived on the scene after the 1998 
election. At the time, they were part of the first wave of new political 
organizations: Miche was part of the Bolivarian Circles, and Adrian of a 
cultural group in his community. He made magic happen with his African 
drums, and the group he was a part of was occasionally hired as “musical 
entertainment” for those who wanted a “folkloric touch” at high-class 
parties in the eastern part of the city.
Both Miche and Adrian had become radicalized after the 2002 coup. 
They were part of the popular resistance during those chaotic days, driving 
around on motorbikes and mobilizing people to demand Chávez´s return. 
Afterward, both of them went to Cuba with Frente Francisco de Miranda.
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Frente Francisco de Miranda is a youth organization that was estab-
lished by a joint agreement between Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez in 
2003 in order to educate a new generation of Venezuelan civil servants. 
The students—mostly young people—were flown to Cuba where they 
lived on campuses while following an intense educational program in his-
tory, political science, public administration, economics, political ideology 
as well as personal development. The organization describes itself as:
A political organization—disciplined, anti-imperialist, dynamic and orga-
nized: fundamental in the struggle for eradicating poverty in all its mani-
festations and for achieving social equality in Venezuela. It is an instrument 
that supports the missions and contributes to the successful development of 
the programs incited by the Revolutionary Government, to benefit the most 
humble classes, in correspondence with the Bolivarian ideal and the think-
ing of Comandante Chávez. We are in every corner of the country day by 
day, giving our lives for achieving a more just society, filled with solidarity, 
fraternity and dedicated to disinterested humanitarian aid without expecting 
nor receiving anything in return apart from the prosperity of our country. 
(Frente Francisco de Miranda n.d., author’s translation from Spanish)
The educational program was free of charge, and the students received a 
minor scholarship for personal costs. For many poor youth, this was their 
first trip outside Venezuela, and for rural students, sometimes their first trip 
to central Venezuela. The classes in Cuba were called avanzadas, and the 
intense period of close-quarter living in dormitories and around- the- clock 
studying—often over several months—generated strong sentiments of col-
lectivity and friendships as well as a close identification with “their” avan-
zada class, which were maintained in the years even as Frente Francisco de 
Miranda as a mass movement as such fell more or less apart (see below).
Miche and Adrian were part of one of the first avanzadas, and because 
they displayed talent, both of them returned to Cuba for shorter and more 
selective classes in administration and leadership. Back in Venezuela they 
were involved in building the Frente’s headquarter in Gato Negro, Catia, 
as well as working with several government ministries.
When I met them, they were both working in Fundacomunal. Miche 
was planning on quitting: he had had enough. “I feel like an accomplice. 
I can no longer justify that I have to answer, ‘I don’t know’ to my com-
munity,” he said. “His community” was the area where he worked with 
the communal councils. He had long been frustrated because those higher 
up in the system in Fundacomunal helped neither him nor the community, 
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and he was the one who had to face the members in the communal council 
every week with an “I don’t know what is happening.”
Adrian agreed that it was difficult to defend the status quo. They wit-
nessed revolutionary fervor being replaced by struggles for power, ineffi-
ciency and opportunism, which represented a serious threat to the political 
future of the Bolivarian revolution. The old vices of the state inherited 
from the Fourth Republic had not only remained, but they had also con-
taminated the revolutionary process from within.
They were both critical of their workplace, as a proper critical revolu-
tionary in their opinion should have been, but they both knew that if they 
voiced their frustrations too loudly, they would get in trouble. It had hap-
pened to them both before. Miche had denounced corruption in another 
organization and had been pushed out, though very subtly. Adrian had 
quit a former job because he was treated badly by a superior with friends 
in high places and had suddenly found himself in a situation where he had 
great difficulty in getting a new job. Because of their attitudes, they had 
not been allowed to advance despite their having been chosen as “selected 
potential leaders” when they first started.
Both Adrian and Miche were tired of all the shortcomings within the 
political administration and state bureaucracy. It also filled them with pro-
found sadness. They both described the early years after 2003 as the best 
moment of their lives. They had been part of the wave of revolutionary spirit 
and new policies in the wake of the 2002 coup and had participated in mak-
ing wonderful things happen. Both of them had traveled across the coun-
try to remote countryside villages and backward middle-of-nowhere sites, 
day and night, and had helped setting up the missions and issuing identity 
cards through Misión Identidad.1 They had sacrificed romantic relation-
ships and family, a decent salary and a good night’s sleep for years. And they 
weren’t the only ones. Thousands of youths had become mobilized. There 
had really been a mass movement, a mass enthusiasm, a sense of family. And 
now they felt that this enthusiasm to a large extent had withered away.
Much of this was due to the bureaucracy, which they viewed as the 
tranca de piedra (sand in the machinery) of the revolution. Adrian was 
waiving his beer as he was presenting his favorite metaphor to describe 
what was happening: the hamburger bread and the meat. The community 
was the bottom piece of bread, and the president was the top piece of 
bread, where the policies benefiting the communities were emerging from. 
In the middle you had a huge hamburger which was the bureaucracy, filled 
with vicios (vices). Because of this dysfunctional bureaucratic hamburger, 
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the policies that were meant to benefit the communities didn’t filter down 
the way they were supposed to. And that was the biggest threat to the 
revolution, Miche and Adrian agreed on that.
* * *
In the foregoing chapter, I started my exploration of community politics 
in the barrios. I analyzed the ways in which popular struggle played out 
within what I have termed a Bolivarian space: a political space of interaction 
between state and grassroots movements, drawing on templates of popular 
sovereignty and the state’s historical debt to the poor. In the following 
two chapters, I will continue my inquiry into the political and everyday 
encounters between popular sector communities and the Venezuelan state 
under Chávez. The broader analytical ambitions with these chapters are 
twofold: one is to understand state practices and state dynamics from the 
pre-Chávez era, and how these vestiges were contested, challenged and 
reproduced during the Chávez era. That is, I am interested in the political 
and temporal interface between the state of the Fourth Republic and the 
emerging state of the Fifth Republic. The second analytical ambition is to 
understand how the popular sectors pushed from below to transform the 
“old” state according to Bolivarian ideals, and to explore the strategies they 
used. At the heart of these processes were attempts to make “the state”—
we will come back to the theoretical implication of studying “the state” 
below—less opaque, less corrupt, less patronizing, less hierarchic, less cli-
entelistic, and more open to popular demands, knowledges and socialities.
I do not claim that these negative dynamics and characteristics attributed 
to the Venezuelan state are unique to Venezuela. Rather, Latin American 
states—to various degrees—share a host of similar characteristics. This has 
its root in their genesis as colonial and later post-colonial states, and how 
processes of state formation were taking place in societies sharing many 
similar features. Thus, in many respects, this account says something about 
Latin American state formations in general, and many of the challenges 
encountered by Bolivarian activists are parallel to those of their fellow 
comrades in other countries (e.g., see Lazar 2008). However, the ethno-
graphic moment and context studied here is unique in the sense that it 
represents a particular historical constellation of political ideas and social 
forces: that is, the Bolivarian process. Through exploring the frictions, 
contradictions and struggles emerging as the ideals of the Bolivarian pro-
cess rubbed against ingrained social practices and heterogeneous interest 
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and ideologies, we are better equipped to understand both the Bolivarian 
process’ particularities and the inherent complexities in processes of politi-
cal and social change.
Theorizing The STaTe
Adrian and Miche’s story tells a tale of a short-term political trajectory 
within the early years of the Bolivarian revolution. It also conveys a deeper 
script about the quest to transform not only state praxis, that is, how 
the state functions, but also to change the meaning of the relationships 
between society and the state.
Scholarly inquiries into the state throw up a host of theoretical implica-
tions. Of particular relevance to our context is, how can we understand 
the relationship between the state and society, and how do we understand 
power and resistance both inside and outside the state? Anthropological 
theory-production about the state has problematized and criticized 
Foucauldian and Weberian approaches to the state that pose state and 
society in a dichotomist relationship. For Foucauldian-inspired scholars, 
the state derives its power and its appearance as a bounded totality through 
the aggregated diffusion of impersonalized rule, institutions and proce-
dures—that is, governmentality (e.g., see Foucault 1991; Mitchell 2006). 
To Weberian scholars, “the state appears monolithic to society because its 
work follows certain impersonal, rational and standardized routines which 
give it a sui generis quality” (Neuman 2005:195). In both cases, the state 
appears as a bounded locus of power, set apart from society.
Anthropological scholars on the other hand, have argued that how the 
state appears, and how people view the state and position themselves in 
relation to it, is essentially a case of empirical inquiry. Gupta (1995), for 
example, asks whether the Western legacy of universalizing a dual cultural 
construction of state–society relations stands up to scrutiny in the face of 
“incommensurable cultural and historical contexts” (Gupta 1995:214). 
Drawing on ethnography from India, he argues that “we should leave 
open the analytical question as to the conditions under which the state 
does operate as a cohesive and unitary whole” (Gupta 1995:229). Nuijten 
(2003) makes a similar argument when she teases out a duality in the way 
Mexican peasants both engage with and imagine the state. Power is not 
an abstract formalized rule, but rather a myriad of changing strategies that 
are personalized and continuously reinvented (Nuijten 2003:120). At the 
same time, she argues that governmental techniques such as stamps, maps 
 THEORIZING THE STATE 
162 
and official terminology contribute to the preservation of the myth of 
bureaucratic rule and the appearance of a coherent system (Nuijten 2003).
hegemony and PracTice
Anthropologists perceive of the state as a set of institutions, strategies and 
practices as well as an idea and ideological construct (see also Abrams 1988 
[1977]; Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Krohn-Hansen and Nustad 
2005; Sharma and Gupta 2006). This is important for our ethnographic 
explorations, because it allows us to understand the Venezuelan state from 
various angles. “The Magical State” as a megamonolithic representation 
of power as sketched out by Coronil as well as the highly personalized 
inroads and dynamics within the Venezuelan state bureaucracy that we have 
already started to analyze are two valuable analytical inroads. However, 
the implicit conceptualization of the state and its relationship to society 
undercutting popular sector agency is also of crucial importance to our 
exploration. At times, people invoked an imagery of the Venezuelan state 
as a monolithic apparatus. This imagery was shaped by the state’s projec-
tion of itself—its imaginary state-craft—as well as by subjective encounters 
through which the state had rendered visible its exclusionary boundaries. 
At the same time, through its lack of Weberian systems of governance, it 
was also perceived of as a domain with the potentiality to be penetrated 
through social relations and practices traversing state–society boundaries. 
Moreover, people understood the state as a condensed site of power strati-
fying and organizing the diffusion of power throughout the rest of society. 
And, vice versa, as an instrument of power that different groups in society 
tried to seize in order to consolidate their power on other social, economic 
and political arenas. That is, the state is an amorphous entity, appearing as 
a different beast in different contexts and from different viewpoints. This 
is reminiscent of what Gupta quotes Donna Haraway on stating, “there is 
obviously no Archimedean point from which to visualize ‘the state,’ only 
numerous situated knowledges” (Gupta 1995:229).
Valencia argues that in order to understand the slogan “We Are the 
State!” as often uttered by Chávez’s grassroots supporters, we need to do a 
“critical rereading of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and its relationship to 
culture” (Valencia 2015:17). His contribution is important because it high-
lights that the state is a site for the construction of hegemony. The popu-
lar sectors’ attempt to transform the state from below was derived from a 
keen understanding of the state’s role in shaping how “various relationships 
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of subordination work” (Crehan 2002:105). As Scott (1985) has showed, 
resistance can come in numerous forms, open and covert, creatively rein-
vented and transformed in the course of different contexts and changing 
contour of domination. In the context of the Bolivarian process, popular 
sector activists were faced on the one hand with a seemingly benevolent 
state that professed—at the level of government ideology—that the state 
was theirs to appropriate and transform. On the other hand, people were 
keenly aware that the de facto transformation of the state implied challeng-
ing both concrete practices and institutionalized networks of power—both 
sympathetic to and in opposition to the government—as well as the cultural 
hegemony ingrained in the state. This duality, of the personalization and 
porousness of state power at the level of everyday practices, as well as the 
imagery of the state as a site of domination, is central for understanding how 
the state became an epicenter for struggle during the Bolivarian process.
Taking over The STaTe (?)
The picture becomes even more complicated when we try to understand 
how and to what extent the Chávez government was actually able to assert 
power over the state. As Hansen and Stepputat note:
Political power does not mean that a new government can change institutional 
routines overnight or that social practices within the bureaucracy can be easily 
modified. The state is an enormous and amorphous mechanism that functions 
along a whole range of discrete and often self-perpetuating logics, bereft of any 
unifying an encompassing rationale. (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2001:28)
They suggest that in order for a new political regime to successfully reach 
its objectives, it needs to design and implement a fairly coherent state proj-
ect that involves “thoroughgoing institutional reforms and a certain rein-
vention of the state” (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2001:29). However, 
more often than not, this does not happen, implying that “most contem-
porary societies remain governed by yesterday’s administrative systems and 
procedures” (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2001:29). The consequences 
of multiple “incomplete overhauls” by new regimes are that state systems 
are shaped by multiple sets of sediments of governance:
Each new regime builds a number of new institutions and nurses particular 
areas with greater care and zeal, often reflecting the larger ideological for-
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mation and communities out of which they have emerged. (Blom Hansen 
and Stepputat 2001:30)
Moreover, different parties cultivate particular ties of loyalties and patron-
age to different parts of the state system, leading to an additional “zoni-
fication” and fragmentation of the bureaucratic apparatus (Blom Hansen 
and Stepputat 2001:30). These insights are crucial for our context. 
Popular politics and state reforms in the Chávez era were taking place 
within a highly conflictive terrain, with a variety of actors and interests 
both within and outside the realm of the state. In addition, the govern-
ment built up a host of new institutions and structures, exactly in order 
to “by-pass” the pre-existing structures that they knew were extremely 
difficult to reform and gain control over. This produced an additional 
fragmentation and “zonification” of the state that made the enactment of 
government reforms a challenge.
Indeed, an inquiry into the Venezuelan bureaucracy to a certain extent 
debunks the popular myth that Chávez and his government wielded exces-
sive power over the state bureaucracy. The Venezuelan state is histori-
cally imbued with “non-Weberian” dynamics in the sense of being a site 
of personalized and highly fallible bureaucratic practices. These practices 
became even more complicated as the Venezuelan state under Chávez 
became a conflictive site for new and old networks of power, some resist-
ing and some reproducing entrenched state practices, and all of them 
intensely competing for power. These insights provide a clearer picture 
of why political reforms enacted from above were so difficult to enact. It 
also helps us understand why popular sector activists insisted on popular 
struggle as the key to the advancement of the Bolivarian process. The 
Venezuelan state would not transform itself on its own. It could only be 
transformed through sustained pressure and popular struggle from below 
in a prolonged Gramscian war of position as well as war of maneuver.
STrucTure, agency and habiTuS
Inquiries into human interaction with external structures will always 
bring up the eternal debate about the relationship between structure and 
agency. It will become clear from my ethnographic exploration that I attri-
bute to the Venezuelan state a considerable power over reproducing habi-
tus (Bourdieu 1979), even in the midst of radical change. In Bourdieu’s 
own words: “the habitus, the product of history, produces individual and 
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collective practices, and hence histories, in accordance with the schemes 
engendered by history” (Bourdieu 1979:82).
However, even as the schemes of the Venezuelan state as engendered 
by history, to paraphrase the quote above, appear to be resilient in many 
ways, I will illustrate the micro-processes of change taking place in differ-
ent fields through the flow of new policies, reforms, discourses and con-
figurations of new political and social actors. In Nuijten’s interpretation of 
Bourdieu’s concept of field
agents and institutions constantly struggle, according to the regularities and 
the rules constitutive of this space to appropriate the specific products at 
stake in the game. Those who dominate in a given field are in a position to 
make it function to their advantage, but they must always contend with the 
resistance, the claims, the contention, of the dominated. (Nuijten 2003:13)
Moreover, in different agents’ quests for conquering that field, they 
deploy the forms of capital (Bourdieu 1986) that correspond to that field. 
The historical conjuncture and the processes at play that are analyzed in 
this book might be cast as a reorganization of fields, and forms of capital 
that correspond to them, as different social actors tried to appropriate new 
political spaces within the Bolivarian process. Concretely, the discursive 
and political potency of the ethos of “popular power” constituted a new 
form of political and symbolic capital that was used in various ways by dif-
ferent actors to gain leverage, prestige and influence.
organizing Power (S)
Wolf argues that if we want to understand power, we need to start with 
history and processes of organization of power. Organization, he argues, 
“sets up relationships among people through allocation and control of 
resources and rewards” (Wolf 1990:590). At the same time he cautions 
that organization is always at risk; as power balances shift and change, 
power never reaches its final form of organization (Wolf 1990:590). As 
I outlined in Chap. 2, the history of the organization of the Venezuelan 
state through different power arrangements can be captured through dif-
ferent time frames, each of them showing processes of continuities as well 
as discontinuities.2 This is also the case with the Chávez epoch.
Changes under the Chávez government, in spite of being frequently 
referred to as a “Bolivarian revolution,” were not a revolutionary process, 
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but a reformist one. While a true political revolution implies “a rapid, basic 
transformation of a society’s political structures” (Thomassen 2012:683), 
the Chávez government left political structures intact or sought to reform 
them from within while simultaneously building new, parallel structures.3 
New legislation invested new forms of responsibilities, ends and means 
into existing institutions, while new institutions were being created in 
order to implement political reforms. At the same time, the Venezuelan 
state apparatus was in many respects left unchanged, permeated by old (in 
parallel with the new) power structures, personnel and institutional prac-
tices. While these inter- and intra-institutional struggles—intrinsic to any 
process of regime change—were evident at the level of day-to-day politics, 
they also gave way to a new understanding of the battle for hegemony 
over the political domain played out between the “old state” and the ideal 
vision of the reformed Bolivarian state.
At the heart of this process was the popular day-to-day struggle for 
appropriating the political space that was opened up by new legislation, 
policies and political discourse. It is to the day-to-day reality that I will 
now turn. However, I believe that it is appropriate to start “from the 
top,” with a broad overview of core issues related to the Venezuelan state 
system and how it relates to the broader process of political struggle and 
reconfigurations of power.
venezuelan STaTe PracTiceS
As is common in other Latin American countries, the political and admin-
istrative bureaucracy in Venezuela is highly personalized and revolves 
around personal networks and alliances. A number of middle- and high- 
level executive positions in the state and government apparatus (the so- 
called cargos 9.9) come with the clause that the new person in charge is 
allowed to change the key personnel working directly under her. These 
positions are called los cargos de confianza (positions of trust). That means 
that every time a key managerial position changes, the team supporting 
it also changes. That is why you often hear employees saying: “Yo entré 
por…” [I entered through…], meaning that you were brought in by the 
new person in charge. Moreover, if a new political actor wins an election 
to the parish, the municipal administration or governorship, the staff and 
service providers corresponding to the office is also by and large changed.
These practices have a range of implications. For one, they open up 
ample space for shady decision-making processes, including “corruption” 
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(see Chap. 10), as positions of power are built around networks of people 
with loyalty to one or a set of managers or leaders. Moreover, the constant 
change of personnel implies a lack of knowledge transfer, as the people 
who were formerly staffing the office all leave, and the new ones do not 
necessarily know the area they will be working in. During the Chávez era 
there was a high turnover of both ministerial positions, a series of reor-
ganizations of ministries and institutions, and a high degree of turnover 
in executive positions at various levels. I repeatedly saw how projects in 
the communities fell apart because there had been a change in positions, 
either in a political or in an administrative office. Often grassroots activ-
ists had spent a lot of time cultivating relations with political figures and 
state officials. But when positions were changed, their contact person and 
leverage also disappeared, and they had to start pushing to find another 
opening within the office they were dealing with.
Such practices also have the consequence that many state jobs are 
highly unstable, and people cultivate a range of different connections and 
networks within the state bureaucracy in order to ensure their future (see 
also Nuijten 2003). This creates strong and crosscutting alliances within 
the state system, which people also can rely on in order to get their job 
done. At the same time it should be said that internal recruitment pro-
cedures are not solely based on personal and political connections. Job 
performance does also play a role, though you often need someone to give 
you an opportunity and open the door for you; you need a door opener.
The PracTice of The Palanca
In Venezuela, a door opener is called a palanca (lever). Palanca is an 
expression that denotes the practice of “knowing” someone on the inside 
in order to obtain something. That something may be a service, an opera-
tion at the hospital, a studying coupon at the university, a job or a bank 
credit. The practice of using a palanca implies that those who don’t have 
a palanca will end up at the bottom of any priority list (e.g., a list of job 
applicants or a list of patients that have to undergo surgery). The social 
activist Rafael Gustavo González describes the culture of la palanca as 
follows:
The palanca doesn’t only move the world, loosens up bolts and opens pad-
locks, but it gets anything. The culture of the palanca has been elevated 
in every sense to the point that the use and abuse of it has become com-
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monplace. Let’s look at these expressions: Quite a trunk of a palanca you 
have! You surely got this with a palanca! Don’t worry mum, I already got 
into university because I got a palanca! This is my friend Pepe who I told 
you about who has a really good palanca in the ministry! Look, Mary, don’t 
forget to call Rosita who has a godmother who is friend of a doorman who 
has contact with the manager who serves you as a palanca! The palanca that 
I have is really good, I am sure to get that job. (González 2013)
The “acquisition-by-palanca” is part of virtually all spheres of society. It 
is possible to obtain things without a palanca, but a lot more insistence 
and effort are required. From an anthropological point of view, we can 
posit that doing a favor as a palanca amounts to an exchange similar to 
Marcel Mauss’s (1954) gift. One the one hand, a palanca can be a formal 
agreement, even implicating an economic compensation. But it is most 
commonly tied to core social obligations inherent in close relationships 
between kin, friends and networks. Serving as palancas for one another, 
constitutes a vital part of how social relationships are forged. Thus, 
the practice of the palanca is part of an expanding web of networks of 
exchange—amounting to a time-diffuse but persistent presence of expec-
tations of reciprocity. If I draw on your nephew’s uncle’s contact within 
the university in order get admitted into a master’s program, it establishes 
me in an undefined relationship of reciprocity, with you or someone in 
your friend’s networks.
Of course, this ties nicely with the common perception of Latin 
American states as infused with practices of corruption, nepotism, patron-
age, clientelism and amiguismo. I will not embark in that discussion here, 
as it would require going back to the historical context surrounding 
Venezuelan, and Latin American in general, state formations. Moreover, 
“corruption” will be thoroughly discussed in Chap. 10 where we will also 
look more closely into state practices and political imaginaries associated 
with corruption at large.
What I want to highlight however, is that the practice of the palanca 
has generated a state bureaucracy that is filled with spiderweb-like net-
works of loyalties and connections. Thus, while key political positions are 
appointed from the top (from the ministry), political power is not total. 
Rather, power is also filtered and diverted through co-existing or compet-
ing fiefdoms within the bureaucracy.
The palanca also creates dynamics whereby the state bureaucracy is 
filled with “fictitious positions”—positions that are created because some-
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one (sometimes unqualified and unmotivated) managed to get a job by 
using the right connections. This, as anyone who has dealt with Latin 
American bureaucracies can testify to, sometimes provides for bureau-
cratic encounters that makes you reach for both Kafka and Dante in order 
to conceptualize your sentiments. On a more serious note, it also evi-
dently taps the state bureaucracy for resources and hampers public service 
performance.
fiefdomS and neTworkS
The sindicatos (labor unions) are also powerful actors within the public 
institutions. They control hiring, and backed by strong Venezuelan labor 
laws, they also make it highly unlikely for people they protect to be fired. 
To be protected by the union is also a matter of cultivating networks and 
palancas. To have a job with the Venezuelan state is extremely desirable. 
According to labor laws, people with a permanent employment contract 
within the state are entitled to new employment, should their job become 
redundant. Public employment also provides good welfare benefits in the 
form of health insurance, bonuses and pension. In some cases, public posi-
tions can even be transmitted from parent to child.
It is a common claim of the opposition that the Chávez government 
purged state institutions from opposition members. In my experience that 
is far from the truth. I have come across non-sympathizers to the govern-
ment in all kinds of government institutions as well as in political offices, 
including the vice-ministry. As people often obtain positions through fam-
ily, friends or a palanca, political preferences may not be relevant. Many 
people have also been employed by the state for years or decades, and 
cannot be removed because of Venezuelan labor laws. The union power 
networks often pre-date the Chávez era, and are powerful blocs that may, 
or may not, be effectively in opposition to the government. “The old per-
sonnel” pre-dating Chávez may also cultivate personal ties and networks 
with new leaders and power networks where political preferences are irrel-
evant or under-communicated. Personal, political and strategic networks 
are not necessarily determined by partisanship, and political power is far 
from hegemonic. Rather, the political field, in the broad sense, is guided 
by highly complex dynamics between new and old power networks, insti-
tutional mechanisms and legislation, and ingrained social practices travers-
ing state–society boundaries.
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The labor conflicT in fundacomunal
A couple of years ago a labor conflict emerged in Fundacomunal.4 A new 
director, appointed by the head of Frente Francisco de Miranda, was put 
in charge of its main Caracas office, located in Catia. The new director 
was bent on reforming the institution from within, well aware of both its 
political importance—as the institution works closely with the communal 
councils—and its internal problematics, in the form of inefficiency, inter-
nal conflicts and, in some cases, incompetent and unmotivated personnel.
The institution’s long history, originally founded by Acción Democrática 
in the 1960s, implied that it was filled with “superfluous” personnel. 
Some of the newcomers, who had entered the institution after the Chávez 
government assumed power, had also adopted a “non-conscientious” 
approach to their work. In the words of one of their former co-workers: 
“The only thing they did was to raise their pay-check and smoke mari-
juana in La Guaira.”5 Eventually the new director fired a group of four to 
five people, from both the old and new guard. The group hired a lawyer, 
pulled strings within the institution, and went to the Ministry of Popular 
Power for Labour (Ministerio de Poder Popular Para el Trabajo) to com-
plain over the alleged unlawful dismissal.
However, since early 2003, during the oil strike/lock out, the Chávez 
government had repeatedly renewed the decree of immobilidad laboral 
(labor immobility). The decree implied the temporary suspension of the 
right to dismiss employees, both in the private and in the public sector, 
unless the termination was on the grounds of a breach of contract (failure to 
fulfill work duties, criminal activities and so on). The reason for these mea-
sures was that during the strike, merchants and business owners from the 
opposition started to fire Chavista sympathizers en masse. In order to put 
an end to this, the immobilidad laboral was announced, and later renewed.
The highest authority in disputed dismissals is the Ministry of Popular 
Power for Labor. In the Fundacomunal firing case, the ministry of labor 
voted in favor of the discharged workers because the director had alleg-
edly not filed the case properly. Fundacomunal was forced to compensate 
them for the unlawful dismissal with a year’s salary, and to reintegrate 
them into the work force. The case had received massive public attention 
because the discharged workers had gone to the opposition media and 
complained, claiming to have been fired for political reasons. Eventually, 
the director was forced to resign from her position, officially, because she 
had not consulted her superiors before making the decision to dismiss 
6 THE STATE AS A BATTLEFIELD
 171
them, unofficially, because of the negative publicity the event had brought 
upon Fundacomunal, and which she was held responsible for.
Thus, as this case shows, “Chavista-power” in state institutions was far 
from hegemonic. Rather, political intrigues, personal connections, laws and 
institutions steered events in one direction or another. Many people (bit-
terly) complained that adecos and copeyanos were more protected in the state 
institutions than the Chavistas, as the latter were newcomers and often on 
temporary contracts. The “old guard” on the other hand was safely pro-
tected by labor laws and long-established networks of power. It was a source 
of anger that, in labor conflicts, opposition supporters used the opposition 
media to give the impression that they were being fired for political rea-
sons—while it might have been because of incompetence or other justifi-
able reasons for dismissal. The main opposition channel, Globovision, was 
in particular notorious for making a media circus out of any case that could 
portray the government as authoritarian or discriminatory.
As the government was wary of such media campaigns, people started 
claiming that the public institutions avoided firing people who should be 
fired, keeping opposition supporters in state jobs, from which they could 
continue hampering and subverting the Bolivarian process from within. As 
one government worker formulated it:
We have this fear of confronting the Right … but if we don’t transform 
[the state], if we don’t have people that are really capacitated, people with a 
compromise and conviction capable to transform [the institutions], then we 
keep on maintaining the old, we keep on feeding the old, strengthening the 
old, and the old keeps on existing.
Government supporters, on the other hand, could be more easily dis-
missed or mistreated, as they would not “run off” to Globovision and 
complain, out of loyalty to the public image of the government.
The endogenouS righT
During the Fourth Republic, access to jobs in the state apparatus was 
based on allegiance to the dominant parties, Acción Democrática and 
COPEI.  Doors were shut for those who were not affiliated with these 
parties and, to a large extent, these jobs were unavailable for the popular 
classes. In the course of the Bolivarian process, a new generation of state 
employees was formed consisting of people with a leftist or lower-class 
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background. To a certain extent, this changed the rules of the state game, 
at the same time as it created a conundrum of highly conflictive and multi- 
farious dynamics within the state and the political sphere of the Bolivarian 
space.
The old layers of the state bureaucracy were often referred to as los 
adecos (sympathizers/loyalists to Acción Democrática), or los cuartare-
publicanos (those from the Fourth Republic). These were perceived of as 
saboteurs of the Bolivarian processes, not only because they might delib-
erately sabotage the execution of government’s policy, but also because 
they were accustomed to a state culture of corruption, inefficiency and 
sloth. However, popular sector activists and conscientious public officials 
also felt that they were struggling on another front, namely against what 
was referred to as la derecha endogena (the endogenous right). La dere-
cha endogena were people who might pose as fervent revolutionaries, but 
who in effect were more concerned with attending to their own ambitions 
and desires. Through not implementing reforms, plans and projects, they 
were sabotaging the process from within. Acting as if they supported the 
Bolivarian process, they could opportunistically plot their own schemes 
and build up their own (equally opportunistic) networks, squeezing out—
through dirty maneuvering—those who conscientiously sought to imple-
ment and act in accordance with “Bolivarian” principles and ideals. The 
presence of the endogenous right and opportunists within state institu-
tions was perceived of as one of the greatest threats to the Bolivarian pro-
cess, because it defamed the government in the eyes of the public and 
effectively sabotaged the advancement of popular sector struggles to 
appropriate the political space made available through government policy.
Additionally, people were concerned with the emergence of a new 
bureaucratic and political cast called the Boliburgesia (a combination of 
the words “Bolivarian” and “bourgeois”). Gossips of lavish spending, 
generous benefits and accumulation of private fortunes among “revolu-
tionary leaders” were widespread both in the communities and among 
lower-rank employees. This was taken as evidence of how the old vices 
of the Venezuelan state—that is, the tradition of using state positions for 
private rent seeking—had gotten hold of revolutionary hearts and minds.
The fragmenTed STaTe arm
Through these accounts of the inner dynamics of the Venezuelan state 
bureaucracy, a picture of a highly fragmented “executive arm” of gov-
ernment power emerges. The hierarchical structures, social practices and 
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cultural meaning historically inscribed in the state bureaucracy was both 
reproduced and challenged, giving way to intense struggles both from 
within and the outside of the formal corridors of bureaucratic and political 
power. Constant battle between new and old networks of power, con-
flictual loyalties, personal interests and ideological positions evolved in 
the midst of attempts to implement new political reforms that at any rate 
would have demanded a lot of cohesive bureaucratic co-ordination and 
effort.
As I quoted Blom Hansen and Stepputat on saying above: “The state 
is an enormous and amorphous mechanism that functions along a whole 
range of discrete and often self-perpetuating logics, bereft of any unify-
ing an encompassing rationale” (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2001:28). 
Historically, the Venezuelan state was constituted as a site for shoring 
up political power and amassing personal wealth. (This is further dis-
cussed in Chap. 10.) As a negative mirror image of the bureaucratic 
Weberian ideal type, the Venezuelan public servant was perceived of 
as being unresponsive and unaccountable to public service, and with 
an explicit class bias excluding the popular sectors. People intuitively 
attributed the state a strong ability to reproduce this kind of behavior 
(or habitus, one could say); once people got on the inside of the state 
system, they were caught up in the inner logics and behavioral expecta-
tions inscribed in the state system. To the popular sector, their struggle 
was thus a matter of challenging the cultural hegemony and accustomed 
practices inscribed in the state itself, at the same time as they battled 
against their own “fifth  columnists”—the Boliburgesia and the endog-
enous right—and the old layers of the Venezuelan state from the Fourth 
Republic.
chávez’S Scolding
The discrepancies between political ideals and realpolitik was far from lost 
on lawmakers, who were working on developing legislation in different 
arenas to facilitate popular participation in state politics. One member of 
the National Assembly, speaking on conditions of anonymity, expressed 
great concern over how the state institutions were managing their day- 
to- day contact with the communities, arguing that the institutions were 
still often circumscribing and manipulating popular power. He criticized 
the simplified vision of popular power that prevailed in state institutions 
(see Fernandes 2010 for an analysis of the neoliberal rationalities of the 
Venezuelan state), estimating success on the basis of the number of proj-
 CHÁVEZ’S SCOLDING 
174 
ects developed and the money spent, rather than on the basis of an inte-
grated vision of popular empowerment and increasing autonomy from the 
state:
My perception is that things are not going as they should, though we are ok 
if we measure the advancement of popular power through obras (projects), 
for the things that they do with the money that they solicit and are granted. 
Why ok? Because, for example, if they elaborate a project to construct 20 
houses to improve the life quality of 20 families they may even stretch the 
money to constructing 23–34 houses, they are efficient in that way. But this 
is not the kit of the revolution, or in other words, the kit of the revolution 
is not that the pueblo administers the state’s resources.
The revolution is about people governing in an integrated manner, do 
you understand? [The idea about the revolution] is developed from an 
endogenous point of view, to improve their life conditions, to establish a 
system of communal economy that makes them less dependent on minimas 
publicas (public grants) and which helps them to construct a socialist society 
of equity, justice and rights … that is why I cannot measure the advance-
ment of popular power [in money] … and that seems like what they are 
doing now, they measure it in the amounts transferred, but the money is 
just a resource that is justified by the projects, but the real benefit is in the 
achievements, in that the projects are generating the happiness of people, 
and not the money for the money’s sake. That is my preoccupation.
This was in 2010, when the communal councils were a key focus area for 
the government. The deputy attributed much of the problems related to 
the implementation of these to the internal politics and culture of el Frente 
Francisco de Miranda, who was put in charge of managing the ministry and 
corresponding institutions responsible for working with the poder popular. 
El Frente, as it was normally called, was led by Erika Farías, a woman origi-
nally from Catia, a popular neighborhood in the west, who slowly, but surely, 
had climbed the ranks within the Bolivarian revolution. Many complained 
that under her, el Frente had been streamlined into a highly hierarchical 
and politically partisan organization, which had also made it lose its original 
appeal to young people from different political backgrounds and with differ-
ent political viewpoints. Moreover, Farías was said to be an astute politician 
with a talent for securing her own power base, which translated into a very 
hierarchically organized ministry with institutions run by people loyal to her.
People often pondered over whether Chávez was informed well enough 
of what was going on, and most concluded that he wasn’t. People thought 
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that he was too trusting of his government ministers and therefore failed 
to pick up on what was going on within governmental institutions and “on 
the ground.” As one man commented: “Lo tienen engañado” [they have 
him fooled]. In November 2009, it seemed as if the news of popular dis-
content over how the institutions were working had also reached Chávez. 
In a live episode of Aló Presidente, he subtly, but firmly, interrogated Erika 
Farías about what was going on in her ministry, and lashed out on the 
“bureaucratism” that was creating obstacles to people’s efforts in organiz-
ing themselves. Even if people were used to Chávez interrogating ministers 
in public, after the live show, it was obvious that he was well- informed and 
upset about the problems between the public institutions and the com-
munal councils, and sending Farías a not-so-subtle message about putting 
her own house in order. After that, Farías wasn’t seen publicly for some 
weeks, and the institutions started to frenetically engage with the commu-
nal councils and approve projects that had been lingering for a long time.
This episode presents, very clearly, the image people had of Chávez 
as the embodiment of government power, yet incapable of actually con-
trolling the state itself. People often said they felt sorry for Chávez who 
wanted to do so much good, but was sabotaged by the people that should 
have been working for him. That also explains why people like Adrian and 
Miche were fighting as best they could. In spite of the difficulties within 
the institutions, they felt that if ideologically committed people gave up 
and resigned, the state would be left to demagogic, opportunist and self- 
serving people who would make the revolution wither away from within.
The oPaqueneSS of The STaTe
Caracas, 2011: One Thursday evening, I show up at seven o’clock in 
order to attend the meeting in the communal council. I had just come 
back to Venezuela after a year in Norway. When I had first spent time 
with them a year ago, they were about to get the communal council up 
and going. At the same time, there was also a lot of buzz around the new 
municipality’s flagship program, Plan Caracas Socialista. This was a plan 
for urban rehabilitation of barrio communities, which would be developed 
in close co- operation by the municipal government and popular sector 
organizations. La Cañada would be the pilot project for the plan. For that 
purpose a gabinete sectorial had been organized—a coordinating forum 
for the different community organizations in this area. The municipal-
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ity also designed an enlace parroquial (a person that would co-ordinate 
municipality and community organizations).
I find the group outside the headquarters of the local colectivo. Last time 
I saw them, when they were about to organize the communal council, they 
were holding meetings at the local school, located next to one of the blo-
ques. Then, 15 to 20 people were attending. Now it’s only 5 to 6, most of 
them the same community activists that have been gathering since long back.
As we wait for Roberto, the undisputed leader of the group, to sit down 
so we can start the meeting, I ask Irene about how things have been and how 
the work is coming along. She sighs and shakes her shoulders: “There is a lot 
of apathy in the community,” she says. I ask about Plan Caracas Socialista and 
she answers that they didn’t fulfill their promises. They did a bad job, and 
continued in the Zona Central before they finished here. “Jorge Rodriguez 
didn’t show his face again,” she says, referring to the kick-off meeting that 
they had with Jorge Rodriguez last year, when he promised that Plan Caracas 
Socialista would be the Municipal flagship program and that he would per-
sonally see to it. At the time it was even said that the mayor was taking secret 
trips to the area at night in order to see how things were proceeding.
Irene says that they have been sending letters to the Alcaldia and have 
tried to talk to them, but to no avail. Now Fundacaracas has taken over. As 
always, money is the issue; she sighs and shakes her head as in, “what can 
you do?” “It ended up being a white elephant,” she says dryly.
But this week she has been called up by Fundacomunal. Suddenly they 
got a plumbing project approved. Fundacomunal had demanded to have 
some papers about the communal council saying that “they should have 
had them yesterday.” Irene sighs again over this, because this whole process 
means that she has to open a new bank account, as Fundacomunal made 
their deposits in a different bank from that of the municipality. That meant 
that the whole process of paper work would have to be done all over again. 
“Why can they not just use the same bank account?” she complains again. 
Marta, a short woman in her 60s with indigenous traits, also comments on 
how difficult it is and how little help they feel that they are getting. She does 
however feel that the barrios are getting more help than the blocks, and she 
wonders if this is because they are in more dire need of help. However, 
both of them agree that they are a bit worn out in general. It feels like they 
have to knock on doors and hunt down decision-makers and decisions and 
information all the time and they just don’t have time for that.
* * *
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People knew from experience that their everyday interaction with the 
state was precarious. The state could suddenly “withdraw” and make itself 
unavailable, projects could stop, employees could say one thing and do 
another, meetings could be canceled, personnel could be changed, money 
could run dry and political processes could be sabotaged. Rumors and 
speculations abounded about what was going on within different gov-
ernment ministries and different institutions, who were on their way out 
and who were on their way in in executive and public positions, which 
decisions Chávez was pondering, and which funds were being released 
somewhere in the system.
The people I met with on that Thursday evening knew that they were 
subject to a series of abstract decision-making processes that went beyond 
their comprehension and reach. In an article from South Africa, Jensen 
(2001) describes how failed security reforms in the post-apartheid regime 
was attributed to remaining agencies of the apartheid’s security apparatus, 
called the Third Force. Over time, Third Force became more a concept 
than a reference to a specific agency, or what Laclau calls “an empty sig-
nifier” (Jensen 2001:117). The “Third Force” functioned as a catch-all 
explanatory narrative of struggle “where everything working against ‘the 
people’ is placed” (Jensen 2001:117). In a similar fashion, popular sector 
activists kept referring to “the bureaucracy” and “the institutions”—the 
key “catch-all explanatory narratives” which were constantly invoked as 
the reasons for everything that went wrong and their frustrating chal-
lenges with the state bureaucracy.
The PeneTrable STaTe
To a certain extent, these notions reflected an imagery of the state as a 
monolithic site of diffuse but palpable governmentality. By making peo-
ple wait, by keeping people in the dark, and by suddenly making deci-
sions taking people by surprise, state institutions demonstrate their power 
(Auyero 2011). However, to paraphrase Gupta (1995:229), it is an ana-
lytical question when and under which conditions the state does appear 
as a cohesive and unitary whole. Accordingly, I will suggest that “seeing 
the state” (Scott 1999) as an enclosed site of power did not preclude that 
they also saw it and knew it for what it was: an incoherent apparatus of 
uncoordinated institutions and organs, of personal fiefdoms and hierarchi-
cal networks, of fragmented and incomplete information. For that reason, 
people continued to push their case, make phone calls, draw on contacts, 
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and write letters (while others got frustrated and worn out). Like in the 
case of the CDI in Chap. 5, suddenly a door could open, the right but-
tons could be sufficiently pushed, the right person could get interested, 
Chávez or a minister could say or do something decisive, or the insistence 
and continuous presence of those involved was enough for the state to be 
engaged once more. In her case study of peasant organizations and the 
state in Mexico, Monique Nuijten (2003) argues that the efforts to con-
nect with the state seldom pay off. In Venezuela, the picture wasn’t that 
gloomy. Often, efforts to connect with the state, via formal or informal 
channels, did pay off, even though it required a lot of efforts.
As Grindle and Nuijten’s note for Mexico, the state apparatus is so vast 
that most people “know someone” within the bureaucracy who can be 
mobilized. Grindle reports that most middle-class people have held a posi-
tion in a political or governmental office at some point in their life, or they 
have had a family member or compadre in one (Grindle 1977:56, cited 
in Nuijten 2003:154). In the case of Venezuela, an increasing number of 
popular sector families now also had family, friends or relatives holding a 
position in political or governmental offices. Furthermore, the political 
alignment between the government and popular sector activists implied 
that, over the years, strategic bonds and alliances had been forged between 
state officials and local communities. Often, state and political officials 
appeared in public meetings where they could be approached, and the 
ideological ethos of popular power provided community activists with a 
discursive and political leverage. All in all, these changes made the state 
potentially accessible—if they were able to get a foot in the door.
Carmen, a community activist in 23 de Enero, expressed these efforts 
“to find a way in” in a very matter-of-fact way one evening, when we 
were talking on a basketball field while we waited for a meeting in the 
community council to start. She and her friend Belkis had been the pio-
neers of community work in their area, and their first project had been to 
fix the basketball court, complete with a mosaic of Bolívar, that we were 
standing on. “But I was practically stalking (former mayor of Caracas) 
Barreto to get the money,” she said. At every public meeting Barreto 
held, she tried to give him a letter or talk to him. She explained that they 
had just gotten word that the money was within reach, when there was a 
change of administration, and the other guy6 took office, “and you know,” 
she sighed. Eventually, they managed to get money for the project from 
the Libertador Municipality, with the help of a local and well-connected 
resident.
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drawing on neTworkS
It is not my intention to suggest that the political and state institutions did 
not initiate and carry out projects and policies in shantytown communities 
on their own account or that the communal councils did not have their 
project approved unless they were able to hunt down significant politicians 
or state bureaucrats. However, what I want to highlight is that the abil-
ity to push the right “state buttons” is a central factor for explaining why 
bottom-up initiated community politics unfolded in such a heterogeneous 
manner in different areas. As we will learn more in the following chapter, 
a community council’s ability to push their project through depended to a 
certain extent on the capacity and conscientiousness of the public official 
that had been assigned to help them in the process. The community’s own 
organizational strength and “social capital” was also shaping their ability 
to access state funds and strengthen their political momentum. Moreover, 
the state institutions also at times identified “priority areas” that were 
assigned particular attention.
To illustrate this point, I’ll use the example of a meeting with a col-
ectivo in 23 de Enero. The colectivo was having a meeting to organize a 
gran mega jornada integral. Jornada is a term describing a fair where dif-
ferent government services and products are present. For example, jorna-
das of large-scale sales of food, through the distribution chain Mercal, are 
occasionally organized in open public spaces, especially before Christmas. 
This gives people the opportunity to do their Christmas shopping (a major 
cost for lower-income families) at discounted prices. For this local mega 
jornada, they were planning on having military enrollment opportuni-
ties arranged, free vaccines, sale of the new government-produced mobile 
telephone, Vergatario, a stall where people could issue new cedulas (iden-
tity cards) and sale of food through Mercal. They also wanted to arrange 
a salsa concert in the evening, and had invited one of the musicians from 
Grupo Madera (a famous band that has also made “jingles” for the gov-
ernment) to join the meeting. The musician present from Grupo Madera 
said that the group would be happy to participate and that they were 
always in favor of working with the communities. Personally, he didn’t 
work for the government, but he had friends that did and that could get 
a hold of the equipment for the event. “This is the political work that 
the government workers have to assume,” the musician said. The group 
started to discuss whom they could use as a connection. “Deputy Chino 
Jose Khan is responsible for this area,” the musician said. Giorgio, the 
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leader of the local colectivo, answered that he had his telephone number. 
He had tried calling him, but the deputy had not answered. He had also 
tried to call Valentin, the influential leader for the colectivo La Piedrita, for 
two months, but he hadn’t picked up either. The musician mentioned that 
he knew the deputy’s assistant, Carmencita, to which Giorgio responded 
that they knew her as well, but that “she has forgotten one’s face.” They 
then mentioned Robert Serra (who was later brutally murdered), another 
of the deputies with close bonds to 23 de Enero, and Giorgio said that he 
would be responsible for making contact with him. They then agreed that 
they still needed to find a way to get a hold of Chino Khan.
As this ethnographic example shows, people draw from the mechanisms 
that have always characterized the informal dynamics of the Venezuelan 
state apparatus, using personal contacts and finding ways to engage cen-
tral decision-makers. In many ways people take it for granted that “this is 
the way things work.” At the same time, as we will discuss further below, 
people’s expectations for state accessibility and accountability, or what 
in Venezuelan terms is dar respuestas (give answers), was increasing as 
community self-consciousness, and the political ethos of popular power, 
translated into a redefined vision of what the state, and its representatives, 
should act like. These changing expectations constituted one of the key 
levels of negotiation that shaped the interaction between communities and 
state and government bodies.
Some activists complained that 23 de Enero (where the example above 
is taken from) received an un-proportional amount of government atten-
tion and resources, not only because its fame and relative proximity to the 
city center gave it a status as a “showcase community,” but also because 
its residents were well-connected through political networks dating long 
back. To a certain extent this is true; 23 de Enero was granted several 
large projects and did have its public services significantly expanded. On 
the other hand, this also happened because the grassroots networks and 
organizations were organizationally prepared to collaborate with the state 
institutions—though organizational capacities were distributed unevenly 
across the community. In spite of the state apparatus’ frequently fallible 
and erratic maneuvers, there was also a keen understanding of the impor-
tance of nurturing popular power in an organic and gradual manner. If 
money and projects were assigned to communities that were organization-
ally unprepared, money would be squandered and the projects would fall 
apart. At the same time, the state also was organizationally and politically 
deficient in following their politics and policies through. As we will discuss 
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further in Chap. 7, the implementation of new public policies and politi-
cal directives was therefore guided by careful considerations of what was 
organizationally and politically feasible, as well as the messy and often 
contradictory realities of the political game and state action.
inSTiTuTional inerTia
In an article from South Africa, Jensen poses the question of how a politi-
cal party can bring about reforms at the level of the state (2001:97). As 
the African National Congress (ANC) swept to power in 1994, the party 
was determined to use the state as an instrument for a complete overhaul 
of society. The South African and Venezuelan cases have similarities. First, 
the ANC perceived the state as a tool to be deployed by a political party 
in order to promote the interests of the people. Second, the perception 
of the “old state” was one of an apparatus designed to protect the inter-
ests of a minority (the white in the South African case, the bourgeois 
and the elites in the Venezuelan case), providing the newcomers with the 
legitimate right to rule and reform the state. However, as Jensen demon-
strates, political reforms were not enacted in the form that the ANC had 
envisioned. Rather, transformations came about “through very localized, 
not always heroic, power struggles” (Jensen 2001:97). He argues that 
“bureaucratic knowledge and experience inscribed in institutional prac-
tices produce inertia within institutions that are very difficult to change” 
(Jensen 2001:107).
This is an observation that can very easily be applied to the Venezuelan 
case. By looking at the state bureaucracy we realize that the state is not 
guided by a single coherent political line, but rather consists of a multitude 
of overlapping, contested and unbounded fields. There are often enor-
mous contradictions and discrepancies between the government’s political 
vision and its ability to implement it. While governments may aim at creat-
ing a new state order with institutions that respond to the citizens’ needs 
and the implementation of new legislation, it may be hard to put such 
political ambitions and directives into practice. Transformation takes place 
in a number of arenas, through a multitude of everyday struggles, with 
conflicting interests and shifting alliances within, outside and between the 
realms of the state and the realms of the popular sector. It leads to the for-
mation of new social relations and new configurations of power and alli-
ances that aren’t necessarily in accordance with the new political discourse, 
and where individual interests compete with visions of collective change.
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In Chap. 7, we will explore how people were actively contesting the 
hierarchical nature and cultural hegemony inscribed in the Venezuelan 
state. Drawing on the political, social and cultural knowledges and sociali-
ties of the popular sectors, people were trying to push state and political 
actors into complying with the Bolivarian ethos of a popular takeover of 
the state. I will start by exploring the role of the so-called promotores inte-
grales—public officials assigned to work closely with popular sector com-
munities through the communal council. I will argue that their role took 
place within a hybrid interface (Long 1999)7 where “state power” and 
“popular power” met on a day-to-day basis, carving out a negotiated and 
contested space for popular sector politics within the realm of the state.
 noTeS
 1. Misión Identidad was a program designed to give identity documents to all 
citizens, including foreigners living undocumented in the country. The pro-
gram was carried out by visiting remote areas with mobile units and setting 
up temporary offices throughout the country.
 2. See also Joseph and Nugent (1994), Nugent (1997, 1998), Starn (1999) 
for explorations of Latin American state formations.
 3. Chávez’s bid for constitutional reforms in 2007 represented a quest for 
gaining popular approval for radical reforms—a proposal that the electorate 
turned down with a narrow margin.
 4. Although this is a publicly known event, I have chosen not to go into details 
about the office and individuals involved. This account is the result of inter-
views and conversations with various people close to the center of events.
 5. La Guaira is the coastal strip around the airport Maiquetia.
 6. Juan Barreto was followed by Antonia Ledezma, who represents the 
opposition.
 7. Long describes interfaces as “point where different, often conflicting, life-
worlds or social fields intersect, or more concretely, in social situations or 
arenas in which interactions become oriented around problems of bridging, 
accommodating, segregating or contesting social, evaluative and cognitive 
standpoints” (Long 1999:1).
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Caracas, 2009: I could see that Miriam was about to work herself up. We 
had gone to the Military Museum in 23 de Enero for a large community 
meeting. The theme for the meeting was how the communal councils 
were to adapt to the new law for the communal councils that had just been 
passed.1 On the way out Miriam was stopped by a woman from a nearby 
communal council. The woman was already quite agitated, shouting that 
people in the communities were fed up, that they had handed in projects, 
but that nothing happened. “What does one have to do,” she shouted. “Go 
to the offices and get naked? The bureaucracy is killing the revolution, the 
revolution is here, with Chávez,” she said, touching (or rather beating) 
her chest. “But this is destroying the process.” Miriam asked what they 
had done, where they had handed in projects, “because here I am, jalando 
bolas (dragging their balls) for the community to hand in projects.” “We 
have handed them to the municipality,” the woman answered. “But not 
to Fundacomunal?” Miriam inquired. “No,” the woman said. “Why not, 
if you had handed the project to Fundacomunal, you would have gotten 
your pavement by now.” “But that is the problem,” the woman shouted, 
“they tell you to go to Fundacomunal, to the municipality, to the ministry, 
to the presidency, but what, this is the problem!”
The discussion continued, back and forth for a while; they spoke about 
a letter that had been handed in, about a project that had been handed 
in, about a temporary halt of the funding of housing projects in order 
to incite people to develop other projects as well. Miriam told her that 
rather than formandome peos a mi (scold me) at the community meeting, 
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she should rather go to Fundacomunal, to formar peos there, so that the 
complaints were made visible to the institutions. “The problem is a lack of 
response from the institutions,” she said. “Look, like I am telling you, the 
other day we got a hold of la Corporación de Servicios, and they got their 
ass moving; don’t you see that they are working? Why? Because in that 
meeting we had with them, all of us were all over them.” She was referring 
to the service branch of the municipality in charge of garbage collection 
and cleaning. In a meeting the other day the community and Miriam her-
self had been telling them off, demanding better services.
Afterward Miriam and I walked home together; both of us living only 
ten minutes away. She was really upset. “I get angry really fast, I am the 
one that got shouted at,” she says, maintaining that the real problem was 
that the institutions high up didn’t dar respuestas (give answers). “And 
besides, now I have to organize yet another meeting because many of my 
communal councils didn’t show up.” Miriam was responsible for all the 
communal councils in the whole of 23 de Enero. I asked her if she had 
asked to get a co-worker to help her out. “Yes, but they just say that ‘you 
can do it.’ I have walked all day in the street, since 8 o’clock (12 hours), 
and now I get home and my husband is there with his cara de culo (liter-
ally: ass face) … I am quitting, I will look for another job.”
* * *
In Chap. 6, we sketched up the conflictive and contradictory faultlines 
between the ideals of the Bolivarian process and the messy reality of how 
it actually unfolded within the domains of the state. Drawing on emic con-
ceptualizations of the root causes of all the problems—“the endogenous 
right,” “the boliburgesia,” “los cuartarepublicanos,” “the institutions,” 
“the bureaucracy”—a quite gloomy picture emerged of a state that was 
caught up in its own power dynamics rather than executing state policy. 
Moreover, a picture was also painted of a political process and ideology that 
was incapable of superseding the exclusionary and hierarchical nature of 
the political domain that it so strongly criticized. However, while popular 
sector activists experienced many challenges, they also experienced many 
small and big victories. Concurrently, while the state in many respects was 
characterized by structural inertia and deep contradictions between ideal 
and practice, the Bolivarian process did also carve out a host of new prac-
tices, rationalities and cultural politics into the state body.
In order to get a better grasp on these complexities, this chapter is dedi-
cated to delving deeper into state–society interaction within the Bolivarian 
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space. I will explore the multiple struggles and strategies deployed by 
ideologically oriented grassroots activist and public officials in order to 
convert the ideals of the Bolivarian process into everyday political prac-
tice. Invoking the ethos of popular power, people were confronting and 
contesting the exclusionary and hierarchical practices of the Venezuelan 
state. At the same time, the rationalities of state governance was put up 
against popular knowledges in a process that was eclipsed by the Bolivarian 
government’s political ideology of transferring state power to el pueblo 
soberano (the sovereign people). Concretely, this ideology was manifested 
in policies and directives that in its legal framework and in its ideological 
framing had the potential to empower popular power at the expense of 
state power. However, as Ferguson (1994) also shows from his influential 
account from Lesotho, policies tend to take on a life of their own when 
faced with complex material, political and social realities. In a similar fash-
ion, the participatory politics promoted by the Chávez government gen-
erated new and contested dynamics both within the state institutions and 
in the communities when the policies were sought carried out in practice.
Betwixt and Between: the Promotores Integrales
We will start our exploration by continuing to focus on Miriam, who is 
introduced in the vignette above. She is an example of the many highly 
conscientious and ideologically oriented public sector workers that truly 
believed in the ideals of the Bolivarian process, and who became central for 
defending government policy inside the state institutions and in converting 
it into reality in popular sector communities. Her job was to be a promo-
tor integral in Fundacomunal, the “front line” public employees that were 
working directly with the communal councils. Her task was to help them 
with whatever challenges they were facing: organizing and constituting 
themselves, developing and executing projects, or resolving internal prob-
lems and quarrels in the communities. In spite of her frustrations, Miriam 
didn’t quit her job as she fretted over above, and over the years I often 
followed her throughout her workday, both in the communities, in public 
meetings and visiting public institutions. The demands put on her and her 
co-workers were not easy. The promotores were poorly paid, and it was an 
exhausting job, both mentally and physically. They had to subir cerro (climb 
shantytown hills) by foot, be in the baking sun, take buses and metros, use 
toilets and ask for water in private barrio homes. At the same time they had 
to fill out paperwork to prove that they were attending to the communities, 
and participate in political and public meetings and training sessions.
 BETWIXT AND BETWEEN: THE PROMOTORES INTEGRALES 
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I suggest that the promotores occupied an ambiguous betwixt-and- 
between position in relation to the communities and the state. They came 
from poor communities, and many of them worked in their own commu-
nities, or in those nearby. At the same time, they were at the bottom of the 
institutional hierarchy and their experiences and field observations were 
often ignored by their superiors. This positioned them in a difficult situa-
tion in the communities. People viewed them as “agents of the state” who 
could help in getting projects approved, while many promotores actually 
had little influence over which projects were approved. These decisions 
were made elsewhere, higher up in the system, through a process that was 
often intransparent to the promotores themselves.
This ambiguous social and professional positioning implied that many 
of the promotores had a dual identity with regards to whom they felt 
that they were most closely identifying with or representing: the com-
munities or the state. Like Miriam was saying above: “In the same way 
you are formandome peos a mi (scolding me) here, you have to go to 
Fundacomunal to formar peos there.” What she meant was that castigating 
her at the meeting in the community did little good. Rather, the commu-
nities, or the woman in this case, would have to approach Fundacomunal’s 
offices directly in order to make their complaint visible to the institu-
tions. Through this statement, Miriam signalized that she felt she neither 
embodied, sympathized with, nor had control over the “institutions.” 
Rather, state power was located elsewhere, and the communities had to 
make their anger visible where that power held seat, namely in the institu-
tions; in “the realm of officialdom.”
MiriaM’s road to revolution
Miriam was constantly frustrated over the way the institutions were work-
ing. For her, working with community organizations was deeply political 
and personal. Her motivation came from her love for Chávez and her 
belief in the revolution, and despite not being well versed in political the-
ory, she had a keen intuitive understanding of the politics of class, of Latin 
America’s colonial and imperial history, and of the transcendental role of 
the state in concretizing social transformation. But above all, she was an 
idealistic pragmatist, and she confronted her numerous daily challenges 
with a sarcastic attitude and a big heart.
Miriam was a middle-aged woman, married to a taxi driver and mother 
of two teenage daughters. In many ways, she was a representative of the 
female backbone supporting the Bolivarian revolution; she was one of 
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those numerous popular sector women who had experienced a political 
awakening with Chávez’s arrival on the political scene (Fernandes 2007; 
Rakowski and Espina 2011; Motta 2013; Strønen 2013).
Her journey toward becoming a “revolutionary” had been long. As a 
young woman, she had started hanging out in 23 de Enero when she met 
the man who later became her husband, a native of 23 de Enero. There, 
she witnessed el Caracazo and later joined the political mobilization 
around Aristóbulo Istúriz, who served as mayor of Municipio Libertador 
for La Causa R in the 1993–1996 period.
And when the things with Chávez started, that is when I really got strength-
ened, and I got really, really strengthened … and when the coup, when they 
took Chávez, that was when … how do you say it, it’s like, when something 
is taken away from you, when someone dies, that is when you really value 
that person … when I felt that they took Chávez away from me, it was like 
they took our soul away.
That is when I really got strengthened … it was the esqualidos that really 
strengthened me and a lot of others as well when they took him away, that 
is when I got strengthened as a Chavista, because I am more a Chavista 
than a revolutionary, you see? I love that man. Imagine. So, no se metan 
(they better not screw him over) because we don’t know how we will react 
… he has people behind him and loads of women behind him, we are loads 
of women, more women than men. Imagine this bunch of women against 
these esqualidos if they screw Chávez over…
Miriam was educated through the Frente Fransisco De Miranda, and had 
just graduated when I first met her in 2009. She had taken her courses and 
done her internships in Venezuela, as the program, previously in Cuba, 
was moved to Venezuela. She wished for and got a job in Fundacomunal 
as a promotor through a female friend who temporarily served as a direc-
tor. In spite of her frustrations, she loved her job:
I like my job, I love my job, I like what I do … I have worked Iselin, I’ve 
had a lot of jobs, I have worked in Pizza Hut, in Burger King, in private 
companies, in factories … I have sold hotdogs, the only thing that I haven’t 
done is work as a whore in a bar and that I will never do … I have worked as 
a buhonera (selling stuff in the streets), I have cleaned toilets….
I studied as well, I took various courses, courses about everything, I studied 
accounting, administration and started to work in a tourism enterprise and 
that’s when I started to work in administration, without university studies, but 
with my courses and the practical knowledge that I possessed, I worked there 
for 12 years, I changed over to the sales department, I did very well there.
 MIRIAM’S ROAD TO REVOLUTION 
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Afterwards I couldn’t take it anymore with the political problems, with 
Chávez, I supported him and the boss was esqualido … so I left and I don’t 
want to work anymore in the private business, and well, God heard me and 
helped me with a job that I like…
Knowing el PueBlo
Miriam often felt that she had to fight to get support on the job and for 
the communal councils she was serving. The institutional structures of 
Fundacomunal were departmentalized and hierarchically organized, with 
limited flow of information between the director and the ground people 
such as herself. She felt that her knowledge of “what was happening on the 
ground” was not sufficiently respected or sufficiently taken into account 
when decisions were to be made. Moreover, the director of Miriam’s office 
cultivated a circle of “loyal” people, while shutting out those who did not 
jalar bolas (suck up). As she found herself in the latter category, she felt 
that it was often difficult to have the ear of her superiors.
In her view, Fundacomunal was hampered by both political and institu-
tional problems. On the one hand, Chávez’s political directives of transfer-
ring power to el pueblo were not followed up on as they should. This was 
particularly worrisome because Fundacomunal was the frontline politi-
cal institution mandated to empower the communal councils. However, 
instead of truly being a transformative entity making itself an effective tool 
for popular activism, it continued reproducing the vices of the “institu-
tions” and “the bureaucracy” through institutional opaqueness. Added to 
this, the institutional legacy of Fundacomunal in terms of being hierarchi-
cally organized and still having staff originating from the Fourth Republic 
made it into an inefficient tool for co-operating and engaging effectively 
with poder popular (popular power). To Miriam, these were matters of 
grave concern, because the institution’s shortcomings and inability to dar 
respuestas (give answers), made people hablando paja (talking bullshit) 
about both Chávez and the revolution.
a Cadre for the revolution
Moreover, Miriam was utterly frustrated with many of her co-workers. Some 
of those working with her didn’t care about their work: for them, it was just 
a way to cobrar (get paid), she alleged. They came to work in the morning, 
signed in, and then did nothing. As a consequence, communities that were 
assigned a promotor that didn’t care about his or her work recieved poor or 
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no support, which led to people losing faith in the government and in the 
revolution. She, on the other hand, viewed her job as a political task, which 
was what motivated her to continue her work in spite of her frustrations.
I am always telling the communities that this is thanks to el Presidente, these 
are the achievements of el Presidente, the missions, this is what he wishes 
for you, he wants you to study, he wants you to organize yourselves, and 
I explain all this about what the president wants, why the laws were made, 
why the Ley Habilitante was passed, all these things….
But I don’t get too elaborate, because people don’t like that, I talk to 
them in the colloquial way that we talk, you see? One has to talk to el pueblo 
in their own language—yes, sometimes it is necessary to discuss, but then 
you discuss with the people who are up for it … but with el pueblo in an 
assembly, you cannot … because people get bored, and instead of listening 
to you they start to yawn, the same thing has happened to me and I start to 
think of birds and stuff … so you have to say things very pointedly…
For Miriam, the job as a promotor meant being a social worker, a politi-
cian, a pedagogue and, not least, an expert in conflict resolution:
You have to climb the cerros (shantytown hills) with them, trudge, assess 
people´s necessities, be a humanist, see if they are carrying out the housing 
projects, listen to the señora, see if the communal councils are doing what 
they are supposed to do, find a way to try again, to act, to help, so that they 
don’t get into trouble there.
As is clear from her accounts, Miriam sees herself as embodying the Bolivarian 
revolution, not the state. For her, the state is a corrupting force, evidenced 
by the lack of responsiveness that she saw around her. In spite of being 
part of el pueblo herself, she saw herself as a guide, instructing people and 
socializing them into becoming new citizens capable of taking on their new 
role in a new society. This was also Roberto’s view, another promotor with 
Fundacomunal, also trained by the Frente Fransisco de Miranda. In an inter-
view, I asked what he liked most about his job. This is what he answered:
The contact with el pueblo, because that is part of this conjuncture, it is the 
state … through my work, taking it to el pueblo … it is like one of Che’s 
theories, that the cadre takes the grand decision of the state, makes them his 
and communicates them to el pueblo, trying to also make el pueblo assume 
it as theirs. So that is why this is a really beautiful job, you have direct con-
tact with el pueblo, you see their realities, you make decisions, you are like 
an intermediary between el pueblo and the state.
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Of course, we have deficiencies in what comes back, in the dialectic you 
could say, but that is what we are working towards … as part of the state 
one feels that one is contributing with solutions for el pueblo and that is the 
beautiful part, the direct contact with el pueblo, to make them the state, to 
transform them into state (volverlo estado, transformarlo en estado).
The promotores were the ones most frequently in contact with the com-
munities. Basically, they were the state’s “eyes and ears,” with ample room 
for making their own personal judgments and choosing how to exer-
cise their role. The promotores weren’t distant “state officials.” Rather, 
they knew well la gente (people) and how local dynamics were playing 
out in the communities. On a separate occasion, I chatted with Roberto 
about the problems in many of the communal councils, and the conflicts 
between different fractions and different interests. Most often there were 
conflicts between those who protected their own interests, and those who 
tried to stay true to the communitarian ideals that the communal councils 
represented. He said dryly that one always knows what la gente (people) 
are like. He could go to a community and immediately see “who is who” 
and what is going on: who is the cheat, who wants to work for the com-
munity, who is the idealist, who is the opportunist, who has a leadership 
role, who aspires to become a leader, who supports their work and who 
does not. In order to be a good promotor you had to know how to deal 
with la gente. As Miriam once stated in her matter-of-fact way: “Cuando 
veo los peos los mato rapidito” [when I see the problems surging I quell 
them immediately].
o inventaMos o erraMos
At least in the beginning, the signals from above were not to be too rigid 
about enforcing rules and regulations in communal council proceedings. 
The idea was that, if things became too formalized and bureaucratic, 
 people in the communities would get de-motivated and lose interest. The 
impetus was rather to let both public institutions and communities learn 
along the way, and to let the thousands flowers blossom. At the same 
time, the organizational framework supporting the communal councils 
was still in the making, and Fundacomunal was struggling to adapt to 
the new legislation, caught up in internal issues and understaffed. Many 
of the promotores that were hired to work with the communal councils 
were uncertain about how to do their job. Indeed, there were no public 
servants that were entirely prepared for working with communal councils. 
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After all, theirs was a completely new legal and organizational figure that 
had yet to be incorporated into the rest of the state bureaucracy.
Thus, Chávez’s order was for institutions to learn to work with el poder 
popular, and he had el Frente Fransisco de Miranda assume responsibil-
ity for co-ordinating and managing the core institutions that would work 
with the communal councils. The idea “to learn as they went along” was 
epitomized by the phrase o inventamos o erramos (either we invent or we 
err). That was a phrase coined by Simón Rodriguez, Simón Bolívar’s friend 
and teacher, talking about forming Gran Colombia. Chávez frequently 
held this phrase up as a guiding proverb, arguing that the bourgeois state 
had to be dismantled, and that a new state, el estado popular (the popular 
state) had to be built bit by bit. It could not be a pre-designed model, but 
rather an organic product of emerging social dynamics and the progres-
sive accumulation of knowledge. Thus, just as the numerous missions had 
been launched “overnight” through the collective effort of state institu-
tions and popular organization, communal councils would start function-
ing in the same manner.
a hyBrid sPaCe
The next case study illustrates the modes of interaction between promo-
tores and communities, and provides ethnographic details about how the 
processes of learning by trial and error were playing out “on the ground.” 
As will emerge from this story, the social dynamics in each community—
las realidades (the realities)—as the promotores often said, were shaping 
community dynamics. Internal conflicts and alliances, and local notions 
of social space, structured the legal and organizational framework of the 
communal councils. The boundaries between the popular sectors and the 
state were difficult to discern, simply because the state effect (Mitchell 
1999) had not yet been grinded into shape. Mobilization was taking place 
in a hybrid space between institutional and legal frameworks that were 
not yet concretized and much less enforced and systematized. “Popular” 
ways of doing things were flourishing in the absence of public officials 
that knew how to enforce state policy or had internalized their role and 
agency as representatives of the state. This produced a hybrid space, I will 
argue, whereby the communities tentatively tried to “become” communal 
councils, yet steeped in complex local socialities shaping those processes. 
At the same time, public officials were also trying to learn “how to become 
the state” while at the same time upholding the principle of promoting el 
poder popular.
 A HYBRID SPACE 
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o inventaMos o erraMos in PraCtiCe
April 2009: it was 8 am, early on a Sunday. I met Miriam down by the 
Agua Salud metro station in 23 de Enero. Together with Miche, a col-
league of hers who normally worked in another parish, we went to do an 
inspection of the work of some of the communal councils in the area. The 
inspection had been scheduled because Chávez had recently instructed 
Fundacomunal to evaluate how the communal councils were progress-
ing before he authorized the injection of new funds for a new round of 
projects. I greeted Miriam and Miche, and we jumped on a camioneta that 
took us to a community in the eastern part of 23 de Enero. When we got 
there, Miriam walked us over to the house of the vocera (spokesperson) in 
the communal bank. She was a middle-aged, short woman, and originally 
Colombian. Her daughter, as well as some of the other voceros from the 
finance committee, was also present.
Miche and Miriam started talking in a friendly but inquiring manner 
about how things had been going with the housing and rehabilitation 
project. It soon turned out that there had been some irregularities. The 
communal council in place when we visited that day was not the origi-
nal communal council. The original council had split into two branches: 
one above the road and one below the road. According to the woman, 
they had received technical assistance from the municipality in doing so. 
Miche and Miriam made it clear that this was against the law. It was only 
Fundacomunal that could supervise and approve the constitution of com-
munal councils. Who the representative from the municipality was and 
what his or her real involvement might have been was never clarified.
Additionally, the communal council could not present bills for its pur-
chase of construction materials as checks were made out to individuals. 
This was a clear breach of the duty to rendir cuentas (present accounts) 
to the community and to Fundacomunal. No social comptrollership com-
mittee had been monitoring how the projects were proceeding and how 
the money was being spent. The communal council had hired an external 
co-operative to do the work. The co-operative had been recommended to 
them by the Ministry of Health that had previously hired them to set up 
a health module in the sector. However, the money dried up before the 
projects were finished and a lot of the work was left incomplete. Some of 
the money had also been used on a medical emergency in the community 
and on the purchase of some take-away lunches. The women were in obvi-
ous distress over this and Miche and Miriam were not too hard on them, 
saying that this was not an irregularity in itself as long as it was approved 
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by a community assembly. The problem was that they had not convoked 
such an assembly.
The original project was to restore 27 houses and substitute 5, for a total 
amount of 870,000 Bs.F. Allegedly, the vocera had received part of the 
funds (15,000 Bs.F) to remodel her own house. She was in fact showing 
us her house, which was obviously in the midst of a renovation. The dis-
cussion was going back and forth, and the lady was explaining as best she 
could. Both Miriam and Miche were laid-back and non- confrontational, 
though I could tell that they were subtly trying to understand what had 
actually happened. Miche was more concerned with recommending that 
they confront the co-operative that had abandoned the work than with 
confronting the woman from the communal bank. He strongly recom-
mended that they organize a construction co-operative themselves, within 
the community, consistent with the government’s focus on desarrollo 
endogeno (endogenous development), so the money could be returned to 
the community in the form of local labor.
After more discussions, the women accompanied us to a neighboring 
house. While walking, Miriam pointed out to me that the woman seemed 
nervous. She and Miche commented that something obviously had gone 
wrong there; they didn’t even represent a legally constituted commu-
nal council. However, they couldn’t only blame the communal councils; 
Fundacomunal was also to blame as it hadn’t done sufficient technical 
follow-up, Miche said. Moreover, it seemed as if Fundacomunal hadn’t 
given them any technical assistance in developing the project in the first 
place, and that was one of the reasons the budget didn’t cover the work 
once the co-operative started the construction process. The co-operative 
should have detected this, Miche said, but he wasn’t sure of what their 
role in this mess had actually been.
The next house we entered was a typical Venezuelan family barrio 
house on three levels, where extended family and in-laws lived together. 
The family had originally received money to renovate the second floor. 
However, in the course of the process, they had decided to use parts of the 
money on the third floor of the house, where the niece lived. We climbed 
up the narrow stairs to the third floor. The head of the family was enthusi-
astically trying to explain what he had done and how he had done most of 
the work himself in order to make the money last longer. Miche had a very 
diplomatic attitude while he made clear that, while he congratulated him 
with the work done, it was illegal to use the allocated money for some-
thing other than what it was originally intended for. Decisions on how to 
 O INVENTAMOS O ERRAMOS IN PRACTICE 
196 
employ the money are made by a community assembly and recorded on 
a legal document. However, he underscored that he wasn’t there as an 
enemy. “As I am institution, and thus part of the state, I come to find out 
what was done with the money.”
When we finally left the house, we moved on to the casa de alimen-
tación (communal kitchen). They had received money to upgrade the 
kitchen through another project. A poster of Chávez hung on the wall, 
over a large stack of bags of rice.
We were served coffee, and stood there for a while talking with the women 
in the kitchen and in the communal bank. Miche underlined to 
 
Photo 7.1 A Casa de Alimentación (soup kitchen) in 23 de Enero. Photo by 
the author
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the community members that they were not there to create problems for 
the community, rather to find solutions. The problem, as he saw it, was 
that there seemed to be a lack of unity in the community, which was why 
the communal council had split in two in the first place. Miriam stated that 
they should have started with collective projects in communal areas, such 
as sidewalks or parks, before taking on housing projects. “It is very diffi-
cult to carry through such a large housing project si no hay communidad 
(if there isn’t [a sense of] community),” she said, “and we don’t want 
people to be like in the east (in the middle and upper class areas) where 
they eat inside the house and don’t know their neighbors.”
As we continued walking, Miche, Miriam and I fell a bit behind the 
others. Miche and Miriam agreed that the problem was apathy—if the 
community doesn’t get involved, there is space for personal interests to 
take over the project. Miche said that he understood that the woman in 
the communal bank had been under a lot of pressure by others in the com-
munity. “When they see that the money is being channeled down (se bajan 
los recursos) they want more and more.” “And the institutions must be self- 
critical on this point,” he said, “because if the community is left without 
proper guidance, it becomes difficult for the spokespersons to manage the 
issues right and hence withstand the pressure.”
We continued our walk for a few more hours. Some of the families we 
visited were reasonably content, while others were outraged with both the 
communal council and the co-operative. One man exclaimed: “It is all a 
big trap.” He had been forced to pay a large part of his new roof himself, 
as the work was abandoned before it was finished.
After the tour, Miche, Miriam and I went over to a nearby health 
station where a larger community meeting was scheduled to take place 
later that evening. We sat down, tired after a long day in the baking sun. 
Miriam and Miche spoke among themselves about what they thought had 
happened. Obviously, someone had cut a deal with someone, and some-
one had been left out, and the woman was obviously nervous because she 
knew that they couldn’t present the bills and they knew that things hadn’t 
taken place according to procedures. “But I don’t know if they gave in 
for pressure from the community and the co-operative, or if they opted 
for anarchy,” Miche said. The problem was also that there had never been 
any social comptrollership in the community. All communal councils are 
obliged to have a committee for social controllership that checks that the 
money is spent according to the budget. However, Miche didn’t seem 
particularly upset over the day’s events. Rather, he was quite pragmatic 
about it: “It isn’t corruption as such, but rather misuse of funds. They are 
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gente humilde (humble people).” And, he underlined, they hadn’t been 
properly followed up on by the institutions, which made it very difficult 
for them to carry out the project according to established procedures. The 
experience with the communal councils was still very new, and the commu-
nities were unaccustomed to managing such amounts of money, he asserted.
exerCising PoPular Power
The following day I met up with Miche and Miriam again in the morn-
ing in order to do an inspection in another communal council—this time 
in Antimano, one of the poorest barrios in Caracas. Because of this, the 
community was considered a high-priority area,2 and had a lot of proj-
ects approved. We jumped on the metro from Agua Salud to El Capitolio 
before we changed to another metro line and reached the metro station 
Antimano. The barrio of Antimano is an impressive sight: the facades were 
painted a few years back as part of one of the first government urban hous-
ing projects. The whole hillside looks like a painter’s palette, each facade 
painted in different colors.
Photo 7.2 The barrio of Antímano. Photo by the author
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It was still early in the morning and none of us had eaten breakfast yet, 
so we sat down in an arepa joint outside the metro station waiting for 
the community leader that would pick us up. The most common morn-
ing snacks for Venezuelans are empanadas, deep fried flour pastries in 
the shape of a half-moon. The most common fillings for empanadas are 
cheese, or seasoned shredded beef, chicken, fish or minced meat. The treat 
is typically accompanied by soft drinks of freshly squeezed juice. It is really 
tasty, but it also explains the high obesity rate and the high sales rate of 
seltzer in Venezuela.
We had just finished eating when the community leader Pedro arrived. 
He was a friendly man in his 50s sporting a cowboy hat, with an air of 
natural authority. He explained that their communal council was a semi- 
rural communal council, located on the fringes of the barrio in a fertile 
area. That meant that their council did not include 200 to 400 families as 
councils of high-density urban areas did. Theirs was limited to 40 to 80 
houses.
In addition to the housing projects that we were there to inspect, they 
had managed to make a sports center, to install a PDVAL (government 
sponsored mini-market) and to restore the stairways into the community, 
he told us. Their long-term goal was to establish a commune together 
with four other communal councils in the area. However, the time was 
not right, he said, because the other communal councils hadn’t started 
functioning properly yet.
We approached the fringes of Antimano, where their barrio was, on a 
hill surrounded by trees, vegetation and some cleared land. His family’s 
house was located in the upper part of the community, an impressive and 
large building with an amazing view over the whole valley. We were taken 
to the office from which the communal council was operating, a little 
space at the back of his house. They had made several large posters of all 
the different project and community events, complete with photos and 
drawings. Here were posters of the staircase project, the Dia de los Niños 
(Children’s Day) party and the housing project event. The paperwork was 
organized in neatly marked paper files, stacked on a shelf, and a computer 
was sitting on a desk.
Miche and Miriam asked about who had carried out the housing proj-
ect. “We chose the solution that suited the community best,” Pedro said. 
Through assembly meetings the community had simply decided to divide 
the money equally between all the households. They had 34 carpenters 
and 31 construction workers living in their community, he informed. So 
instead of hiring an outside company or co-operative, they had done the 
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work. Miriam asked if they had gotten help from an engineer, but Pedro 
responded that, no, they knew how to resolve their problems and had 
solved everything themselves. Now all the projects were finished, except 
for one house for which they had run out of money. In the next couple 
of days they would arrange a memoria y cuenta (report and account) in 
a community assembly where each household would present a report on 
how money was spent.
When Miriam had finished looking over the papers, we started the 
inspection, going from house to house. Some houses were in very poor 
condition and had been completely rebuilt, while others were in fairly 
good condition and had seen more “luxurious” upgrades, such as ceramic 
tile floors. People were visibly satisfied and explained to us in detail the 
work they had done. Afterward, we were escorted by Pedro to the small 
community super-market, PDVAL, which also functioned as a commu-
nal kitchen. There, we were served dinner by some of the women in the 
community. Afterward we sat out on the patio while Miriam filled out the 
paperwork with Pedro before he drove us back to the metro station.
A couple of days later, we returned for the memoria y cuenta event, 
which was on the patio outside Pedro´s house. A large circle of chairs was 
set up under the shade of some trees. Pedro told Miche and Miriam that 
they had gone from house to house and informed people about the meet-
ing, collecting their signatures, which confirmed they had received the 
message. One by one, they explained to the group what they had done 
with their house. One woman started to cry out of gratefulness and hap-
piness. She was so relieved over finally having a vivienda digna (dignified 
home). One man directed his gratitude to “God and to el Comandante.” 
All in all, 36 homes had benefited from the project.
When everyone had explained what they had done with the funds, 
Miche made a small speech. He said that he was very happy with the 
work of this communal council, even if they had distributed the money 
equally among all households instead of distributing according to a com-
munity census over who were in most need. Nevertheless, he viewed 
their work as very positive, and said it was a true expression of poder 
popular. He maintained that in many communal councils, people were 
trying to implement projects by the book, and instead ended up fight-
ing. He encouraged the community to collect some money in order 
to repair one of the stairs he thought was in dire need of repair, as the 
elderly woman who lived there had problems climbing up and down the 
staircase to get to her house.
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He thought they were ready to launch some socio-economic projects. 
“Recently the communal councils in Caracas have just been concerned 
with bricks, cement and sand, and we all know that it is necessary, but we 
also know that there are a lot of other needs here as well, like culture and 
socio-productive activity.” Pedro said that they had a seminar scheduled 
for the next day about agricultural production and that they had already 
received credits from Fondemi3 for different socio-productive activities 
like the production of sweets and pastry, a sowing project and painting and 
carpentry businesses. The meeting was dismissed shortly thereafter and 
Pedro drove us back to the metro station. Both Miche and Miriam were 
in a very good mood on the ride home. They expressed great satisfaction 
over how the community had been able to ejecer poder popular (exercise 
popular power), organizing themselves in a way that benefited the com-
mon good.
textures of relations
From the ethnographic accounts above, we can discern the complex 
dynamics surrounding the communal councils, as well as the texture of 
relations (Gupta 1995:215, cited in Sharma and Gupta 2001) between 
the realm of the state, represented by the promotores, and the realm of 
the popular sectors.
As we have previously discussed, social and spatial configurations in 
a neighborhood shape people’s knowledge of each other, the degree of 
social trust, the degree of social cohesion and their assessments of com-
mon needs and priorities. To outsiders, the barrio seems like a chaotic 
labyrinth with few apparent borders and boundaries. From the inside, 
people have a keen awareness of what is on the inside, on the edges and 
on the outside of “their community”—even if it is not inscribed on a map. 
Consequently, you also have a sense of who are “your” people, and who 
are “the others”—those in the barrio over there, those in the bloques 
down there, those who use the stairways over there, those who have just 
set up a shack settlement over there. All these factors contribute to the 
particular dynamic surrounding the unfolding of a communal council.
As we will discuss below, the importance of anchoring communal coun-
cils in people’s own socio-spatial identities were not at all lost at lawmakers, 
and it was also of great importance to popular sector activists. However, at 
times, communal councils were formed that didn’t necessarily conform to 
“natural boundaries.” As in the case with the first communal council that I 
 TEXTURES OF RELATIONS 
202 
visited with Miriam and Miche, this at times lead to splits and the forming 
of new communal councils. Both of them immediately captured that there 
was a low degree of social identification and cohesion in the community, 
and that this was an underlying partial cause for the irregularities and lack 
of transparency in the communal councils’ proceedings. Consequently, 
Miriam’s advice to the community was that they should have started with 
collective projects bringing them together in a joint cause, rather than 
housing projects benefiting individual households.
Another key issue was the existence of leadership figures in the com-
munity. In the first communal council, leadership roles in the communal 
council were assumed by a group of people that apparently had no trajec-
tory or experience as local leadership figures in the past. Consequently, 
Miche and Miriam speculated if they had been subjected to pressure from 
other community members as well as by external actors, and directed their 
critique toward the institutions for not providing enough support and 
guidance.
In the other communal council, Pedro came off as the undisputed local 
leadership figure in the barrio. Both his aura, attitude and property (his 
house was much nicer than the rest, and he also had quite a bit of land 
attached to it) indicated that he was a resourceful person. Moreover, the 
community itself, as a semi-rural community with quite defined edges, 
contributed to enhanced mutual social identification. Miriam and Miche 
captured and understood these dynamics, and even if they at one occasion 
called Pedro the local “patron,” they acknowledged that he had used his 
power to (as far as they could gather from our two visits) bring the com-
munity together in a transparent and relatively friction-free process.
In short, Miriam and Miche viewed the unfolding of the communal 
councils both through the lens of “the local realities,” at the same time 
as they assessed how the communal councils were faring according to the 
directives of the state. However, given that the order from above was to let 
the thousand flowers blossom, they adapted a pragmatic position, estimat-
ing success in terms of social achievements for the community rather than 
strict adherence to the legal framework. For them, as well as for many state 
legislators, the communal councils were not only about using state money 
to execute local development projects. They were also means to a supe-
rior end: to promote participation and social cohesion in the communities 
in order to strengthen poder popular. These experiences were building 
blocks for the communal state that eventually was to replace the bourgeois 
state (see Ciccariello-Maher 2016). As a member of the national assembly, 
7 NEGOTIATING THE POPULAR AND THE STATE
 203
who had been central in developing the law for the communal councils 
commented:
We define the communal councils as a broad popular organization as defined 
by article 2 in the law [for the communal councils] …. They should be a 
space for the articulation between citizens, between popular movements, 
between social movements and all the expression for popular power that 
exist within a geographical area, which we have called a geographical com-
munitarian space (espacio geográfico communitario) where the communal 
council is seated … this is a strategical intention (línea estratégica) linked to 
the development and profoundization of direct democracy, of participatory 
democracy, of popular democracy.
From these formulations, we can discern how the ideological and discur-
sive framing of the communal councils from “the heights of power” put 
emphasis on the exercise of popular agency. Consequently, as agents of 
the state as well as popular subjects, Miriam and Miche viewed themselves 
not as Weberian disinterested public officials, but as cadres whose job it 
was to guide and empower people to assume a new form of citizenship in 
alignment with the idea of a radical participatory democracy in the mak-
ing. It was a delicate balance, for they understood all too well that the 
communal councils lend themselves to conflicts and not-so-noble actions 
and maneuverings. Thus, their role was to try to steer things in the right 
direction through maneuvering in  local landscapes as well as providing 
critical feedback to the state institutions.
develoPMent froM Below
In many respects, the knowledge production surrounding the communal 
councils was in alignment with insights provided by critical development 
scholars and analysts (e.g., Pigg 1996; Cooke and Kothari 2001; McNeish 
2001). Development projects can very uneasily be mandated from above 
in a pre-designed manner. Rather, projects need to be firmly rooted in the 
social realities, local populations and specific needs in the locality which 
they are intended to benefit.
Some scholars have been highly critical of the communal councils, argu-
ing that they promoted clientelism, co-optation and patronage (Machado 
2009; Alvarez and García-Guadilla 2011; López 2011). While this is 
certainly one aspect of it, it is also important to recognize not only the 
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social and human gains that they generated, but also the effects that 
these experiences had in terms of advancing local organizational skills and 
capacities. In those communities where communal councils did work out 
well, it often generated both community cohesion and significant welfare 
improvements. Innumerable people had their housing standard upgraded, 
or were relocated to new houses in the cases where they were living in 
gravely substandard- or dangerous housing. (Many barrio houses are built 
in landslide-prone areas, and it is not uncommon that people lose their 
lives when their houses collapse.) To popular sector households, which 
might spend years and decades slowly improving their housing standards, 
the ability to add an extra room to their home, to install a bathroom with 
an actual door, to have a cement floor instead of a dirt floor, to put up a 
roof that did not leak when it rained, constituted an enormous enhance-
ment of their quality of life, and not least for their sense of dignity. Many 
communal councils also prioritized upgrading local infrastructure such as 
roads, passages, stairways, parks and sewage systems, as well as local sports 
facilities and other collective welfare improvements.
Moreover, from a scholarly perspective, it is paramount to analyze their 
evolvement within the real-life context within which they were unfolding 
(see also Ellner 2009; Irazábal and Foley 2010). Promoting “develop-
ment” and popular empowerment is never a straightforward process, not 
least in contexts as socially and materially complex as shantytown commu-
nities historically shaped by entrenched socio-economic inequalities and 
socio-cultural marginalization (e.g., see Willson 2007). The development 
of each communal council—for better or worse—was conditioned by local 
modes of sociality, local spatial configurations, localized interpretations of 
needs, existing social resources as well as the support they received from 
state institutions. Moreover, the features characterizing different commu-
nities were not “static” characteristics. Over the years, I observed that 
different communities went through different phases and stages as the 
communities gradually accumulated collective knowledge about the legal, 
bureaucratic and administrative aspects of managing the communal coun-
cils. Some managed to resolve conflicts, while others entered into new 
ones. The communal councils constituted a steep learning curve, whereby 
“local development scapes,” to paraphrase Appadurai (1990) were gradu-
ally fostered as social relations and local needs were increasingly reconcep-
tualized through the framework of the communal councils.
The promotores, in time, also became more skilled in their work; 
though, here too, there were differences among them. There was a quite 
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high turnover rate among the promotores, and not all of them were apt 
at working with popular sector communities. I also occasionally heard 
rumors that some of them abused their position in various manners, for 
example, through charging a “cut” from approved grants, or by undue 
meddling in  local struggles for power. At the same time, other promo-
tores, like Miriam, became very skilled in mediating local conflicts and 
trying to steer the communities toward doing things “by the book” and 
for the common good. Many promotores also became deft at nudging the 
right state offices and officials in order to help “their” communal councils.
sChools for PoPular Power
In the course of the first few years, it became evident, both to the law-
makers and the institutions in charge of supporting and financing them, 
that there was a need to strengthen the communal councils’ capacity to 
concretize and develop projects. Moreover, people asked for more support 
and guidance from the institutions as project development generated a lot 
of confusion and problems. For that purpose, workshops were organized 
in the communities, part of what were called escuelas de poder popular 
(schools for popular power), oriented toward providing both ideological, 
political and technical education to the communal councils through “edu-
cational cycles” organized across the country.
On one occasion, I attended a workshop in 23 de Enero, called taller de 
formulación de proyectos (workshop for formulating projects). The meet-
ing was led by Juan Roberto, a promotor from Fundacomunal. There 
were 14 people present from different communal councils; all but one 
were women. The goal was to help people concretize their problems, and 
translate them into a project that could be submitted to state institutions 
for financing. The workshop was divided in two parts; the first part was 
a theoretical explanation of methodology, and the second one was a ses-
sion on the application of the methodology to a project’s development. 
Juan Roberto explained that people often confused “themes” with prob-
lems, which hindered their ability to find solutions. For example, people 
would say that “garbage” or “safety” were their problem. However, Juan 
Roberto stated, these were not problems, these were themes that had to 
be concretized into specific projects. A “problem” could be, for instance, 
the lack of a sports field in the local community, which could then be 
developed into a project step-by-step. He shared some points (Table 7.1), 
which could be used to facilitate this process. The points consisted of:
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Throughout the workshop, Juan Roberto used concrete examples of 
common communal council activities: building a sports field, setting up a 
local project for sewing women’s clothes, or building a new pipe system. 
People were eagerly participating by sharing their points of view, contrib-
uting the experiences from their own communities. Juan Roberto man-
aged to engage people without seeming patronizing, and he demonstrated 
intimate knowledge of the nitty-gritty details of community development 
planning, such as the diameter of the tubes needed to upgrade sewage 
systems, and the challenges of sending toddlers to kindergartens on the 
congested camionetas traversing the barrios in the morning. In fact, Juan 
Roberto lived in Casalta 3, the same area I was living in at the time, and 
was therefore very familiar with the barrio reality.
Metis and PoPular Power
In the example above, Juan Roberto has attempted to concretize for-
mal procedures for project development through drawing on people’s 
skills and knowledges about their own social and material realities. The 
Bolivarian discourse put much stress on the inherent differences between 
the knowledge of the state and popular knowledge. Popular knowledge 
Table 7.1 Points from workshop discussions about how to analyse and elaborate 
a community project. The parish of 23 de Enero, Caracas, February 2010
  •  Definition of the problem (the location of the problem, who is affected by it and 
for how long people have been affected, i.e., the lack of a sports field in the 
community la Camboya affecting children and adolescents, and a total of 200 
families for the past 10 years)
  •  The name of the project (reflecting exactly on what the project is about, i.e., 
sewing elegant dresses)
  •  Amount of money required to carry out the project
  • How long it will take to carry out the project
  • Where the project will be carried out, and by which communal council
  • Description of the problem
  • Cause(s) of the problem
  • Why it is worthwhile to implement the project, i.e., what will be gained from it
  • What is the motivation for carrying out the project
  • What will the concrete result be once the project is finished
  • Who will participate in the project, who is responsible
  •  Development of a step-by-step plan for how the project will be carried out, 
including follow-up and control
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was understood as the knowledge that people had accumulated through 
their real-life experiences in their particular (challenging) environment, 
or what was sometimes referred to as los saberes del pueblo (the peoples’ 
knowledges). In fact, the way popular knowledge was conceptualized came 
very close to Scott’s (1999) concept of metis: “a wide array of  practical 
skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing 
natural and human environment” (Sunstein 1998). Scott maintained that 
communities that were marginal to market and states had to acquire a high 
degree of metis out of necessity, “as they have to rely disproportionally on 
the knowledge and materials at hand” (Scott 1999:335).
People often referred to popular knowledge as an open referent, as 
something that constituted a wide array of skills, knowledges and life expe-
riences. It referred to the constant creativity and improvisations needed in 
order to construct your barrio house with scarce resources. It referred to 
people’s accumulated and collective knowledge about soil conditions and 
local topography, about the improvised constructions of sewage systems 
and electricity grids, about the intricacies of buildings and constructions 
that were built and intertwined onto and into each other, within any engi-
neer telling them when the construction had reached its maximum bear-
ing capacity. It referred to the creativity of making ends meet, and about 
their capacity to organically organize in the face of collective needs and 
crisis. It was a form of knowledge rooted in a deep knowledge about their 
social environment, in the genealogy of the barrio and sector they were 
living in, in the myths, memories, and stories underpinning local social 
identities.
In short, popular knowledge was drawn from the dense experiences of 
living life on the margins of society and the official economy, to live in a 
culture of urgency (Pedrazzini and Sanchez 1992) that often produced 
hardships, but also enormous creativity and resilience. It constituted a 
different form of knowledge than the life experiences of the middle- and 
upper classes, cushioned by their socio-economic resources, of formal 
spheres of society, and of the techniques, procedures and rationalities of 
the state.
The latter aspect, the contrast between the knowledges of the state and 
popular knowledges, was constantly stressed in Bolivarian discourse. The 
state’s way of doing things was conceptualized as its slow institutionalized 
procedures, its emphasis on formalities, its faulty capacity to act “in the 
moment” and improvise, and above all as its lack of knowledge about local 
realities. These contrasts repeatedly emerged as an issue in interactions 
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between the popular sector and state representatives as a way of making 
explicit that there were two different modes of action, reasoning and mak-
ing use of knowledge at play.
CaPturing loCal realities
However, the importance of drawing on local knowledge and resources 
was not only emphasized by the popular sectors. It was also highlighted 
in the formal procedures of the communal council as well as the ideologi-
cal discourse surrounding them. In order to form a communal council, 
the community had to elaborate a written overview of the social geneal-
ogy and cultural characteristic of that area. The explicit purpose was that 
through capturing popular history and making people’s common identi-
ties and histories explicit, the communal identity—a key factor for mak-
ing the communal council work—would be strengthened. Moreover, a 
central task for a newly constituted communal council was to elaborate 
what was called a diagnostico social (social diagnostic) and a diagnostic 
communitario (community diagnostic). This implied making a survey of 
population—their demographic profile, how many people resided in each 
house and under what conditions, what special needs they might have 
(medical or otherwise), the community’s housing conditions, and so on. 
It also implied making an overview of the infrastructural characteristic of 
the community and the availability of services and recreational areas—or 
lack thereof. They also recorded available human resources in the commu-
nity, such as laborers and professionals that could participate in developing 
or executing projects. In order to elaborate the diagnostic, the voceros 
and voceras of the communal council walked from door to door—prefer-
ably on Saturday afternoons or Sundays when people often are at home. 
Consequently, the diagnostic formed the basis for developing projects 
according to the community’s most pressing needs and joint priorities.
negotiating Power
Conflicts and negotiations between the popular sector activists and state 
officials over how to ground community activism “in the local” played 
out in a variety of manners. It could be the extent to which local activists 
were involved in the development and planning of project initiated by the 
municipality, and who would be employed in the project. It could be over 
where meetings would take place and when: in a public office during office 
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hours (which created a lot of problems for people) or in the barrio at a 
time when people were off work. It could be over the paper trail necessary 
for forming communal councils and developing projects, and for delays in 
getting answers from the institutions, which often caused that the initial 
community mobilization waned and the project lost its momentum. These 
conflicts and negotiations were frequently framed by popular activists as 
fundamental ideological and political problems. In their opinion, the state 
had not been sufficiently conquered by popular power, and was reluctant 
to cede space and change procedures accommodating the strengthening 
of popular power.
For example, in May 2009 I was present at a two-day workshop about 
the proposal for a new law that would govern the organization of the 
communes (Ley Orgánica de las Comunas). Consistently with the inventa-
mos o erramos approach, Chávez had suggested that a commune had to 
be constructed and invented along the way. To that end, several pilot 
communes had already been set up in different parishes of Caracas before 
their legal framework had been developed. At the workshop, there was 
a lot of meta-critique of the revolutionary process. One of the most fre-
quent complaints was that popular power had not gained sufficient space 
and force. The structures of the state did not allow for people to assume 
power, and the state did not cede power to people. “The resistance to 
the poder constituyente (constituent power) has to die,” one man said as 
a metaphor. Another man criticized the Law for the Communal Councils 
(which was also debated at the time), arguing that it contained several ele-
ments that had nothing to do with their everyday life and that the law had 
to be submitted to popular discussion again (which happened later that 
year). Another man suggested that people should work with the National 
Assembly through the Comites de Legislación Popular (Committees for 
Popular Legislation) and that with time the communes should develop 
instituciones de gobierno de poder popular (institutions for the government 
of popular power) that would take over areas of responsibility from con-
temporary public institutions.4
The discursive content of these discussions reflect the deeper ideologi-
cal debates over what popular power entailed, and the political obstacles 
toward obtaining it. Debates such as these were quite common in political 
and public meetings, though primarily taking place among popular intel-
lectuals, political figures and ideologically oriented activists.
However, on a day-to-day basis, numerous less explicit political strug-
gles were also taking place. Many of the participants in the communal 
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councils were more concerned with concrete obstacles to their organiza-
tional efforts than with ideological debates. The main points of conten-
tion were the institutions’ lack of flexibility and unwillingness to adapt to 
their needs. The ways in which the state functionaries, or political figures, 
dealt with popular complaints varied. Often, public functionaries would 
be practical and pragmatic; they would listen to community complaints 
and, as in Miriam’s case above, suggest ways of dealing with them. Indeed, 
more often than not, there were constructive dialogues and respectful 
interaction between state representatives and community activists, not 
least when they shared a common socio-economic background and ideo-
logical engagement with the Bolivarian process, which was often the case. 
However, sometimes, public functionaries would try to divert attention 
away from the complaints that were raised. This would often provoke the 
anger of the community activists, who were wary of “condescending” and 
“patronizing” attitudes.
the Meeting that got off traCK
Below is an example of such an encounter, at a meeting in 2009 attended 
by two public officials and several members of communal councils in 23 
de Enero. The meeting took place in a community health station in 23 de 
Enero. I was invited to the meeting by Ricardo, a promotor in Fondemi, 
to whom I had been introduced at a community meeting the night before. 
Ricardo was from 23 de Enero at the same time as he served as the promo-
tor for its parish.
Fondemi was another state institution dedicated to channeling funds to 
projects elaborated by communal councils. Whereas Fundacomunal was 
financing projects related to housing and infrastructure, Fondemi solely 
focused on proyectos socio-economicos (socio-economic projects). Only 
projects developed within the vision of communal, endogenous develop-
ment could formally be considered for funding. Those involved in the 
project had to establish themselves as a social or communal co-operative, 
and parts of the income had to be circulated back into the community 
in the form of seed money for new economic initiatives or as a social 
emergency fund (e.g., if someone were in acute need for money for a 
health emergency or a funeral or if their house collapsed). Furthermore, 
the projects had to be elaborated in accordance with identified local needs 
emerging from the diagnóstico communitiario (community diagnostics). 
For example, if the community did not have a bakery nearby, Fondemi 
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could finance the establishment of a co-operative-based bakery. Similarly, 
the institution could finance the establishment of local manufacturing—
many of them supplying school uniforms to the local Bolivarian schools. 
However, one of the criteria for having a project approved was the use of 
primary materials. For that reason, Fondemi did not finance business pro-
posals for hairdressers, Internet cafés or DVD rentals. However, Ricardo 
confided to me that there was flexibility as to which projects were actually 
approved, in order not to crush the communities’ initiatives and energy.
The meeting at 10 am was aimed at informing the spokespeople from 
the communal banks about how they could work with Fondemi. Chávez 
had recently announced that the creation of communes was “high prior-
ity,” and for that purpose, Centros de Formación Socialista (Centers for 
Socialist Formation) were about to be established in the barrios. These 
centers were to be educational and informational centers that would func-
tion as a meeting place for different community social groups and differ-
ent state institutions.
Before the meeting started, Ricardo said that he expected 80 people 
to attend. Only 12 joined. We were sitting outside, on the upper floor 
of the local health station, which was not open at that hour of the day. 
A tall slender man in his late thirties, another promotor from Fondemi, 
was hosting the meeting. A black, intense woman around the same age, 
who lived in the barrio El Junquito, in the outskirts of eastern Caracas, 
was also attending. She started the meeting by talking about El Salvador, 
where Mauricio Funes had won the presidential elections for the left-wing 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMNL) just three days ear-
lier. She was probably trying to incite the revolutionary spirit of those 
present and put their “domestic revolution” in a larger context. Her 
attempt failed, triggering a slightly skeptical attitude in the audience. She 
held a short passionate speech about how El Salvador constituted another 
front in the left-wing wave that was sweeping the continent, and how they 
had now woken up from their enslavement. She then proposed that the 
participants offer their views on the issue, but people were just staring, 
slightly confused and amused by her. A few people eventually spoke about 
the recent events in El Salvador, but her speech did evidently not generate 
the enthusiasm she was hoping for.
It soon became clear that it was the practical day-to-day challenges that 
the voceros wanted to discuss. One member said that he had tried to 
develop a project that involved Fondemi, but Fondemi demanded that 
all five voceros in the communal councils attend a five-day seminar, when 
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it was obvious, he said, that people could not do that, as they needed to 
work. He finished by alluding to Chávez’s call for everyone to come out in 
the streets and work after the victory on February 15.5 “But people have 
been in the streets all the time since the process started. It is the institu-
tions that have remained inside the walls!”
Another man said that his communal council was also told to attend sem-
inars by Fondemi but that they could not go either because of work. “They 
are not responding to the needs of el pueblo, but to the needs of Fondemi,” 
he stated firmly. The next speaker said that he could only speak from personal 
experience and that he had just started working in the communal councils, 
but so far he felt that they had received satisfactory responses from the insti-
tutions. The next speaker said that they all had to exercise control over the 
institutions and that the institutions needed to have a flexible time schedule 
that suited people, not the bureaucracy. If not, people would become de-
motivated. In their case, they had started to work on a project for one of the 
bloques in their community, up in the El Mirador sector. The bloques were 
falling apart, and they had taken photos and had received visits from people 
from the institution. As there had not been subsequent follow-up from the 
state, the initial interest waned and people lost their enthusiasm.
The woman from Fondemi then said that, certainly, within the institu-
tions there were people who didn’t work as they should and who hacen 
trampas (play tricks); “but we, as revolutionaries are above this,” she said. 
Revolutionaries do not have their own lives, she continued. She used her 
own sacrifice for the revolution as an example, how she was working day 
and night, coming home late to her children. She acknowledged, however, 
that many people were working and could not go to all the meetings all 
the time. What the communities needed to understand was that the com-
munal councils represented la nueva institucionalidad (new institutional-
ism), and that the communal councils were not only composed by the 
voceros, but by the whole community. “So if the voceros cannot come, 
another member from the community should go instead,” she stated. She 
used their meeting as an example and said that those convoked were the 
heads of the communal bank, and they were there not only for themselves, 
but also for the whole community. They needed to go back and inform 
everyone about what had taken place at the meeting. “We are all a part of 
the process and we all need to contribute to developing all of us,” she said.
She continued talking about how the process of the communal councils 
was a “trying, failing and learning process,” and that it was easy to blame 
the institutions when something went wrong. But the communities also 
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had to look at what they did. “Take the problem with money that ‘disap-
pears.’ Millions have been bajados (channeled down) to the communities 
for infrastructure projects. Millions of gotas de petroleo (drops of oil), but 
no one in the communities has so far been jailed for corruption.”
After a bit of back and forth over this topic, she announced that it was 
time to get instructed on how to develop the community projects. The 
semana de formación (education week) started in April, and they would 
accommodate people’s schedules so everyone could attend. One man 
asked if they would be getting money for transport to and from the meet-
ing, and was told that they would not. “Chávez says that as a revolutionary 
one has to work 23 hours a day, and as a revolutionary one has to move 
around.” Again, the woman from Fondemi referred to herself and to how 
she the other day got home at 11 pm, to El Junquito where she lived. “I 
was worried about the kids, it was late and it was dangerous.” One man 
responded in a slightly sarcastic tone: “No one doubts your compromise, 
negrita.”6
In my fieldnotes from the meeting, I noted that people at the meeting 
were becoming warier toward the woman from Fondemi as they were try-
ing to raise real issues, while she was trying to focus on “ideological tutor-
ing.” At the time I was puzzled by the fact that the promotor leading the 
meeting was unusually “out of sync” with the people present, especially 
since she was a lower-level public functionary from a barrio. I was later 
told by another worker in Fundacomunal that promotores had recently 
been instructed by their superiors to hold an inspirational and educational 
speech before meetings in order to foment consciousness about the larger 
context of their day-to-day struggle, which explained why the promotor 
seemed out of touch from the very beginning in this particular meeting.
Several researchers have noted the high level of politicization of the 
communal councils (e.g., Álvarez and García-Guadilla 2011), but as this 
episode illustrates, the “recipients” of ideological touting are hardly pas-
sive subjects. If people didn’t like the content of the meeting, whether 
because of ideological touting or for other reasons, they would deploy a 
range of “strategies of resistance” such as being sarcastic, leaving, talking 
among themselves, talking back, quarrelling or playing with their mobile 
phones, amounting to local variants of Weapons of the Weak (Scott 1985). 
Moreover, the push toward picking up on ideological subject often came 
from popular sector activists themselves, who used it as a discursive tool 
to criticize the state institutions’ deficiencies and unwillingness to assume 
a revolutionary agenda.
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negotiating hierarChy
We have previously referred to the popular sector’s contestation of the 
cultural hegemony and politics of the state. A key aspect of this strug-
gle was to challenge class distinctions inscribed in the hierarchy among 
grassroots activists, barrio residents and state officials. As previously 
noted, the social composition of the Venezuelan state and political class 
has undergone a shift, and there are now more people from popular- and 
leftist radical backgrounds occupying these positions. At one level, this 
changed the form of interaction between people and the state because 
of increased socio-economic and political proximity, at the same time 
as the inherent hierarchical relationship between the inside/outside of 
state power shaped new strategies of subjugation and resistance. Much 
emphasis was placed on under-communicating power differences and 
hierarchies between el pueblo and officials, at the same time as these 
hierarchies were constantly negotiated—sometimes directly and some-
times indirectly. In particular, representatives of the state and the gov-
ernment frequently alluded to poder popular in order to signalize that 
they were aligned with el pueblo, at the same time as people used the 
concept of popular power as a discursive strategy to push or challenge 
state and political officials.
Moreover, political discourse was markedly “popularized,” in the sense 
that it was explicitly anti-elitist. A prime example of this popularization 
was of course Chávez, who mastered the popular language to the finger-
tips, even when he spoke about complex political and economic issues. 
However, a popularized political discourse, emphasizing informality and 
colloquiality, was deployed in a variety of settings. This included the inter-
action between high-level politicians and public functionaries and com-
munity members. In the following example, we will see how this played 
out at a public meeting in 23 de Enero with Jorge Rodriguez, the then- 
mayor of the Libertador Municipality.
a visit froM the Mayor
The purpose of the meeting was the inauguration of the new mayor’s 
pilot program: Plan Caracas Socialista. Plan Caracas Socialista was an 
urban infrastructure program that would be carried out in close coopera-
tion with the communities through the formation of gabinetes sectoriales 
(sectorial cabinets), which would include all social movements (communal 
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councils, colectivos and other groups) in the area and the representatives 
from the municipality.
The meeting took place at Plaza la Juventud in La Cañada, located 
between the bloques and the road leading up the roundabout of bloque 
seven. A small stage was set up, with rows of chairs under a red-and-white 
baldaquin. A lot of people showed up, both from La Cañada and adjacent 
sectors. After having been introduced by Guadalupe, one of the leaders for 
the Colectivo Coordinadora Simón Bolívar, Jorge Rodriguez greeted the 
community and started to explain how the projects would proceed. At one 
point, in the midst of the explanation, a man in the audience shouted from 
the back: “But what about barrio Sucre?” Rodriguez responded: “Ah, I’m 
getting there, compadre, I am getting there.” Later in his speech, another 
woman shouted out: “In El Observatorio there are bloques without doors,” 
to which Rodriguez responded “I know amor mio, like I am telling you, in 
less than a month we will start up there.” Throughout his speech, he often 
used hermanas and hermanos (brothers and sisters) to address the crowd.
 
Photo 7.3 Public meeting with Jorge Rodríguez, the mayor of the Libertador 
Municipality, in 23 de Enero. Photo by the author
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Rodriguez’s choice of words is not insignificant. Compadre, literally 
meaning godfather, is an expression that is most commonly used between 
equals. Similarly, amor mio, my love, is a colloquial way of addressing both 
friends and strangers (e.g., in shops) though the form mi amor is more 
common. Hermano and hermana are also ways to address other people 
to indicate equality and friendliness. By using these forms to respond to 
comments, Rodriguez was signaling colloquiality, equality and intimacy.7
Jorge Rodriguez, a psychiatrist by trade, is the son of Jorge Rodriguez, 
the leader of the political movement and party, Liga Socialista, who was 
beaten to death by security agents in 1976. Even though Rodriguez has 
a middle-class background, he has intimate knowledge of popular sector 
political discourse and sociality.
The social and political background of the Chavista leadership is signifi-
cant for understanding how the social interaction between popular sector 
communities and public officials unfolded within the Bolivarian space. As 
Caldeira notes: “In hierarchical societies, access to political speech is gen-
erally a privilege of the dominant class. Word and power are associated” 
(Caldeira 1988:452). Through the Bolivarian process, the poor acquired 
an advanced mastery of political speech, and they frequently had access to 
forums where they could engage with politicians directly. Moreover, poli-
ticians and community activists shared the political discourse and symbolic 
universe of the Latin American left. This created a platform for negotiat-
ing differences through discourse as the popular sectors could assert them-
selves through rhetorical devices and political references autochthonous 
to them.
i want to talK too
The following example illustrates how the notion of popular power was 
invoked to negotiate hierarchy at a meeting concerning the passing of 
the new law for the communal councils in 2009. A large tent, in white 
and red, had been set up outside the National Assembly, downtown 
Caracas. Various representatives from the National Assembly and com-
munity activists were present. The members of the Comisión Permanente 
de Participación Ciudadana, Descentralización y Desarrollo Regional 
(Permanent Committee for Citizen Participation, Decentralization and 
Regional Development) held long speeches about the loopholes in the 
2006 law, and about the new provisions of the reformed law. Afterward, 
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the floor was opened to questions. Nicolas, an elderly man from a com-
munal council in El Junquito took the microphone and said:
First of all I want to greet my beloved comandante Hugo Rafael Chávez 
Frías for moving this forward, for being fascinated,8 and secondly, to the 
representatives that have spoken because they have dedicated themselves 
really, paying attention to details and I am really satisfied with how this is 
going. Now, listen, I want to propose that there isn’t only space for ques-
tions here, because si yo soy poder popular (if I am popular power) it cannot 
be that you only allow me to ask a question, I want to say something in 
depth.
Nicolas then made a lengthy and well-formulated speech that was well 
received by the audience. Afterward, one of the national assembly rep-
resentatives followed up on some of the points Nicolas had made in a 
respectful and serious manner. As Sharma and Gupta note: “Everyday stat-
ist encounters not only shape people’s imagination of what the state is 
and how it is demarcated, but also enable people to devise strategies of 
resistance to this imagined state” (Sharma and Gupta 2006:17). Through 
his speech, Nicholas signalized that the state representatives could not set 
themselves above the representatives of popular power through dictat-
ing the agenda and form of the meeting. His choice of words was readily 
understood by the members of the National Assembly, who then adapted 
to the claims that he was making. Indeed, more often than not, power 
holders would put emphasis on signalizing equality and that the floor was 
open for debate. However, on a few occasions, I observed more con-
flictual dynamics emerging from the trespassing of acceptable displays of 
power and hierarchical difference.
defleCting CritiCisM
One such occasion was a meeting in the national theater of El Capitolio, 
in the center of Caracas. It was an important event, and the mayor, the 
minister of culture, the minister of the commune and Jacqueline Farías, 
the head of the government of the Capital District (Distrito Capital), were 
supposed to be present, together with representatives from the communal 
councils from all across western Caracas. The purpose of the meeting was to 
present a summary of the proposals that had been elaborated by extensive 
popular participation for the reform of the Law for Communal Councils. 
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Parallel popular assemblies had taken place all across Caracas in the previ-
ous weeks, and involved approximately 2600 people. The assemblies were 
organized both as plenary discussions and as work groups, where each 
group, comprising of an average of 35 people, had elaborated a detailed 
analysis, with corresponding proposals for reforms of the law, for the com-
munal councils. From all this work, five documents, each representing one 
eje (axis) of Caracas,9 had been elaborated, summarizing different points 
of view, which were now to be officially presented to the authorities. This 
would form the basis for the reform.
The meeting was scheduled to take place on Sunday at 10 am, but it 
didn’t start until about three hours later. In the meantime, those who 
waited outside and inside the theater had been given breakfast in take- 
away boxes—yogurt, ham and cheese sandwiches and orange juice. 
When the meeting finally started, it was announced that neither the 
mayor nor the minister for the commune would come. The leader of the 
meeting was Jacqueline Farías who held an introductory speech, after 
which the spokespeople for the five axes presented their main points on 
Power Point slides.
Many people were eager to address the panel, but Farías said that a gen-
eral discussion was not scheduled and would not take place. One woman 
took the microphone and shouted angrily: “We have been here since nine 
o’clock in the morning, and now you are telling us that only five people 
are allowed to speak? Everyone who wants to should be allowed to speak.” 
A heated discussion erupted as others joined the woman’s protest.
To distract the crowd, Jacqueline Farías stated that “we have more 
important enemies than our own politicians” and that “here we are all 
from el pueblo, and even if today I have this position, on another occasion 
it will be you.” In my field notes, I wrote that she seemed a bit defensive 
and that her attempts to distract came across as quite patronizing. She was 
saved by a young woman from Gramoven, an area in Catia that was known 
for high levels of organization, who was a relatively well-known commu-
nity activist. She argued that the political representatives were doing the 
best they could to attend to all the different areas they were responsible 
for. Shortly thereafter, the discussion died out, and the meeting ended. It 
was obvious that some of the people wanted a discussion with more sub-
stance, as they had put in a lot of time and effort into working out these 
proposals. (The previous day I had participated in a full-day discussion 
and summary session in the axis that corresponded to 23 de Enero.) The 
fact that the few politicians that actually showed had showed up late (even 
though no meeting ever starts on time) added to the frustration.
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a Contested Bolivarian sPaCe
Throughout the past three chapters, we have explored, from various angles, 
the interface between popular politics and state politics within what I have 
called a Bolivarian space. I have emphasized the contested, conflictive 
and at times contradictory dynamics that emerged as the ideals, ideology 
and politics of the Bolivarian process rubbed against political structures, 
ingrained social practices and heterogeneous social actors and interests. In 
particular, I have emphasized an in-depth understanding of “the local” as a 
point of departure for understanding how grassroots politics was unfolding 
with popular sector communities and in close interaction with the state.
Chapter 8 will continue this line of exploration, but from a different 
angle. We will now turn our attention to how the templates, practices 
and values associated with oil wealth gained salience in the crafting of 
a Bolivarian ideology and corresponding new social, cultural and politi-
cal practices. Specifically, I will explore how notions of money, wealth, 
consumption, individualism, greed, and corruption can be traced back to 
the nation’s history as an extractive state. Concurrently, I will show how 
these contested moralities and values translated into a deeply ambivalent 
and unstable terrain for the unfolding of the Bolivarian process at the level 
of everyday political dynamics as well as for its ideological underpinnings.
 notes
 1. This event took place in the spring of 2009. In order to adapt to the new 
legal framework of the reformed law from the communal councils, the 
councils had to go through a process called adequación (adjustment), which 
implied calling for new elections and re-registering with Fundacomunal.
 2. Fieldwork interview, Eliér Gonzales, director of Fundacomunal in western 
Caracas, spring 2009.
 3. Fondemi is a state institution that gives credits (which have to be repaid) to 
socio-economic projects boosting local economic activity.
 4. The communes were envisioned as progressively becoming instances of 
auto-gobierno (self-government) consistent with the ethos of the Socialism 
for the twenty-first century.
 5. This was a referendum over amendments of five articles of the constitution 
(a modification of the original proposal that was turned down in a referen-
dum in 2007, see Chap. 4).
 6. Note that negrita is not meant disrespectfully in this context. It is a common 
expression among peers, both used for those who clearly have African heri-
tage and for those that have a whiter skin tone.
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 7. In Bolivarian political discourse, compañeros/as is the most common way 
of referring to someone. It is also frequently used in political settings where 
politicians or public officials interact. It is important to note that 
Venezuelans are relatively more informal in their everyday interactions than 
in many other Latin American countries. The formal version of the pro-
noun you, usted, is frequently omitted in everyday speech, and people 
commonly address each other as tú (informal version of you). Professional 
titles are however frequently emphasized in formal and semi-formal set-
tings (e.g., licenciado/a, doctor/a, maestro/a, professor/a) and pupils 
and students commonly address their teachers as maestro/a or professor/a. 
Usted may be used out of respect in some contexts signalizing formality or 
hierarchies, and it can also be used to maintain a certain distance from a 
speaker. In the street, people address each other in a number of ways 
according to sex and gender. Mi amor (my love) is a relatively common way 
to address strangers in a range of everyday context, both men and women. 
Men can address each other as pana (buddy) or hermano (brother) if they 
want to create a situation of friendliness or informality, even to a stranger.
 8. Fascinated, in this context, means engaged, dedicated.
 9. The division of Caracas into axes (ejes) is a part of the new geo-political 
restructuring that was proposed by Chávez in his amendments to the con-
stitution. The different axes are based on strategic evaluation of the charac-
teristics, needs and potential of each area, constituting an “overlapping” 
political map, in addition to the formal territorial divisions between parishes 
and municipalities.
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CHAPTER 8
Moralities, Money and Extractive Capitalism
Venezuelans know the price of everything and the value of nothing
Venezuelan actor and intellectual Julio Motta, cited in Strønen and 
Wærness (2007)
Caracas, spring 2011: I was sitting on a tall bar chair in a little DVD 
and CD stall located in a small and worn-down basement shopping mall 
close to La Hoyada, in downtown Caracas. I was doing an interview with 
Ricardo, a family man in his 30s from 23 de Enero, and a newly elected 
vocero (spokesperson) for the communal council in his street. He was the 
owner of the stall, and I was interviewing him as passing customers stopped 
for a peek, to purchase something or for a chat. Ricardo had recently been 
elected vocero for the Committee for Ideology. At the meetings I had 
attended in his community, he was always trying to cut through the quar-
rels, urging people to come to their senses, stop fighting and rather think 
about the collective good. The community was in the midst of finalizing 
housing projects that would benefit around 20 families. This was a project 
that had been going on for a long time, causing a lot of rifts, quarrels and 
dirty maneuvers among the neighbors. Now, the money seemed to be on 
its way, and with some secret horse-trading and heated public arguments, 
the matter of who would be benefiting from it was settled. However, it 
had been a long process. Allegations of robbery, fraud and ulterior motives 
had stirred tempers and caused the consolidation of two factions in the 
community competing to gain control over the process. Ricardo was frus-
trated about his community and the way people behaved:
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When resources are given to us, the communal council in each parish has 
to be sincere, honest, right? We cannot get greedy when we see the money, 
because you know one thing, the money is the enemy, money cannot be 
viewed as raw (en bruto) because then the person becomes distracted or 
corrupted, just by the thought of taking a piece of this, right?
And that is already egoism, because you cannot … one cannot think of 
this, but you have to think that it is for the community, because it belongs 
to the community as such and if a person is going to carry out a project and 
in the long run resources are diverted, then we are falling into the same trap 
as before, then we are not making a real effort to change.
The idea is that that resources are transferred for projects for the future, 
that no one skims off a bolivar because then we are doing … I am talking 
from my point of view, if anyone skims off the minimum of a céntimo, then 
unfortunately everything is ruined. Why? Because then we are entering into 
corruption, and if I see that this person skimmed off a céntimo, then the 
other person also wants a céntimo and when everyone wants, then in the 
end of the day nothing is done.
* * *
With these comments, it was as if Ricardo attributed to money an uncanny 
ability to corrupt the person who sees it. Money is not to be seen “raw,” 
he says: “If I see that this person skimmed off a céntimo, then the other 
person also wants a céntimo and when everyone wants, then in the end 
of the day nothing is done.” Like the Coca Cola bottle that falls down in 
the middle of the Kalahari Desert in the film The Gods must be Crazy (Uys 
1980), money has the ability of making everyone fall under its spell and 
eventually making everything fall apart.
Ricardo’s choice of words was not unique. Often, people lamented how 
the seductive power of money was working against the Bolivarian process 
from within, engendering conflicts and corruption; promoting “individ-
ualism,” egoism, greed and consumerism; and preventing a revolution-
ary consciousness from gaining foothold. These templates were talked 
of as the products of the country’s capitalist history during the Fourth 
Republic, and how the implementation of neoliberalism by corrupt politi-
cians from the 1980s onward had wrecked society from within.
By way of contrast, these historical experiences, and their imprint on 
the social and political body, were contra-posed to a new morality in the 
making: a revolutionary, socialist consciousness promoting collectivism, 
unity, integrity and solidarity. In this process, “Che’s New Man” was to 
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be born—the new man and woman that according to Che Guevara would 
develop through both material and moral incentives, as the revolution 
converted society as a whole “into a gigantic school” (Guevara 2003 
[1965]:216).
In Venezuela, the concept “Che’s New Man” was occasionally used 
by the more ideologically oriented: popular intellectuals, state officials 
and politicians, and Marxist-schooled activists. But discourses articulating 
“folk wisdom” also constantly reiterated that the Bolivarian process had to 
reverse capitalism’s “vices” and engender a new social and political order, 
changing both the rules of politics and people’s values and everyday life 
practices.
Destructive social Facts
These ideas were often explicitly or implicitly tied to the template of oil; 
oil had since long ago generated a culture of voracious individualistic rent-
seeking among the elites and corrupted Venezuelan society. Now that oil 
wealth circulated in all spheres of society, the vices that it engendered 
were filtering down to ordinary people who behaved as if “my drop of 
oil” was finally up for grabs. Coronil has noted that: “As an extraordi-
nary valuable commodity, it is hard for people to control [oil], particularly 
when it undergoes its most dramatic metamorphosis: when it becomes 
money” (Coronil 2008). As I delved deeper into Venezuelan history and 
social symbolism, I became increasingly fascinated by how the notions of 
capitalism, money and oil converged in templates and narratives of immo-
rality and social destruction, bringing associations to Durkheim’s “social 
facts.” Oil wealth and extractive capitalism was viewed as having debased 
Venezuelan society since long ago through engendering particular sets of 
harmful norms, values and practices. If not countered and replaced with 
new moral economies and values, this legacy would destroy the Bolivarian 
process from within. The destructive power of oil was thus not only tied to 
its effects upon the political game and the economy, but also over people’s 
hearts and minds.
New Moral ecoNoMies
Community politics was viewed as a key site for the emergence of new 
social and political relations through the crafting of new values and moral-
ities. I use the concept of moralities in this context as a notion that “con-
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tain and express both discourse and practice” (Howell 1997:4). Moralities 
are not static templates, but rather founded on values that are susceptible 
to change through practices (ibid.). Analogously, practices considered 
conflictive, individualist, opportunist, scheming, and dishonest were fre-
quently denounced, negotiated and mediated through a moral discourse 
emphasizing la falta de valores (lack of values) characterizing Venezuelan 
society.
I believe that it is paramount to understand the conflictual and contra-
dictory nature of these processes not as a result of individual “virtues” or 
“deviances,” or as evidence of the nation’s “pathologies,” but rather as 
the outcome of a series of historical, cultural, social and political processes. 
We need to capture how Venezuela’s experience with oil-saturated capital-
ist—and later neoliberal—economic, political and social formations, were 
conceptualized within a moral and value-laden repertoire. In that frame 
of mind, we are better equipped to capture how contested practices, and 
the way these were conceptualized through discourses of moralities, con-
stituted a focal point whereby the historical formation of Venezuelan state 
and society was placed in juxtaposition to the Bolivarian vision of a new 
social order.
NeoliberalisM aND the social
Within academia, as well as the realms of policy-making, realpolitik, politi-
cal activism and folk wisdom, the concept of neoliberalism is deployed in 
highly heterogeneous ways. In its orthodox economic sense, neoliberalism 
is often presented (by its proponents) merely as an economical-political 
restructuring of society whereby the role of the state is reduced in order 
to obtain a better, and supposedly socially more beneficial (at least in the 
long run), distribution of goods and services through an unhindered mar-
ket. Scholarly criticism of neoliberalism does not only concern the kind of 
policies it promotes, and its frequently harsh social consequences in the 
form of increased poverty and inequality, but also the ways in which it 
works at an ideological level. As Gledhill notes:
What makes neoliberalism something that a classic liberal such as Adam 
Smith would have found as disturbing as Pope John Paul II does is its eli-
sion of the distinction between a market economy and a market society, to 
the point where the latter seems to engulf life itself. (Gledhill 2004:340, 
emphasis in original)
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Sandel, in his “Tanner Lecture on Human Values” delivered at Oxford in 
1998, maintained that “one of the most powerful social and political ten-
dencies of our time [is] the extension of markets and of market-oriented 
thinking to spheres of life once thought to lie behind their reach” (Sandel 
1998:93). This blurring of boundaries between what belongs to the mar-
ket and what doesn’t is a powerful threat to society at large, he argues, 
as it blurs the boundaries of what can be bought and sold. Moreover, 
the increase of social and economic inequalities combined with the mar-
ketization of expanding spheres of human life undermines the republican 
ideal, dating back to Aristotle and Rousseau, of society as a common civic 
sphere. Tanner concludes his speech with the observations that there are 
certain “moral and civic goods that markets do not honor and money can-
not buy” (Sandel 1998:122).
A consequence of the expansion of market thinking to the heart of civil 
life and public services is that citizenship—historically a notion capturing 
the relationship between rights and duties of the individual, the wider pol-
ity and the state—has been replaced with notions of consumer citizenship. 
As Scammel has noted: “It is no longer possible to cut the deck neatly 
between citizenship and civil duty, on the one side, and consumption, and 
self-interest, on the other” (McGregor 2002:20). The marketization of 
society has transformed the community and collective good into an obso-
lete imaginary object; each one of us is supposed to navigate within the 
array of market opportunities “offered” to us. A failure to do so is attrib-
uted to individual deficiencies, to a deviance from the free, self-creating 
individual that neoliberal ideology is founded upon.
uNDerstaNDiNg local iNterpretatioNs oF capitalisM
There are significant differences between how market capitalism and 
neoliberalism have been absorbed in the Global North and in the 
Global South, and indeed between countries and regions in each sphere 
(Harvey 2005). These differences do not only concern how policies 
have been implemented, but also how reforms have interacted with the 
broader social, political, economic and cultural fabric. Anthropologists 
have, during the past decades, produced a broad array of ethnographic 
accounts documenting people’s reactions to the high noon of capitalism 
in different parts of the world (e.g., see Comaroff and Comaroff 1987, 
1999, 2001; Englund and Leach 2000; see also Ortner 2016). One of 
the most well-known accounts from Latin America about capitalism’s 
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effect on “traditional” societies is Michael Taussig’s The Devil and 
Commodity Fetishism in South America (1980). Building upon Marxist 
theories of value as well as Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism, he 
explores how the devil, in local folklore among African-Colombian planta-
tion workers and Ayamara Bolivian tin miners, becomes an idiom through 
which the destructive effects of capitalism upon human and social rela-
tions are mediated. Through this account, Taussig argues that rather than 
seeing folkloric tales as irrational peasant believes, it is from the fringes of 
the capitalist economy that the enigma of capitalism can best be captured: 
“They provide us with insight into the irrational bias of our own economy 
and stereotype of homo oeconomicus” (Taussig 1977:475).
Capitalist critiques, with a Marxist underpinning, have always held sway 
over Latin American popular intellectuals and academic scholarship on 
Latin America alike, perhaps because the exploitative force of capitalism has 
always been so blatant. The ideological twins of Western modernity; the 
templates of liberal democracy and market capitalism, have been eagerly 
embraced by state builders at various historical junctures. However, fol-
lowing Polyani’s insight that “markets thrive on formal equality combined 
with brutal inequalities in practice” (see also Sandel 1998; Hoffman and 
Centeno 2003; Weyland 2004; Fourcade and Healy 2007:293) there 
has often been a simmering resistance to, or at least ambivalence toward, 
“capitalism” among those who are excluded from, or unequally embraced 
by, its virtues (Gledhill 1995; Nugent 1996). This collusion between the 
economic paradigm of capitalism, the implementation of formal liberal 
democracy, and class politics is important in order to understand how the 
narrative of the Fourth Republic and its social, political and moral degen-
eration played out in the course of the Bolivarian process.
NeoliberalisM aND the social boDy
In Chap. 2, I outlined how the breakdown of the oil-fuelled developmen-
talist paradigm and the installment of neoliberal “shock treatment” caused 
a political and social havoc from the 1980s and forward. These processes 
spurred the deepening of social problems among those that were already 
most vulnerable in Venezuela. The incapacity of the market economy to 
incorporate the rapidly increasing informal urban population created a 
“surplus” population forced to scramble for its survival on the margins 
of society. Urban informal growth strained the barrios’ already limited 
and inadequate infrastructure. The poor’s inability to participate in the 
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increasingly commodified “welfare market” relegated them to a state of 
permanent scarcity, insecurity and a sense of existential precariousness. 
The increasingly open hostility of the state, which by the end of the 1980s 
had abandoned its pretense of advocating for incorporating “the popular” 
into the state and nation body, relegated them to a condition of demean-
ing otherness. This perpetuated the sense of being cut out not only from 
a narrative of the nation-state itself, but also from the aspirations of a 
life project. At the same time, real wages declined and working condi-
tions became worse, increasing the sense of exploitation and perpetual 
hardships.
As a result of these processes, people experienced not only a pulveriza-
tion of the faith in the political system at large, but also a crumbling of the 
social fabric in the popular sector communities. People recount that their 
communities were previously experienced as quite meaningful and tightly 
knit social worlds in spite of abject poverty. They had their problems, and 
life was harsh indeed, but a sense of local security, collective local life and 
collective aspirations for the future still prevailed.
From the 1980s and onward the future was “called off.” Social prob-
lems emerged on a large scale: violence and crime, the expansion of a 
violent drug economy, alcohol and substance abuse, an increased presence 
of weapons, life tragedies and family tragedies, a brutalization of collec-
tive spaces and subsequent retreat from communal life, acute needs, suf-
fering and death. Life was experienced as a perpetual struggle to make 
ends meet, and significantly, a sense of being at war against each other as 
poverty became more aggravated and social needs became individualized. 
People experienced social trust and respect for others vanishing and infor-
mal social control mechanisms breaking down. In short, they experienced 
both a loss of meaning and a loss of a moral community and a collective 
future (see also Lander 2005).
It is important to understand these narratives as epistemological and 
ontological “truths” derived from people’s real-life experiences. Not only 
do these referents undercut contemporary critique of capitalism’s frag-
mentary, individualizing and violent effects, but they also help explain why 
Chávez’s attacks on “capitalism,” viewed by the Western press as oddities 
and derailings of a flamboyant populist, resonated with ordinary people. 
For them, “capitalism” epitomized a broader embodied understanding of 
social disintegration and anomalies that had permeated their individual 
lives and the social body throughout the past decades.
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oil society
Capitalism in Venezuela—both as a socio-economic model and as a social 
imaginary—cannot be properly understood unless we also capture how 
it has shaped and has been shaped by the country’s oil wealth. Wealth cir-
culation and wealth allocation in Venezuela, as well as social and political 
imaginaries, are born from this dialectic. Writing about oil wealth is always 
difficult. Oil constitutes a tangible substance, and at the same time, its 
representations are steeped in an enigmatic veil engendering imageries of 
certain pathological, social and political properties. As Coronil maintains, 
“oil does not do anything by itself,” but it becomes an important fac-
tor shaping society “as it is transformed and used by people under given 
historical frameworks, specific historical situations and global economic 
context” (Coronil 2008).
Citizens in oil-rich countries are often presented as being captivated 
by the illusion of wealth abundance, displaying a series of behavioral 
traits such as sloth, chicanery and opulent consumption. Polish journalist 
Ryszard Kapuściński once noted that
oil creates the illusion of a completely free life, life without work, life for free 
… the concept of oil expresses perfectly the enteral human dream of wealth 
achieved through lucky accident …. In this sense oil is a fairy tale and like 
every fairy tale a bit of a lie. (Watts 2004:213)
For his book Petromania (2009), Norwegian journalist Simon Sætre trav-
eled to several of the world’s oil countries in order to find out “what oil 
does to us.” He coins the expression homo petrolicus: not a person with 
innate pathologies per se, but rather a person that adapts to the envi-
ronment he or she is embedded in, following certain behavioral patterns 
caused by the centrality of oil wealth in public life.
The notion that oil wealth engenders particular social dynamics is a 
familiar one (Apter 1993; Karl 1997, 1999; Watts 1999). However, I 
posit that it is paramount to discern exactly how socially embedded “oil 
cultures” are articulated in everyday life practices, ideas of personhood 
and state–society relations at particular historical conjunctures. Thus, 
through exploring particular cultural idioms associated with money and 
oil wealth, such as consumption, individualism, corruption, egoism, val-
ues and greed, we may achieve a deeper understanding of the contested 
cultural qualities that the particular Venezuelan experience of oil-fuelled 
capitalism has engendered.
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coNspicuous coNsuMptioN iN veNezuela
Cash is king in Venezuela. La plata, los reales, los billetes, however you 
call it, money gives you status, money gives you friends, money gives you 
power and not least, money gives you women.
For the rich: the opulent mansions and haciendas in Venezuela, their 
houses in Miami and the Dominican Republic, the SUVs, the surgically 
enhanced trophy wife or girlfriend, the upscale restaurants and clubs, the 
farandula (celebrity parties), the vacations to luxurious destinations, the 
jewelry, the designer clothes, the hair, the nails, the makeup, the maids 
and nannies.
For the middle classes: the constant struggle to move upward 
through symbolic consumption mimicking upper-class lifestyles as 
best they can. The commodification of the female body. The obsession 
with Western (read: US) consumer objects, clothes and habits, and the 
constant talk about what they have bought and where they bought it 
(preferably outside Venezuela). The flaunting show-off of conspicuous 
consumption.
For the “ordinary people” in the barrios: the Blackberry, the imported 
whiskey, the breast implants (or girlfriend with breast implants), the 
ceramic tile floors, the vacation to Isla Margarita (with tax-free shopping), 
the designer bags, branded clothes, the motorbike and so on. I have 
known women who spent an entire month’s wage on a Louis Vuitton bag, 
and men who spent one-fourth of a month’s rent on a bottle of whiskey. 
I have known a lot of people who spent at least two months of their mini-
mum wage on a smart phone.
Guy Debord wrote: “the Spectacle is the other side of money; it is the 
general abstract equivalent of all commodities” (Debord 1967:1). The 
trips to shopping malls on the weekend: the opulent, glitzy shopping malls 
converted by rich and poor alike into something akin to a shrine: its shiny 
galleries, silent escalators and greasy, over-crowded fast-food courts. The 
malls have become the site of a bizarre self-conscious ritual, a site for 
confirming the atomized, yet collective triumph of modernity. The replica 
of the Statue of Liberty, four-stories tall, in the center of the El Recreo 
mall, in Central Caracas. Fervent little girls and boys enter the gates to 
consumer heaven, while a man carries his super-mega combo order of 
Kentucky Fried Chicken over to his family’s plastic table as if he were car-
rying a tray of the finest oysters and champagne.
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the booM
These were the years before the economic crisis set in, still the years of the 
vaca gorda (fat cow), when Venezuela’s BNP was still pointing upward, 
inflation was still manageable and consumer products were readily avail-
able. Yet, the disparity between wages and consumption puzzled me; it 
didn’t make sense. Money seemed to be everywhere, flowing from hand 
to hand, endless streams of transactions, deals, favors, trickeries, rebusques 
(inventive ways of generating extra income). Venezuelans were amazed 
themselves: at Christmas time everyone spoke about how crowded the 
streets were, how the consumption rates had hit the roof, how certain 
sought-after items (especially name-brand children’s toys) were out of 
stock across Caracas. At every Easter and Christmas holiday, tickets for 
buses, boats and planes were sold out for practically all destinations and 
people would comment: “They say that things are going bad here, yet 
everyone is going on vacations.” People in the barrios talked about how 
the streets had become more and more congested because of car sales 
hitting the roof, of how increasing numbers of barrio women had got-
ten their boobs and buttocks done,1 of how “everyone” had a Blackberry 
(though many didn’t have money to use it) and not least, how people were 
now being killed in the street for their smart phones. Despite a collective 
acknowledgement of how the alluring symbols of wealth posed a threat 
to the social fabric, the golden calf continued to be worshipped nonethe-
less. The spectacle of consumption was so powerful that one could start 
to wonder if there was any poverty left, or if those who didn’t partake in 
the fiesta were just too principled, or simply not cunning enough. Money 
seemed to have an uncanny yet ubiquitous existence in the midst of a 
political process that not only sought to sow the idea of creating a soci-
ety based upon socialist notions of the collective good, but which also 
denounced consumption as one of the evils of capitalism.
the aMbivaleNce oF wealth
The ambivalence of wealth is a thin red line running through Venezuelan 
modern history. Coronil has written about how Venezuela’s black gold 
became vested with magical, yet destructive powers, vowing to lead its 
citizens toward the promised land of development, modernity and pros-
perity—a siren’s song that never materialized (Coronil 1997). Indeed, the 
symbolic representations of wealth, status and money in Venezuela cannot 
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be understood separately from the manner in which oil wealth has circu-
lated both as an imagery and as a source to great wealth throughout the 
social and political body. It divided the population between those who 
consumed and those who stood on the outside looking in on the con-
sumer spectacle, ascribing power to those who could possess the conspicu-
ous symbols of wealth, and creating both desires and resentments among 
those who could not.
Many authors have pointed to the emergence of a culture of conspicu-
ous consumption developing in Venezuela as oil rent started to circulate 
in society in the first half of the twentieth century (Ewell 1984; Hillman 
1994; Coronil 1997; Tinker Salas 2009). This was not only offset by the 
increasing influx of North American and European consumer goods, but 
also by an increasing volume of North American media sources such as 
TV, print and newspapers (Ewell 1984:134–144) as well as by the pres-
ence of North American oil companies (Tinker Salas 2009). As we dis-
cussed in Chap. 2, the latter not only implied the general formation of 
an imagery of national progress and modernity via oil-financed develop-
ment actively conjured by the oil companies (Tinker Salas 2009). It also 
implied an increasing contact between segments of the Venezuelan popu-
lation and North American residents—oil managers, oil workers and their 
families—whereby North American consumer values and class symbolisms 
were absorbed by a rapidly growing population in search of a national 
identity (Tinker Salas 2009). These factors created a process of cultural 
reconfiguration whereby the national imageries of class identities as well as 
modernity, development and progress were associated with the ability to 
consume “US style.”
The first government of Carlos Andrés Pérez, in the 1970s, deepened 
and added new dimensions to this cultural imagery. Vowing to propel 
the country into first-class status financed by the booming oil wealth, the 
government flushed enormous amounts of money throughout the system. 
Ruthless corruption and rent-seeking made the upper classes perversely 
rich, “flaunting their loot” (Coronil 1997:360) in public. As Duno (1975) 
worded it: “Clothing, automobiles, jewelry, mansions, trips, yachts, more 
and better clothing, automobiles, jewelry, mansions, trips, yachts” (Duno 
1975:58, cited in Coronil 1997:337). Middle-class Venezuelans went on 
shopping trips to Miami for the weekend, giving birth to the idiom está 
barato, dáme dos (it is cheap, give me two). Symbolically, PDVSA employ-
ees often flew with the company’s planes for their leisure trips. Venezuela 
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became known internationally as Venezuela Saudita. An article written in 
1978 by Caracas correspondent Peter Arnett in the US newspaper News 
and Courier reads:
Buy a 3-foot tall Salazar of French champagne from your local supermarket, 
price 459 USD including the ice to chill it. Transport your purchase in a 
USD 45,000 white Mercedes Benz sedan from any one of a dozen nearby 
dealer. And discreetly drink it with your secretary in any one of a dozen 
private clubs, membership fees up to USD 100,000. All these items are 
available and have ready buyers in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, where 
cascading oil wealth has given new meaning to the cliché “boom town.” 
(Arnett 1978)
The article cites a US embassy official who “fretted” that “he felt more 
underprivileged here than any other place in the world,” and made ref-
erence to the daily Pan Am 747 flight called the “Disneyland Shuttle” 
between Caracas and Miami that returns “each evening with exhausted big 
spenders laden with purchases.” Referring to the nouveau rich oil-spurred 
spending in Saudi Arabia, the journalist interviews a Swiss hotel manager 
who has worked in Saudi Arabia, who says that “the Venezuelan are much 
more light-hearted about spending money than the Arabs … they enjoy it 
more I think.” The article also mentions the poor who observe the down-
town spending spree from the shantytowns hills, quoting a US govern-
ment report which estimates that one-third of the country’s population is 
ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed and ill-schooled. However, the author notes 
that the social unrest found in other Latin American countries with great 
economic inequalities seems to be lacking. He quotes a Caracas journalist 
saying that: “They think they’ll get money too. It seems so near” (Arnett 
1978).
As we now know, this boom only lasted four more years. By then, the 
national imagery of material culture had been saturated with conspicuous 
consumption US style, a trait that continued to shape national identities 
also in the decades to come. Thus, paradoxically, while during this epoch 
the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez pledged to modernize the coun-
try and bring it on the path to prosperity and development—in itself a col-
lective project of state building—an increasingly powerful individualized 
notion of modernity was perpetuated, that of wealth, power and success 
displayed by crude consumption.
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the power oF coNspicuous coNsuMptioN
As should be clear by now, I am not concerned with consumption per se. 
Rather, my interest is to unearth what discourses about consumption can 
reveal about how popular sector activists conceptualized the Bolivarian 
process, and the ways in which the template of consumerism gained 
salience in discourses about capitalism’s effect on Venezuelan society. As 
Slater (1997) puts it: “To state the obvious, consumer culture is capital-
ist culture” (Slater 1997:26). Consumer culture was born from capitalist 
arrangements of labor, capital and production, and social critique against 
consumerism is as old as capitalism itself. Alexis de Tocqueville, visiting 
the young nation of the USA in 1831, observed that:
Among democratic nations, men easily attain a certain equality of condition, 
but they can never attain as much as they desire. It perpetually retires from 
before them, yet without hiding itself from their sight, and in retiring draws 
them on. At every moment they think that they are about to grasp it; it escapes 
at every moment from their hold. They are near enough to see its charm, but 
too far off to enjoy them; and before they have fully tasted its delights, they 
die. (Alexis de Tocqueville 1904:624–625, cited in Mullins 2011:1)
In 1899, Veblen introduced the now well-known concept of conspicuous con-
sumption, arguing that capitalist consumption was just as socially destructive 
as the capitalist production process itself (Fourcade and Healy 2007:291). 
However, while a culture of “consumerism” as such is an old phenomenon, 
global mass consumption, in its contemporary form, is often seen as a key 
feature of late-twentieth-century globalization in the form of ever-expanding 
flows of cultural mass imageries and mass commodities (see Slater 1997 for a 
thorough analysis). There is a broad body of anthropological literature deal-
ing with novel ways of understanding the role and meaning of consumption 
in the contemporary world (Appadurai 1988; Friedman 1994; Douglas and 
Isherwood 1996; Miles 1998; Jackson 1999, 2004; Walsh 2003; Graeber 
2011). As these analyses emphasize, global imageries of consumption are 
codified, transformed and absorbed in numerous ways in different cultural 
contexts. However, in its essence, the dominant imagery of consumption is 
shaped by a lifestyle that is intrinsically interlinked with broader notions of 
modernity emanating from the Global North. As Slater notes:
Consumer culture is in important respects the culture of the modern west-
certainly central to the meaningful practice of everyday life in the modern 
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world; and it is more generally bound up with central values, practices and 
institutions which define western modernity, such as choice, individualism 
and market relations. (Slater 1997:8)
Intersecting with broader templates of modernity such as liberalism, 
consumption is projected through a densely packed message of freedom 
epitomized by the concept of consumer sovereignty (Slater 1997:27). 
However, a broad body of work across disciplinary fields has dissected 
how the emancipatory message written into the imagery of consump-
tion (freedom is to shop the identity of your choosing!) constitutes a very 
twisted or limited liberty, or liberty only for the few.
Paradoxically, the pressure to consume may be weighing in more heav-
ily on those who do not have the capacity to consume (Miles 1998:151). 
Gledhill has put forward a similar perspective, arguing that “the measure-
ment of social worth in terms of consumption and marketed ‘lifestyle’ sym-
bols penetrates deeply even into the lives of the world´s poorest citizens” 
(Gledhill 2004:340). No wonder then, that consumption often takes on a 
daydreaming quality; it becomes a way of imagining and fantasizing about 
the unattainable (Miles 1998:151).
These perspectives are important to capture, because they remind us 
that the poor are as equally prone to consume imageries of commodi-
fied lifestyles as the rich, creating an economy of desires and wants that 
intersects with a broader repertoire of power and domination, poverty and 
exclusion, identity formation, compliance and resistance. In Venezuela, 
as we learned above, the popular sectors were, throughout the twentieth 
century, relegated to the place of spectators witnessing their better-off 
fellow countrymen and women flaunt a lifestyle and level of consump-
tion that was far beyond their reach. Indeed, during el Caracazo, it was 
not only food and household items that were looted; it was also TV-sets 
and refrigerators. As many of my informants said: “For a long time poor 
people had been forced to watch consumer propaganda touting what they 
should have. During el Caracazo some people used to opportunity to seize 
these things.” The desire to consume had been “democratized” across 
society, but only a small part of the population had been able to partake in 
the fiesta. However, consumption took on a dark meaning for the popular 
sector, as expressed through the often-said truism “here will kill each other 
for a pair of shoes.” The phrase originated in the 1980s, when the social 
hype around the Nike Escape models apparently led to a string of robber-
ies and even murders. Being a tragic illustration of the localized outcomes 
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of globalized messages about modern identities, the phrase “here we kill 
each other for a pair of shoes” remained in the popular social imagery, 
confirming the power of commodities in the construction of Venezuelan 
social identities.
coNsuMptioN iN the age oF chavisMo
Consumption boomed under the Chávez government. Private per capita 
consumption grew more than 50 percent between 1998 and 2012. In 
2013, Venezuela had 150 shopping malls for a country of almost 29 mil-
lion inhabitants. In contrast, Argentina, with 40 million inhabitants had 
19 malls (Informe21 2013) Throughout the Chavez period, purchasing 
power among the popular sectors increased significantly because of a com-
bination of several factors: social spending targeting poor social groups, 
increased wages, a new oil boom and public policies creating expanded 
economic activities and, in turn, increased employment opportunities and 
circulation of capital. Due to the altered class profile of the state appa-
ratus, more people from the popular sectors were able to access public 
sector employment. And with new political constellations, new public 
policies, and a new influx of oil resources, new channels to tap into public 
resources, through clientelism or corruption, were opened for new sec-
tors of the population. Put together, these factors increased the purchas-
ing power for people in the lower end of the socio-economic scale, and 
enabled them to consume beyond the level of “mere survival” as they 
were historically accustomed to. Now, they could also partake in symbolic 
consumption, and an increasing number of people did so, even if it often 
cost them hardship and sacrifice.
buyiNg oN a whiM
Many Venezuelans perceive themselves as heedless, senseless spend-
ers, throwing out money, “here today, gone tomorrow,” so thoroughly 
couched into a consumerist culture that they spend even if they don’t need 
it and even if they cannot afford it. I discussed this one night with David, 
a young community activist, as we were sitting in his rooftop terrace over-
looking the glittering lights across the valley of 23 de Enero:
DAVID: Here in Venezuela we are, we are quite consumistas, Vene-
zuela has distinguished herself as one of the countries that 
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consumes the most, so you can say that we are consumerists, 
we sometimes buy unnecessary things that we don’t want or 
we don’t need (…). Here we are practically living off imports, 
practically everything is imported, and now we are more con-
sumerist, we buy … every day we buy something.
ISELIN: And where does it come from, this need to buy something?
DAVID: It is not a need, sometimes it can be a need, depending on the 
point of view, but sometimes it is just a capricho (a whim) for 
having it. Here in Venezuela we have always lived, well, we 
still live something that is modernism, to give you an exam-
ple, if I don’t have this cap from a fashion brand, I don’t feel 
well. And today, within society and above all in the barrios 
where you see this the most, among the youngsters, that if 
a youngster doesn’t have clothes from a fashion brand they 
are not accepted by their groups and friends. That is where 
the mother also fails, because sometimes the mother abstains 
from buying necessary things for the home in order to buy 
unnecessary things for her children. So that is a problem that 
we also need to attack in today’s youth and another thing as 
well, that today there are too many murders, for a telephone 
of a fashion brand, for a (inaudible) of a fashion brand, if we 
don’t have purchasing power, for a capricho, we kill another 
person.
ISELIN: And from where and when do you think that this culture in 
Venezuela has come from?
DAVID: This is coming from decades ago, decades, decades, decades, 
that has been imprinted here by previous governments, as far 
as I know since Gómez and up till now … the majority of the 
governments since then have been … we have been invaded 
and acquired by capitalism, which is what we are fighting 
against today, and we are achieving this goal. Here, all the 
other governments have depended upon capitalism, we have 
been dominated by capitalism and today they are cataloguing 
the president as bad because he doesn’t want to let himself 
be dominated by capitalism. We are neither going to let our-
selves be dominated by capitalism because we have already 
woken up and saw reality, we woke up from this dream that 
had (inaudible) us … now we are in a social dream, socialist, 
of justice and peace.
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Note that David attributes this cultural proclivity to spending to “modern-
ism,” which he directly associates with having name-brand clothes. Albeit a 
seemingly casual choice of words, it illustrates how modernity and symbols of 
global mass consumption were tied together in the popular imagery. David, 
who was pursuing a university degree in public administration, and who also 
had attended several courses in popular education, went on to immediately 
identify capitalism as the “culprit” for this national trait. This formulation 
illustrates how the template of “capitalism” within the Bolivarian discourse 
refers to a particular socio-cultural paradigm that the country has lived by 
for the greater part of the twentieth century. As he pointed out, Chávez was 
perceived as the first president who resisted this model of domination, set-
ting Venezuelans on a new path toward social justice and peace—and at a 
confrontational path with the patrons of capitalist modernity.
coNsuMerisM FroM withiN
The alluring power of conspicuous consumption constituted a source of 
deep preoccupation for many community activists. It was perceived as a 
form of “false consciousness” that made the popular sectors, now with a 
slightly better purchasing power, seek refuge in dreams of middle-class 
consumption and commodified Western identities instead of gaining 
consciousness about the cultural and political battle that the Bolivarian 
process constituted. Oscar, whom we recognize from the ordeal with the 
Community Hospital (CDI) in Chap. 5, was a particularly concerned 
interlocutor of this view. As a stern believer in poder popular and in the 
imperative of emancipation from cultural imperialism, he observed with 
great concern how people around him were drawn to dreams and practices 
of consumption. In one interview, he framed it this way:
OSCAR: Look, I will give you an example that concerns me and my 
daughter, I call her mamita, she is 10 years old. And we go 
for a walk in the park, or we are strolling, and she says to me, 
“Dad, I want to go to the shopping mall, the El Sambil, El 
Recreo.” And I say to her: “But why will we go there?” My 
sister says that one goes there to glue your snot on the window 
displays of those large shopping malls … those large shop-
ping malls that are now all over the large cities like Caracas, 
Valencia, Maracaibo, Barquisimeto. So look, my daughter 
asks me to go there and these are some of the contradictions. 
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And as she is a little girl, 10 years old, and I say to her but coño 
mamita, what are we going there for? “Well, to eat, to look.” 
“But what are we going to look at?”
 So having a shopping mall over there is to awake in her all this 
consumerism … of buying this, of buying clothes, I … I am a 
militant, I am a militant of revolutionary ideas, and these con-
tradictions that I am hearing daily with my daughters, with 
my nieces and nephews, with my family, this is a debate that 
is going on daily … and what do we do if where she is study-
ing, in this school or in this sector where she lives sees these 
[values], what do we do? Because I cannot impose my ideas 
on her, rather, this is a constant process with her, to debate, 
to make her see the new values, or the values that I have (…).
Oscar was part of an old boy’s colectivo in 23 de Enero, which for decades 
has been central in organizing cultural, sportive and social events in the 
community. They set themselves apart from many other colectivos in the 
community by their explicit non-militant style. Also, they were hesitant 
to tie themselves too closely to the new arenas for popular participation 
endorsed by the government. Rather, they considered popular struggle as 
essentially a process of bottom-up emancipation from both cultural and 
political modes of dominance and power. Consequently, Oscar and his 
comrades were deeply worried about many of the “vices” that continued 
to thrive within the Bolivarian movement, and the obstacles this posed for 
continuing political struggle beyond having a sympathetic government in 
power. He saw ideologies of consumptions as one of the most worrying 
signs of the limitations to the Bolivarian revolution as a process of deep 
socio-cultural change:
What can we do if there is this constant; the television, the internet, the 
mobile telephone in fashion. I mean, here people are saying that this is 
the country with the largest acquisition of new mobile telephones (smart 
phones) and in the communities, you get shocked how this is instilled in 
our young women, in your children, that the Christmas presents, from the 
Jesus Child2 in quotation marks, the arrival of these gifts from Christmas are 
telephones, they are giving a Blackberry to a child of seven, eight years …. 
What do we do then?
So look how society, how these big men have us subdued … and they 
still have total dominance, that is without a doubt … and besides, this is 
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also one of the contradictions within our communities, in these processes of 
struggle that the communal councils are engaged in, that are taking place in 
the different community organizations, in sports, in culture, this debate or 
this diffusion of new ideas that is taking place. This is daily work, constant, 
at every hour…
Oscar’s words are representative of how many people would conceptual-
ize the paradox between the powerful template of consumption within 
the popular sectors and the simultaneous drive toward fomenting a new 
consciousness that was taking place in a variety of arenas. He found it puz-
zling and disturbing that many poor people seemed to prioritize buying 
consumer goods, at any cost, and that children were being pushed into a 
consumer culture through all media channels, supported by parents who 
failed to gain consciousness themselves. Indeed, a major concern of many 
activists was, above all, for young people, who were continuously induced 
into believing that “anything foreign” was way better than anything 
Venezuelan. All the brands that children and youths’ culture revolved 
around were foreign: McDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Pizza Hut, 
Disney, Hello Kitty, Monster High, Hollywood blockbusters, Blackberry, 
Apple, Nike, Ralph Lauren, the list is endless.
The subject was also brought up in a conversation with Marta, a woman 
in her 30s originally of humble origins but now an accomplished singer. 
Over a cup of coffee by her mother’s dining table in one of the low-rise 
apartment blocks in 23 de Enero, she spelled it out like this:
What is the most problematic about it? Ideologically we are still, we could 
say that the revolution is still in between the Fourth and the Fifth Republic 
… the masses, el pueblo has really not imprinted, formed, what is socialism, 
this is why we are still living in the midst of capitalism. Chavismo, one of its 
principal traits I would say, is this love for the patria, the need for justice, 
that is why eight millions and something have voted for Chávez, because of 
this sense of nationalism that we had completely lost … before the February 
4, 1992,3 there wasn’t this sense of patria, of nation …. Chavismo has this 
element which is what the esqualidos don’t have, it doesn’t interest them … 
but what happens?
I am talking about the ideological element, the fight against consum-
erism, because certainly we have been able to break through these things 
and created a sense of patria, of national identification, of pride of being 
Venezuelan, of recognition, about what it means to be Bolivarian, where are 
we coming from, where are our roots, but still there are elements that are 
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imprinted upon us, above all from the great enemy, what we have there in 
front of us, the media, Hollywood, we are trying to recuperate our national 
identity, but it is really difficult, really difficult, because our children still 
have Disney Channel—and I don’t mean that Disney Channel is completely 
bad, but the problem is that we haven’t managed, even with the educational 
processes at school, with the Canaimita,4 to make what is ours, our customs, 
our traditions, attractive to the younger generation…
Marta’s way of expressing herself illustrates how the template of consum-
erism was tied to depreciating all things Venezuelan, a form of cultural 
imperialism undercutting the struggle for Third World political emancipa-
tion. Therefore, it was an important symbol of anti-consumerist nation-
alism when Chávez, in 2009, launched Venezuela’s first domestically 
produced mobile telephone, the Vergatario,5 costing approximately 15 
dollars. This was seen as an important confrontation with the power of 
cultural imperialism in Venezuela, and the telephone indeed quickly sold 
out, strategically launched by Chávez on live TV just before Mother’s Day.
saMbil society
A clearer picture is now emerging of how “consumerism” within Bolivarian 
discourse implied a broader set of signifiers describing Venezuelan his-
tory as a colonialized, transculturalized and socially segregated country. 
Consumerism became codified as the opposite of a people’s history of 
Venezuela, of nationalist symbols, autochthonous traditions and national 
dignity. It was the child of the hegemonic globalization of the imagery 
of mass modernity “US style.” Below is a text that eloquently captures 
this multi-layered interpretation of what consumerism represents, bring-
ing out very clearly how it is socially and culturally codified within the 
current process of deep political polarization. The text, written as a poem 
and titled “What does it mean to be from Sambil society?” is a reference to 
the shopping mall chain Sambil, owned by the Venezuelan Cohen family, 
and probably the most potent symbol of consumer culture in Venezuela. 
Sambil Caracas is the third largest shopping mall in Venezuela. (The larg-
est ones are in Isla Margarita and Maracay, which are among the largest in 
Latin America.) There are seven Sambil malls across Venezuela, in addi-
tion to one in Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic, 
one in Curaçao, and one in Madrid (Sambil 2017).
Eighty thousand people a day visit Centro Comercial Sambil Chacao, 
in the center-east of Caracas (Informe21: 2013) It features two movie 
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theaters, with a total of ten screens, a rooftop amusement park, a concert 
arena, a bowling alley, an arcade, a small aquarium and several food courts, 
with both international and national fast-food kiosks. It sells a range of 
international luxury brands, and has spin-off initiatives, such as a beauty 
contest and its own magazine. The chain also organizes group weddings 
in the month of February (cashing in on Valentine’s Day) as a way to 
“demonstrate its compromise with the Venezuelan society” and in order 
to “promote and consolidate moral values in the Venezuelan society” 
(Notiactual 2011, author’s translation from Spanish). Sambil arranges 
fashion shows, holds cooking classes for housewives, sponsors schools and 
sport facilities, organizes fundraising events and aerobic classes.
I am mentioning these details to underline that Sambil is more than a 
mall in Venezuela; it is a cultural symbol. The exact origin of the phrase 
Sociedad Sambil (Sambil Society, alluding to civil society) is uncertain, but 
it was famously used by the now-deceased popular revolutionary leader 
Lina Ron, founder and president of the party Unión Popular Venezolana 
(UPV). This twist of words elegantly captures how Sambil has come to 
epitomize a lifestyle, an attitude and an imagined class community. An 
article was later posted on the pro-government activist website www.
apporea.org, entitled “What does it mean to be from Sambil society?” 
(Silva 2005). I will quote it in full here, because its extremely rich cultural 
references illustrates how templates of consumption, class and politics play 
into the deeper cultural-political struggles taking place between contrast-
ing and contradictory worldviews.
What does it mean to be from the Sambil Society?
It is to live for consumption and not to consume in order to live, that is, 
to pass by your house and live in Sambil, not to live in your house and pass 
by Sambil.
It is to be an innocent victim of the dictatorship of the media of incom-
munication (sic), which from childhood on teaches one to live from appear-
ance and not from essence.
It is to ridicule social sensibility that people with fortunes feel towards 
“the wretched of the earth” (Frantz Fanon).
It is to talk negatively about Venezuela and her people while drinking 
whisky in a bar in Las Mercedes (and the most fortunate ones in London), 
and when they meet for a business lunch in Altamira (idem in Paris).
It is to blame the Venezuelan people suffering in poverty for being lazy 
and irresponsible when it is these people who produce goods and riches for 
those parasites and for the gringo empire that they admire so deeply.
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It is to prefer to read Seventeen magazine instead of a book about 
Venezuelan history.
It is to know all the gossip from the parties in high society and beauty 
contests, and to ignore the socio-historical formation of Venezuela as a 
nation.
It is to discriminate against someone who doesn’t have a luxury car or 
brand clothes like they have.
It is to imitate foreign fashion promoted on television, and to despise as 
monkeys and marginals the creole traditions and customs.
It is to dress the mind with T-shirts of Backstreet Boys and Britney 
Spears, and to look ugly upon those who dress their body in T-shirts of Ali 
Primera and Simón Bolívar. In a few words, it is to speak Spanish and think 
in English.
It is to feel pain for the dead North Americans in the World Trade Center 
in New York, and not feel anything for our dead Latino brothers in the 
Chorillos neighborhood when the United States invaded Panama.
It is to criticize with “squalid” hysteria the destruction of the statue of 
Christopher Columbus as an act of the marginal hordes of the circles of ter-
ror, and not to say anything about the civic pacific pull down of the statue of 
Cacique Guacaipuro in Los Teques when they did the guarimbas.6
It is to settle with being the pupil of a big high school when one should be 
a student at the university, and to graduate in order to serve an exploiter with 
the purpose of becoming like him, without caring about whether his work 
harms or benefits the people who paid for the existence of the very university.
It is to make tremendous fuss for knowing that there are students who 
don’t eat at McDonald’s or cannot pay for books, which is why they propose 
that each human right (like the right to education, to life or to freedom of 
expression) should be paid by those who have the most, and make it avail-
able at a low cost to the poor students (and not give it for free … zero pater-
nalism for the tierrúos (dirty poor) according to papa’s boys), all based on 
a socio-economic study that converts the human rights of all (which should 
be free!) into a privilege for the few (who can pay).
It is to be an adulador rastacuero (sycophant ass-kisser) to a decadent 
and opportunist aristocrat professor, and to join him in scorning other 
members of the university community for their academic conditions, their 
social origin and their racial characteristics.
It is to call themselves civil society when they protest, and to call the poor 
hordes and mobs when they do the same.
It is to protest comfortably from their luxurious balcony putting on a CD 
with pot-banging7 to not get their delicate skin sweaty.
It is to be in favor of Chávez if he had been white and with blue eyes, and 
had talked in an abstract and technical language in order to be a hypocrite 
like them, instead of making objective and constructive criticism.
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It is to die from hunger in a shack on the shantytown hills, while thinking 
and wanting to be like them!!!!
In this text, Sambil Society takes on multiple meanings: of class resent-
ments, of anti-nationalism, of lack of sense of patria and sense of social 
consciousness, of adulation for anything foreign, anything with superfi-
cial status, anything that represents the opposite of the values that the 
Bolivarian process—through its ideological thirdworldism outlook and 
class rooting—represents. Sambil Society implies to be a snob and a hypo-
crite. The very term “Sambil Society” refers to the ways in which, as is 
also described in the poem, the middle and upper classes call themselves 
civil society, whereas Chavista supporters are referred to as hordes and 
mobs. This is a point that is often underscored by Chavistas because, to 
them, it illustrates the global dimension of Venezuelan class conflicts; they 
interpret “civil society” as an ideological concept embracing a particular 
socio-economic group of global citizens (see also Chatterjee 2004 for an 
analysis of its historical origins and its colonial adaption). From the point 
of view of the popular sectors, the concept “civil society” is monopolized 
by the opposition and actively used as a worldwide marketing strategy in 
order to gain support for its cause, legitimizing oppositional and middle-
class political agency while negating popular and pro-government agency.
It is however important to note that Sambil Society is not merely 
ascribed to class. Rather, the last line, “It is to die from hunger in a shack 
on the shantytown hills, while thinking and acting like them!” refers to 
poor people who try to associate with middle-class culture through con-
sumption. They are often colloquially referred to as sifrinos. Bourdieu 
teased out the ways in which class mobility is conditioned by habitus—a 
lower-class person can aspire to social mobility through simulating upper-
class aesthetic dispositions, but this person will be exposed by the inca-
pability of assuming (embodying) the finer details of that higher-class 
habitus (Bourdieu 1979). Grounded in a similar popular understanding 
of social mobility and symbolic capital, many “vanguard revolutionaries” 
viewed sifrinos with a mix of pity and contempt. In embracing middle-class 
identity markers (sociolect, consumption symbols, talking in a denigrating 
manner about poor people and popular culture, using a scornful middle-
class discourse about Chávez and the government, being “snobbish”) they 
are performing an act of “class betrayal.” Yet, they will never be able to 
“become middle-class” and be fully socially accepted by the middle class, 
no matter how hard they try.
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reappreciatiNg the NatioNal-popular
As the text “What does it mean to be from Sambil Society?” illustrates, 
imageries and discourses of consumption tie up with the broader political-
cultural process of carving out a new sense of nationalism and national 
dignity. Central to this process is a rejection of the symbols of Western 
consumer capitalism and a revaluation of what is perceived as the “authen-
tic” and “autochthonous” Venezuela.
The latter is, in popular and political discourses, often represented 
by national traditions and costumes like folkloric and popular music, 
Venezuelan traditional food (some stereotyped binaries: arepa instead of 
bread, pabellón criollo instead of McDonald’s, papillón con limón instead 
of coke, hallaca instead of Christmas turkey), watching Venezuelan mov-
ies instead of the latest Hollywood blockbusters, going on vacation in 
Venezuela instead of going abroad, appreciating traditional folkloric 
dances and African drums rather than Western commercial music.
Rosa, a woman in her 60s from Propatria, recalled how it used to be 
“shameful” to listen to popular and folkloric music even in the barrios; 
it was considered backward and not fashionable. Instead of letting the 
music blast from open windows, as they usually did, they would listen to 
it behind closed doors. Whether this is true I don’t know, but the fact 
that she recalls it this way illustrates how the “traditional Venezuela” was 
devaluated even in popular imagination.
couNter-cultures
Fernandes (2010) argues that cultural identities in Venezuela under 
Chavez “provided an idiom for the expression of class and racial cleavages 
in an emerging battleground between multiple competing tendencies in 
Venezuelan society” (Fernandes 2010:114). In a similar vein I would sug-
gest that the attempt to create a counter-culture to the global consumer 
culture by emphasizing traditional, popular and national symbols, values 
and commodities represents an idiom for articulating the broader cultural-
political struggle that the Bolivarian process represented. Consumerism—
in its capacity of being global capitalism’s seductive hoax and the prime 
signifier of bourgeois and elite identity—symbolizes the opposite of assum-
ing a political consciousness and revolutionary agenda, thereby becoming 
a prime signifier within this ideological scheme.
However, one must be careful to interpret these dual schemes as con-
trasting and distinct “identity-imageries”: one espousing Western moder-
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nity through consumption, and the other espousing anti-consumerist 
autochthonous, nationalist development. Rather, repertoires of meaning, 
cultural idioms and social formations shaping “consumer identities” in 
various guises in Venezuela are embedded in broader processes of identity 
formation and cultural-political symbolisms and ideologies. Members of dif-
ferent social and political groups are appropriating heterogeneous reper-
toires of goods and messages circulating within global circuits as well as in 
specific localities. Moreover, what constitutes “autochthonous Venezuelan 
culture” is evidently not a definite bundle of practices and tradition that is 
set in stone. In Venezuela, as in any other locality, what is espoused as an 
expression of “cultural authenticity” is malleable, vexing and open to both 
the invention and reinvention of tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992).
It is therefore important to underscore that rather than creating two 
binary “cultures” as if they were true reflections of binary identity constructs 
or “real” binary opposites, my intention here has been to illustrate how this 
schism is ideologically articulated within the dominant Bolivarian discourse. 
It reflects the political polarization in the country revolving around the 
construction of opposites: pro-government—opposition, pro-Venezuela—
pro-imperialism, pro-nation—pro-USA, pro-Socialism for the twenty-first 
century—pro-capitalism, pro-poor—pro-bourgeois. Within these opposites, 
“consumerism” emerged as a key symbolic marker expressing different cul-
tural-political identities, imagined communities and moral economies.
* * *
This chapter started out with the observation of how “money” seemed to 
constitute a dense social signifier in Bolivarian discourse and social imagi-
naries, forming part of a broader narrative of a bundle of social vices that 
had been installed in society since long back. Consequently, I linked this 
to a theoretical and empirical exploration of how we may ground emic 
conceptualizations and social critique of “capitalism” and “neoliberalism” 
to the ways in which these macro-processes were imprinted in people’s real 
lives. Furthermore, we discussed how stereotyped class and political iden-
tities were crafted around notions of cultural and material consumption 
drawing on distinctions between “autochthonous” culture and Western 
modernity. In Chap. 9, we will continue our exploration of contrasting, 
contradictory and symbol-laden notions of oil wealth and consumption. 
However, this time, our ethnographic focus is not conspicuous consump-
tion, but the ways in which collective consumption through state distribu-




 1. Though many die because they cannot afford to do it in proper clinics (see 
World Observer Online 2013).
 2. Venezuelan children get their Christmas presents at midnight on the 
night of 24 December, and they are told that the presents are brought by 
the Jesus Child.
 3. This is the date of the Chávez-led attempt to overthrow the Perez govern-
ment; see Chap. 2.
 4. Canaimita is a Venezuelan-assembled mini-computer that is handed out for 
free to children in public schools, produced based on an agreement with 
China.
 5. The name itself caused a bit of controversy. Vergatario is a slang word for 
excellent, superb or optimal, but it is also a vulgar reference to penis.
 6. This line deserves some explanation. On October 12, 2004, a statue of 
Christopher Columbus was torn down in Caracas in protest against the cel-
ebration of the discovery of the Americas. October 12 has previously been 
celebrated as a national holiday, named Día de la Raza (day of the races). In 
Venezuela, this day has been re-baptized as Dia de Resistencia Indígena (day 
of indigenous resistance). The destruction of the statue was heavily criti-
cized by the opposition who termed it an act of Chávez’s “hordes” and the 
Bolivarian Circles, who are commonly referred to as circles of terror in 
opposition media (see Chap. 5). On the other hand, Cacique Guacaipuro 
was an Indian tribal leader who led the resistance against the invasion of the 
Spaniards. His statue was brought down by opposition marchers during the 
guarimbas in 2004—guarimbas refers to street riots which were put in 
motion by the opposition with the purpose of inciting a civil uprising.
 7. To bang pots and pans against each other is a common form of public pro-
test in Latin America, predominantly among the middle classes.
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CHAPTER 9
Collective Consumption and the Wealthy 
Nation-State
The state of Vargas, spring 2011: The area was unrecognizable from the 
last time I passed through here. The coastline west of the international 
airport of Maiquetía, in the state of Vargas, used to be a dusty shantytown 
area with a dimly lit road cutting through the lines of brick houses and 
shacks. Children used to play half-naked on the side of the road while 
their mothers were sitting on chairs outside their houses yelling to their 
kids as the cars and motorbikes rushed through. The men used to stand 
in clusters, talking and drinking beer and cheap liquor, or around a car 
or motorbike talking in men’s manly and competitive manner. The hot, 
humid, salty air from the Atlantic Ocean, 300 meters away, was corrugat-
ing everything: the roofs, the bricks, facial skin, the energy to do anything. 
Behind the last line of houses, a half-built road was lying in the dark. 
Behind the road was a muddy, unlit beach.
Now, everything had changed. Two long rows of freshly painted yellow 
apartment buildings were facing the Atlantic Ocean. A sign announced to 
the visitors that the community’s name was Mares Abajo. A newly con-
structed highway ran in front of the buildings. On the other side of the 
road was a recreational area, complete with a children’s playground and 
wooden beach tents. A sign welcomed the visitors to Playa Surfista (surf-
er’s beach) and another sign announced that this was a recreational area 
and that it was forbidden to sell or drink liquors. The shantytown area and 
the dusty road cutting through it had been demolished; only some smaller 
clusters of brick houses were left on the side of the apartment buildings. 
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We took off from the highway and drove into the plaza between one of the 
apartment buildings’ clusters. It was clean and spacey and the cars were 
neatly lined up along the pavement. Children were running around with 
their bicycles. A group of adults had taken out chairs and a table, where a 
domino game was set up.
Together with a friend I had come to visit Abigayl and Ramón, friends 
from a long time back. They used to live with a family so large that I was 
never able to keep track of all its members, all cramped together in one 
of the makeshift brick shacks that had now been demolished. The “bath-
room” was a wooden shack with a defective toilet and a bucket to wash 
it with.
Four months back, they had moved into the new apartment. It had 
two bedrooms, a bathroom with shower and a combined living room 
and kitchen. The apartment buildings were part of Gran Misión Vivienda 
Venezuela, a massive housing project launched by Chávez in 2010. They 
hadn’t paid for the apartment. As they were very low on the income scale, 
it was handed to them for free. Abigayl and Ramón had two small sons 
together, nicknamed El Chino (the Chinese) and el Ruso (the Russian). 
Another son, the eldest, had died when a toddler as a result of brain dam-
age caused by a hospital error during delivery. He suffered from convul-
sions until he eventually died. They never got a real explanation, proper 
treatment or an apology from the hospital. Abigayl always got a profoundly 
sad expression when this topic came up. Her lined face and skinny body 
were marked by a hard life, and shadows of grief often moved through her 
sparkly, friendly eyes.
Abigayl and Ramón were examples of people who had had their lives 
transformed in small, but significant steps during the past decade. Ramón 
was a short, skinny man in his 40s with a restless energy. He talked quickly, 
moved quickly and smoked quickly, and when he started to drink beer or 
anís, which he frequently used to do, he drank quickly too. He would 
probably have been diagnosed with ADHD if he had ever in his life been 
in contact with a school psychiatrist who cared. Of course, when he went 
to school, such a thing didn’t exist. Ramón made a living as a construc-
tion worker, or as a truck driver or as a mechanic. He had no professional 
education, but in front of any engine with tools in hand, he was a wizard. 
Some years back, Ramón went to Cuba as a part of Frente Fransisco de 
Miranda. He was inspired by his brother, who lived in Caracas and was 
deeply involved in the political movement that the Frente constituted at 
the time. Ramón enjoyed the stay in Cuba. Once back in Caracas, he 
collaborated with the Frente the best way he knew—driving and main-
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taining their cars. He participated in perhaps the most intense part of the 
revolution, the years after the coup in 2002–2003, when thousands of 
young people roamed the country setting up health stations, identifying 
the needs of poor communities, visiting the most remote corners of the 
country to give identity papers to people who had lived their whole lives 
as undocumented citizens.
Ramón will never be an intellectual. He will never be an ideologue. He 
wasn’t very fond of the classes in political economy and history that they 
had in Cuba, he confided. In fact, I suspected that his literacy skills were at 
minimum level. But through the Frente, he got a political identity, social 
and political companionship, a sense of belonging. From his guts, if not 
from a coherent ideological set of ideas, he contributed to the political 
processes Venezuela was experiencing. He had even participated in con-
structing the apartment buildings they were now living in as well as the 
highway that ran past them.
Even though Ramón and Abigayl had only moved some 100 meters 
away from where their old shack used to be, they had in reality taken a 
step into a completely different life. To live in an apartment and to live 
in a rancho was for them worlds apart. And it was as if both of them 
had changed. I couldn’t point to exactly what, but they had a new air 
to them, a new way of talking, as if their new physical surroundings had 
become imprinted in their bodies, into their way of moving. The apart-
ment was scarcely furnished, and the furniture that they had was old and 
shabby. The water supply in the apartments was unstable as the work on 
the underground tanks that would supply the apartments had not been 
finished. Yet, they both felt that they had started a new chapter in life. 
Abigayl told me that she was about to start night classes with Misión Ribas 
in order to complete high school. After that, she wanted to study social 
work. Ramón continued finding employment in the construction sectors, 
in the other apartment projects that were under way in the area. El Chino 
and el Ruso, who were racing around the apartment on two small bikes, 
nodded when I asked them if they liked their new home.
Ramón in particular seemed calmer. He was standing outside on the 
narrow French balcony, pointing down to the plaza between the two 
apartment blocks that were facing each other. “We are all good neigh-
bors,” he said. “We meet down in the patio to play domino and talk, but 
there aren’t any problems here, and besides, there are several policemen 
living here.” He also confided that he drank less now. He just drank some 
beer when he played domino down in the plaza, but other than that he 
just worked as much as he could.
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Repaying the Debt
The story about the transformation of Ramón’s and Abigayl’s lives reminds 
us of a fundamental aspect of the Bolivarian process; namely, that through-
out the years of the Chávez government, millions of poor people saw their 
lives improve. They were better fed; were better schooled; acquired bet-
ter housing, received free healthcare, wheel chairs, vaccinations, university 
scholarships, single mother scholarships, and pensions; and participated in 
sports programs and cultural education. According to ECLAC, the United 
Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, 
income-based poverty rates fell from 48.6 percent of the population in 
2002 to 27.8 percent of the population in 2010 (Tinker Salas 2015:192). 
Per the National Statistics Institute, overall poverty levels fell from 55.6 
percent in 1998 to 21.2 percent in 2012. Extreme poverty dropped from 
25.5 percent in 1998 to 6 percent in 2012.1 In addition, there were signif-
icant welfare improvements not captured through income-based statistical 
methods (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007). In a UN-Habitat report from 
2012, Venezuela was ranked with a Gini index of 0.41, the best score in 
Latin America (the lowest level of economic inequalities). This is a signifi-
cant improvement compared to the 1990s (UN-Habitat 2012).2
During my time in the barrios in the Chávez era, people responded 
rather univocally that they had never before had such access to social 
welfare (though it was by no means perfect). Indeed, people’s subjec-
tive assessment of the situation for themselves as well as their peers was 
that not only was poverty reduced and social services more available, but 
also that they enjoyed increased access to different arenas and venues for 
self-development, being it through education, community media, sports, 
culture or work programs. I met numerous people who expressed that 
their lives significantly changed for the better through the government’s 
policies. To present a few examples: one was my neighbor in 23 de Enero, 
a slim, nervous single mother of three, constantly biting her teeth. She 
was a beneficiary of Misión Madres de Barrio (Mothers from the Barrio), 
through which she had gotten a small scholarship while following courses 
and other requirements that the program demanded. She told me with 
pride about when she resigned her scholarship from the government and 
signed a contract with Metro de Caracas. For the first time in her life, she 
had a job with pension benefits and cestatickets.3
Another one was a young girl who was severely physically dysfunctional 
because of a rheumatic condition, presumably because of an untreated 
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virus infection when she was a child. Her condition was irreversible, and 
the doctors who originally treated her said that she was bound to end 
totally crippled in bed. It could perhaps be halted through operations, 
medication and physiotherapy, but it would require intense follow-up, 
which the family was not able to pay for through private medical insur-
ance. At the time, public health was also in shambles, and it required a lot 
of payment on the side. In the early years of the Bolivarian process, her 
family sought out help through the Cuba-Venezuela health program. The 
girl was sent to Cuba several times together with her mother, all expenses 
paid for. The longest stay lasted for three months. Today, the accentuation 
of her condition has been halted. Two years ago, she graduated as a lawyer 
at the Bolivarian University (Universidad Bolivariana).
Another example is the numerous elderly people who underwent free 
surgeries for cataracts and similar conditions. This is a quick and relatively 
cheap procedure, but it had been out of reach for numerous people in the 
barrios. Through the so-called Misión Milagro set up by the Chávez gov-
ernment, 676,790 people had undergone eye surgery by 2012 (Correo 
del Orinoco 2012). One of them was Elizabeth, who lived together with 
her sons, their girlfriends and her grandchildren in a barrio in Catia. She 
had slowly lost her eyesight over several years, and when I first met, her 
vision was so bad that she did not dare to leave her house. After the opera-
tion, it was as if she could resume her life all over again.
Another example, again of which there are many, is the numerous peo-
ple, above all women, who went back to school through the government’s 
educational missions. One was my neighbor in Propatria, a dark-skinned, 
slim woman in her fifties. Her seven children, whom she had raised alone, 
were grown-ups (and one was dead). After having completed high school 
through Misión Ribas (high school level educational program), she was now 
studying comunicación social (journalism) through Misíon Sucre (univer-
sity level educational program). She, as many others middle-aged benefi-
ciaries of the educational missions I spoke to, expressed that going back 
to school above all meant an increase in self-respect and a new sense of 
purpose. As many worded it, “it has opened our eyes.”
Another example is the numerous people who were able to upgrade 
their homes. In the context of housing projects, the phrase recurrently 
used was to have a vivienda digna (a dignified home). Over the years, I 
have visited countless barrio homes. While some are quite comfortable, 
others live in substandard and even dangerous conditions. In one home 
I visited, one of the walls was completely covered with mold, producing 
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a nauseating smell and tickling sensation that made me instinctively want 
to run out. A whole family lived and slept in this room, including chil-
dren. Their grandmother had recently died from a respiratory disease. 
Another home was flooded every time it rained, damaging their belong-
ings and furniture. The children had become traumatized and started 
crying and screaming that they had to move their things out every time 
rain started. In innumerable homes, people shower and go to the toilet 
behind a curtain or an old sheet in the absence of a door. In most barrio 
homes, people share beds and bedrooms, and often they cook, sleep and 
spend their time in the same room. People may spend years and decade 
improving their homes, slowly saving up money to add an extra room or 
construct a proper bathroom. The housing rehabilitation (or relocation) 
projects therefore represented a giant leap for many people in terms of 
living conditions, but also for their sense of dignity.
 
Photo 9.1 Ranchos in Casaalta 4, according to local residents built in unstable 
soil. Photo by the author
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I am emphasizing these histories for two reasons: one is in order to 
highlight the subjective experiences of poverty reduction, welfare improve-
ments and improved life opportunities that undercut people’s embrace 
of the Chávez government’s pro-poor policies. Another is to provide a 
 preamble for the ensuing discussion about the contradictions and par-
adoxes surrounding the use of oil revenues for collective consumption. 
Because all these social policies cost money. State money. Oil money. The 
social justice ethos of the Bolivarian process hinged on the promise of 
repaying the state’s social debt to the poor. In an attempt to reverse a pro-
cess of decades of accumulated poverty, neglect and marginalization, enor-
mous sums of money—no one really knows how much—were channeled 
into public programs of various kinds: some by the public ministries, some 
through the executive’s discretionary budgets, some through the state oil 
company, PDVSA. This significantly reshaped how people thought of oil 
 
Photo 9.2 New home built through a communal council housing project. This 
kind of project is referred to as sustitución de ranchos por casas (substitution of 
ranchos (shacks) for homes). Photo by the author
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and national wealth, creating a sense of collective entitlement epitomized 
by the government slogans “Venezuela is now for everyone” and “PDVSA 
is now for everyone.” A narrative about how the country’s elites previ-
ously monopolized the nation’s wealth contrasted this transfiguration of 
the relationship between public wealth and the popular sectors. Manuel, a 
bearded man in his 60s from 23 de Enero put it this way:
Just have a look around to see how he has changed Venezuela. Everything 
he has done for the poor. Chávez has never given anything to me, but I look 
around, and I see how many people have benefited. Before, Venezuela was 
 
Photo 9.3 New roof acquired through a communal council project. Photo by 
the author
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run by three families. The Cicneros, the Zulvaga and the Phelps. It is in their 
nature to oppose Chávez because he runs against their interests. I accept 
that they oppose him. It is in their nature. But look how much this govern-
ment is spending on the poor and still there is money left!!
At this point he was raising his voice before he finished: “And then imag-
ine how much they took for themselves before, when they didn’t share 
with the poor!”




Oil is at the center of popular imaginaries of the state in various Latin 
American countries, not only in Venezuela. Drawing the linkages between 
persistent accumulated marginalization—shaped by class and race—and 
elite rent capturing, claims for participating in the country’s wealth, 
through state redistribution, loom large in struggles from below. As 
Gledhill has argued, these processes, and the imaginaries that they have 
fostered, are a reflection of how the neoliberal paradigm has been absorbed 
in Latin America:
In the case of the imaginary of “the people’s oil,” loss of sovereignty over 
resources is symptomatic of the abandonment of any “national project” by 
neoliberal regimes seeking to deepen the “opening” of national economies 
at any cost. (Gledhill 2008:59)
This is why “resource nationalism” and popular claims for redistribution 
go hand in hand. As resources are privatized in the collusion between 
national elites and foreign interests, “the privatizers are seen as alienating 
what should be public goods in their personal interest as well as ‘selling 
the patrimony of the nation’ to foreign interest” (Gledhill 2008:59). As 
he notes, the resistance to these policies is immediately derived from the 
direct consequences that they have in people’s lives as the everyday costs 
of household reproduction increase (Gledhill 2008:59).
The Bolivarian discourse clearly articulated the interconnectedness of 
these political processes. Social justice was framed as state-led redistribu-
tion of their common patrimony, that is, oil rents. In contrast, “capitalism” 
or alternatively “neoliberalism” implied the unequal distribution of wealth 
through elite capturing and lack of redistribute measures. As Miche, the 
government worker from Fundacomunal, worded it:
Well, the concept of oil has changed, because before the oil was for los 
petroleros (the oil people), or to put it this way, we knew that the country 
was a super power in oil, but the very same politics of bread and circus for 
el pueblo made it so that we were satisfied with the little that they sup-
posedly gave us while they stole or the corrupt got away with most of the 
wealth.
Now, the concept of oil that we have is that it is for all Venezuelans … 
that the state resources have been distributed through the social policies that 
the state has implemented, to the people.
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However, as I will seek to illuminate in this chapter, the actual enact-
ment of redistributive politics through collective consumption and the dis-
courses underpinning it also came accompanied with a host of paradoxes. 
At the core of the matter were templates and practices intrinsic to the 
political culture in Venezuela during the Punto Fijo era. This legacy draws 
on the imaginary of the “Latin American populist-assistentialist state,” 
holding deep roots in political culture across the continent (Auyero 2001; 
Nuijten 2003). However, these attributes also intersected with cultural 
imageries of the “demanding rentist citizens,” mediated through national 
symbolisms and idioms. At the same time, the government and the state 
deployed a quite ambivalent discourse and performance of its rule. On the 
one hand, the spectacle of the Magical State (Coronil 1997) loomed large 
in the background, as a state possessing endless wealth and enormous 
capacities to transform realities. On the other hand, the government at 
times tried to deploy a quite sobering discourse, warning people against 
expecting that the state would fix everything and for thinking that oil 
revenues were endless.
Seen together, the blending of these imaginaries and practices created 
deep tensions and contradictions within the Bolivarian process. To many 
popular sector activists and state officials, it was paramount for the future 
of the Bolivarian process to defeat the historical legacy of individualistic 
rent-seeking and to foment a new revolutionary consciousness through 
popular organization and collective consumption. However, the ways in 
which “oil wealth,” “state welfare” and “resource redistribution” were 
framed through different lenses in different context evidenced once again 
how ingrained social practices and political culture were rubbing against 
the ideological goals of the Bolivarian process.
the pateRnalist state
In order to understand these ambivalent imaginaries, we need to capture 
the historical dynamics and cultural templates that had shaped the rela-
tionship between the popular sectors and the Venezuelan state. A friend 
of mine once told me a popular joke about the adecos (politicians from 
Acción Democrática). It went something like this: an adeco running for 
the presidential elections is touring the country to gather votes. In every 
village he comes to, he promises the villagers everything they want: “We 
will build you new houses! We will build you a new electricity system! 
We will give you water! We will build you a new hospital!” Then he goes 
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to a village in the interior of the country. He is standing on the podium 
shouting enthusiastically: “We will give you new tractors! We will build a 
new road! We will build you a new bridge over the river!” A campesino 
(peasant) then raises his hand and says: “But señor, we don’t have a river 
here.” The adeco then lifts his hand in a sweeping gesture: “But then we 
will build you a river too!”
This joke starkly brings out the political imaginaries that the Punto 
Fijo parties engendered: those of seeking to entice followers through lofty 
promises of lavish spending. It was a pattern of state–society relations with 
its particular temporalities and political aesthetics, well known for students 
of Latin America. The “populist tradition” in Latin America has always 
hinged on “grandiose promises” to the masses that are later fulfilled, or 
not fulfilled, depending on the social inclination and political honesty of 
the incoming president. Both Auyero (2001) and Lazar (2008) discuss 
how “election time” in Argentina and Bolivia constitutes a particular 
period whereby the citizen tries to “seize upon the moment” and obtain 
the most benefit out of the “political opportunity window” before it closes 
again after the elections. Adrian, the government worker that we got to 
know in Chap. 6, described these dynamics during the Punto Fijo period 
like this:
For the Venezuelans it was above all about obras (public work) the streets, 
street lights … when the electoral processes starts, then they come doing 
their campaigns, they start to offer, they do and do and do when once they 
are in power the period of forgetting starts.
So I take care of the population for months, some months, for the elec-
toral campaign, I become president or governor and then come four years 
of forgetting, that is how the population was educated, saying “let’s wait for 
the new elections and they will fix the street.” Do you understand? So the 
next year they fix the street and then comes four new years of forgetting. 
That was the dynamic and that is why we are talking about a paternalistic 
culture.
Rosa, who had lived in the barrio of Casalta 3, high above Propatria, since 
she was a little girl, recalls that prior to the elections in 1978,
Luis Herrera came to do campaigning in the community. He came here 
and started talking to my mother, because, you know, the typical photo of 
politicians with the old lady, the photo drinking coffee with the old lady, 
and well, in reality we were ignorantes (ignorant people), or not ignorantes, 
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but we had other concerns than politics, we had to get food, we had to look 
for work, we had children that we needed to get into school, these things 
… so we were apathetic what politics was concerned, the majority of people 
in the barrios were concerned with finding food and try to fix their rancho 
(barrio shack).
Luis Herrera (COPEI) won the elections and assumed office in early 
1979. Shortly thereafter, the sewage system and other basic infrastruc-
ture were built in the community, Rosa recalled. She thought that this 
was because he himself came from a more modest background than 
other presidents in the Puntofijo era. “And well … in spite of all the 
corruption in Luis Herrera’s government—even though it was Carlos 
Andrés [Pérez] who took home all the medals in what corruption is 
concerned—one can say that there was a little bit more done for the bar-
rios,” she concluded.
Many people also brought up the common practice whereby local party 
brokers (Auyero 2001) went from barrio house to barrio house before the 
elections and distributed bricks or bags of food in exchange for promises 
to vote for the party. Moreover, people commonly sought out the brokers 
for petty assistentialism such as bricks and zinc sheets for their ranchos. 
Acción Democratica’s political profile and voter base implied that they 
cultivated tighter clientelistic relationships with popular sector communi-
ties than COPEI. Rosa recalled that her now-deceased father conceptual-
ized the difference between the two parties like this: “the adecos are like 
hens; they eat and leave their mess so that those around them also can pick 
up some. But the copeyanos are like vultures, they eat off everyone else 
whilst no one eats off them.”
The administrative architecture of the Venezuelans state as outlined 
in the 1961 Constitution accentuated assistentialist and clientelistic 
dynamics between the political parties and informal neighborhoods. 
As the Constitution did not recognize municipal power as a separate 
political branch, “the municipal councils became mere extensions of the 
central government and the dominant political parties” (Rivero Santos 
1995:5). Consequently, popular sector struggles for public services such 
as roads, light posts, sewage system and water “directly addressed issues 
totally under the control of the centralized and populist state appara-
tus controlled by the parties” (Rivero Santos 1995:6). Moreover, mak-
ing use of public services, or obtaining jobs, also frequently required 
partisanship.
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the legacy of assistentialism
A clearer picture now emerges of the habituated political culture and 
dynamics fostered during the Punto Fijo era. For decades, the popular sec-
tors were accustomed to using political opportunity windows to “receive” 
whatever was on offer; otherwise one had to draw on direct mediation 
between the political parties and its client network. (Here it is worthwhile 
to recall our discussion about la palanca—the door opener—in Chap. 6.)
In its place, the ideological focus of the Bolivarian process was two-
fold. One, to provide universal access to public welfare such as health, 
education and pensions. And two, to establish broad-based popular orga-
nizations that could serve as the foci for fomenting collective local devel-
opment and welfare improvements. In order to achieve the latter, it was 
crucial to develop critical consciousness among people about their collec-
tive rights and duties as citizens, and, as part of this process, to reverse the 
historical legacy of individualized strategies for rent-seeking. However, 
many popular sector activists were deeply concerned with how the habitu-
ated assistentialist and clientelist political imaginaries hampered popular 
organization. Adrian, the government worker we got to know in Chap. 
6, commented:
I think that organization here is not very easy, because unfortunately they 
taught us this individualistic culture, the paternalistic culture, that is, that 
the state has to give, that the state has to give, that we don’t have to do 
anything, that the state will give things to us, and of course, many years will 
have to pass before this reality is reversed, and this is what is expressed here 
in this moment, that the population doesn’t understand that organization 
is what is needed.
What Adrian referred to here was on the one hand, the habituated expec-
tation that the state would come and “give,” however little, in the critical 
“hand-out” conjunctures of the electoral cycle. On the other hand, he 
referred to the difficulties in incorporating “ordinary” people, who were 
not accustomed to participating in collective struggles, into community 
organizations. As we have previously discussed, a broad and heteroge-
neous popular movement had indeed emerged following Chávez’s elec-
tion, drawing on popular organization and critical consciousness that was 
born through social struggles in the decades prior to Chávez. However, 
this ideological orientation and prior organizational experience was not 
equally distributed in the population.
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Many in the older generations were also cynical of new community ini-
tiatives and political initiatives emerging from the government, brushing 
them off with es la misma vaina que los adecos (it is the same thing as the 
adecos), meaning that they considered it as promises that would not mate-
rialize. In a similar manner, many people considered the communal coun-
cils to be replicas of the former neighborhood organizations that served 
as client organizations to Acción Democratica. These former neighbor-
hood organizations had different formal names (see Rivero Santos 1995), 
but people habitually referred to them as juntas de vecinos. The associa-
tion between these organizations and the communal councils made peo-
ple prone to think that either those who were active in the communal 
councils had joined solely to attend to their individual interests, or that it 
was communal councils’ spokespersons’ responsibility to “fix” things for 
the rest of the community. In any case, these habituated perceptions of 
 neighborhood councils as self-serving client organizations impeded many 
people from joining the communal councils, constituting a great deal of 
frustration for grassroots activists trying to mobilize their neighbors.
my DRop of oil
For others, the government’s pledge to distribute oil revenues magnified 
people’s expectations of receiving “their drop of oil.” To paraphrase Nuijten 
(2003), the Venezuelan state became converted into an expectation- 
generating machine, fueled by not only the tangible results of redistrib-
ute measures and social spending, but also by the seeming abundance of 
wealth at the time. Many community activists were highly critical of their 
fellow neighbors whom they perceived as demanding not only toward the 
state, but also toward the voceros and other people in the community that 
were actively participating in various projects. Often, these community 
activists experienced that they got little gratitude in return, and instead 
received scolding, accusations and criticism. Many of the internal conflicts 
of the communal councils were related to the different and contradictory 
understanding of what these organs were supposed to provide, who was 
responsible for providing it and how. I once asked Candy, a community 
activist in 23 de Enero, why she thought that it was so difficult to organize 
people. They were dealing with the problem of mobilizing enough people 
to stand for the elections they were organizing. She answered dryly: “I 
have been everywhere in these streets. There is nothing new you can tell 
me. I know Venezuelans. They want you to bring them a bag of food, then 
 MY DROP OF OIL
268 
they want you to cook the food for them, and then they want you to stick 
it into their mouth.” She added, “Oh, mami, what they really want is an 
oil well in their backyard.” Somewhat less pungent, a public functionary 
in the Libertador municipal administration who had worked closely with 
the communal councils eloquently summed it up this way:
People have different criteria, because there are those who think that 
Venezuela is a super rich country and that the state has to give them every-
thing, there are those who think that there is a struggle for power over 
using the oil in an arbitrary manner and keep on handing out and keep on 
destroying the country, while only a small group is making itself rich, and 
there are those who think that if we distribute it well we can resolve all these 
problematics that we have…
PaPa goveRnment
Chávez expressed keen awareness of the cultural and political tradition 
that the Venezuelan electorate was used to, and frequently spoke of popu-
lar mobilization as the prime criteria for social development. He repeat-
edly reiterated that people could not hope for the state to fix all their 
problems. As he said in one televised speech: “I am telling you with all 
my love, but also crudely: Don’t get used to coming to papa government 
for everything ‘to give me the little machine that I need’” (Chávez 2005, 
addressing Núcleo Endógeno Fabricio Ojeda; cited in Aponte Moreno 
2008:175, author’s translation from Spanish). As we recall from Chap. 7, 
community workers in Fundacomunal were instructed by their superiors to 
emphasize this message, warning people against thinking that “their drop 
of oil” would come in the form of a gift. Rather, collective organization 
was a prerequisite for receiving funds. Indeed, except from student schol-
arships (through Misión Ríbas) and single mother’s scholarships (through 
Misión Madres de Barrio), none of the social programs contained direct 
cash transfers. In the case of the communal councils, the legal framework 
for transference of fund was in theory designed to avoid that individual 
beneficiaries got cash in their hands (though there was many irregularities 
concerning how this was carried out in practice).
When oil prices started to drop in the spring of 2011, voceros working 
with the communal councils were instructed to raise the issue in commu-
nity meetings. Hedging against future discontent and underlining that oil 
money was not endless, they tried to inspire discussions about the impli-
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cations the drop in prices would have for future state spending. Thus, at 
a discursive level, the government was frequently trying to foment a new 
notion of rent distribution, coupling social welfare with collective organi-
zation and a broader ideological horizon of social transformation.
At the same time, the state’s lavish spending, which gave the impression 
of endless wealth, as well as its personalistic style of government, also con-
tributed to reinforcing these notions, striking deep chords of the collective 
psyche. The habituated practice of soliciting help for solving individual 
problems was reproduced on a number of arenas. Ever since Chávez was 
elected, people had the custom of trying to hand him personal notes with 
requests for help during public meetings. Indeed, when he traveled across 
the country, he was followed by personnel whose responsibility it was to 
collect these notes and catalogue them in a special office. Moreover, the 
vice-presidency—vis-à-vis the presidential palace—had an office dedicated 
to processing citizens’ emergencies and difficulties with other institutions. 
The task of this office however, rather than providing assistance directly, 
was to turn to other state entities (i.e., a hospital, a municipal government, 
a social security entity) and try to find solutions. As a last resort, peo-
ple came to this office from all over the country. Individual attempts for 
problem- solving was also on display every day in the top national news-
paper, Ultimas Noticias. It has a section whereby people can call or send 
short messages by SMS. It contained as string of requests directed to the 
government or President Chávez, or sometimes to a particular institution 
or just anybody, to, for instance, supply credit for a car so that someone 
can make a living as a taxi driver, or to provide material for constructing a 
house, or a lap-top for the children’s education.
I want to reiterate that it is not my intention to be patronizing or con-
descending toward people’s efforts to solve their problems as best they 
can. Rather, the persistence of these practices—reflecting a political imag-
ery as much as historically habituated mechanism of problem-solving—
must intrinsically be understood through a structural perspective. As long 
as needs are still widespread, and universal access to welfare is hampered 
by continuous poverty and patchy state policies, these practices neces-
sarily reflect people’s attempts to find “a way in” and a last resort when 
other options are exhausted. Fundamentally, these practices are intimately 
interwoven into political culture across Latin America, reflecting particu-
lar patterns of post-colonial state formation in societies characterized by 





Thus, rather than dwelling on these practices per se, my interest here 
is to shed light on how these tensions between the historical templates 
of “state handouts” and the ethos of social justice through collective 
organization and broad social transformation were articulated. A case 
in point is the social discourses emerging after the launch of the public 
housing program Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela (grand Venezuelan 
housing mission), of which Abigayl and Ramón were beneficiaries. This 
mission was launched by Chávez in April 2011, spurred by the heavy 
torrential rains that fell in November 2010, leaving 130,000 homeless 
and killing 34 people. With the tragic landslide in the state of Vargas, 
which claimed perhaps as many as 30,000 lives in 1999, fresh in mind, 
the government pledged that everyone who was left homeless would 
be relocated to new and safe housing. When the mission was launched, 
everyone living in inadequate housing conditions was encouraged to 
apply for a new home. The government vowed to build 2 million new 
homes between 2011 and 2017, which was the estimated housing defi-
cit across Venezuela. This would be done through a concerted effort 
of the state, the private sectors and the communal councils, as well 
as the communes. More than 10 million people registered, supplying 
data on social and economic conditions, which would be the basis for 
an analysis on who was in fact eligible. By the end of November 2012, 
293,799 homes, apartments or houses, depending on location, had 
been constructed. The overall goal was set to 3 million homes by the 
end of 2019.
However, the housing mission generated two different discourses 
among social activists. On the one hand, it was conceptualized as a ques-
tion of social justice, and as the state’s fulfillment of its constitutional duties 
to ensure that all citizens had dignified and adequate living standards. On 
the other hand, it was framed as a state handout to passive, undeserving 
and demanding citizens that expected the state to resolve their problems. 
It was public belief that many people resorted to dirty tricks and maneu-
vers to get an apartment, and that once built, they complained about 
deficiencies and shortcomings. At the same time, stories were circulating 
about how the apartment buildings soon became worn-down as a result 
of the inhabitant’s “barrio habits” of throwing litter everywhere, letting 
the children do whatever they wanted without supervision and a general 
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lack of maintenance. As Oscar, the ideological activist from 23 de Enero, 
said on one occasion:
They give them a fully equipped apartment, and if there is a fork missing 
they complain. They give them an apartment and six months afterwards 
everything is in decay, they don’t appreciate it. Easy come, easy go.4 What is 
missing here is education, the values.
Adrian, Ramón’s brother, shared a similar view. He had just moved into his 
girlfriend’s apartment, in Fuerte Tiuna, which she had also gotten through 
Misión Vivienda. Adrian’s girlfriend had a child from a former relation-
ship and they were expecting a child together within the next couple of 
months. He was happy about his new living conditions, but complained 
about the neighbors’ behavior—all of whom had been assigned apartments 
through Misión Vivienda. “There are 8 apartments on each floor, and 6–7 
loudspeakers blasting. You don’t hear anything. The kids paint graffiti on 
the wall. The education starts at home, and that is the problem, the lack of 
education at home. I keep saying: ‘Coño, you left the rancho, left the mal 
vivir (bad living) for a buen vivir (good living). You have to change as well. 
People have moved to better homes, now you have to change values.’” On 
one occasion I was visiting one of the shelters that the government had set 
up for the dignificados5—those who had been evacuated from their homes 
during the 2010 rains. On the wall, there was a poster saying:
“GIVE ME A HOUSE” should be accompanied by “give me a life,” “give 
me a path,” “liberate me from the capitalist logic, let’s start to be human 
beings,” “let’s stop being wrecked merchandise desperately hanging on to 
the margins of consumer society.” Give me a house should mean “LET’S 
CONSTRUCT A NEW WORLD!”
This discourse about a lack of appreciation of what they had received and 
the need to change values was tied to a broader moral discourse about 
how people failed to respond to the call to becoming different kinds of 
citizens: collectively orientated, socially aware citizens, the New Men and 
Women we have previously referred to. Eduardo Piñate, a director in the 
administration of the Libertador Municipality, commented to me that:
What we generally are concerned with is a kind of popular participation that 
is more based in the political, that goes beyond the revindicative perspective, 
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right? Because the revindicative perspective is closely tied to an individualis-
tic thinking, and this is an ideological and cultural issue, right? So, our parish 
governments, all the assemblies and reunions with the parish government 
where I assist, and I can tell you that I go to at least ten a week … they are 
very permeated by this revindicative thinking, but in order to nuance this, I 
should also say that we have encountered an emerging growth of collective 
consciousness, solidarity, that is, every time we go the parish governments 
are discussing less individual problems and more collective problems.
mi negRa
The opposition frequently criticized the government for reckless spend-
ing of oil money on the social programs. However, in the electoral cam-
paign for the 2006 presidential elections, the opposition candidate Manual 
Rosales introduced a new twist to the notion of “my drop of oil” when 
he introduced a credit card called Mi Negra (my black woman) as his 
main electoral bait. Rosales promised that if he was elected, the credit 
card would be distributed to middle- and low-income households, with 
a monthly sum of 600,000 bolivares (approximately USD 280) for free 
spending, and with an additional 400,000 bolivares which could only be 
used to purchase food. The resources to fund this credit card would be 
drawn directly from the oil revenues, consuming approximately 20 percent 
of gross national revenues. In 2007, the minimum wage in Venezuela was 
approximately USD 250 per month. If Mi Negra had actually been imple-
mented, many people would have seen their income doubled over night.
The exact eligibility criteria for receiving the credit card were never clari-
fied. During the electoral campaign, Rosales’s people set up tents across 
the city where people could fill out the forms and obtain their cards, which 
Rosales promised would be activated once he was installed in the presidential 
office. The name of the card caused harsh reactions among many (see Duno-
Gottberg 2011). Literally, the term Mi Negra means “my black woman,” 
but the Rosales campaign insisted that it alluded to the black color of oil. 
However, many people insisted on the inherent racism in the word, as Mi 
Negra is also a folk expression that refers to a “black slave” or “black maid.”
As previously noted, Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuściński once wrote 
that:
oil creates the illusion of a completely free life, life without work, life for free 
… the concept of oil expresses perfectly the enteral human dream of wealth 
achieved through lucky accident …. In this sense oil is a fairy tale and like 
every fairy tale a bit of a lie. (Watts 2004:213)
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The credit card was evidently an attempt to tap into such a vein in the 
Venezuelan population, sublimating the relationship between the popu-
lace and the nation’s natural resources into hard cash and a care-free 
life. I was in Venezuela during the electoral race and the 2006 elections, 
and my impression was that the popular sector segments didn’t really 
take this electoral promise seriously. In the end, Rosales only received 
approximately 36 percent of the votes, evidencing that he was not able 
to tap into the popular sectors that were the main target for the Mi 
Negra campaign. There is a lot to say about why that was the case, but 
I wish to highlight three things. First, that the popular sector electorate 
recognized a promise of a “new river” when they saw it (referencing the 
adeco joke above), and were well aware of the fact that they were being 
tempted with “election candy.” Second, that they had been sufficiently 
politically formed throughout the last ten years or so to prefer the gov-
ernment’s model of collective rent distribution, and that, third, even 
the humblest shantytown dweller knew that such a measure would have 
catastrophic economic consequences.
Many community activists at the time commented that Rosales’s pro-
posal stood in stark contrast to the political ethos of the Bolivarian revo-
lution revolving around state-sponsored welfare. Indeed, it represented 
essentially, as one man said, a “capitalist proposal” (Strønen and Waerness 
2007) whereby each person could buy what he or she wanted on the mar-
ket place. However, he said, this was exactly the kind of (neoliberal) social 
model that had such detrimental effects on Venezuelan society in the past, 
and from which the Bolivarian process emerged as a counter-proposal 
espousing collective solutions to collective problems.
the Question of oil pathologies
In 2011, I did an interview with Santiago Arconada, a renowned popu-
lar intellectual from the community of Antimano, who has been involved 
in community organization and popular activism for decades. He drew a 
linkage between rentenist mentality and consumption, arguing that this 
was a way of thinking that was imprinted in the collective Venezuelan 
imaginary, and which would be very uneasily rooted out:
[Consumerism] is one of the largest deformations, distortions of the petro-
leum rent, I was enraged with my brother when I asked him epa, what’s 
up, what have you been doing, and he would answer “I, nothing, I buy 
everything ready-made.”
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There was a time when this answer became a sort of fashion, people 
perceived it as … they said it with the greatest pride … like being proud of 
being a person that produces nothing and as by magic receives a resource to 
buy everything in life ready-done, not to produce, to buy. This way of think-
ing, like a chip in our hard drive, continues to do us great harm….
I believe that we cannot … I have heard in the fields of health studies that 
a tumor that was developed over 20 years cannot be cured in three days, you 
can start the process of reversing the tumor but it is going to take the same 
time as it took to develop it … what I want to say is that we cannot retreat 
from 100 years of a culture of petroleum rents from one day to the other … 
what is also certain is that if we don’t start, we will never change … if the 
vision of that petroleum pays everything remains, that we will not be able to 
question the essential elements of our daily lives.
Arconada represents the ambivalence found among many popular ideo-
logues and organic intellectuals: wholeheartedly supporting social and 
political change away from elite rule and neoliberalism per se, but criti-
cally and cautiously observing how the Bolivarian process was unfolding.
As he pointed out, there are certain historical processes leading up 
to Chávez’s time in government that continued to hold great sway over 
social imaginaries and political life. Throughout the past two chapters, 
I have tried to tease out some of the frictions arising in the faultlines 
between Venezuela’s historical trajectory as an oil state and the ideological 
goals of the Bolivarian process. Notions of oil wealth and consumption 
loom large in these narratives, emphasizing how Venezuela’s turbulent 
and ambivalent relationship to its national patrimony is seen as having 
engendered both the potential for great personal and collective prosperity, 
as well as great harm.
Discourses of oil wealth and consumption, in Venezuela and elsewhere, 
draw on a host of contested notions over how oil wealth should be spent, 
how and by whom it should be distributed, and who is deserving of receiv-
ing a piece of the pie. Each of these questions are wrapped in complex 
economic, political, cultural and ideological schemes with global reach. 
However, as anthropological scholars of oil have emphasized, oil is in itself 
imbued with an imaginary power engendering valued-laden and morally 
ambivalent notions about “oil citizens” and “oil as a way of life” (Appel 
et  al. 2015:27–28). Within these schemes, the trope “oil pathologies,” 
whether it is used to characterize a country, a particular political regime 
or individuals benefiting from oil rents is frequently looming implicitly in 
the background.
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However, as a final comment I want to suggest that there is reason 
to be cautious when notions of “rentist citizens” and “oil patholo-
gies” are brought up, both in scholarly analysis and as articulated in 
“folk wisdom.” These are seductive templates that may be used and 
manipulated in ideological and class-biased discourses without making 
explicit underlying political assumptions or agendas. As the Venezuelan 
economist and oil analyst Carlos Mendoza Potellá maintains in the case 
of Venezuela:
The abusive use of the label “rentist” has served the supporters of oil expan-
sion [privatization] in a subordinated association with foreign oil capital 
in discrediting the Venezuelan struggle for ensuring a just distribution of 
wealth of national patrimony. (Flama 2011:39, interview)
Chávez’s critics repeatedly framed social spending for the poor as popu-
list oil-demagoguery. This position is also reflected in the scholarly lit-
erature (e.g., see Corrales and Penfold 2007; Penfold-Becerra 2007; 
Rodríguez 2007). However, these arguments often serve as barely 
concealed resistance against the very idea that the Venezuelan state 
should control and prioritize redistributing oil revenues toward its poor 
citizens. Concurrently, a narrow and one-sided focus on “rentist citi-
zens” or “assistentialist state policies” have the potential to deaden the 
broader problematic of historical and accumulated unequal distributions 
of wealth, and the question of how oil wealth actually can be redistrib-
uted. This has to be seen in relation to how accusations of the poor’s 
pathological welfare dependencies have deep roots in history (O’Connor 
2001), wielding strong justificative power for not redistributing wealth 
or providing poverty relief. However, as the author Norman Mailer has 
formulated it:
To blame the poor for subsisting on welfare has no justice unless we are also 
willing to judge every rich member of society by how productive he or she 
is. Taken individual by individual, it is likely that there’s more idleness and 
abuse of government favors among the economically privileged than among 
the ranks of the disadvantaged.6
As we have previously discussed, Venezuela’s well-off citizens commonly 
argue that they have become rich because of hard work, while the poor 
are poor because of laziness and sloth. However, in Venezuela and other 
countries with low social mobility, high socio-economic status is more 
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often than not a result of hereditary luck. And, we may add, an abundance 
of personal wealth is not infrequently a result of murky or exploitative 
business, or simply because of in-built structural and political mechanisms 
that distributes wealth upward rather than downward. It is therefore the 
poor, who necessarily are the ones in need of assistance from the state, 
who are often accused of displaying oil pathologies and state dependency. 
Thus, feeding into a broader discourse of dependencies, amoralities and 
cultures of poverty (Lewis 1966), the poor are in effect crucified twice: 
First for being poor, and, second, for being lifted out of poverty through 
state redistribution of wealth.
That is not to say that we should not critically examine how oil 
resources are spent and policies developed, or that we should abstain from 
critical analysis of how particular redistributive regimes are mediating and 
mediated by cultural and social relations. However, as I have sought to 
tease out through these chapters, we need to develop our analysis with 
a keen understanding of the complex interaction between historical and 
contemporary socio-cultural processes and political formations. In Chap. 
10, we will continue this explorative endeavor into yet another contested 
terrain, namely corruption. As I will show, corruption constituted yet 
another template that emerged in the context of moral discourses about 
how Venezuela had become destroyed from within during the Fourth 
Republic. At the same time, corruption gained salience in the context 
of community politics, engendering local struggles as well as making vis-
ible the plasticity of what constitutes “corruption” on different social and 
political arenas.
 notes
 1. These statistics are also derived from income-based measurements (INE 
n.d.).
 2. Some scholars have however questioned the impact of the Chávez govern-
ment’s social policy. For example, Ponce and Gonzáles (2015), from the 
neoliberal Venezuelan think tank CEDICE, argue that social spending had 
limited effect on structural poverty and that the poverty reduction that did 
take place was primarily an effect of the oil boom.
 3. Cestatickets are checks that can be used as payment in certain shops and 
restaurants. It is widely used in Venezuela as part of the salary in addition to 
the monetary payment.
 4. In Spanish: “Lo que nada cuesta, hagamos fiesta” [we make a party of what 
comes for free].
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 5. As a symbolic and political re-definition of the victims of the 1999 landslide, 
Chavez started to call those that had become homeless for dignificados (the 
dignified) instead of damnificados (the victims) (see Fassin and Vasquez 
2005). This term continues to be used.
 6. Thanks to my CMI colleague Elin Skaar for making me aware of this quota-
tion in just the right moment.
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Corruption is the mother of the crisis, of all the problems, it has extended 
to all levels like a cancer, to the lowest levels, it has taken on a thousand 
faces and a thousand ways of camouflaging itself … to wage a war against a 
monster with a thousand heads is a complex process, long and difficult … 
it is very difficult to get rid of all these anti-values that are immersed in all 
sector and all institutions. (Hugo Chávez, cited in Díaz, Eleazar R. (2006), 
author’s translation from Spanish)
Caracas, November 2012: I hadn’t seen Alfredo for a year and a half, when 
I went to visit him upon my return to Venezuela. The day before we had 
agreed to meet via SMS, and since I had visited that particular commu-
nity many times, I felt safe about going alone to his home, located in the 
middle of an established barrio community in 23 de Enero.
Alfredo was sitting in the living room waiting when I knocked on the 
door. It was close to Christmas, and a nacimiento—the cherished Venezuelan 
Christmas crib featuring Maria and Joseph in the manger with the newborn 
baby Jesus—was balancing on a shelf in the corner. Alfredo was one of the 
most dedicated believers in community work that I had met throughout 
the process. He had been involved in politics all his life, and had been 
central in organizing both the Health Commitee and the Land Commitee 
in his community ever since Chávez first came to power. In the past 
years, he had been vocero de finanza—finance committee spokesperson— 
in the communal council.
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Last time we spoke, he told me of the problems that he was having 
because a competing faction in the community had embarked on a cam-
paign of outmaneuvering Alfredo and his friends who, for a long time, had 
been central to community activism.
We started to chat, and I soon noticed that something was wrong. 
After a while he told me that he had resigned from his position as financial 
spokesperson. The other faction had smeared him, spreading rumors in 
the community that he was corrupt and that he hadn’t done the rendición 
de cuenta (present the balance sheets) to the community, even if that was a 
lie. They had also claimed that he hadn’t done any work in the communal 
council, which also was a lie, and the evidence was there for everyone to 
see—the work was visible there in the community, stairways, several new 
houses built and others reconstructed, and above all a huge project of 
drainage and reconstruction of a hillside on the outer slope of the com-
munity that put the houses on its edge at risk for landside. He got up and 
found his resignation letter for me to read. It was signed on June 6, 2011, 
two weeks after I last saw him. The letter stated that he resigned because 
of the campaign against his good name and honor, and the untruthful 
accusations against him and his work as the financial spokesperson. The 
letter was stamped with the communal council’s seal.
Every time I had visited Alfredo during the past years, he had showed 
me the accounting books for the communal councils—everything listed 
in orderly columns and accompanied by a folder of neatly stacked receipts 
and invoices documenting the purchases that the communal council had 
made. In spite of the two housing projects that he had helped develop, 
his house had not been rehabilitated—the poor and crumbling apart-
ment with humidity stains on the ceiling was certainly a testimony to that. 
Indeed, when he made a pot of coffee before we sat down to talk again, I 
realized that he didn’t even have a cup in his cupboard that wasn’t broken.
In spite of Alfredo’s trajectory as a long-term renowned community activist 
he had become more vulnerable to power plays after the last electoral round, 
when he was elected for the second time. In the former communal council 
he had been accompanied by several long-term friends and allies—all of them 
long-term activists in the community. But in the last elections the other fac-
tion had orchestrated to outmaneuver him, rushing the elections with the 
help of a promotor in Fundacomunal who according to Alfredo was involved 
in the “complot,” and adding new people to the electoral list from an area 
adjacent to the community—an area that, it was disputed, did not belong to 
the communal council. They had all voted for the other faction, probably 
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stimulated by sweet promises, and as a result, Alfredo’s long-term ally lost the 
election and was replaced by one of the people in the other faction.
After that, they had then made life difficult for him and smeared his name 
in the community. Eventually he couldn’t take it anymore, and resigned. 
Now, the others had taken over the communal council and carried out proj-
ects that he had been in charge of and raising money for, passing it off as their 
own work. Moreover, they were skimming off money, Alfredo maintained: 
“And they couldn’t have done that without accomplices in the Alcaldia and 
Fundacomunal. I have seen them here, visiting, and I ask myself what they 
are doing here … they are signing checks and papers and vaina (stuff).” 
And the copying machine and other items that the communal council had 
acquired for the common use of the community were long gone; quite con-
venient since the woman who headed the campaign against him, and now 
had a central position in the communal council, owned a local copying shop 
where they charged five bolivares per copy. Moreover, they were charging 
for writing out constancias de residencia (proof of residence) even if this was 
supposed to be free. “People say that I should take up the fight, but I won’t 
… Petra and Maria and the others feel intimidated (they were some of his 
allies in the community), and they have kids in the street.”
“But doesn’t the community care?” I asked. “They know what work you 
have done.” “Ahh you know what people are like,” he responded. “They 
sit at home and watch cable TV. They don’t want to get involved.” He got 
up and found another one of his folders, with photos of the different events 
and projects they had carried out. One after one, he placed them in front 
of me, explaining each one of them. Several photos were photocopied onto 
an A4 sheet, showing him at the meeting for a larger housing project that 
was implemented in the area. He pointed to some of the other people who 
appeared in the photos with him: “She got a house, and she got a house, 
and she got a house over in the Zona Central.” Another photo showed sev-
eral kids sitting in the street outside Alfredo’s apartment making paper kites. 
“We made paper kites with the kids and went over to the football camp to 
fly them … the kids still come to me and say Alfredo, Alfredo, when will 
we make paper kites again!!” “I am really sorry about all this, I know how 
dedicated you were,” I said, and I really meant it. “Well what can you do,” 
he responded and shrugged. “This is a part of the revolution as well … 
politics … but people shouldn’t do dirty politics. It harms the revolution.”
* * *
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This story of how the dynamics of a communal council were character-
ized by rumors and allegations of corruption was not unique. Such stories 
were structured through a discourse which converted corruption into, 
to slightly twist Durkheim’s concept, a social fact which people thought 
structured social life and people’s behavior. Community activism became 
a key site where broad notions of social solidarity, “fair play” and cor-
ruption became activated as people were struggling to navigate different 
ideological and moral terrains. Perhaps we could even say that community 
politics sometimes became condensed into a “micro-cosmos” reflecting 
the challenges of transforming Venezuelan society from within as political 
imageries of “self-seeking behavior” and “politics of greed” were mirrored 
in local-level struggles.
Indeed, the talk of corruption (Gupta 1995) was so widespread that I 
realized that not only was corruption a key tale about the state as such, but 
also a key tale about society. I constantly heard tales of how employees, 
both in private and in public positions, hospital workers, shop keepers and 
bank clerks skimmed off money here and there. Everyone “knew” that the 
hospitals in particular were out of equipment and medicine because the 
employees stole and resold them. It was often said that when the Chávez 
government bought new high-tech medical equipment for the public hos-
pitals, the doctors stole it and brought it to their own private hospitals 
only to then go to the press and say that the public hospitals were in a state 
of disarray. I heard innumerable tales of construction projects that were 
sucked dry along the way in an un-holy alliance between politicians, public 
functionaries and construction companies. Tales of shady business deals 
and the 10–15 percent “gratitude payment” for contracts. Tales about the 
notorious empresas maletin (suitcase businesses) that acquired contracts by 
“trafficking in influence” and then subcontracted the work, pocketing the 
difference. Rumors of how public servants, supposedly in relatively mod-
estly paid positions, suddenly acquired expensive houses, new cars, new 
boobs or new designer clothing. Rumors of high-level politicians that sud-
denly moved to the far east of the city and dined at expensive restaurants in 
Altamira, Prado del Este and Las Mercedes. And in the context of commu-
nity politics, rumors of members of communal councils that all of a sudden 
refashioned their homes with ceramic tiles and a new floor, or who all of a 
sudden purchased a new car or went for expensive holidays on the beach. 
People had a keen eye for what their neighbors did and bought, hence the 
proverb “no se ve la mano que roba pero sí la que gasta” [you don’t see the 
hand that steals but you see the hand that spends]. If  people spent outside 
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their “common pattern,” it was quickly discovered and talked about. In 
short, corruption was seen as an intrinsic part of life, as something that 
happened everywhere (yet I never spoke to anyone that admitted being 
part of it). It was by many considered almost a natural part of the human 
existence. Like one man said about corrupt politicians: “It has always been 
like that and it will always be like this.”
While recognizing that corruption was an intrinsic part of contemporary 
political life, the dominant Bolivarian narrative articulated that corruption 
was part of the bundle of vices that had been instilled in Venezuelan soci-
ety since long back. To change this pattern, formed part of the efforts to 
construct a new society, and, indeed, Che’s New Man.
In this chapter, I will go back in history and disentangle how corrup-
tion has emerged both as a social practice and as a meaning-saturated 
narrative in Venezuela. Subsequently, I will inquire into how the template 
of corruption was conceptualized within the Bolivarian discourse in the 
context of community politics, representing a key point of contention in 
attempts to negotiate new public and private moralities. Through these 
combined efforts, I aim to offer a “thick” corrective to the often simplified 
stereotypes of corrupt “Third World” countries, at the same time as the 
analysis may shed light on why, on a general level, “corrupt practices” are 
so uneasily reversed.
Anthropologies of Corruption
Initially, I had little interest in the issue of “corruption.” However, I 
gradually realized that I could not leave it out of my analysis. Rather, 
as for most anthropologists, it imposed itself “because it matters to our 
informants and because of the prevalence of ‘corruption’ talk in the areas 
where we conduct fieldwork” (Haller and Shore 2005:6). In recent years, 
there has been a growing body of anthropology literature critically exam-
ining scholarly as well as popular usage of the concept of corruption. As 
a means to counter the notion that corruption is only something that 
is taking place among Third World “others,” significant attention has 
been paid to corruption in Western domains, including the Enron scandal 
(MacLennan 2005) the EU commission (Shore 2005) and Italy (Pardo 
2004).
Haller and Shore have suggested that “corruption merits more anthro-
pological attention simply because of its inexplicable pervasiveness and the 
curious fascination that people, in almost every part of the world, seem to 
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have with stories of corruption” (Haller and Shore 2005:8). However, the 
fact that anthropology hasn’t included the concept of “corruption” in its 
disciplinary vocabulary until recently doesn’t mean that anthropologists 
haven’t previously observed “it” in our field. But rather than labeling it 
“corruption,” we have resorted to concepts from our historical disciplinary 
tool box—gift-giving and gift-exchange, networks and kinships, solidarity, 
reciprocity, relationships of power and moral economies—in an attempt to 
capture how these forms of exchanges are interwoven in social, political 
and economic life. More recently, anthropologists have sought to show 
how corruption is also the legitimate child of the colonial administration. 
The imposition of a colonial apparatus fostered parallel moral economies 
intertwining “imposed” Western concepts of rational bureaucracy with 
localized notions of kinship, exchange, reciprocity and solidarity (Pierce 
2006). Corruption may then be viewed as a hybrid child of different sets 
of economic logics, social moralities and relationships of power.
These perspectives, grounded in “solid” anthropology, continue to 
inform much of the thinking around the topic. Thus, anthropological 
accounts of corruption tend to highlight its historical and cultural context 
(Prato 2004:80, cited in Pardo 2004) as well as how it is interwoven with 
a broader realm of local social and political practices. Significantly, anthro-
pological approaches to corruption tend to problematize the private–pub-
lic divide that orthodox notions of corruption take for granted (and hinge 
on) by showing how these distinctions are inherently difficult to draw, 
even in “Western societies” (Haller and Shore 2005:5). As Pardo notes,
corruption and its causes must be understood in the context of the inher-
ently difficult relationship between politics, bureaucracy, law and civil society 
which, in distinctively different ways, mark both Western and non-Western 
states. (Pardo 2004:10)
The fact that exchanges between differently situated actors have always 
existed in all societies without necessarily being labeled “corruption,” 
indicates that “corruption” can also be understood as part of the global 
discourse of modernity interlinked with the diffusion of Western notions 
of state formation and state–society relations. At the same time, societies 
still have significant divergent conceptions of what constitutes corruption, 
illustrating the inherent problematic of adhering to a universal definition 
of what corruption is. Blat (gift-giving) in the post-Soviet countries and 
guanxi (networking) in China (Haller and Shore 2005:17) are examples 
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of culture-specific social practices that would be termed “corruption” 
elsewhere.
In one of the, by now classic, anthropological contributions on cor-
ruption, Gupta explores how corruption is talked about in the village of 
Alipur in India. The topic was central to everyday conversations among 
the villagers, revolving around everything from “the going price” of a ser-
vice or a loan, to who in the bureaucracy was most likely to lend a “helping 
hand.” In his analysis, Gupta focuses on how the state comes to be imag-
ined through these everyday conversations: “The discourse of corruption 
turns out to be a key arena through which the state, citizens and other 
organizations and aggregations come to be imagined” (Gupta 1995:212). 
This is an approach that has been widely recognized and applied in subse-
quent studies (Lazar 2008).
However, “corruption” can be widely protested and contested even 
in societies where it is seen as “normal.” “The talk of corruption” often 
constitutes a profound critique of social hierarchies and power. Our task 
is to capture what this critique can tell us about how people interpret 
and conceptualize their society, both in its actual institutional and politi-
cal form as well as in the domain of norms and values. That is not to say 
that corruption should be romanticized in the name of cultural relativ-
ism. Corruption has a range of negative effects upon society, like “inflated 
contracts, distorted development priorities, increased exploitation and 
inequality and heightened uncertainty” (Haller and Shore 2005:7), in 
addition to undermining democracy and the rule of law (Haller and Shore 
2005:7). Moreover, it is the poor who are most affected by these distor-
tions. As Pardo notes:
Corrupt relations draw on an interaction between power (and its asymme-
tries) and its expedient (dishonest, self-serving, and so on) or incompetent 
exercise, whereby the misuse of power breeds power and feeds on it. (Pardo 
2004:12)
These hierarchical relationships, where corrupt transactions are often tak-
ing place, put the poor in a vulnerable position as they seek to have their 
needs and interests covered. At the same time, it has been argued that 
mechanisms of corruption serve to fill a gap and provide an opening for 
the under-privileged in the face of discordant state formations. As claims 
to the state cannot be made on the basis of universally ascribed rights, the 
poor can enter by paying—to a certain extent leveling the field slightly. 
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Pragmatically speaking, that may be true, but it does not come without a 
cost. Not only does the “practice of paying” effectively reproduce itself, 
creating a systematic disadvantage for those who simply cannot pay and 
creating a constant scramble for resources for those who can barely pay, 
but it also continues to privilege those in power, thus perpetuating unequal 
relations of power. As Pardo notes:
Corruption at once draws and thrives on injustice, exploitation of inequality, 
distortions of power and betrayal of fundamental principles of citizenship, 
for those that do not have access to, or refuse to engage in corruption are at 
a disadvantage. (Pardo 2004:11)
Moreover, as Zinn (2005) notes with reference to Schneider: “Those who 
are in a subaltern class position more often bear the stigma of label associ-
ated to corruption; whereas business and political elites can make use of 
connection capital” (Zinn 2005:239). Corruption may be a “weapon of 
the weak” (Scott 1985) in a given situation, but the greatest benefits are 
always reaped by those in power.
A history of stAbilized Corruption
In Bolivarian political discourse, corruption was one of the key con-
cepts through which the differences between the past governments of 
the Fourth Republic and the Chávez government were mediated and 
contrasted. Indeed, one of Chávez’s main “war cries” against the old 
system—which contributed to his electoral success in 1998—was that the 
governments of the Fourth Republic were both morally and economically 
corrupt. The tale of the corruption of the Fourth Republic within the 
Bolivarian sphere was tied to a broader discourse of social decay, political 
illegitimacy and treason against el pueblo. The descarado (shameless) man-
ner in which corruption was carried out was taken as evidence that society 
was morally and politically bankrupt. Carlos Andrés Pérez’s fame for cor-
ruption served as a moral and legitimizing justification for the attempted 
coup against him in 1992, underwriting the notion that Venezuela had to 
be redeemed from within.
In order to understand the depth of this narrative, it is necessary to go 
back in Venezuelan history and tease out the role of corruption in forming 
both political practices and political imaginaries. Private wealth accumu-
lation through coercion and opportunity run as a thin red line through 
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Venezuelan history, ever since the first colonizers established themselves 
on Venezuelan soil. As the renowned Venezuelan historian Luis Britto 
García (2013) writes:
Corruption in Venezuela has historical roots. Perhaps a mode of production 
is nothing else than a mode of stabilized corruption. The conquest was a 
colossal looting operation, appropriating goods and common work by force 
to the benefit of a vile minority. In the colonial caste society positions were 
[bought and] sold, and their discriminatory stratification was prolonged 
throughout the Republic, leaving as the principal means of social climbing 
that of quick riches. The Oligarchic Republic and other systems maintained 
this unequal distribution of wealth stemming from racketeering. With the 
irruption of the oil and mineral economy, the assets and public incomes 
exceed that of the private economy, and a collection of new rich and new 
corrupts [emerges from] trafficking in concessions and from milking the 
State. (Britto García 2013, author’s translation from Spanish)
As Britto Garcia eloquently teases out, illegitimate enrichment by force 
constituted the very foundations for the establishment of Venezuelan 
political and economic structures through the colonial era. In the after-
math of the Wars of Independence, political and economic positions con-
tinued to be traded through the prerogative of force and cunningness. 
When the oil economy gained pace in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century, entrenched social inequalities dominated by political casts and 
networks became irrigated and solidified by the new possibilities for rent- 
seeking that they engendered. The collusion, meddling and horse-trading 
taking place between an emerging cast of oil professionals, the govern-
ment and foreign private oil companies created a shady world of business 
deals and private and sectorial rent capturing.
the dArk side of the boom
I have previously discussed the extravagance and opulence that character-
ized the first government of Carlos Andrés Pérez during the oil boom 
in the 1970s. The epoch also created a nexus between immorality and 
 corruption: a public imagery that was projected and diffused from the 
heights of power.
To a certain extent, state spending had been kept in check during the 
1960s because of the limited amount of wealth in state coffers (Coronil 
1997:5). However, as the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez embarked 
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on a massive spending spree, corruption, at a systematic and endemic 
scale, became the new norm for political casts. Oil rents washed through 
the system, grandiose development projects and state policies were put in 
motion without any checks and balances, and Pérez himself created net-
works of close friends and allies through strategic trading of political and 
economic assets.
Several political scandals were exposed to the public, revealing dark 
connections between political and financial elites, corruption and crimi-
nal activities. The boundaries between legal economic activities and cor-
rupt or criminal activities became blurred, and the protagonists of this 
economy reappeared with a new public face, flaunting their quasi-legal or 
illegal riches in the public without shame or remorse.
During the oil boom, criminality established its claim as a normal form 
of sociality. Its ideals were brought out into the open. Its heroes left the 
clandestine world and proudly paraded in public places, making deals in 
restaurants, broadcasting their accomplishments in private clubs, flaunting 
their loots everywhere, seeking the company of society’s notables. (Coronil 
1997:360)
The emergence of the imagery of the new, ruthless actor in the economic 
realm also shifted the normative definition of behavior in other spheres:
The notion of the responsible citizen paled before that of the independent 
individual, a person free from social constraints. To be someone, one had 
to be clever, daring, and rich; and to be rich, one had to have the power 
to stand outside the law and above social constraints. (Coronil 1997:360)
Venezuelans had always had an ambivalent relationship with oil, but now 
oil came to be seen “as the dark inside of nature and as the vicious lubricant 
of all transactions in Venezuelan society” (Coronil 1997:353). Petroleum 
came to be primarily seen as money, imbued with an innate “corrupting 
force”—what Simmel once called “the complete heartlessness of money” 
(Coronil 1997:353).
The processes of liberalization and privatization in the 1980s and 1990s 
made ample room for shady and criminal businesses, making well-placed 
individuals in politics and business perversely rich. It has been estimated 
that by 1990, wealthy Venezuelans had stashed away the equivalent, or 
more, of the nation’s external debt in dollars overseas (Derham 2010:8). 
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This culture of private rent-seeking by illegitimate means circumscribed 
not only the upper echelons of political and economic circles, but also 
state bureaucracy itself. Indeed, within the bureaucratic culture you 
were allegedly considered “stupid” if you didn’t use the opportunities to 
enrich yourself. Tellingly, Gonzalo Barrios, a leading politician, and two- 
time minister for Acción Democrática, once famously remarked that “in 
Venezuela, there are no reasons for not stealing.” A number of proverbs 
surged from this “public secret.” One of the most famous proverbs, still 
frequently cited today, is: “No me des, ponme donde hay” [don’t give 
me, just put me where there is]. This meant that one wants a position 
from where one can amass and accumulate private wealth. Another one is: 
“Cuanto hay pa´eso?” [How much is there for this?], in the sense that a 
public functionary might, for example, blatantly ask how much you offer 
for a “service.” A third example is “con los adecos se vive mejor, porque 
roban y dejan robar,”1 [with the adecos one is better off, they steal and 
let others steal as well]. Indeed, in 1984, the Venezuelan historian and 
journalist Carlos Capriles Ayalaco co-authored a book series in three vol-
umes entitled Diccionario de la Corrupción en Venezuela (the Dictionary 
of Corruption in Venezuela) listing known cases of corruption.
the ClAss dimension of the rule of lAw
An important characteristic of Latin American societies is that the rule 
of law is differently dispatched according to class. Commonly, the elites 
perceive themselves as “above the law,” as epitomized by the classic phrase 
“do you know who you are talking to” (Gledhill 2004:167). This feature 
can be traced back to the ways in which institutions and principles from 
the Old World were incorporated into the existing and evolving socio- 
political body during colonial times. As Wiarda notes:
In the New World, classes and castes were strictly segregated; justice was 
similarly dispensed on a sectorial and not an egalitarian basis. When men 
talked of “rights” they were not referring to any abstract Lockean “natural” 
or individual rights but rather seeking to guarantee and frequently enhance 
the “fueros” or special privileges that were inherently theirs because of their 
or their group’s place and status in the society. (Wiarda 1971:440)
Thus, “the rule of law,” as well as the enactment of rights and duties, 
was not universally applied, but rather “strategically” used according to 
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accumulated power and privileges. As Gledhill notes with reference to 
DaMatta, the implementation of liberal constitutions in the continent, 
with its emphasis on equality before the law, actually served to perpetuate 
inequalities. The powerful were above the law anyway, as they could draw 
on their social connections and status. The poor on the other hand were 
those who would feel the force of the law if they transgressed it (Gledhill 
2004:166).
This historical conceptualization of the rule of law in the public domain 
is helpful for illuminating Bolivarian narratives about elite relationships, 
the political system and corruption in the Fourth Republic. Intrinsically, 
these are tied to a broader notion of inequality and injustice, whereby the 
rich historically got away with “anything.” As Gonzalo Barrios, the lead-
ing Acción Democratíca politician and two-time minister quoted above 
once said: “What is stolen remains stolen, as long as it is sufficient to pay 
off judges and lawyers” (Díaz, Eleazar R. 2006, author’s translation from 
Spanish). In other words, corruption has historically been considered a 
“class privilege,” both by those who took advantage of this privilege, and 
those who witnessed it from the outside.
VenezuelAn personhood And the origins of ViVeza
What is going on here is a slow, dramatic and desperate effort of a society 
to assume itself, in a territory and within habits and codes that don’t cor-
respond to them, nor expresses them, and occasionally, don’t even make 
sense to them. (Cabrujas 1996 [1995], author’s translation from Spanish)
It was José Ignacio Cabrujas, one of Venezuela’s greatest playwrights, 
writer, actor and public intellectual, who uttered these words. Working 
between reality and fiction his whole life, Cabrujas tried to penetrate the 
innermost soul of Venezuela. Without mercy he pointed to the weak spots 
of the nation, exposing vanity, self-delusion and self-deceit in a forgiving 
yet unsparing manner that only an insider can get away with.
The quotation is from one of his latest speeches, 11 months before he 
died in October 1995. At an event entitled La Cultura de Trabajo (the 
culture of labor) in the theater Ateneo de Caracas, Cabrujas gave a merci-
less verdict on what he considered to be Venezuelan culture, work ethic 
and national essence. His conclusion was quite gloomy, as the quotation 
illustrates. He maintained that Venezuela lacked an autochthonous culture 
and a vision for the future. The historical process of colonialism, of trying 
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to adapt to, and mimic, all things foreign had deprived Venezuela of an 
inner self, of an integrated core, he argued.
Venezuela hasn’t been inaugurated, and her capital Caracas neither. It is 
a city without a vision, without memories, with nothing particular to her, 
it is a temporary project. The whole of Venezuela is a temporary project 
and besides it has the culture of a temporary project.2 Here we have always 
been confronted with the dilemma that what we are, what occurs to us, 
our behavior, our historical self doesn’t correspond with our books, with 
our verbs, with our words, with our institutions, with our laws and codes. 
There is an enormous difference between reality and the fixation of a cul-
tural framework in the country. The laws that we have are not ours, it is a lie 
that the Criminal Code castigates crime, commerce in Venezuela has noth-
ing to do with the Code of Commerce, it is a lie, above all that the constitu-
tion expresses the project of a nation, her innermost desires. (Cabrujas 1996 
[1995], author’s translation from Spanish)
Cabrujas maintains that what prevailed is the victory of opportunism, of 
the celebration of la viveza, a word derived from the term vida (life) “and 
we managed to confuse it with viveza, we think that being alive is to do 
mischief, to say that a person is viva, vivo (alive) because they are plotting 
something, they are up to something.”
In his speech, Cabrujas held high the image of Bolívar, the visionary, the 
sublime man, true to his dreams and aspirations, uncompromising and mor-
ally uncompromised. For Venezuelans, Bolívar has become a paradigm, an 
enigma, their only bond to the sublime and the elevated. But paradoxically, 
Bolívar wasn’t really a Venezuelan, Cabrujas said. The real Venezuelan is 
the villain in the story: General José Antonio Paez, who betrayed Bolívar 
and betrayed Gran Colombia. Paez: “the cunning, the astute, the medio-
cre, he who was incapable of pondering a dream.” Cabrujas quoted a letter 
that was sent to Paez from the country’s merchants at the time, saying that 
“[This] is a Venezuelan letter, completely.” It read like this: “Esteemed 
General Paez, it seems to us that the project of General Bolívar is incom-
patible. We have struggled selflessly for overcoming the Spanish colony, the 
Spanish power, we have been killed in the battle fields in order not to have 
to pay taxes to the Spaniards, and what, are we now going to pay taxes to 
the Colombians? No.” Then writes Cabrujas:
This is the reason why a sublime dream collapsed, because all the merchants 
of Venezuela decided that paying taxes to the government of Santa Fe de 
Bogota was a crime and something anti-Venezuelan.
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And he continues:
This is the point where the sublime stays behind and the cunningness starts, 
the astuteness, against the Bolívar of the past, the complex dream, distilled, 
difficult, from the enterprise of enormous magnitude, emerges the trap, the 
sideways, the by way of, the meandering, the manner of coming, of not los-
ing … this is a big part of our history.
Cabrujas’s speech has more historical un-packing and sophisticated 
nuances than I can cover here. It is also so culturally rich and subtle that 
numerous interpretations can be drawn from it. However, I wanted to 
quote him here because he manages to indicate the deep-seated and com-
plex template of viveza, or what is called la viveza criolla in several Latin 
American countries, or in the case of Brazil, jeitinho.
The concept denotes a form of cunningness and calculated astuteness 
that forms part of the Latin American imagery of collective personhoods 
and social arrangements. “First we invent the trampa (the trick, trap) 
and then the law, with enough cracks to allow us to go through with 
la trampa,” said Ezequiel Martínez Estrada, Argentinian intellectual and 
author (La Nueva 2010, author’s translation from Spanish). It describes 
the socialization of an individualized and shameless anything-goes behav-
ior, whereby only a fool obeys the rules.
In Venezuela, the concept encapsulates everything from corruption 
to shady or semi-legal rebusques (inventive ways of making quick money 
or earn an extra income), jumping ahead in the bus line, pushing one’s 
way through by force in a traffic jam, refusing to offer prioritized seating 
to elderly and pregnant people on the metro, a general lack of respect 
for others and any kind of self-seeking behavior. It could also be used to 
denounce politicians or career climbers, or anyone who seek to get ahead 
through cunningness and foul play.
In colloquial speech it is often used when someone tries to be clever 
or trick themselves out of (or into) something, as in no seas vivo/a (don’t 
be inventive/don’t be mischievous). While it is commonly referred to as a 
negative trait, it is also at times ambiguously interpreted as a positive trait 
symbolizing the ability to survive in a difficult environment, a “talent for 
life,” and, to a certain extent, social success. Sometimes, you would hear 
people practically boast about their capacity to enrich themselves through 
petty corruption or favorable rebusques. Among some, it seemed to be 
considered a sign of masculinity.
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Thus, viveza represents a dense social signifier, which ambivalently and 
depending on context describes both a negative trait and an ability to 
get ahead, to not be left dumfounded and outmaneuvered by others who 
are more agile. Because of this ambivalence, it also reduced the effect of 
shame as a social control mechanism, as well as undermining social trust. 
Correspondingly, viveza is considered to fuel and amplify corruption and 
dishonest practices because it creates an attitude of “if I do not do it, 
someone else will do it,” or, “why cannot I do it if everyone else does it.”
I want to emphasize that these social templates and practices imbued 
in the concept of “viveza,” should not be read as a “proof” of individual 
or collective pathologies. Such discussions always actualize the question of 
politics of representations, not least in the context of poverty and inequal-
ity (Bourgois 2003:11–18). However, what I want to illuminate with this 
section is how the concept of viveza forms part of a broader social narra-
tive about norms and values steering political and social life, crafting both 
individual and collective identities. In Bolivarian discourse, it emerged as 
part of a discourse advocating for the refoundation of society through 
fostering new individual moralities—epitomized by the imagery of Che’s 
New Man—through collective organization and critical consciousness. 
Together with other templates, such as individualism, consumption, greed 
and lack of values, viveza was part of a story of not only economic corrup-
tion, but also social corruption in the sense lack of solidarity, decency, hon-
esty and fair play. As I have sought to show throughout the past chapters, 
these narratives about today’s moral decomposition were framed as the 
outcome of the Punto Fijo regimes’ blatant amorality, and capitalism’s—
and later neoliberalism’s—erosion of the social fabric and public morals.
reVersing And Contesting the morAl Crisis
Coronil argues that corruption forms part of a broader array of social dis-
orders emerging from the thwarted form of capitalist development taking 
place in the Latin American continent:
“Corruption,” a word that condenses multiple meanings related to the self- 
seeking violation of public norms—from idleness on the job to clientelism 
and nepotism, from petty theft to blackmail and murder—has become an 
endemic structural phenomenon widely accepted as an inevitable part of 
everyday normality. (Coronil 2011:39)
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However, even though it has become part of everyday life people haven’t 
stopped hoping for something else:
But this economic and moral crisis far from extinguishing it, has rekindled 
the hope that someone, or something, will offer a solution to our social 
fragmentation and establish a sense of collective well-being. The turn to the 
Left has been an expression of this hope. (Coronil 2011:39)
In Venezuela, the Bolivarian revolution was cast as that “someone, or 
something” that could transform Venezuelan society into a kinder, more 
orderly state of being. People put their hopes not only on the fact that 
the Bolivarian state could promote a new mode of state culture, but 
also on the fact that the process intrinsically would change people “from 
within”—their hearts and minds—so that a new social order could take 
shape. As a social activist writes on the activist forum www.apporea.org:
It cannot be denied that our revolutionary process is full of acts of corrup-
tion … but they are fruit of the immaturity of the revolutions, that is, in our 
ranks there is a diversity of human beings: those who are supporting the 
process but don’t trust it. Those who are participating in order to satisfy 
their economic interests. Those who have political interests …. There are 
those who dress in red but who are white and green on the inside. And there 
are those who put their mind, heart and life into the revolutionary process. 
(Díaz 2009, author’s translation from Spanish)
The dominant political narrative about how this “social disease” has gained 
foothold focuses on Venezuelan state formation since colonial times and 
on the fraudulent rule of the Fourth Republic. It is useful to consider 
Oscar’s words, which illustrate the direct linkages drawn between his-
torical trajectories and the contemporary challenges within the Bolivarian 
process:
OSCAR:  What is happening is that … since our process of indepen-
dence, those struggles were accompanied by dealing out land, 
by control over houses … all the wars that were taking place 
during the independence period in the 1880 and up till today 
… the important military figures among the ruling casts, who 
had the weapons, start to get engaged in these economic rela-
tions as well, in trading with the European countries, a form 
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of slavery, because this doesn’t come in the genes, I mean, 
they have told us that we are corrupt, because this is normal 
and common. But no, this comes from a concept of class, that 
there are some people who need to have more and more in 
order to be well, and for that they have to screw up others. 
And you see, this government hasn’t gotten rid of this. It is 
like the adecos used to say: “Ponme donde hay.”
ISELIN: Ponme donde hay?
OSCAR: Yes, that was the adecos.
ISELIN: What does that mean?
OSCAR: It means like “where are the resources” or “where is the 
money,” it was like a saying among the adecos, “find me a 
place where there is, don’t pay me,” because if I am in a posi-
tion to manage a budget in a municipality or a budget for 
whatever, I use this position to charge my 10 percent, my 
15 percent, or through some scam I build up some grand 
business and tentacles. And in effect, things haven’t changed. 
Look, all the director or sub directors of whichever ministry, 
whichever state institution, has chauffeurs, has a paid mobile 
phone, has a great car, has a salary, and through this he has 
the dispositions, or like, the resources that give him power, 
that give him decision-making power, and many people affili-
ate with him in order to, well, to get a small contract, and 
this is corrupting our communities, our communities don’t 
escape this. Today, in the communal councils, there are fights 
and disputes because people owe money or because people 
make some business and don’t pass on all the money to the 
community that they really received.
In Oscar’s formulation, one recognizes the often repeated narrative of 
how the historical heritage of corrupted state practices and “privileges” 
attached to public office had also permeated the Bolivarian process, while 
at the same time bringing the communities into the realms of corrup-
tion. In the past, poor communities were generally not accustomed to 
wealth. To the extent that “contentious” money did trickle down, it was 
through spoils in the form of clientelist networks, populist-style hand-
outs and small-scale corruption. However, this “scrambling for spoils” was 
seen as having been installed into people, and now that more wealth was 
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available, rent-seeking practices became reinforced. As Miche, one of the 
promotores in Fundacomunal worded it:
MICHE: The weaknesses, well, we all know what they are, here in 
Venezuela there aren’t other people than the very Venezuelans, 
who have been here for 40, 50 years, and, at the end of the 
day, we are dragging along with us the same vices that have 
existed for 40, 50 years here … it’s not like people from Mars 
have arrived to organize us. Why am I saying this? Because 
the same people who are now in the communal councils are 
the same people who were with the adecos, with the copeya-
nos, with Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), which I am say-
ing with quotation marks…
ISELIN: The people in…?
MICHE: The people in the communal councils. Because the major-
ity of the people involved are older people, 40, 50 years, or 
that is like the average, there is a low degree of participation 
among the youth, and that is why they are dragging along 
with them the same vices from 40 years ago, and as there are 
now resources available el gusanito de la corrupción (the worm 
of corruption) is eating them and they are always looking for 
ways to skim off funds or get into corruption, well, here I 
mean corruption not only in the manner of stealing money 
but also in the sense of helping someone you know more than 
someone you don’t know, all this kind of human misery…
In the section above we discussed how the template of viveza encapsulates 
a particular form of social cunningness also engendering corrupt practices. 
People often attributed to other people a remarkable capacity of  inventing 
trampas (tricks) to win a struggle or to get their hands on money, a fea-
ture of community politics that frequently generated tensions within the 
communities. These conflicts often played out between competing frac-
tions with different “interests” and often different ideological reasons 
for partaking. The following case study about a long-term conflict in a 
communal council serves to illustrate how these processes played out in 
practice. It shows how the collusion between corrupted state officials and 
local struggles for power translated into a prolonged process whereby the 
community was negotiating what kind of moralities should guide com-
munity organization.
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negotiAting morAlities
This communal council had been involved in a conflict over power and 
resources dating back to a housing project developed by the foregoing 
members of the council that had now been replaced with new members 
after elections took place in 2011. The initial project had been developed 
through a meticulous process conducted by the committee for housing and 
infrastructure, who had been mapping out the needs and deficiencies of all 
the houses on the street. Based on that investigation, a prioritized list was 
elaborated and handed to the Fundacomunal, which eventually approved 
the project. However, at that point, something happened. From what I 
gathered based on my long-time interaction with this particular commu-
nal council, a member of the community who worked in Fundacomunal 
“conspired” with the heads of the finance committee who had the author-
ity to release the funds from the banking account, and changed the list of 
beneficiaries. That move was discovered by another member of the com-
munity who also worked in Fundacomunal, who in turn contacted a per-
son she knew in Safonaac, the institution directly in charge of depositing 
project funds into the accounts of the communal councils, once the proj-
ects were approved by Fundacomunal. However, by the time that account 
was frozen, some members of the community, allied with those in the 
finance committee, had already withdrawn their checks.
The project was then stalled, and the communal council that had been 
responsible for the project ended its term. Thus, it was up to the sub-
sequent communal council, which was elected at great pains as people 
in the community had become cynical as to what the matter was really 
about, to get the project up and going again. The finance committee of 
the former communal council “disappeared,” refusing to meet up and 
present its financial statements to the community. Eventually, after a lot of 
back and forth with Fundacomunal over whether the bank account could 
be opened again, the new communal council was promised that it could 
go on with the project if a community consensus was reached over who 
would benefit from the initiative and if the money was spent according to 
plans. This brought tension to the community as the communal council 
was, after the new elections, divided between two factions that had con-
trol over the project and over the key positions in charge of overseeing 
accounts and releasing funds. After a series of heated community meet-
ings, the last part of the discussions took place behind closed doors, in a 
meeting attended by voceros of the communal councils (where I was also 
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allowed to be present) during which members reached an agreement on 
those that would benefit from the project. These allocations were first and 
foremost based on the census of documented needs, though it seemed as if 
some horse-trading was also taking place over who, among the friends and 
allies of those present, was needy enough or deserving of being included 
on the list. At the subsequent community assembly meeting, when the list 
and the planned proceedings for releasing funds were announced, for the 
most part, people embraced this community “truce.” At the meeting it 
was made clear that it would no longer be allowed to hand out personal 
checks to house owners, as had happened before. Now, the house own-
ers had to elaborate a budget with a hardware store, and a check would 
be written out to the store so as to eliminate the possibility of people 
directly accessing the funds. In the meeting however, some people, and 
one woman in particular, were disputing this new practice, arguing that it 
was nobody’s business if they actually repaired their kitchen or their living 
room with the money they received. The woman thus proposed that the 
checks be written out to individuals instead of to the hardware store. The 
argument was obviously not completely coherent—she could have gone 
to the hardware store and worked out the budget herself. But as Teresa, 
one of my contacts in the communal council commented afterward: “She 
just wanted to have her hands on the check; that is what she wanted.” 
Thus, what took place was a subtle negotiation over the manner in which 
the legal procedures of the communal council were to be carried out—a 
subtext that everyone, including this researcher, understood.
the Corrupt stAte
In the context of community politics, I often heard rumors or tales of 
how public functionaries “lured” people into corruption through entic-
ing them into “deals” or promising some form of “help,” thereby making 
people in the communities accomplices in scams that were, above all, an 
expression of ingrained dishonest practices of the state body. Miriam, for 
example, was utterly enraged by some of her co-workers who allegedly 
engineered such scams, considering it deeply immoral and threatening to 
the Bolivarian process:
I don’t mingle with crooks; if you stole a check from a communal council 
you have to assume your shit, because you cannot steal money from the 
communal council, you cannot steal from el pueblo, steal from the rich but 
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not from el pueblo. And you stole money from someone poor, and that is 
against the principles of the revolution and also against the principles of 
God, you see? You can have all the problems in the world, but you cannot 
take something that isn’t yours, you cannot take as much as a bolivar from a 
communal council you see? That is like stealing candy from a child.
As we learned in Chap. 7, Miriam was deeply concerned with how the 
institutions were directed by people who seemed to be more concerned 
with their own interests rather than with attending to the communal 
councils and nursing popular power by displaying a revolutionary moral. 
For her, petty corruption by public officers was evidence of how the vices 
of the Fourth Republic continued to hold sway over public institutions. 
However, she also perceived people in the communities as vivos, as the fol-
lowing quote, formulated in her usual straightforward manner, indicates:
What happened before was that the communal councils were formed 
because … people were going to take the money, they didn’t participate 
with the intention that our Comandante wanted, to organize themselves, 
to help the communities, they just meddled their way in so they could take 
the candy or the money that the president was giving for the communities.
It should be noted that what Miriam said here is in no way descriptive 
of all communal councils, something she also emphasizes later in the 
 interview. However, this dynamic was believed to be widespread in the 
first years of the communal councils. Many community members went 
to public institutions to denounce their fellow neighbors who had stolen 
common money, but to no avail as the judicial status of the communal 
council members and their public prosecution were not contemplated in 
the law. This was deeply concerning for lawmakers,3 which is why the 2009 
reform of the law for the communal councils provided for the prosecution 
of communal council members who embezzled funds. The law also dic-
tated that family members, up to fourth-degree consanguinity, could not 
occupy main seats in the communal councils at the same time, preventing 
them from becoming a “society of accomplices.”4
The initial penetration of corruption in the communal councils was 
facilitated by the fact that this model of community organization was not 
yet known or understood by all members of the community. This gave 
ample leeway for some “inventive” individuals to steer the process as it 
pleased them. As public outcry over neighbors who were stealing “the 
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community’s money” grew, and people became more and more aware of 
what the communal councils consisted of (and the social gains they could 
bring), the community’s “panopticon” was increasingly activated. People 
seemed to believe that major cases of corruption within the communal 
councils decreased after the first few years of their functioning, though 
rumors of “cuts” here and there were always widespread. But as Lazar 
(2008) also notes for community organizations in Bolivia, “minor com-
pensations” are often socially accepted as long as they are not too much. 
Members of the community recognized that voceros couldn’t work for 
free, but the ambiguities of what constituted corruption or not, and the 
ethos of voluntary work inscribed in the formal design of the communal 
councils, made it a contentious topic as to where the compensation should 
be drawn from and how much.
For example, once I visited a communal council that was in the pro-
cess of constructing and rehabilitating several houses in its community. 
I had traveled with Gerardo, a promotor integral from Fundacomunal, 
up to the highest hills of La Silsa, next to 23 de Enero. We spent the 
morning visiting the different houses and talking with the workers and the 
house owners before we went to the home of the leader of the communal 
bank in order to fill out the necessary paperwork that Gerardo needed for 
bureaucratic purposes in Fundacomunal. On the metro ride back home, 
Gerardo confided that when the housing project was first launched, the 
ladies in the communal bank had tried to do some “creative accounting” 
and that he went down hard on them. He had told the leader of the com-
munal bank that she could not play around with the invoices, “because 
you are the one that will pay for it” (if it gets detected) but that everyone 
recognized that she worked for free, and that, for that reason, she should 
rather cut a deal with the workers to get a share. I asked if that was com-
mon and he answered that, yes, it was, “but I wouldn’t know how.” This 
episode illustrates how gray areas of the law and folk perception of fairness 
to some extent interfered with how corruption was socially evaluated in 
the communal councils.
AmbiVAlent morAlities
As Gledhill notes with regards to higher-level corruption, “popular pro-
test may reflect only antagonism to exclusion and excess, rather than 
objections of principle” (Gledhill 1994:104). Similarly, everyday lower- 
level corruption may be thought of as a blurred boundary between what is 
“fair” and “justified,” and what is “crooked” or “greedy.” In everyday life, 
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Venezuelans are confronted with a range of daily chores which forces them 
to deploy, or not, strategies that go against normative or legal boundaries. 
People may choose to pay a public functionary for “a little help” instead 
of seeing their papers placed at the bottom of the paper stack because they 
know no one “on the inside.” Or for example, it is compulsory to have 
a medical certificate in order to receive a driver’s license. But instead of 
going through the toilsome process of waiting at a doctor’s office for an 
appointment and pay for the routine check, one can easily buy a medical 
certificate from a “sympathetic” doctor. (When I accompanied a friend to 
get her driver’s license, the office of the “sympathetic doctor” was conve-
niently located right next to the office that issued the driver’s license.) It 
is also compulsory to take driving lessons in order to get a driver’s license, 
but one just needs to ask around in order to find someone who can issue a 
license without requiring proof of driving lessons—of course, in exchange 
for a small sum of money.
To a certain extent, corruption holds a spot on the opaque scale of moral 
ambiguities that is between how things are and how they should be. Upon 
closer scrutiny, what people consider as corruption is not clear–cut, and 
what is also not clear is if all forms of corruption that contravene the law 
are considered morally “bad.” Moral categories of what is bad and what is 
acceptable, what constitutes corruption and what doesn’t, are ambivalent 
and context-specific, not only among different people, but also within the 
moral chart of individuals. As Rigi notes in an extensive descriptive analysis 
of the various practices of gift-exchange, bribes, corruption and extortion 
within, and outside, personal relations in Kazakhstan, people often have 
an ambiguous and context-specific perception of these practices and the 
degree to which they, freely or unwillingly, are engaging in them. “While 
the status of blat5 and of small bribes disguised as gifts is ambiguous, large 
bribes and extortions and the Mafia are classified as outright corruption” 
(Rigi 2004:114, cited in Prado 2004).
William, a young man in his 30s working for Fundacomunal, tried to 
explain his idea of the different categories of corruption to me. For him, 
the basic form of corruption was el rebusque—meaning that people, for 
example, stole small things on the workplace and resold it privately, or 
inflated their traveling expenses when they handed them to their employ-
ers. This kind of rebusque wasn’t really corruption in his view, but rather 
a necessary way of making ends meet, in which most people would engage 
without thinking of it as corruption. He argued that “ordinary” low-level 
salaries very rarely covered basic needs and that in one way or the other, 
people had to earn some extra once in a while. In that sense, the rebusque 
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can been seen as filling the void between real salaries and the cost of liv-
ing, which converts the practice into a structurally deficient part of the 
economy reflecting economic inequalities and the conditions of the work-
ing poor. The other corruption category he identified was that of politi-
cians and businesses engaging in corrupt deals—that was, in his opinion, 
“corruption” pure and simple. Here there were no “excuses” other than 
greed. I asked him how he would categorize stealing money within the 
communal councils destined to community projects. This he classified as 
robbery. I asked him if someone would classify this as a rebusque rather 
than stealing, and he said that, no, “they are rats, they are stealing from 
their own people.” In William’s view then, el rebusque was, to some 
extent, acceptable and perceived as an act of need, while corruption was 
“pure robbery”—an act of greed and low morality.
Corruption high And low
The ethnographic focus of this chapter is on the interface between popular 
sector communities and public institutions. However, I want to reiterate 
that these practices should in no way be taken as indication of a culture 
of poverty (Lewis 1966) in the form of social pathologies particular to 
certain social groups. As Zinn (2005) has noted, “those who are in a sub-
altern class position more often bear the stigma of label associated to cor-
ruption; whereas business and political elites can make use of connection 
capital” (Zinn 2005:239). Tales of lower-level corruption should  therefore 
always be seen in relation to the broader political-economic organization, 
whereby the wealthy, through their relationships with political elites as 
well as their positions, assets and networks, are capable of using the ambiv-
alences of legal norms and their class shield against law enforcement to 
amass wealth through dubious means. By that, I do not mean to condone 
corruption at “lower levels”—and as this section has shown, corruption 
within communal councils was by and large morally condemned—but to 
emphasize that an interpretation of social norms and practices in this con-
text has to be intrinsically understood in relation to broader socio- political 
organizations as well as relationships of hierarchies and power.
As Pardo notes “the experience of corruption may be a corollary of 
the reach of the state. It may also be testimony to an internalization of 
its norms and values” (Pardo 2004:10). The state in Venezuela was his-
torically shaped by crude power plays and the amassment of wealth, long 
before the concept of corruption was invented. However, as processes of 
state formation throughout the twentieth century were mirrored in the 
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 imagery of democracy and rule of law, corruption also emerged as a symbol-
laden socio-political concept in public life, gradually bringing out in sharp 
relief the contrast between “democratic ideals” flaunted by the elites and 
their actual practices. It is telling that Carlos Andrés Pérez was ultimately 
removed from power on corruption charges—though it should be added 
that his removal also reflected internal power plays in Acción Democrática 
(Trinkunas 2002) and the need for a scapegoat to take the blame for the 
legitimacy crisis that concerned the political casts at large.
However, Pérez’s public fall evidences that “corruption” has, since long 
ago, been internalized in the public imagery as an “evil” and that it is a per-
vasive phenomenon extremely difficult to root out. I often spoke with com-
munity activists about what could be done to change things at state level, 
and many pointed to the necessity of reforming the ethos and organization 
of public offices from within. “Opportunity makes thief,” one man said, and 
the “informal” state organization of fiefdom, networks of loyalties and gate 
keepers provide ample space for dishonest practices. At the same time, the 
practices of corruption were also explained as the outcome of the continu-
ous power of existing state personnel, engaging in corrupt behavior since 
long back. One man explained this by recounting how SAIME6 (previously 
called DIEX7 and later ONIDEX8), the public office issuing passports and 
identity cards, had been reformed. SAIME used to be a public institution 
that was notorious for corruption, including “selling” fake identity cards 
and routinely charging fees for issuing documents. Moreover, as DIEX, the 
office allegedly had the habit of “forgetting” or simply not bothering to 
issue identity cards to popular sector citizens who were not adeco support-
ers, which meant that those citizens were not allowed to vote.
However, in 2003, as a part of Misión Identidad,9 the institution was 
taken over by the political scientist and lawyer Hugo Cabezas, aided by 
young people from Frente Fransisco de Miranda. After Misión Identidad 
was completed, the institution was reformed and only received online 
applications (avoiding personal contact with public officers). Many of the 
existing personnel, basically adeco supporters, retired. The result, accord-
ing to my interlocutor, was that SAIME was now one of the public insti-
tutions that functioned properly and was known for having low levels of 
corruption.
However, as we have explored previously in this book, most state institu-
tions in the Chávez era were a corollary of new and old personnel, networks 
and organizations, permeated by an ambivalent co-existence of old “state 
practices,” and new ideological visions and political ideals. Moreover, the 
deeply ingrained imagery of the state as a site through which one can amass 
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wealth (“ponme donde hay”) still held sway over how new cohorts of state 
servants exercised their role and the social expectations inscribed into such 
positions. Rosa, whom we got to know in Chap. 3, recounted that she had 
been asked by a neighbor: “Why do you continue to work when you have 
two children working for the government?” Rosa told me this to exemplify 
la mentalidad (the mentality) that circulates among many people. If you 
have children working for the government they are able to pull strings in 
order to provide the things you need. And as government workers they are 
well positioned for getting their hands in the honey jar one way or the other.
However, I suggest that it is a highly fictitious intellectual exercise to 
separate corruption at state level from corruption in other spheres of soci-
ety (be it the business community or any other public or private institution 
or enterprise). Corruption is part of multi-vocal bundles of social practices 
that are thriving upon ambivalent norms and values, socially codified strat-
egies for regulating supply and demand and historical formations of power 
and privileges.
Thus, in essence, we need to understand how templates of corruption 
are historically dense and intimately intertwined with broader processes 
of state formation and social relations, forming part of a broader set of 
discourses and practices embodying and articulating social and political 
moralities. As this chapter has demonstrated, the Bolivarian discourse har-
bored on the one hand, a profound tension between everyday realities of 
social and political life, and on the other, ideals and visions of a different 
moral order that could engender a more just and harmonious society.
* * *
Throughout the past three chapters, I have explored how the Bolivarian 
process under Chávez was characterized by attempts to find a new moral 
terrain from which the Bolivarian process’ political goals could be realized. 
Epitomized by phrase “Che’s New Man,” linkages were made between 
individual behavior, goals and values, and the emergence of a new social 
order at large. What loomed large in these discourses were denouncements 
of individual and collective behavioral traits such as individualism, greed, 
corruption, reckless consumption and dishonesty. However, throughout 
these chapters, I have tried to highlight the broader processes and structures 
underpinning these discourses and social struggles, tracing them back to 
particular forms of post-colonial state formation, social and political dynam-
ics emerging through the development of the oil economy, and local ver-
sions of global discourses of modernity, class identities and development.
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The discussions sustained through these pages show that Venezuela’s 
experience with extractive capitalism engendered very particular political 
practices, social experiences and cultural idioms. In people’s vernacular nar-
ratives, we find that they draw direct linkages between “macro processes” 
and their individual life experiences. “Extractive capitalism” or “neoliber-
alism” was not only theoretical and descriptive concepts, but also deeply 
communal and embodied social experiences codified in  local idioms and 
narratives. In the next and final chapter, I will offer some concluding reflec-
tions on how we may understand and interpret the interlinkages between 
local experiences of popular struggle in the Caracas barrios, Venezuela’s oil-
fuelled development trajectories before and during the Bolivarian process, 
and global structures and processes. We will start with a snapshot of a large 
concentration in the city center of Caracas, the year before Chávez died.
notes
 1. This is the more commonly used short version. The full version is: “Con los 
adecos se vive mejor, porque roban y dejan robar mientras que los copeya-
nos roban pa’ ellos solos” [with the adecos one is better off, they steal and 
let others steal as well, while the copeyanos only steal for themselves].
 2. Temporary projects is the translation of campamiento, which literally means 
camp (like summer camp). However in Venezuela it can also refer to the 
habit of starting short-time project/campaigns, for example a political cam-
paign launched solely for electoral propaganda.
 3. Interview, anonymous member of National Assembly, spring 2011.
 4. The phrase “una nación de cómplices” [a nation of accomplices] was first 
used by the writer Tómas Lander in 1836 in an attempt to describe how all 
the stakeholders at the time engaged in the same destructive and amoral 
dynamics, bleeding the country economically, politically and morally. The 
phrase is often used in the contemporary discourse to underscore that 
“everyone” is corrupted in one way or the other.
 5. Blat is the local term for using personal relations for obtaining goals.
 6. The office has been called Servicio Administrativo de Identificación, 
Migración y Extranjería (SAIME) since 2007.
 7. In 1963 named Dirección de Identificación y Extranjería (DIEX).
 8. In 2004 DIEX was re-named Oficina Nacional de Identificación y Extranjería 
(ONIDEX).
 9. Misión Identidad was a program put in motion by the government in 2003 
after recognizing that large parts of the poor and rural urban population 
didn’t have identity cards. The mission was organized in mobile outreach 
units whereby people from Frente Fransisco de Miranda traveled across the 
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CHAPTER 11
Final Reflections: Understanding 
the “Revolutionary Petro-State”
It was May 1, 2011. I was standing on the bridge connecting the state- 
owned Hotel Alba Caracas (formerly Hilton Caracas) and the apartment 
hotel, Residencias Anauco in Parque Central (Central Park), where many 
of the Cuban collaborators in government missions and international 
political guests were living. The bridge is located on the eastern end of 
Avenida Bolívar, a two-kilometer-long eight-lane motor road connecting 
the southern end of Parque Central with the tunnels leading to Plaza 
O’Leary at the eastern end of El Silencio. Avenida Bolívar was filled with 
people dressed in red as far as the eye could see. Chávez was talking from 
a stage at the far end of the avenue. I didn’t know it yet, but it would be 
the last time I saw him alive.
The march had started earlier that morning in Gato Negro, in Catia—a 
popular neighborhood par excellence. Avenida Sucre, which connects 
Plaza Sucre at the entrance to Caracas from the motorway Caracas-La 
Guaira, and to the city center with the presidential palace, was closed off. 
The Guardia Civil (civil guard) was directing traffic and the crowds that 
were pouring in from all the connecting streets. I had arrived by motor 
bike along with a friend. I wanted to take pictures and needed to be able 
to move quickly in order to find good shots. People had already started 
to march toward Avenida Bolívar and we trawled between the crowds 
alongside the road. Caraqueños are used to motorbikes; they move 
slowly (sometimes not at all) at the sound of a honk without even stop-
ping their conversations. The marchers were carrying posters and banners 
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reading: “Female workers constructing socialism!” “For those who want 
patria, let’s go with Chávez!” “The revolution vindicates the Venezuelan 
working class. Long live the Revolution!” “Mothers from San Juan,” 
“FETRAELEC. Workers’ Control,” “PDVSA oil workers fighting tooth 
and nail. Fatherland, socialism or death, we will win!” Someone had made 
a giant inflatable balloon portraying the globe, featuring a white arm and a 
black arm embracing South America, and the communist insignia  hammer 
and sickle hovering over the North Pole. A man was holding a large hand-
written poster saying: “The revolution is carried in the heart to die for 
her and not in the mouth to live off her.” A group of oil workers with red 
helmets on their heads were playing drums. A giant sound system on the 
back of a truck filled the air with revolutionary jingles, while a group of 
women, dressed in traditional Venezuelan costumes, danced in the middle 
of the march. The air was filled with music, shouting and laughter as the 
 
Photo 11.1 March and public meeting with President Chávez in Avenida 
Bolívar, May 1, 2011. Photo by the author
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crowd moved slowly toward Avenida Bolívar where Chávez a few hours 
later would enter the stage.
* * *
Over the years, I had participated in many mass gatherings just like this 
one. Pre-electoral rallies, post-electoral celebrations, May 1, commemo-
rations of the defeat of the 2002 coup. Giant marches and celebrations 
filling the western city center with men, women and children of all ages, 
dressed in red, carrying posters and banners, dolls or art work. Street ven-
dors selling food and drinks, bottles passing around, and revolutionary 
music blasting out on stages, loudspeakers and giant television screens. 
Often many hours would pass before Chávez actually appeared, but that 
did not matter. People chatted with family and friends, meeting old politi-
cal allies and making new ones. When Chávez finally arrived a giant roar 
would fill the air, and people calmed down to hear him talk. However, 
as his speeches tended to be long, they quickly resumed talking as they 
listened. When his voice reached a crescendo to underline a point, people 
cheered, whistled and shouted comments of support, occasionally break-
ing out in collective chanting of political slogans.
This vignette represents, in many ways, the incarnation of a populist 
rally, the perfect aesthetics of a popular revolution uniting el pueblo and 
the state. Javier Auyero’s much acclaimed monograph Poor People’s Politics. 
Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita (2000) opens with a 
similar epigraph from a Peronist march in Argentina celebrating Perón’s 
birthday. As he argues, the marches only represent a small part of the over-
all “set of material practices and symbolic constructions that constitute 
[Peronisms] organizing principles” (Auyero 2001:207). Auyero succinctly 
illustrates that the political practices and representations of Peronism must 
be understood in the context in which they are lived; as the product and 
everyday re-production of a political idea as much as a  political party 
structure, grounded in structural inequalities, socio-cultural politics of 
difference, social relationships, and real-life needs. Toward the end of his 
account, Auyero makes reference to a reflection made by Wacquant:
The intellectual bias which entices us to construe to world as a spectacle, as 
a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be 
solved practically, is more profound and more distorting that those rooted in 
the social origins and locations of the analysis in the academic field, because 
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it can lead us to miss entirely the differentia spesifica of the logic of practice. 
(Auyero 2001:207, emphasis in original)
The warning against construing the world as a spectacle that this quote 
alludes to is pertinent to our context. The symbolic universe uniting 
the popular sectors and Chávez was indeed often spectacular. Chávez’s 
charismatic qualities accentuated his symbol-laden rhetoric, his allu-
sions to national icons, historical genesis and destined future, and 
his invocations of grand visions that were to be materialized through 
the unity of the state and el pueblo. Symbolic dramaturgy and mate-
rial change were tied together, forming part of what I, in this book, 
have called a Bolivarian space. This space was  a political, ideological 
and social universe uniting the Chávez government and its support-
ers, carved out of the backbone of a dense political narrative portray-
ing the Bolivarian process as the historical moment of vindication for 
Venezuela’s marginalized people. These are the most obvious surface 
expressions of Chávez’s rule, those that could be publicly observed 
and critically dissected, framed through a photogenic political snapshot 
epitomized by crowds dressed in red collectively cheering Chávez’s 
flamboyant speeches.
However, throughout this book, I have sought to go beyond this sur-
face image. My aim has been to gain a deeper understanding not only 
of the historical background and political processes leading to Chávez’s 
rise to power and subsequent enormous popularity among his support-
ers, but more importantly, the social histories, political agencies and lived 
experiences emerging from within the popular sectors that accompanied 
him throughout his rule. As I argued, if we want to gain a proper under-
standing of the form, expressions and evolution of the Bolivarian process 
we need to understand Venezuelan history, both in the past and in the 
present, through the lens of the popular sectors. At the time of Chávez’s 
rise to power, the Venezuelan political and economic system was severely 
exhausted and stripped of legitimacy. Contra-factual history could surely 
have provided a range of different scenarios of what would have hap-
pened if Chávez hadn’t been the person to seize power at such a schis-
matic moment. However, it was Chávez who arrived on the political scene 
at this juncture in Venezuelan history, representing, to paraphrase Victor 
Hugo, an idea whose time had come. This historical convergence would 
not only create paradigmatic shifts in Venezuela, but also leave its mark on 
the Latin American political landscape at large.
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Understanding ideology
Throughout this book, I have sketched out a broad picture of historical 
interpretations and identity politics, ideologies and worldviews as concep-
tualized from the point of view of popular sector activists. Recognizing the 
plasticity of historical interpretations, I have strived to connect these emic 
articulations to broader historical trajectories, processes and structures, 
showing how dominant history and ideology are diverging from those 
emerging from subalternity. Unfamiliar worldviews and ideologies may 
often seem incomprehensible to external observers. However, as Nugent 
notes:
The conditions according to which the organization by people of material 
and social relationships may be formulated differently (re-cognized) over 
time means that [the] concept of ideology articulates a fundamentally his-
torical phenomenon, revealing growing contradictions in social relations. 
(Nugent 1993:36)
Thus, the diverging ideological directions, and indeed worldviews, that 
have polarized the Venezuelan polity since long back, taking new forms 
and meaning after Chávez’s first electoral victory in 1998, need to be 
interpreted within a framework that takes into account how social relation-
ships have been intrinsically formed in relation to material and structural 
configurations of society at large. Different social groups in Venezuela 
base their identity politics, interest regimes and ideological frameworks on 
radically different life paths and lifeworlds. Simultaneously, these different 
features are molded upon a range of shared symbolic and material signi-
fiers. This creates the potential of transcending existing differences, at the 
same time as the social gulf makes it difficult to build comprehension and 
mutual recognition.
FissUres throUgh history
As I have shown throughout this book, the Venezuelan polity has been 
molded by racial- and class-based fissures throughout its entire history 
as a nation, each political epoch giving different form and significance 
to the social imaginaries that these differences engender. The end of the 
oil-smoothed development paradigm in the 1980s, the enactment of neo-
liberal reforms as well as violent government responses to popular pro-
tests shattered the myth of national unity that had prevailed since Acción 
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Democrática consolidated its social hegemony in 1959. As Lander notes, 
the birth of electoral democracy in 1959 had engendered expectations in 
the populace about imminent social development and national progress 
(Lander 2005:33).
A “modern” integrated society appeared possible in a not too distant future. 
A political culture of “national harmony” and its corresponding multiclass 
political party organization achieved hegemony. The self-image of an inclu-
sive, egalitarian, and racially democratic society became dominant. Optimism 
prevailed. The thesis of Venezuelan exceptionalism took firm hold. (Lander 
2005:26)
The Puntofijismo hegemony was underwritten by habitual “everyday” 
violence against the poor, violent persecution of radical opposition, as 
well as skillful containment of organized labor and the peasantry (Ellner 
2008; Ciccariello-Maher 2013). On the surface, social harmony prevailed. 
However, toward the end of the 1970s, this myth started to crack. Poverty 
and inequalities increased drastically. Historical divisions, and more recent 
forms of social exclusions that political dominant discourse and imag-
eries had glossed over, started to surface (Lander 2005:26). As Lander 
states: “An increasingly divided society took shape in Venezuela” (Lander 
2005:26), accompanied by an increasing sense of insecurity. The wealthier 
classes started to build fences and place bars around their living spaces, 
and the poor started to increasingly become portrayed as “the dangerous 
classes” in the media (Lander 2005:27), featuring racist overtones that 
had never been previously uttered in public. Society seemed to fall apart 
from within:
These processes of exclusion, segregation, and fragmentation led to socio- 
economic decay—especially in the cities—and to the decomposition of the 
traditional mechanisms and forms of socialization, particularly the family, 
school and work. (Lander 2005:27)
Meanwhile, the political classes were increasingly becoming stripped of 
legitimacy. Not only were they caught up in a range of political scandals 
and endemic corruption, but the enactment of neoliberal reforms was also 
by many viewed as a betrayal of national interests and of the very popu-
lace. El Caracazo in 1989 dealt the final blow to the imagery of national 
harmony. Not only had racial- and class-based tensions become a public 
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truth, but the state’s readiness to maintain its control through the use of 
force made it clear that the popular sectors were collectively viewed as 
antagonistic to the Venezuelan polity. When Chávez led the attempt to 
topple Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1992, the coup was widely perceived by the 
popular classes and beyond as a legitimate means to dispose of a political 
system and ruling class that had exhausted its legitimacy.
As I have suggested throughout this book, it is paramount to under-
stand this prolonged socio-political drama not only as the origin of the 
profound polarization and social antagonisms in Venezuelan society, but 
also as constitutive of the ways in which the Bolivarian process gradually 
became cast as a political crusade aimed at restoring national dignity and 
sovereignty through founding a new moral, social and political order. 
Significantly, the popular classes, who not only had borne the main bur-
den of the socio-economic crisis but had also been cast as the nation’s 
“others,” became within the Bolivarian process cast as el pueblo soberano, 
a synthesis of the refounding of the nation and the redemption of its 
people.
As Lander (2005) notes, this discourse was radically and divergently 
interpreted by different social groups. For the upper and middle classes, as 
well as for many of the country’s intellectuals, who were oriented toward 
“consumption patterns, value orientations, and enjoyment of the ‘modern’ 
global good life” (Lander 2005:33), this discourse was alienating. Indeed, 
the Bolivarian political orientation—away from Westernized imageries of 
modernity, Western political alliances as well as its allusions to national-
ism—was interpreted as “an anachronism in a globalizing world, a return 
to unfeasible and historically Third World postures” (Lander 2005:33). 
For the poor however, the reorientation toward traditional and popu-
lar Venezuela, the reinterpretation of the nation’s founding myth, and a 
pledge of solidarity to other Third World countries and oppressed peoples 
became a pathway into a process of “cultural decolonialization” (Lander 
2005:34). At the same time, it became an ideological and social platform 
for their political integration into the state and nation body.
VenezUela’s rise and Fall
It is vital to comprehend this socio-political genealogy not as a process 
confined to national dynamics alone, but rather as constitutive of broader 
processes of post-colonial state formations and configurations of global 
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capitalism in the twentieth century. The formation of the Venezuelan 
state and political economy was essentially a product of its position as 
a resource-exporting country (Coronil 1997; Karl 1997). Indeed, the 
Venezuelan state came into being as an entity, real and imagined, through 
this very process:
It was only when it was transformed into a mediator between the nation 
and foreign oil companies that the state acquired the capacity and finan-
cial resources that enabled it to appear as an independent agent capable of 
imposing its domination over society. (Coronil 1997:4)
Yet, this process was more than a question of political state-making. 
Through the nation’s entanglement into the global production of cen-
ter–periphery relations, Venezuela became a site of convergence for locally 
appropriated ideas of modernity and progress molded upon Western 
notions of universal progress. As Coronil (1997) notes: 
I have tried to keep in mind that the process of state formation in Venezuela 
is part of a global project of modernity that claims for itself a singular uni-
versality, rationality, and morality that depends in the subordination, exclu-
sion or destruction of alternative forms of sociality, rationality, and values. 
(Coronil 1997:17)
This perspective is important to capture in order to appreciate the deeper 
script behind the rise and fall of the Venezuelan dream for the future in 
the latter part of the twentieth century—and indeed the imagery of the 
Venezuelan nation-state. As for Zambia’s copper belt, succinctly ana-
lyzed by Ferguson (1999), the rise to modernity and progress for the 
nation and its people alike seemed to be so close during the heydays of 
developmentalist optimism in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, this bubble of 
optimism was founded on structural fragility and illusions of national 
independence. Venezuela’s attempt to make a “great leap” into First 
World modernity through industrial development and modernization 
projects were based on mortgaging the nation’s oil rents to Western 
powers in return for loans. As Escobar (1995) has shown, these pro-
cesses of economic restructuring and loan agreements were part of a 
broader ideological global process of “a total restructuring of ‘under-
developed’ countries” (Escobar 1995:4). In terms of real politik, this 
shift was spurred by a “need to expand and deepen the market of U.S. 
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products abroad, as well as the need to find new sites for the invest-
ment of U.S. surplus capital” (Escobar 1995:32). When this bubble 
burst, Venezuela’s peripheral and subordinate status became evident. 
From then on, the indebted nation was subordinate to the dictums of 
Western capital interest and development ideologies, mediated through 
the IMF. It is a paradox of almost epic proportions:
Ironically, a state that was constituted as a national state through its control 
over petroleum was undone when it used the nation’s subsoil to underwrite 
loans to finance a project of industrial development designed to end the 
nation’s dependence on petroleum. (Coronil 1997:392)
The fall from grace was twofold: not only was the Venezuelan state 
stripped of its grandeur and illusions of sovereignty in the attempt—how-
ever truncated, jagged and inadequately executed—to try to free itself 
from the grip of oil and to better integrate into the world economy, but 
this downfall also perpetuated the country’s subordination to the point 
that, in spite of possessing great riches, the space for domestic economic 
and political maneuvering became even smaller. Over time, Venezuela 
became a hostage of its own riches, trapped in a global web of exploitative 
and unequal power relations.
the deVil’s excrement
Oil has always been conceived of as Venezuela’s Achilles’ heel, her nemesis. 
“We are drowning in the Devil’s Excrements.” The words were uttered by 
Juan Peréz Alfonzo, the Venezuelan lawyer, diplomat and politician, min-
ister for mines and hydrocarbons during Betancourt’s second government 
(1959–1964), and one of the founders of OPEC. His words have been 
repeated over and over again ever since. In 2011, the Venezuelan Central 
Bank (BCV) reprinted a new edition of Alfonzo’s book, first published 
in 1976, with the same title. Arturo Uslar Pietri, who was the first one 
to coin the phrase “sow the oil,” predicted, since early on, that oil would 
change and determine everything in Venezuela, leading the country astray 
on the path of doom:
“Petroleum is the fundamental and basic fact of the Venezuelan destiny. It 
presents to Venezuela today the most serious national problems that the 
nation has known in its history. It is like the minotaur of ancient myths, in 
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the depths of its labyrinth, ravenous and threatening. “The vital historical 
theme for today’s Venezuela can be no other than the productive com-
bat with the minotaur of petroleum. “Everything else loses significance. 
Whether the Republic is centralist or federalist. Whether the voters vote 
white that is, AD] or any other color. Whether they build aqueducts or not. 
Whether the University is open or not. Whether immigrants come or don’t 
come. Whether schools are built or not built. Whether workers earn five 
bolívares or fifteen bolívares. All those issues lack meaning. “Because they 
are all conditioned, determined, created by petroleum.They are all depen-
dent and transitory. Dependent and transitory. “Petroleum and nothing 
else is the theme of Venezuela’s contemporary history. (Uslar Pietri 1972, 
cited in Ewell 1984:61)
In Betancourt’s speech to congress in 1975, as he was presenting 
the draft for the new Petroleum Law, he opened with the words from 
E.H.  Davenport and S.R.  Cooke’s 1923 book The Oil Trusts and the 
Anglo-American Relations: “It is a much disseminated opinion that oil 
awakes the worst passions, awakes a more devouring greed in the men of 
business than the passion of Gold, and incites the men of the State to fol-
low Maquiavellian plans”1 (Betancourt 1975:10, author’s translation from 
Spanish). When Carlos Andrés Pérez resigned from his second term, he 
stated that “I raised the hopes of our people and built confidence on our 
country, but there was too much that I could not do, that I, with all the 
oil money, could not change” (Karl 1997:72).
It is not only in Venezuela that oil has been imbued with powers of 
destruction of the minds of men and obstruction of the paths of politics. 
Oil wealth is surrounded by a distinct mythos (Watts 1999:2); it is an 
enigma just as much as a material substance. Consider Watts’s (1999) 
descriptions of one of the inherent characteristic of oil, which he terms 
Petro-Fetishism/Petro-Magic (the El Dorado effect). By this, he means 
“oil as a world of illusions. People become wealthy without effort; fabu-
lous wealth and fiscal madness […]. The ephemerality of money—boom 
to bust, here today gone tomorrow; wealth which scorches the fingers, 
signifies the loss of the soul” (Watts 1999:7–8). Oil is associated with 
criminality, violence, corruption, the crude exercise of power and the 
destruction of people, nations and nature alike (Watts 1999). “Graft and 
thuggishness are its defining characteristics. And it is to be expected then 
that in an age of unprecedented denationalization and market liberaliza-
tion, the mad scramble to locate the next petrolic El Dorado continues 
unabated” (Watts 1999:1).
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the heterogeneity oF resoUrce Wealth
The combined political and emotive volatility associated with oil is accen-
tuated in the symbol-laden scholarly concept of the “resource curse,” 
associated with a historical determination and an inescapable faith, while 
also being steeped in economistic, macro-oriented and technocratic evalu-
ations of resource management or lack thereof. The theory of the resource 
curse, which started gaining prominence in the 1980s (Rosser 2006:557), 
postulates that an abundance of natural resources, rather than promoting 
social development and economic growth, engenders a host of political 
and social problems in developing countries. High levels of poverty, civil 
war, thwarted economic growth, authoritarian rule and high levels of con-
flict are all characteristics that have been linked to resource wealth (Rosser 
2006). However, anthropologists have repeatedly criticized this concept, 
arguing for the need to seek more subtle and nuanced understanding 
of social and political processes emerging from resource extraction (see 
Watts 1999, 2004; Sawyer 2004; Coronil 1997; Mitchell 2011; Logan 
and McNeish 2012).
In line with this view, I have in this book sought for ethnographically 
based understandings of the socio-cultural processes and political dynam-
ics that resource wealth engenders. This exploration has been structured 
around three parallel, but interrelated, lines of inquiry. First, an inquiry 
into the lives of the popular sectors in the shadows of the nation’s oil wealth, 
cut off both from its material benefits and from the symbols of progress 
that it engendered. By drawing on collective memories and political nar-
ratives from the era of Puntofijismo, I teased out a broad imagery of the 
escalation of rage and grievances stemming from this symbolic-material 
deprivation, showing how the underbelly of the Magical State was con-
cretely experienced as suffering, violence and deprivation. Simultaneously, 
I showed how these experiences engendered a massification of protest 
from within the popular sectors, paving the way for Chávez’s electoral 
 victory in 1998. Within the Bolivarian discourse, the narrative of social 
exclusion and marginalization engendered an ideological ethos of the 
state’s duty to repay its social debts to the poor through the redistribution 
of the nation’s wealth. These promises were materialized through a range 
of political reforms and social programs directed to the poor, interlinked 
with broader ideological notion of popular power and el pueblo soberano. 
Concurrently, policies for political participation as well as other arenas for 
social mobilization became platforms for a reconfiguration of the rela-
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tionship between the popular sectors and the state. Through inquiring 
into these platforms, I have sought a broader understanding of how the 
cultural-political emancipation of the formerly marginalized sectors of the 
population was connected to their claims to finally take part in the nation’s 
oil wealth.
However, as I have shown, the leap from this political ethos into 
political realities was fraught with conflicts and tensions. In that pro-
cess, the state became cast as a battlefield between the old, antagonistic 
state, to borrow Derham’s (2010) apt formulation, and the vision of 
a new Bolivarian state capable of converting the ethos of social justice 
and political participation into reality. The Chávez government inher-
ited a massive state bureaucracy and a state culture that continued to 
reproduce itself through ingrained social and political practices under 
the tutelage of a reform-bent government. This illustrates the difficul-
ties of fomenting institutional change at the level of the state, as well 
as the theoretical fragility of posing a dichotomist divide between “the 
state” and society at large. The role of the state apparatus as both an 
instigator and an impediment for political change under the Chávez 
government must be understood not only as a series of institutional 
practices and dynamics, but also as the “stickiness” of imageries of the 
state as a site of power and privileges which through its day-to-day 
procedures and practices reproduced exclusionary mechanisms vis-à-vis 
the popular sectors.
At the same time, I have shown how the political ethos of popular power 
within the Bolivarian space, as well as the concrete policies and reforms 
accompanying it, opened up what I called a hybrid space of politics from 
above and politics from below. By drawing on the symbolic repertoire 
within the Bolivarian discourse and seizing the political opportunity win-
dows emanating from the government, the popular sectors found leverage 
for including popular agencies, modes of organization and cultural poli-
tics into the languages of the state (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2001). 
These processes were part and parcel of everyday politics in the interface 
between the popular and the state. Meetings between state bureaucrats, 
public functionaries, political figures and community activists were consti-
tuted as politically charged arenas where the resilience of state power and 
historical exclusionary practices were tested and challenged. Importantly, 
these processes did not reflect a schismatic divide between the inside and 
the outside of the state. Rather, different interests, ideologies, received 
11 FINAL REFLECTIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE “REVOLUTIONARY...
 321
wisdoms and personal ambitions were converging both within and out-
side the state apparatus, reflecting the real-life messiness of a society in the 
midst of a process of transformation, as well as the uncertain outcomes of 
these processes.
Finally, I turned to the historical legacy and the spectacles of oil in 
different socio-cultural imaginaries, converging in the narratives of the 
immoralities and destructiveness of Venezuelans’ historical experience 
with extractive capitalism. I showed how the Bolivarian space harbored 
a profoundly moral discourse about the necessity of refounding a social 
and moral order that was lost to greed, immoral consumption, corrup-
tion and social fragmentation, and how these social “vices” were attrib-
uted to the ways in which oil wealth was (unequally) distributed and 
consummated within the socio-political body. Moral personhood and 
political integrity had been undermined by the triumph of hedonistic 
rent-seeking, exacerbated by the ways in which Western templates of 
modernity had become locally absorbed as the conspicuous display of 
money. These discourses of moralities also played into political polariza-
tion at large. Through their support for, and association with, modernity 
“US style” and the global capitalist system undercutting it, the opposi-
tion and their supporters were cast as the “bearers” of this cultural heri-
tage. In turn, these value systems were cast as the anti-thesis to the form 
of national identity, social transformation and cultural reappreciation 
of autochthonous socialities and traditions that the Bolivarian process 
sought to engender.
At the same time, struggles to create a new moral order were ham-
pered from within the popular social body itself. Individualized dreams 
of consumption, sectarian and personal ambitions and desires for wealth 
were constantly present in the day-to-day processes of founding a new 
collective social order revolving around collective consumption at the 
grassroots level. I have suggested that these tensions reflect the inherent 
difficulties of fomenting social and political change, and the inherent con-
tradictions of the Bolivarian process itself. Different ideological templates, 
social practices and political imaginaries were converging in a multitude 
of sites throughout society, expressed through symbolic as well as  material 
practices in everyday life. This reflects not only the enduring legacy of oil 
(Tinker Salas 2009). Fundamentally, it also reflects of Venezuela’s embed-
dedness in global economies of capital as well as global economies of 
desires and wants.
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a diFFerent cUrse?
The formation of a Venezuelan oil economy produced a distinct process 
of class formation; “the middle class grew proportionally larger than the 
working class: an inverted class pyramid propped up on petro-dollars” 
(Karl 1997:82–83). This would later determine the political priorities of 
subsequent governments (toward favoring middle-class and elite inter-
ests), the dominant socio-cultural norms and values reflected in “official” 
society, the untenable growth of the state bureaucracy and the relative lim-
ited political attempts to cater to the popular classes. These socio-political 
patterns proved successful, on the surface at least, until the crisis hit the 
country in the beginning of the 1980s.
As Coronil has emphasized, a fundamental breach in Venezuelan political 
trajectories occurred with the liberalization of markets and the rise of finan-
cial speculative capitalism in the 1980s (Logan and McNeish 2012:17). This 
form of economic restructuring took place in many countries in the Global 
South at the time. However, the particular ways in which it occurred and 
the ways in which it was socially interpreted in Venezuela were essentially 
molded by the country’s oil wealth. Not only was the domestic produc-
tive economy already gravely underdeveloped (see Karl 1997), exacerbating 
inclinations to speculation and rent-seeking that had already existed within 
the political economy for a long time. But the symbolic interpretations 
attributed to money, wealth and national patrimony produced a new politi-
cal imaginary of deep fissures between the socio-political national body and 
the natural body of oil harbored in its soil. In other words, Venezuelans had 
always known that they were rich. Even the poor had a vague sense of this 
albeit they perceived oil as something out of their reach. However, a close 
reading of history and social imaginaries connected to this epoch indicates 
that the fundamental crisis occurred because, on the one hand, the country 
was told that it was broke and that “people” had to tighten their belt even 
more, and on the other, massive amounts of capital were circulating among 
those who were positioned to grab their loot.
These intertwined processes created a sense of fundamental rupture 
between the nation’s wealth, the political system and its representatives, and 
the people. The political leaders were perceived as pillagers, devoid of national 
sentiments or social responsibility toward their people. As Coronil writes:
Since the traditional elite was implicated in the financial crisis, the [previous 
distinction between reputable businessmen and unprincipled speculators] 
became untenable. As a depositor in the Metropolitan Bank who lost his 
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savings stated bitterly about the trust he had placed in the bank’s board of 
directors: “They were members of the country’s business aristocracy. They 
were the best names. Honest people, people with blue blood.” But now he 
regarded them as people who “don’t have a country.” As he puts it: their 
country is money. (Coronil 1997:382)
This quote is extremely powerful because it alludes to a profound sense of 
deceit. The symbolic bond between the guardians of wealth and its legiti-
mate beneficiaries was ripped apart, only later to appear in Bolivarian dis-
course as a narrative of betrayal against both the nation and its populace.
As Gledhill notes, “a popular imaginary of the potential link between 
national resource sovereignty and social justice has had powerful historical 
effects” (Gledhill 2008:57). The fact that this trope is increasingly at the 
center of (often violent) negotiations between states and their citizens, 
indicates that there is a profoundly diverging perception between how oil 
has been managed, structured and conceptualized through global energy 
markets and domestic political systems, and the ways in which “the peo-
ple” vest natural resources with a whole range of socio-cultural properties 
linking together citizenship, state governance, nationhood, belonging and 
justice. In essence, natural resources are embedded in a much broader 
economy of values, subjected to strong emotive reactions and association, 
including grievances and rage. The contemporary global economic para-
digm of high-noon capitalism and accelerated resource extraction does to 
a very little extent allow these different scales of values into its epistemo-
logical frameworks of reference. This is also why the Bolivarian process 
as well as the so-called Pink Tide harbored a profound contestation of 
the intertwined doxa of resource wealth, liberal democracy and market 
economy.
Venezuela was in many ways the first country to challenge the hege-
mony of “there is no alternative” at the level of the state at the turn of the 
century. I have often wondered why this was the case and whether it was 
just a historical coincidence or something particular to Venezuela propel-
ling the process of political rupture and change of horizons. Empirically, 
there might not be a good answer to this question. But on a more philo-
sophical level, I ponder over whether this occurred because Venezuela, 
more than most other countries, believed so hard it was on the fast-track 
toward a bright future. Being the best, brightest and most exceptional 
“pupil” in the Latin American liberal democratic class, the country was 
praised by foreign leaders, intellectuals, academics and journalists as the 
exception to the rule of Third World unruliness. Blessed by providence, 
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Venezuela possessed enormous resources that would guarantee devel-
opment, prosperity and modernity. When its fall from grace eventually 
happened, it came hard. And the poor, who had never benefited from 
the virtues neither of the country’s democratic system nor abundance of 
wealth, realized that it was very unlikely that they ever would. They were 
tired of being regarded as collateral damage in a system that both alienated 
and impoverished them. As Derham (2010) notes about Venezuela as well 
as other countries steeped in similar conflicts:
After a century or more of experiments with “democracy” and politicians 
… the conditions in which the majority has to live are simply unacceptable 
… why should they be expected to waste yet another twenty years of their 
life, waiting for the consolidation of a system that has never worked before? 
(Derham 2010:278)
It is with this background and with the twist and turns in history that 
followed that Chávez gained power, and the Bolivarian process gradually 
took shape, in parallel with the nascent leftist and subaltern political cur-
rent elsewhere at the continent.
changing the QUestion
Centuries ago, Rousseau wrote: “Do you want the state to be solid? Then 
make the wealth spread as small as you can; don’t allow rich men or beg-
gars” (Rousseau 2010 [1762]).2 I suggest that if there is one central issue 
that can be learned from Venezuelan history of the past 50 years, it is that 
the country’s trajectories confirm the insight offered by Rousseau. The 
countries that are often referred to as exceptions to the rule of the so-called 
resource curse, Canada and Norway, are also the countries that enjoy some 
of the lowest inequality levels in the world and highest indices of human 
development. Of course, the reasons for this are as complex as the reasons 
for why other oil-rich countries have struggled. Fundamentally, these are 
countries located in the Global North, subjecting them to entirely dif-
ferent development processes, demographic formations, socio-political 
dynamics and modes of integration into the global (political) economy 
than those characterizing post-colonial countries.
However, perhaps there is still a deeper lesson to be learned if we man-
age to reconceptualize the resource curse: that is, not as a matter of wealth, 
but fundamentally as a matter of unequal distribution of wealth. Posing 
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the analytical challenge that way we are better equipped to ask new ques-
tions and find new answers. The resource curse thesis is often presented as 
if there were an inherent quality in resource wealth that generated poverty 
and social inequalities. However, as the first author to associate Venezuela 
with the term “petro-state” also makes clear in her book: “The question 
is not whether oil is a blessing or a curse, but rather what specific type of 
political and economic development trajectory it encourages and whom it 
benefits” (Karl 1997:235).
As this book has sought to illuminate, inequality in Venezuela is the 
result of complex dynamics between historical, structural and geo-political 
trajectories, as well as political priorities and configurations of power and 
dominance. As Chávez’s time in power showed, this legacy can also be 
contested and poverty can be significantly reduced over a relatively short 
period of time. It is thus paramount to recognize that resource wealth does 
engender great possibilities in reducing poverty—depending on whether 
there is political will to exploit or create structural opportunity windows.
Nonetheless, as this empirical inquiry into the everyday realities of the 
Chávez government’s political reforms has suggested, poverty reduction is 
not at all only a matter of technocratic decision-making processes and policy 
designs. Rather, it is also interwoven in broader economic, social, cultural, 
political and institutional dynamics and processes, making it paramount 
to capture the complexities at play and the frequent un- predictability of 
its outcomes. As the Venezuelan example clearly shows, efforts to reverse 
decades or centuries of structural inequalities and entrenched poverty are 
part of a highly complex and messy “broader whole,” playing not only 
into political struggles over resources, power and control at large, but 
also intersecting with culturally contingent political practices and social 
imaginaries.
Moreover, we need to recognize that “domestic” relations of poverty 
and opulence, wealth and wants, power and subordination are molded 
through global processes, responding to global schisms between the win-
ners and losers of the contemporary global political-economic model and 
the social imaginaries accompanying it. As Coronil notes:
While the international elite moves easily between even more insecure 
domestic enclaves of privilege and the metropolitan centers, the majority 
is restricted to an increasingly impoverished social environment palpably 
marked by abandonment and neglect […]. The tragedy of modernity is that 
its promise of universal progress cannot be fulfilled in the terms in which it 
has been cast. (Coronil 1997:385)
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As the example from Venezuela and other countries caught up in strug-
gles over natural resources illustrate, the tangible yet ephemeral qualities 
of oil make it a “perfect screen” for projecting this “tragedy of modernity” 
and the structural divisions undercutting it. However, I will reiterate that 
these structural divisions are not natural, but man-made. Moreover, they 
are not only political in a narrow sense, but essentially ideological and 
epistemological.
We therefore have to bring the question of resource wealth together 
with broader questions about how the hegemonic power inherent to the 
political economy of capital can be replaced or supplemented with a broader 
economy of values. Essentially this implies, as was indicated by Escobar 
(2010), a quest to carve out a vision of alternative modernities or futures 
which are not founded upon the myth of limitless economic growth; a 
myth that in its core relies on the myth of limitless extraction of natural 
resources. If we accept this postulate, it follows that redefining modernity 
and redefining the production, management and distribution of oil intrin-
sically constitute two sides of the same coin. As Coronil succinctly states:
Oil has helped mold a highly stratified and ecologically unsound world 
shaped in the image of disconnected peoples and things that have in com-
mon their separation from each other and from the history that engendered 
them. If modernity is a process characterized by the incessant, obsessive 
and irreversible transformation of a world splintered into distinct entities, 
then the effects of an oil production and consumption reflects the spirit of 
modernity. (Coronil 1997:18)
These insights brings into sharp relief that the challenges that Venezuela 
has faced and is still facing are not confined to the country alone. Rather, 
in essence, it is a challenge with global scope, reaching into the essence of 
how we have organized, molded and imagined our common world for the 
better part of the last century.
Final aFterthoUghts
The Venezuela that is explored in this book is very different from the 
Venezuela of today as I write these words in February 2017. Chávez is 
dead, the Maduro government has record-low support, the opposition 
has increased its electoral strength, the political conflict has hardened, the 
country’s institutional weaknesses have become even more evident, oil 
prices have fallen drastically, the economy is in shambles, poverty levels 
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have increased, social indicators have radically worsened, and many grass-
roots activists have become de-mobilized. In short, Venezuela is a country 
in deep crisis. The international context is also different. The so-called 
Pink Tide is by most accounts and measures officially over. In its place, 
many predict the pendulum with swing toward a right-wing neoliberal 
model once more, as is already happening in Argentina and Brazil. I have 
deliberately not made references to the current situation throughout my 
analysis of the Chávez years in this book, because I wanted to focus on 
the ethnographic present as it unfolded at the time. However, I believe 
that the developments in Venezuela after Chávez’s death highlight the 
importance of an analytical focus emphasizing historical continuity and 
ruptures as I have pursued in this book. In many ways, the thin red lines 
through Venezuelan history are put into even sharper relief in the cur-
rent moment. The country’s vulnerability in the face of global oil mar-
kets and geo-politics, its reliance on oil and imports, the political costs 
of the historical legacy of playing the political field as a zero-sum game, 
the continuous absence of a social contract between the nation’s different 
classes, the continuous weak institutionalizing capacity of the Venezuelan 
state, the continuous politization of public institutions: as Buxton rightly 
notes, there were a lot of historical continuities that gave cause for concern 
already during the Chávez years (Buxton 2011:xx–xxi). Seen together, 
this legacy, in combination with Chávez’s death, the political turbulence 
that followed, the global fall in oil prices and its effects upon the domestic 
economy, fostered in many ways a perfect storm for which the outcome 
is yet to be seen. The challenges now facing scholars of Venezuela is to 
inquire into exactly how these historical and contemporary processes were 
intertwined and playing out, as well as examining how the Bolivarian pro-
cess has engendered new social, cultural and political legacies that will 
shape the country’s future development trajectories.
Because of the current crisis, it is tempting to dismiss the political pro-
cesses in Venezuela in the Chávez epoch as merely “old wine in a new 
bottle,” as another resource-cursed economic cycle, or as yet another left-
ist utopia turned sour. However, if we do so, we are not only commit-
ting an academic fallacy in failing to take into account the fine-grained 
dynamics between historical and time-specific social, economic, political 
and cultural processes in the course of the Bolivarian process. We are also 
missing an opportunity to learn something about political struggle and 
social change more broadly.
As Geertz noted: “Social change will not be hurried and it will not 
be tamed” (Geertz 2004:578). And if there is one thing that is truly 
 FINAL AFTERTHOUGHTS
328 
global at this moment, it is that control over resources, power and poli-
tics are increasingly being fought over on a multitude of arenas. In large 
parts of Europe, young people are now faced with the prospect of being 
worse off throughout their life time than their parents. The promise of 
an ever-brighter future—of a fast-track to a prosperous, developed high- 
modernity—is increasingly fading even in its place of origin. Faced with an 
aggravated loss of control over their lives and livelihoods and an increas-
ing closure of spaces for de facto democratic influence, people are taking 
to the street with a combination of anger, resignation and desperation. 
Only time will tell how these processes will evolve, and toward what that 
anger, resignation and desperation will be directed. But for that exact rea-
son we should pay close attention to Venezuela. Throughout the past 
decades they have faced a democratic and economic breakdown spurred 
by the volatility and supremacy inherent in global capitalist logic and the 
monopolization of power and resources at both international and national 
level. Popular rage and protest was followed by the election of Chávez, 
to a displacement of hegemonic power, aggravated political polarization, 
and the search of an alternative political horizon and model. This, in the 
end, did neither prove sustainable nor tenable, and now, as indicated, after 
Chávez’s death Venezuela has entered into yet another époque whose 
future trajectory and outcome are yet to be seen.
Venezuela’s social and political trajectories are particular to their con-
text and history, but these processes tell us something about how global, 
national and local processes are intimately intertwined and ultimately 
inseparable. Anthropologists’ focus on the local, “the human condition, 
down here on earth” (Lambek 2011:199) is an important and indispens-
able corrective to the grand political and economic narratives that remove 
people’s real lives, struggles and hardships from the equation. Our task 
is to tell the stories about how people, everywhere and all the time, are 
struggling and trying to shape their own life histories, though often not 
in conditions of their own choosing, to paraphrase Marx. This book has 
told such a story, and innumerable similar stories are unfolding in this very 
moment, right in front of our eyes.
 notes
 1. This is my translation from Spanish as I was unable to get a hold of the 
English original. In Spanish the quote reads: “Es una opinión muy difun-
dida que el petroleo despierta las peores pasiones, hace nacer en los hombres 
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de negocio una avidez más devoradora que la pasión de Oro e incita a los 
hombres de Estado a seguir designios maquiavélicos” (Betancourt 1975:10).
 2. Social Contract, book 2, ch. 11, footnote 16.
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